People v. Axtell

2017 IL App (2d) 150518 No. 2-15-0518
Opinion filed December 21, 2017
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS, ) of Lake County.
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) No. 12-CF-2977
)
MICHAEL S. AXTELL, ) Honorable
) Victoria A. Rossetti,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
PRESIDING JUSTICE HUDSON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Hutchinson and Spence concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 After a bench trial, defendant, Michael S. Axtell, was convicted of first-degree murder
(720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 2012)) and sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment. On appeal, he
contends, first, that his conviction must be reduced to involuntary manslaughter (720 ILCS 5/9­
3(a) (West 2012)) because the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew that
the act that caused the victim’s death created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to
her (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 2012)). Second, he contends that the trial court erred in
admitting a statement that the victim made shortly before the fatal incident. Third, he contends
that, if his conviction is affirmed, the judgment order must be corrected. We affirm the judgment
as modified.
2017 IL App (2d) 150518
¶2 Defendant was charged with murdering Tammy Stone on the evening of October 4, 2012.
At the time, they were residing in her house in Antioch with their son, Michael, and Jordan
Johnson, Stone’s son by another man. Defendant and Stone had a daughter, Meghan, who lived
elsewhere. The indictment charged defendant with striking Stone about the body, knowing that
his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to her.
¶3 The State moved in limine to admit several statements as exceptions to the hearsay rule.
Only one is at issue here. According to the State, Jordan would testify as follows. On the
evening of October 4, 2012, he heard Stone and defendant yelling. He then saw Stone lying
unconscious on the kitchen floor. He returned to his room. Stone regained consciousness, ran
into his room, and told him, “ ‘We need to find the phone or [defendant] is going to kill me.’ ”
¶4 As pertinent here, the State argued that the statement was admissible under the exception
to the hearsay rule for spontaneous declarations, because (a) there was an occurrence sufficiently
startling to produce a spontaneous and unreflecting statement—i.e., defendant’s attack on Stone,
(b) there was insufficient time for her to fabricate the statement, and (c) the statement related to
the circumstances of the occurrence. See Ill. R. Evid. 803(2) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011); People v.
Williams, 193 Ill. 2d 306, 352 (2000). Defendant argued that Stone’s statement was not a
spontaneous declaration, in part because it did not relate to a preceding occurrence. Without
explanation, the court ruled that Stone’s remark was admissible as a spontaneous declaration.
¶5 At trial, the State first called Meghan. She testified as follows. She was 21 years old and
lived with her grandmother in Lake Villa, where she had resided on October 4, 2012. Defendant
and Stone had never married; shortly after Meghan was born, defendant moved out of state. In
2011, he and Stone resumed their relationship, and he moved in with her, Michael, and Jordan.
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¶6 Meghan testified that, on October 4, 2012, she, defendant, and Stone went to lunch at
Chopper’s Bar and Grill. After an hour, Stone and Meghan went shopping while defendant
stayed at Chopper’s. When they finished shopping, Stone and Meghan returned home.
Defendant and Jordan were there; Michael was not. At some point, Stone asked Meghan to
accompany her and defendant to Yvonne’s, a restaurant in Ingleside, but she declined and went
home. Later that evening, she and her friend Jenna Rice visited Joe Janusz in Round Lake
Beach.
¶7 Meghan testified that, while she was with Joe and Jenna, she received a call on her cell
phone from Stone. Stone was crying and said that “she got her ass beat” by defendant. Jenna
drove Meghan and Joe to Stone’s home. Meghan exited the car. Stone was standing outside.
She had a black eye. Meghan entered the house through the garage, locked the door to the
house, then passed through the laundry room and into the kitchen. She saw defendant, who was
on the couch in the living room.
¶8 Meghan testified that she asked defendant why he had put his hands on Stone. Defendant
said that “she grabbed his nuts.” Meghan replied that he still had no right to hurt her. Meghan
entered the living room. Defendant stood up and approached her. Stone, Jenna, and Joe entered,
having been let in by Jordan. Defendant and Stone started arguing. Meghan told defendant to
get his things and move out. Defendant pushed her; she pushed him down, pinned him to the
loveseat, and struck him. Joe pulled her off. At Stone’s request, Jenna called the police.
