People v. Redmond

2022 IL App (3d) 210524Opinion filed November 15, 2022
____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
2022
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
ILLINOIS, ) of the 14th Judicial Circuit,
) Henry County, Illinois.
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
) Appeal No. 3-21-0524
v. ) Circuit Nos. 20-CL-27 and
) 20-TR-3348
RYAN SHAVAR DON REDMOND, )
) The Honorable Daniel P. Dalton,
Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding.
____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE McDADE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Daugherity and Hettel concurred in the judgment and opinion.
____________________________________________________________________________
OPINION
¶1 Following a traffic stop and subsequent search of his vehicle, the defendant, Ryan Shavar
Don Redmond, was charged with unlawful possession of cannabis (720 ILCS 550/4(a) (West
2020)). He filed a motion to suppress evidence, alleging that the officer who stopped him lacked
probable cause to search his vehicle. After a hearing, the circuit court granted the motion, and the
State appealed. On appeal, the State argues that the circuit court erred when it found that the odor
of burnt cannabis emitting from a vehicle was insufficient to support a probable cause
determination. We affirm.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 On the night of September 15, 2020, Illinois State Police officer Hayden Combs was in
his parked squad car around mile marker 19 on Interstate 80 in Henry County when he observed
a silver Kia sport utility vehicle with an improperly secured license plate traveling three miles
per hour above the speed limit. Combs effectuated a traffic stop of the vehicle, which was being
driven by Redmond. Redmond pulled over immediately, and he did not make any furtive
movements.
¶4 Combs approached the passenger side of the vehicle, and Redmond rolled down the
window. Combs testified that he smelled a strong odor of burnt cannabis emanating from the
vehicle. He did not see anything in the vehicle that was lit or emitting the odor. When Combs
asked about the odor, Redmond stated that he had not smoked cannabis in the vehicle.
¶5 Combs also asked Redmond for his license and registration, which he was unable to
provide. Combs then asked Redmond to step out of the vehicle, and Redmond complied. He
could not recall whether he smelled the odor of burnt cannabis on Redmond’s person. Combs
also admitted that Redmond did not exhibit any signs of impairment.
¶6 Combs led Redmond to the front of the squad car and conducted a pat-down search.
Combs also read Redmond his Miranda rights (see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)),
told him he was not free to leave, and then asked him numerous questions, including about the
nature of his trip. Redmond said he was coming from Des Moines, Iowa, where he had been
staying with a girlfriend due to COVID, and headed to Chicago, Illinois, where he lived. Combs
testified that he construed Redmond’s comment that he was “staying” in Des Moines as a
statement that he was “living” there. Combs further claimed that Redmond did not give a straight
answer on his address or the purpose of his trip.
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¶7 Combs was able to retrieve Redmond’s driver’s license information, which revealed a
valid Illinois license with a Chicago address. Further, Redmond told Combs that the vehicle had
been rented for him by a friend in Des Moines because he did not have a debit card to be able to
rent it himself.
¶8 Combs stated that “a large portion” of his decision to search the vehicle was based on the
smell of burnt cannabis. He also stated that, based on his training and experience, “I-80 is a
known drug corridor across the United States” and “Des Moines, Iowa is a hub of criminal
activity and so is Chicago, Illinois.” He admitted that he thought he had probable cause to search
the vehicle based solely on the smell of burnt cannabis. He also stated that the smell of burnt
cannabis caused him to suspect a violation of the statute prohibiting the smoking of cannabis in a
vehicle. He was also concerned that there may have been improperly packaged cannabis or an
unlawful amount of it in the vehicle.
¶9 Combs found a plastic bag containing approximately one gram of cannabis in the center
console of Redmond’s vehicle. Redmond was given a citation for a misdemeanor violation of
section 4(a) of the Cannabis Control Act (720 ILCS 550/4(a) (West 2020)).
¶ 10 On June 29, 2021, Redmond filed a motion to suppress the cannabis, which alleged that
the mere odor of burnt cannabis did not provide Combs with probable cause to conduct a search
of the vehicle Redmond was driving. The circuit court held a hearing on Redmond’s motion on
August 4, 2021, at which only Combs testified. At the close of the hearing, the court took the
matter under advisement.
