People v. Hill

NO. 4-09-0765 Opinion Filed 5/11/11
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Macon County
DEMETRIUS G. HILL, ) No. 07CF1546
Defendant-Appellant. )
) Honorable
) Timothy J. Steadman,
) Judge Presiding.
________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE TURNER delivered the judgment of the court,
with opinion.
Justices Pope and McCullough concurred in the judgment
and opinion.
OPINION
In July 2008, a jury found defendant, Demetrius G.
Hill, guilty of aggravated battery. In August 2008, the trial
court sentenced him to nine years in prison.
On appeal, defendant argues (1) the State failed to
prove him guilty of aggravated battery, (2) the trial court erred
in instructing the jury, and (3) he is entitled to additional
sentence credit. We affirm and remand for further proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
In October 2007, the State charged defendant by infor-
mation with one count of aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-
4(b)(8) (West 2006)), alleging that, while committing a battery,
he knowingly caused bodily harm to Willie Ford, who was in the
Macon County jail, a public property, when he struck and bit
Ford. Defendant waived his right to counsel.
In May 2008, defendant filed a pro se motion to dismiss
the aggravated-battery charge, arguing the offense did not occur
on public property. The State countered by arguing the county
jail constitutes public property as it is publicly funded. The
trial court denied the motion.
In July 2008, defendant's jury trial commenced. Joshua
Wilson, a correctional officer with the Macon County sheriff's
department, testified the jail consists of three pods, individual
housing units, in each of the six trods, the main housing area.
Each pod contains 12 to 14 cells. On October 19, 2007, defendant
and Willie Ford were located in pod B. Wilson observed Ford at
the dayroom table when defendant attacked him. After Ford pushed
defendant up against a window, defendant bit Ford on the neck.
Willie Ford testified he was sitting at a table in the
dayroom when he saw defendant walking toward him. Defendant
"took a swing" at him but missed. The two then wrestled on the
floor. After getting to his feet, Ford grabbed defendant by the
throat. As he held defendant up against the window, defendant
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bit him in the jaw.
Jennifer Mahannah, a registered nurse, testified she
works part-time at the Macon County jail. On October 19, 2007,
Mahannah was called to examine Willie Ford, an inmate who had a
bite mark on his neck. Ford told her he had been bitten by
defendant.
The trial court took judicial notice the Macon County
correctional center is public property. The court allowed
defendant to argue to the jury the jail pod was not public
property because no public access to the area was permitted.
Ernest Brooms, an inmate at the time of the occurrence,
testified for the defense and stated he saw defendant bite Ford
on the chin. Another inmate, Deangelo Cook testified he saw
defendant bite Ford.
Following closing arguments, the jury found defendant
guilty of aggravated battery. In July 2008, defendant filed a
pro se motion for a new trial. Later that month, defendant
retained counsel, who adopted the motion. In August 2008, the
trial court denied the motion and sentenced defendant to nine
years in prison.
In September 2008, defense counsel filed a motion to
reconsider the sentence. Because defense counsel had legal and
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mental-health issues that arose, the cause was not called for
hearing for approximately 10 months. Defendant elected to
proceed pro se, and the trial court allowed him to file a new
motion for a new trial given his counsel's troubles. In October
2009, the court denied the motions. This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Aggravated Battery
Defendant argues the State failed to prove him guilty
of aggravated battery because a jail pod is not public property
within the meaning of the statute. We disagree.
Pursuant to section 12-3(a) of the Criminal Code of
1961 (720 ILCS 5/12-3(a) (West 2006)), "[a] person commits
battery if he intentionally or knowingly without legal justifi-
cation and by any means, (1) causes bodily harm to an individual
or (2) makes physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature
with an individual." A simple battery may be elevated to an
aggravated battery when committed under one or more circum-
stances. For example, a person committing a battery may be found
guilty of aggravated battery if he "or the person battered is, on
or about a public way, public property or public place of accom-
modation or amusement." 720 ILCS 5/12-4(b)(8) (West 2006).