Meghan, Jenna, and Joe walked to the garage area.
¶9 Meghan testified that she heard a loud thud and ran back into the house. From the
kitchen area, she could see into the living room and down the hallway. Defendant was exiting
Stone’s bedroom, closing the door behind him. As he crossed Meghan’s path, she asked what
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the noise had been. He responded, “ ‘nothing.’ ” Meghan opened the bedroom door. Stone was
lying unconscious on the floor. Meghan shook her and spoke to her but got no response. Jordan,
Joe, and Jenna soon entered. They put Stone onto the bed and turned her head to the side,
because “she was kind of choking on her spit” and having trouble breathing. Her eyes were
rolling back into her head. Jenna called the police, and the other three left the room.
¶ 10 Jenna testified as follows. While she, Meghan, and Joe were at Joe’s house, Meghan
received a call and said that they needed to go to Stone’s house. Jenna drove them there. As she
pulled into the driveway, she saw that Stone was standing outside. Jenna, Meghan, and Joe
exited the car. Meghan ran to the attached garage and inside the house. Jenna and Joe
approached Stone. Stone had a bruise on her left cheek, with some swelling. Jenna eventually
went to the back door of the house, where Jordan let her, Stone, and Joe in.
¶ 11 Jenna testified that, after going inside, she saw Meghan and defendant arguing in the
living room. Stone pulled Jenna aside and showed her the swelling near her left eye and cheek.
Jenna then saw defendant and Meghan fighting. Stone told Jenna to call the police. Jenna left as
Meghan was pinning defendant. Outside, she called the police and remained on the line. She
reentered the living room and saw that Joe had pulled Meghan off defendant. Jenna, Meghan,
and Joe went to the garage. As she left, Jenna saw defendant and Stone enter the bedroom.
¶ 12 Jenna testified that, in the garage, she heard a loud thud. She, Meghan, and Joe ran back
inside, where they saw defendant leaving the bedroom. He passed them and had a brief
exchange with Meghan. Jenna and Joe entered the bedroom. Stone was lying on the floor.
Meghan and Joe moved her to the bed and tried to get her to open her eyes and talk, without
success. Remembering that she had left her car running, Jenna ran out and saw defendant
entering it. She reached in, turned off the car, and took the keys. As she turned around, she saw
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defendant walking away. She reentered the bedroom. Stone was still not moving. Jenna and Joe
went outside. Soon, the police arrived.
¶ 13 Jordan testified as follows. On October 4, 2012, at about 4 p.m., he came home from
school. Defendant was on the living room couch. Stone was in her bedroom. Jordan went to his
room and played a game online. Defendant and Stone left the house and returned at about 8 or 9
p.m. Jordan was in his room with the door closed and a headset on. He could hear defendant
and Stone arguing in “the other end of the house.” Jordan then heard a loud thud from the living
room. He left his room. Stone was on the floor next to the couch, crying. Defendant was at the
other end of the couch, his feet near her head. He was not helping her. Jordan asked what had
happened. He got no response and returned to his room.
¶ 14 Jordan testified that, shortly afterward, he heard yelling, followed by a second thud. He
left his room. Stone was lying on the floor between the kitchen and the living room. Her head
was about two feet from defendant, who was sitting in a chair. He was looking down at Stone
but not helping her. Stone did not appear conscious. Jordan dragged her to the living room. He
returned to his room, closed the door, and resumed his game.
¶ 15 Jordan testified that, perhaps five minutes later, Stone entered his room. Over
defendant’s objection, Jordan testified that she told him, “ ‘help me find my phone. [Defendant]
is going to kill me.’ ” He found Stone’s phone, and she called Meghan. When Meghan arrived,
Jordan had returned to his bedroom. Hearing Meghan yell, he left his room. He saw Meghan
tackle defendant and get on top of him; Joe pulled her off. Jenna called the police. Everyone but
defendant and Stone went to the garage.
¶ 16 Jordan testified that, while in the garage, he heard “a loud thud from across the house.”