¶ 11 On November 10, 2021, the circuit court issued a written order granting Redmond’s
motion to suppress. The court characterized the issue as “whether the smell of burnt cannabis is
sufficient to provide probable cause to search the defendant’s vehicle.” The court found that the
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legalization of cannabis in Illinois rendered older case law distinguishable and emphasized that
Combs did not observe any indicators to suggest Redmond had recently used cannabis. The court
also dismissed Combs’s other comments about the circumstances, finding Combs’s claims that
Interstate 80 was a “trafficking corridor” and that Redmond’s answers to certain questions
indicated that he was engaged in illegal activity were unpersuasive. Lastly, the court concluded:
“If the court were to find that the smell of cannabis (whether it be raw or
burnt) is, standing alone, probable cause to search a vehicle, it would
create an untenable situation. A person could exercise his statutory right to
possess and consume cannabis only to give up his rights under the Fourth
Amendment with no evidence that he possessed or consumed cannabis
illegally. This court declines to impose that choice upon the defendant or
any other similarly situated individual. Accordingly, this court finds the
search of Mr. Redmond’s vehicle to be in violation of his Fourth
Amendment rights. The motion to suppress is allowed.”
¶ 12 The State appealed.
¶ 13 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 14 On appeal, the State argues that the circuit court erred when it found that the odor of
burnt cannabis, emitting from a vehicle, could not support a probable cause determination.
¶ 15 When reviewing a circuit court’s decision on a motion to suppress evidence, we employ a
two-part standard of review. People v. Hill, 2020 IL 124595, ¶ 14. First, we accord great
deference to the circuit court’s factual findings and reverse them only if they are against the
manifest weight of the evidence. Id. Second, we review de novo the circuit court’s ultimate legal
conclusion on the motion to suppress. Id. We also note that when the facts are uncontroverted, as
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they are in this case, our review is de novo. People v. Stribling, 2022 IL App (3d) 210098, ¶ 9
(citing People v. Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d 60, 64 (1996)).
¶ 16 In part, the fourth amendment protects citizens from unreasonable searches. U.S. Const.,
amend. IV. Warrantless searches are presumed to be unreasonable except in limited
circumstances. Stribling, 2022 IL App (3d) 210098, ¶ 10. Under the automobile exception to the
warrant requirement, “a warrantless search of a vehicle is not per se unreasonable as the transient
nature of vehicles renders it unfeasible to secure a warrant before the vehicle leaves the
jurisdiction, with the potential evidence of a crime or contraband in tow.” Id. The warrantless
search of a vehicle is permitted when the officer has probable cause to conduct the search. Id.“Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time would
warrant a reasonable person to believe there is a reasonable probability that the automobile
contains contraband or evidence of criminal activity.” Id. The circumstances are examined
through the viewpoint of an objectively reasonable officer, who is allowed to rely on his or her
training and experience. Hill, 2020 IL 124595, ¶ 23.
¶ 17 It is important to recognize that “[p]robable cause deals with probabilities, not
certainties.” Id. ¶ 24. An officer need not rule out innocent explanations for facts he or she deems
suspicious. Id. Rather, probable cause “requires only that the facts available to the officer—
including the plausibility of an innocent explanation—would warrant a reasonable man to
believe there is a reasonable probability ‘that certain items may be contraband or stolen property
or useful as evidence of a crime.’ ” Id. (quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983)).
¶ 18 Here, the State argues in part that case law still requires a holding that the odor of burnt
cannabis is sufficient to support a probable cause finding. This contention ignores the impact of
subsequent changes in the underlying law. The legislature can change the law as it sees fit,
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subject to constitutional requirements. Cf. Fure v. Sherman Hospital, 64 Ill. App. 3d 259, 267
(1978). Legislative action can moderate, or even totally negate, the impact, the applicability, and
the pertinence of prevailing case law. There have been such changes in the law regarding
cannabis possession and use in Illinois. Cases such as People v. Stout, 106 Ill. 2d 77, 87 (1985)
(holding that the odor of burnt cannabis without other corroborating evidence was sufficient to
establish probable cause to search a vehicle), interpreted the law when all cannabis possession
was illegal. With the changes brought about by the Cannabis Regulation and Tax Act (410 ILCS
705/1-1 et seq. (West 2020)), those cases are no longer applicable. See Stribling, 2022 IL App
(3d) 210098, ¶ 29 (holding that “the supreme court’s holding in Stout is no longer applicable to
postlegalization fact patterns”).