In this case, the State charged defendant with aggra-
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vated battery, alleging he committed a battery against Ford while
inside the Macon County jail, a public property. Defendant
argues government ownership does not make a location "public
property." Instead, defendant claims the property must be open
for access to the public. If the members of the general public
are not allowed admittance to the jail's housing units, defendant
argues he cannot be found guilty of aggravated battery based on a
battery occurring on public property.
"The primary goal in construing a statute is to deter-
mine and effectuate the intent of the legislature. The most
reliable means of accomplishing that goal is to apply the plain
and ordinary meaning of the statutory language." People v.
Amigon, 239 Ill. 2d 71, 84-85, 940 N.E.2d 63, 71 (2010). "Where
a term is not defined, 'we must assume that the legislature
intended the term to have its ordinary and popularly understood
meaning.'" People v. Beachem, 229 Ill. 2d 237, 244, 890 N.E.2d
515, 520 (2008) (quoting People v. Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d 336,
349, 747 N.E.2d 339, 347 (2001)). The ordinary and popularly
understood meaning of a word may be determined by utilizing the
dictionary definition. Beachem, 229 Ill. 2d at 244-45, 890
N.E.2d at 520. Courts, however, "may not depart from the stat-
ute's plain language by reading in exceptions, limitations, or
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conditions that conflict with the legislature's intent." Amigon,
239 Ill. 2d at 85, 940 N.E.2d at 71. As the issue of statutory
interpretation is one of law, our review is de novo. Amigon, 239
Ill. 2d at 84, 940 N.E.2d at 71.
The aggravated-battery statute does not define "public
property." "Property" has been defined as "something owned or
possessed; *** a piece of real estate." Merriam-Webster's
Collegiate Dictionary 933 (10th ed. 2000). We note "public land"
has been defined as "land owned by a government." Merriam-
Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 942 (10th ed. 2000). Without
discussion and on the issue of sentencing, this court found two
assaults by a defendant against his attorney, which took place in
the jail and in the courthouse, occurred on public property for
purposes of the aggravated-battery and aggravated-assault stat-
utes. People v. Childs, 305 Ill. App. 3d 128, 140, 711 N.E.2d
1151, 1159-60 (1999). We find the plain and ordinary meaning of
"public property" is property owned by the government.
Defendant, however, relies on a line of cases, the
latest being People v. Ojeda, 397 Ill. App. 3d 285, 921 N.E.2d
490 (2009), for his belief that a location does not constitute
"public property" simply because it is government owned. In
Ojeda, 397 Ill. App. 3d at 286, 921 N.E.2d at 491, the trial
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court found the defendant guilty of aggravated battery after he
hit a highschool classmate in the face. On appeal, the issue
centered on whether a high school constituted "public property."
Ojeda, 397 Ill. App. 3d at 286, 921 N.E.2d at 491.
The Second District cited People v. Kamp, 131 Ill. App.
3d 989, 476 N.E.2d 768 (1985), and People v. Ward, 95 Ill. App.
3d 283, 419 N.E.2d 1240 (1981), in finding "property is not
public solely because it is funded by local taxpayers." Ojeda,
397 Ill. App. 3d at 287, 921 N.E.2d at 492. The court noted the
definition of "public building" included the accessibility of the
public and determined "public" refers to property "which is for
the public's use." Ojeda, 397 Ill. App. 3d at 287, 921 N.E.2d at
492. The court held the high school was public property, as "the
public does have use of public schools in some way, although that
use may be restricted or limited." Ojeda, 397 Ill. App. 3d at
288, 921 N.E.2d at 493. Although the general public did not have
unlimited access to the public school, the court concluded the
school met the definition of "public property" intended by the
aggravated-battery statute. Ojeda, 397 Ill. App. 3d at 288, 921
N.E.2d at 493.