He, Meghan, Jenna, and Joe reentered the house. Defendant was walking away from the
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bedroom. Jordan and the others entered the bedroom. Stone was unconscious on the floor and
was making sounds like snoring. She was not moving or responsive. Later, the police arrived.
¶ 17 Joe testified as follows. On the evening of October 4, 2012, he, Stone, and Jenna drove
from his house to Stone’s house. As Jenna pulled into the driveway, Stone was outside nearby.
She had a bruise on her face. Meghan exited the car and ran inside. The door from the garage to
the house was locked, so Joe, Jenna, and Stone went around the back, where Jordan let them in.
Defendant and Meghan were inside. They were yelling at each other. Defendant started arguing
loudly with Stone. He and Meghan got into an altercation; Joe pulled Meghan off defendant.
¶ 18 Lieutenant Michael Keller of the Lake County sheriff’s office testified that, shortly after
midnight on October 5, 2012, he arrested defendant, who was walking on the shoulder of Route
173. Detective Craig Somerville arrived and placed defendant into his squad car. Somerville
testified that, on the ride to the station, defendant appeared intoxicated and said, among other
things, “[W]hat would you do if somebody grabbed your nuts like Tammy did.” At the station,
defendant was questioned by Sergeant Kevin Eckenstahler. The interview was recorded.
¶ 19 Eckenstahler testified that he asked defendant what had happened. Defendant responded
that, when he and Stone returned from Yvonne’s, Stone started “talking shit.” During a break,
Somerville took several photographs of defendant. Eckenstahler and Somerville gave defendant
a change of clothes and left the room. While alone, defendant continued to talk, calling Stone
names and saying, “ ‘I need to figure this out, self-defense.’ ” Eckenstahler returned, told him
that Stone had died, then left. Defendant expressed disbelief, cried, and said that he had done
nothing. Eckenstahler returned and resumed the interview. Defendant said that Stone bruised
the area of her left eye when she fell off a kitchen chair and landed on her face. The DVD of the
interview was played in court.
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¶ 20 Brian Dekind testified that, on the evening of October 4, 2012, he was a volunteer
paramedic and was dispatched to Stone’s home. As he entered, he saw a sheriff’s deputy
performing CPR on Stone, who was lying face-up on the bed. The deputy and Dekind moved
her onto the floor and continued CPR. An ambulance arrived and took Stone to a hospital.
¶ 21 The State called Dr. Nancy Jones, whom the court qualified as an expert in forensic
pathology. On direct examination, she testified as follows. On the morning of October 5, 2012,
she performed the autopsy on Stone. Afterward, she learned that Stone had lost consciousness at
least once before the incident in the bedroom. A concussion could have caused the loss of
consciousness, had it been sufficiently severe. A concussion is “a brain injury without physical
evidence of an injury.” It does not produce contusions or bleeding but disrupts the nerve
impulses between the brain and the rest of the body. A person who sustains a concussion is more
susceptible to another concussion, which can be more severe even with less of an impact.
¶ 22 Jones testified that the autopsy began with an external examination, which showed
several blunt-trauma injuries. Stone had a fresh bruise with swelling around the area of the left
eye and cheek, some abrasions on her left arm, bruising on her right shoulder, and minor impact
injuries on her extremities. The bruising to her left cheek was not consistent with a fall.
¶ 23 Jones testified next about the internal examination. She found a “subgaleal hemorrhage,”
i.e., bleeding on the left parietal region of the top of the scalp. Otherwise, the skull appeared
normal; there were no fractures. Next, Jones removed the skull cap. She immediately noticed a
“subarachnoid hemorrhage,” i.e., bleeding on the surface of the brain itself. The bleeding
“feathered up along the side over the top of the brain,” and the brain was swollen. She had the
area photographed, then removed the brain. There was considerable bleeding on the interior
surface of the brain, concentrated around the brain stem.
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¶ 24 Jones testified that, to locate the source of the bleeding, she removed the brain completely
and washed away the blood to expose the vessels at the base of the brain, known as the circle of
Willis. The circle of Willis supplies blood to the brain. Two vertebral arteries that run up the
spinal column meet at the brain stem to form the basal artery; this artery continues forward, with
“different branches coming off the cerebral arteries, posterior cerebral arteries.” The overall
pattern is a rough circle with vessels going to the right and left sides of the brain. Jones
discovered a laceration, specifically a longitudinal tear, in the right posterior cerebral artery. She
had it photographed, then removed the circle of Willis so as to preserve it in formalin.