¶ 19 In Stribling, a different panel of this court recently addressed the exact issue presented by
this appeal. In that thorough and well-reasoned decision, the Stribling court first examined the
history of cannabis regulation in Illinois. Id. ¶¶ 14-24. In part, the Stribling court noted that when
all cannabis was illegal, our supreme court held in Stout that “when a trained and experienced
police officer detects the odor of cannabis emanating from a defendant’s vehicle, the odor alone
provided sufficient enough probable cause to search the vehicle under the automobile
exception.” Id. ¶ 15 (citing Stout, 106 Ill. 2d at 88). Next, it was noted that the possession of
medical cannabis was partially allowed by the legislature in 2013 with the enactment of the
Compassionate Use of Medical Cannabis Pilot Program Act (410 ILCS 130/1 et seq. (West
2014)). Stribling, 2022 IL App (3d) 210098, ¶ 17. Subsequently, our supreme court decided Hill,
which held, inter alia, that even after the change to the law regarding medical cannabis, the odor
of raw cannabis could still contribute to the probable cause determination when other
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corroborating factors were also present. Id. ¶ 21. It was also noted that in Hill, the corroborating
factors were that
“(1) [the officer’s] training and experience indicated that the passengers in
the car were hiding contraband or retrieving a weapon when the defendant
delayed pulling over and (2) [the officer] ‘saw a loose “bud” in the back
seat and smelled a strong odor of cannabis, which, together, indicate[d]
that cannabis was in the car and, likely, not properly contained.’ ” Id. ¶ 20
(quoting Hill, 2020 IL 124595, ¶ 35).
¶ 20 The Stribling court then summarized the major change to the law regarding cannabis
possession that took effect on January 1, 2020:
“Since Hill, Illinois became the eleventh state to legalize marijuana
for adult, recreational use. As of January 1, 2020, under the Cannabis
Regulation and Tax Act (410 ILCS 705/1-1 et seq. (West 2020)), an
Illinois resident 21 years of age or older may possess up to and including
30 grams of cannabis, up to 500 milligrams of tetrahydrocannabinol
(THC) in a cannabis-infused product, and 5 grams of cannabis
concentrate. Id. § 10-10. Possession of more than these quantities and
delivery of any amount remains illegal and subject to the penalties
previously set. 720 ILCS 550/4(a), (b) (West 2020). Cannabis may not be
possessed in a vehicle unless it is in a ‘reasonably secured, sealed
container and reasonably inaccessible while the vehicle is moving.’ 410
ILCS 705/10-35(a)(2)(D) (West 2020). Moreover, a person may not use
cannabis while in a vehicle (id. § 10-35(a)(3)(D)) or drive a vehicle if the
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person has, within two hours of driving or being in actual physical control
of a vehicle, a THC concentration in their blood or urine of either 5
nanograms or more of delta-9-THC per milliliter of whole blood or 10
nanograms or more of delta-9-THC per milliliter of other bodily substance
(id. § 10-35(a)(5); 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(7) (West 2020); 625 ILCS 5/11-
501.2(a) (West 2020)). The cannabis concentration limitations on driving
do not apply if the person is a licensed patient under the Compassionate
Use of Medical Cannabis Program Act. 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(7) (West
2020). In that case, the licensed patient may not drive a vehicle if impaired
by the use of cannabis. Id.” Id. ¶ 23.
¶ 21 Next, the Stribling court examined the question of whether the enactment of the Cannabis
Regulation and Tax Act had changed the probable cause determination for cannabis. Id. ¶ 24.