We do not agree with the Second District's restrictive
view of the definition of "public property," i.e., that not only
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must the property be funded by taxpayers but it must also be open
for the general public's use. The Second District's analysis
focused on the high school as a public building and whether the
public had access to the building and use of the facility in some
way. However, section 12-4(b)(8) of the aggravated-battery
statute uses the term "property" instead of "building." Defen-
dant's and the Second District's reading of the statute substi-
tutes "public space," "public place," or "area that is open or
accessible to the public" in place of the phrase "public prop-
erty." Nothing indicates the General Assembly meant for the
plain and ordinary meaning of "public property" to be anything
other than government-owned property. Moreover, the county jail
is property used for the public purpose of housing inmates.
Here, the county jail was property owned by the govern-
ment and thereby constituted public property. Given that the
battery took place within the jail in one of the pods, the
offense falls within the aggravated-battery statute. Accord-
ingly, the State proved defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.
B. Judicial Notice
Defendant argues the trial court erred in instructing
the jury that it had taken judicial notice that the county jail
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was public property. We disagree.
"A court may take judicial notice of matters generally
known to the court and not subject to reasonable dispute." In re
A.B., 308 Ill. App. 3d 227, 237, 719 N.E.2d 348, 356 (1999). A
court may take judicial notice of a fact even if it constitutes
an element of the offense. See People v. White, 311 Ill. App. 3d
374, 380, 724 N.E.2d 572, 577 (2000).
In the case sub judice, the trial court took judicial
notice that the Macon County correctional center is public
property. Based on our finding to the previous issue, the
character of the jail pod as public property was not subject to
legitimate dispute. Accordingly, the court did not err in taking
judicial notice of the fact and instructing the jury thereon.
C. Sentence Credit
Defendant argues this cause should be remanded for the
award of an additional 50 days of sentence credit for time spent
regaining fitness and an evidentiary hearing to determine how
many additional days of credit he is entitled to between the date
of his rearrest and sentencing. We agree in part.
Section 5-8-7(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections
(730 ILCS 5/5-8-7(b) (West 2006)) provides an offender shall be
given credit on his sentence "for time spent in custody as a
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result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed." A
"defendant is entitled to one day of credit for each day (or
portion thereof) that he spends in custody prior to sentencing,
including the day he was taken into custody." People v. Ligons,
325 Ill. App. 3d 753, 759, 759 N.E.2d 169, 174 (2001).
"Time spent in custody pursuant to orders
issued under [s]ection 104-17 or 104-20 or
pursuant to a commitment to the Department of
Human Services following a finding of unfit-
ness or incompetency under prior law, shall
be credited against any sentence imposed on
the defendant in the pending criminal case or
in any other case arising out of the same
conduct." 725 ILCS 5/104-24 (West 2006).
"[A] defendant will not be credited for the day of sentencing in
which he is remanded to the Department of Corrections." People
v. Foreman, 361 Ill. App. 3d 136, 157, 836 N.E.2d 750, 768
(2005).
In his initial brief, defendant argued he is entitled
to 50 days of sentence credit between February 28, 2008, and
April 17, 2008, which included time spent in the Department of
Human Services following a finding of unfitness. In response,
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the State pointed out the trial court entered an amended sentenc-
ing order awarding defendant sentence credit from October 19,
2007, through July 20, 2008. In his reply brief, defendant
agrees with the State, and this issue is now moot.
Defendant, however, argues he is entitled to additional
credit for time in custody between the time he posted bond on
July 20, 2008, and his sentencing date of August 27, 2008. The
State notes it appears defendant became jailed at some point
after posting bond but argues the record does not establish he
spent additional time in custody as a result of the present
offense. Because of the ambiguity in the record, remand is
required to determine whether defendant is entitled to sentence
credit between July 20, 2008, and his sentencing date of August
27, 2008.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's
judgment and remand for further proceedings. As part of our
judgment, we award the State its $50 statutory assessment against
defendant as costs of this appeal.
Affirmed and remanded for further proceedings.
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