¶ 25 Jones identified and described six photographs taken during the internal examination.
The photographs were admitted into evidence. Jones testified that one photograph (People’s
exhibit No. 59) showed the vicinity of the tear, which she had marked with scissors. She noted
that the artery was intact at the point of the scissors and slightly onward but that the photograph
showed the ragged and irregular portion of the artery where it was split. Jones testified that
another photograph (People’s exhibit No. 60) showed “the bony ridges that are present over the
base of the skull which can cause lacerations or tears of the blood vessels at the base of the brain
if the brain moves inside the skull.”
¶ 26 Jones testified that a subarachnoid hemorrhage can be caused by the rupture of an
aneurysm. An aneurysm is a weakening of the blood vessel wall, causing it to expand, and can
result from turbulent blood flow, hardening of the arteries, or repetitive impact to the blood
vessel. The first two kinds are the most common. The first normally occurs at branch points in
blood vessels; the laceration to Stone’s artery did not occur at a branch point. Jones examined
the circle of Willis for an aneurysm but found none. She did not notice any congenital defects in
the vessels or anything unusual for a woman of Stone’s age (40).
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¶ 27 Jones testified that, once a person suffers the type of arterial laceration that Stone
received, death is very rapid, especially with the great bleeding present in her case. Although
Stone was intoxicated when she died, that played no role in her injury.
¶ 28 Jones testified that, to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty, Stone’s death was
caused by “a subarachnoid hemorrhage due to a lacerated cerebral artery due to blunt head
trauma due to assault.” She explained that, to bring about such a chain of events, the assault’s
impact must cause the head to hyperextend and rotate. With the head extending backward, the
blood vessels stretch; with the rotation, the brain moves across the base of the skull and exposes
blood vessels to the danger of running across the bony ridges at the base of the skull. A blood
vessel can tear because it is stretched too far or because it makes contact with a bony ridge. It is
quite possible for all of this to occur without leaving any external sign of trauma, such as
bruising or a skull fracture. In Stone’s case, the bruise to the left eye area and the parietal
subgaleal hemorrhage were not related to the laceration of the cerebral artery.
¶ 29 Jones testified that, to cause movement of the brain that would make the posterior
cerebral artery move over a bony prominence in the skull, “a significant act of force” is required.
The force must also be applied “in just the right way so the head rotates and extends,” but it does
not always cause any external injury.
¶ 30 Jones testified on cross-examination as follows. She had performed more than 10,000
autopsies and had seen only three cases of the type of injury that Stone had suffered. Jones was
not aware of any documented case of a traumatically caused laceration of the right posterior
cerebral artery, but she had not searched the literature. The bruise to Stone’s cheek could have
caused the subarachnoid hemorrhage, but the cause was probably something else; in the previous
cases, the fatal blow had been lower on the face. The bruising elsewhere on Stone’s body was
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minor, and there was no other external evidence of the trauma that caused the cerebral artery to
tear. Shown two photographs from the autopsy (Defendant’s exhibit Nos. 8 and 9), Jones circled
the location of the laceration on each one.
¶ 31 Jones testified that the rupture of a cerebral aneurysm is a frequent cause of subarachnoid
hemorrhaging. An examination with the naked eye might not disclose a ruptured aneurysm.
¶ 32 Jones testified that she removed as much of the circle of Willis as she could and placed it
into formalin with the other stock tissue. On March 11, 2014, she met with Dr. Shaku Teas at
the Lake County coroner’s office.
¶ 33 On redirect examination, Jones testified that, when she met Teas at the Lake County
coroner’s office, the circle of Willis from Stone’s brain had become “all sort of twisted” from
long storage in formalin, which causes tissue to harden and form knots. Jones reiterated that the
cause of Stone’s death was an assault or altercation that involved blunt-force trauma, resulting in
the laceration of the cerebral artery. The laceration in turn caused the subarachnoid hemorrhage.