That question was answered in the affirmative and resulted in a holding that “the smell of the
burnt cannabis, without any corroborating factors, is not enough to establish probable cause to
search the vehicle.” Id. ¶ 29. That holding was fully consistent with the supreme court’s decision
in Hill.
¶ 22 As was the case in Stribling, there are no corroborating factors in this case to provide
Combs with probable cause to search Redmond’s vehicle. Here, Combs merely smelled a strong
odor of burnt cannabis emanating from inside the vehicle driven by Redmond, leading him to
suspect that Redmond had smoked cannabis inside the vehicle. Redmond did not delay pulling
over or make any furtive movements, he rolled down the window when Combs came to the
passenger side of the vehicle, and Combs did not observe any cannabis or related drug
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paraphernalia in the vehicle, smoke in the vehicle, or signs of impairment in Redmond. 1
Redmond also told Combs that he had not smoked cannabis in the vehicle. Further, there was no
odor of raw cannabis nor any other factor indicative of improperly packaged cannabis or an
unlawful amount of it in the vehicle, despite Combs’s claim that he was concerned about such
matters.
¶ 23 Additionally, neither Redmond’s driving of a vehicle on Interstate 80 nor the fact that the
vehicle was rented provided any rational support for Combs’s suspicions. While Combs claimed
Interstate 80 was a “known drug corridor,” Combs acted on a suspicion of Redmond having
smoked cannabis in a vehicle, not that he was a drug courier. Further, it is not reasonable to
assume that all persons driving or riding in vehicles—including rented vehicles—traveling on
such a major interstate highway are involved in narcotics-related activities. Combs’s claim, if
taken to its logical conclusion, would essentially subject every vehicle traveling on Interstate 80
to a search for narcotics. The United States and Illinois Constitutions do not give the police such
unfettered and unreasonable access to the innocent activities of citizens or the unknown contents
of people’s vehicles.
¶ 24 Further, like the Interstate 80 “drug corridor” analysis, Combs’s general belief that both
Des Moines and Chicago were “hubs” of criminal activity provided no corroboration that
Redmond was acting criminally in this case. Again, Combs’s claim, taken to its logical
conclusion, would essentially subject every resident of Des Moines and Chicago driving on
Interstate 80 to vehicle searches based on some vague notion of them possibly engaging in
1
We also note that the traffic violations for which Combs stopped Redmond—driving three miles
per hour over the speed limit and an improperly secured license plate—were not indicative of impairment.
See Stribling, 2022 IL App (3d) 210098, ¶ 28.
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criminal activity. It is simply not reasonable to assume that any or all residents of Des Moines
and Chicago are criminals.
¶ 25 Lastly, Redmond’s answers to Combs’s questions provided no corroboration of his
suspicions in this case. Combs clearly misconstrued at least the answers Redmond provided
regarding residency. Redmond told Combs he lived in Chicago but had been staying with a
girlfriend in Des Moines due to COVID. Combs—and only Combs—decided this meant
Redmond “lived” in Des Moines. Even if that construction had been correct, it is unclear why it
would be suspicious. Moreover, any suspicion should have been quickly dispelled when Combs
determined that Redmond in fact had a valid Illinois driver’s license that listed a Chicago
address.
¶ 26 As was the case in Stribling, no evidence existed in this case to lead a reasonable officer
to conclude that there was a reasonable probability that Redmond’s vehicle contained contraband
or evidence of criminal activity giving rise to probable cause to search. See id. ¶ 28. Under the
circumstances of this case, we hold that the circuit court did not err when it granted Redmond’s
motion to suppress.
¶ 27 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 28 The judgment of the circuit court of Henry County is affirmed.
¶ 29 Affirmed.
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People v. Redmond, 2022 IL App (3d) 210524Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Henry County, Nos. 20-CL-
27, 20-TR-3348; the Hon. Daniel P. Dalton, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys Catherine Runty, State’s Attorney, of Cambridge (Patrick
for Delfino, Thomas D. Arado, and Nicholas A. Atwood, of State’s
Appellant: Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the
People.
Attorneys Bruce L. Carmen, of Carmen Law Office, PC, of Cambridge, for
for appellee.
Appellee:
11