¶ 34 The State rested. Defendant’s first witness was Dr. Anne Majewski, the McHenry
County coroner, who testified as follows. She was familiar with Stone’s case and was the keeper
of the evidence. This included the stock tissue, taken at the time of the autopsy, that was
preserved in formalin in a sealed jar. In January 2014, Teas removed, viewed, and photographed
the stock tissue, then returned it to the jar. Later, it was transferred to the Lake County coroner’s
office, where Jones and Teas took samples. The samples were sent to a forensics laboratory,
which produced histology slides, and the tissue was returned to Majewski’s office. The slides
could be examined with a microscope.
¶ 35 The court accepted Jan Edward Leetsma as an expert in forensic neuropathology. On
direct examination, he testified as follows. At Teas’s request, he looked at some of the materials
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in the case, including photographs that Teas had taken and microscopic slides that she had
provided. He made photographs of these slides.
¶ 36 Leetsma explained that a subarachnoid hemorrhage occurs in the space between the
arachnoid membrane and the base of the brain. The most common causes of the bleeding inside
the circle of Willis that leads to subarachnoid hemorrhages are aneurysms and arterial venous
malformation. Head trauma can cause a subarachnoid hemorrhage, and if the impact sets the
brain in motion, it can do so without cranial penetration. Aneurysms are a far more common
cause of subarachnoid hemorrhages than are head traumas that do not penetrate the head.
¶ 37 Leetsma testified further as follows. Jones was undoubtedly correct that Stone had died
of a massive subarachnoid hemorrhage. He had examined Defendant’s exhibit Nos. 8 and 9 and
could not detect any rupture in the right posterior cerebral artery. However, it can be difficult to
see a longitudinal tear with the naked eye. Leetsma had also examined the slides taken of the
artery and had not seen evidence of tearing. His examination of the photographs he had taken
disclosed arterial injury. Abnormalities in the wall of the vessel existed, and there was also more
arterial plaque than usual for a 40-year-old woman. These factors would heighten the risks of
developing an aneurysm and having it rupture.
¶ 38 Leetsma testified that, because he could not find a tear or hole in the artery, he had to
determine what caused the massive hemorrhage. He explained further, “And one has to then I
suppose you could say place their bets with statistics and say probably the most common cause
of fatal subarachnoid hemorrhage is especially in this age group aneurysm.” Leetsma
acknowledged, however, that he did not see any aneurysm.
¶ 39 Leetsma testified that, if trauma has caused a subarachnoid hemorrhage, he would
generally look for fractures or some other major impact. The bruise to Stone’s cheek was not the
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sort of impact he would expect to cause a subarachnoid hemorrhage. A great deal of force would
have to be behind a single blow. Based on the medical literature, “[i]t would be most
uncommon” for the right posterior cerebral artery to rupture and cause a subarachnoid
hemorrhage.
¶ 40 Leetsma testified on cross-examination as follows. His report on the case was dated
September 18, 2014. He was not involved in the autopsy or Teas’s examination of the stock
tissue, and he had never viewed Stone’s brain directly. His report stated at one point, “ ‘I was
not able to perceive any aneurysm in the specimen photographs [provided by Teas].’ ” The
report concluded in part that there was no specific evidence that Stone had had an aneurysm.
¶ 41 Leetsma acknowledged that subarachnoid hemorrhages have resulted from single blows
and that one blow can lacerate a cerebral artery without producing any fracture. Also, a study
that he had coauthored included two fatal subarachnoid hemorrhages caused by single punches to
the face.
¶ 42 After the court qualified Teas as an expert in forensic pathology, she testified on direct
examination as follows. She had examined the autopsy report, photographs she had taken,
photographs the police had taken at the hospital, and police reports. In January 2014, at
Majewski’s office, she photographed the tissue specimens.
¶ 43 Teas testified that subarachnoid hemorrhages usually result from natural causes, most
frequently the rupture of an aneurysm. Aneurysms cannot always be detected, as they can be too
small or located in places that cannot be seen. Other natural causes include malformation of the
arterial structure of the brain and arteriosclerosis. The most common cause of subarachnoid
hemorrhages in 40-year-old women is a ruptured aneurysm.
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¶ 44 Teas testified that she had read Jones’s autopsy report and taken histology slides of those
portions of the circle of Willis that were preserved. Examination with the naked eye did not
reveal any laceration. Slides of various photographs were displayed in court. One slide was a
photograph that Jones took while removing Stone’s brain. Jones had used the photograph to
show the right posterior cerebral artery. Teas testified that she could not see any laceration at the
point that Jones had marked. Teas saw no laceration anywhere in the photograph.
¶ 45 Teas testified that the photographs of several cerebral arteries showed arteriosclerosis.
The arteriosclerosis and the lack of trauma to Stone’s body were consistent with an undetected
aneurysm. Thus, Teas disagreed with Jones’s opinion that Stone’s hemorrhage had been caused
by a laceration to the right posterior cerebral artery. Asked for her opinion of what caused
Stone’s death, Teas responded that “the most reasonable and common cause would be [a]
ruptured aneurysm that left two subarachnoid hemorrhages [and] was not detected.”
¶ 46 Teas testified on cross-examination as follows. Her report was dated September 13,
2014. She had not attended the autopsy or viewed the body in person. When she observed the
partial circle of Willis, there was no laceration, but she saw no evidence of an aneurysm either.
Her report stated that one way that an aneurysm can rupture is physical trauma from an
altercation, such as a blow to the head with a fist.
¶ 47 Defendant rested. In argument, the prosecutor began by recapitulating the evidence. He
mentioned, without elaborating, Stone’s remark to Jordan, “he is going to kill me.” He argued
that defendant’s statements while in custody showed that he realized that his acts had killed
Stone and that she had not collapsed suddenly from a ruptured aneurysm. The prosecutor then
focused on Jones’s testimony, noting that she not only had testified to having seen an arterial tear
but had photographed it and described it in some detail. Jones had also testified that it took a
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great amount of force to cause the head to move in such a way as to produce the tear. She had
also looked for an aneurysm and found none.
¶ 48 The prosecutor focused on Jones’s testimony that one concussion makes a second one
more likely and means that less force is needed to produce an equally or more severe injury.
Also, Leetsma had conceded that one punch to the head can cause a laceration to a cerebral
artery.
¶ 49 The prosecutor noted that defendant had given the court the option of convicting him of
involuntary manslaughter instead of first-degree murder (or an acquittal). However, he
contended, the evidence showed more than recklessness; it proved that defendant knew that his
acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to Stone. He had already inflicted
great bodily harm by knocking her unconscious on the kitchen floor. He had steadily escalated
the level of violence: the first time, Stone remained conscious; the second time, she lost
consciousness; and the third time, she died. Defendant had known that the third blow, directed
to Stone’s head, was likely to cause great bodily harm in one or more of numerous ways. The
sound of Stone hitting the ground could be heard in the garage, at the other end of the house.
¶ 50 Defendant argued that there was no evidence of what trauma Stone had suffered in the
bedroom; she had received the black eye earlier. Leetsma’s testimony cast doubt on the
likelihood of a subarachnoid hemorrhage without any external evidence of injury and on the
likelihood that a laceration to the right posterior cerebral artery caused the hemorrhage.
Moreover, there was conflicting evidence on whether Stone had suffered a lacerated artery.
Stone’s physical condition had put her at risk of rupturing an aneurysm.
¶ 51 Defendant contended that, even had the State proved that he had caused Stone’s death by
punching her and causing a subarachnoid hemorrhage, it had not proved that he had known that
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his act created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to her. Defendant argued that
no reasonable person would know that great bodily harm would result from a punch with a fist,
because that rarely happens, everyone is aware that it rarely happens, and case law has said as
much. The previous incidents, even if they occurred as the State portrayed them, would not have
made defendant able to foresee the effect of his later act: the State could only speculate that the
punch in the kitchen had given Stone a concussion.
¶ 52 In rebuttal, the prosecutor contended that one punch can cause great bodily harm and that
many people have suffered broken noses, concussions, or other serious injuries from single
blows. Also, defendant and Stone had been yelling at each other just a few seconds before she
fell, and it was unlikely that she suffered a ruptured aneurysm in that short time. Defendant’s
attempt to escape and hide was not the conduct of a witness to a fatal medical accident.
¶ 53 The judge found defendant guilty of first-degree murder based on knowledge that his act
created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to Stone. The judge began by
recapitulating some of the evidence, noting, but not emphasizing, Stone’s statement to Jordan
that defendant was going to kill her. The judge then noted the following.
¶ 54 While in custody, defendant admitted that he had hit Stone in the bedroom, and the
evidence disproved his story that a fall off a chair had caused Stone’s loss of consciousness in
the kitchen shortly before. Jones had testified that Stone died of a subarachnoid hemorrhage that
had resulted from a tear in her right posterior cerebral artery, which in turn had been caused by a
blow from defendant. That blow had required a significant amount of force in order to cause the
head to hyperextend and the brain to move so as to expose the artery to the bony ridges. Jones
had found no evidence of an aneurysm. Although Leetsma and Teas disagreed with Jones, they
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admitted that they found no sign of an aneurysm. Thus, the judge credited Jones’s opinion of the
cause of Stone’s death.
¶ 55 The judge then turned to the remaining issue: whether defendant had known that his act
would create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to Stone. The judge explained:
“We know she was found crying in the living room on the ground after a first
thud. The second thud is the first time anyone saw any redness or swelling. She was not
responsive. She was knocked out cold on the floor laying on the ground. Again, why
Jordan did what he did in dragging her away leaving her alone, I don’t know. It does not
change the fact that she was knocked unconscious, which to this Court is great bodily
harm. The victim’s state of mind after regaining consciousness that [defendant] was
going to kill her, this was not the fatal blow. We know that because she was up walking
around, talking, had the presence of mind to call her daughter. The smoking a cigarette
[sic].
We know again there was an argument between the defendant and his daughter.
That after that argument [Stone] and *** defendant go into the bedroom. And by his own
words she was yelling at him. That he just knocked her off the bed. He did not think he
hit her that hard. He knocked her unconscious, and not just unconscious. It is what
caused her death.” (Emphasis added.)
The judge concluded that defendant had knowingly caused Stone great bodily harm and was
therefore guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of first-degree murder.
¶ 56 Defendant moved for a new trial, arguing in part that the court had erred in admitting
Stone’s statement to Jordan that defendant was going to kill her. The court denied the motion
and later sentenced defendant to 30 years in prison. The written judgment cited the statutory
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subsection based on intent to kill or do great bodily harm or knowledge that the act will cause
death (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2012)). After the court denied his motion to reduce the
sentence, defendant timely appealed.
¶ 57 On appeal, defendant argues first that the evidence did not prove him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Defendant implicitly concedes that the trial court was within its prerogative in
finding that his attack on Stone caused a rupture in her posterior cerebral artery that, in turn,
caused the subarachnoid hemorrhage that resulted in her death. Defendant thus does not dispute
causation but limits his argument to guilty knowledge. He maintains that the State did not prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew that the fatal blow created a strong probability of death
or great bodily harm to Stone. See 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 2012). Defendant acknowledges
that the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the fatal blow was likely to cause death
or great bodily harm to Stone and that he performed it recklessly, thus making him guilty of
involuntary manslaughter. See 720 ILCS 5/9-3(a) (West 2012). Therefore, he contends that his
conviction must be reduced to that offense and the cause must be remanded for resentencing.
¶ 58 Defendant relies primarily on opinions stating that, as a rule, death or great bodily harm
is not contemplated as the natural consequence of blows from bare fists. See, e.g., People v.
Crenshaw, 298 Ill. 412, 416-17 (1921); People v. Mighell, 254 Ill. 53, 59 (1912); People v.
Yeoman, 2016 IL App (3d) 140324, ¶ 20; People v. Nibbe, 2016 IL App (4th) 140363, ¶ 27;
People v. Jones, 404 Ill. App. 3d 734, 748 (2010). Defendant recognizes the exceptions to this
principle, i.e., (1) when the defendant inflicts multiple blows on the victim (see Yeoman, 2016 IL
App (3d) 140324, ¶ 21) and (2) when there is a great disparity in size and strength between the
defendant and the victim (see People v. Brackett, 117 Ill. 2d 170, 180 (1987); Yeoman, 2016 IL
App (3d) 140324, ¶ 21). But he maintains that the evidence did not prove that he hit Stone more
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than once in the bedroom or that his previous attacks had any role in causing her death, and he
contends that there was no proof of a great disparity in size or strength between Stone and
himself.
¶ 59 The State responds that, under the circumstances, the judge properly concluded that
defendant knew that his act created a strong probability of great bodily harm (although not death)
to Stone. The State notes that, shortly before the fatal altercation in the bedroom, defendant had
battered Stone twice, and the second blow had caused bruising and rendered her unconscious.
The State notes further that the judge found that the loss of consciousness was “great bodily
harm.” Thus, the State reasons, having recently caused Stone great bodily harm by a blow with
his fist, defendant knew that a second blow to the weakened victim created a strong probability
that she would again suffer great bodily harm.
¶ 60 For the following reasons, we hold that the State proved guilty knowledge.
¶ 61 In considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we ask only whether, after
viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational fact finder could
have found the elements of the offense proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Ward, 154
Ill. 2d 272, 326 (1992). The trier of fact is responsible for determining the witnesses’ credibility,
weighing their testimony, and deciding on the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the
evidence. People v. Hill, 272 Ill. App. 3d 597, 603-04 (1995). It is not our function to retry the
defendant. People v. Lamon, 346 Ill. App. 3d 1082, 1089 (2004).
¶ 62 To resolve defendant’s claim, we must apply the statutory language. The statute requires
knowledge of a “strong probability” of death or “great bodily harm.” 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2)
(West 2012). “Strong probability” is “between the ‘practical certainty’ and the ‘likely cause’ and
‘substantial and unjustifiable risk’ of involuntary manslaughter.” Nibbe, 2016 IL App (4th)
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140363, ¶ 25 (quoting People v. Davis, 35 Ill. 2d 55, 60 (1966)). This definition is necessarily
imprecise, but it is settled. The definition of “great bodily harm” as used in the first-degree­
murder statute is, however, less settled. The parties cite several cases in which great bodily
harm was an element of the charged offense (such as aggravated battery). These opinions
discuss specific and limited instances of actual bodily harm but not potential bodily harm, which
can include a wide, if not indefinite, range of results that never materialize. Thus, the opinions
do not map neatly onto cases in which the fact finder must determine not whether “great bodily
harm” occurred, but instead whether the defendant knew that “great bodily harm” was highly
probable.
¶ 63 In People v. Mays, 91 Ill. 2d 251, 256 (1982), the supreme court construed the term
“bodily harm” in the context of simple battery (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, ¶ 12-3 (now codified
at 720 ILCS 5/12-3(a) (West 2016)). “[S]ome sort of physical pain or damage to the body, like
lacerations, bruises or abrasions, whether temporary or permanent, is required.” Mays, 91 Ill. 2d
at 256. To define “great bodily harm” and determine whether the State had proved it in a given
case, courts have started with Mays’s general statement and then considered (1) the construction
of the added term “great” and (2) whether the bodily harm to the victim in the particular case
rose to that level.
¶ 64 On the first score, courts have recognized the obvious: “great” bodily harm must be
something more than the mere “bodily harm” required for simple battery. See, e.g., In re J.A.,
336 Ill. App. 3d 814, 815-16 (2003); People v. Figures, 216 Ill. App. 3d 398, 401 (1991).
However, in itself, this truism is not helpful to defining how severe bodily harm must be in order
to rise to “great.” It appears to us that the court’s statement in Mays was intended not to set a
baseline for proving simple battery or to distinguish “bodily harm” from “great bodily harm,” but
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only to differentiate between battery based on bodily harm and battery based on insulting or
provoking contact. See People v. Cisneros, 2013 IL App (3d) 110851, ¶¶ 16-18; see also Mays,
91 Ill. 2d at 256. Thus, beyond reflecting a commonsense understanding of “bodily harm,”
whether “great” or not so great, Mays does not bear on the construction of “great bodily harm.”
¶ 65 Moreover, there is another reason why opinions from cases in which the issue was
whether the victim suffered “great bodily harm” are of little guidance in construing the term as it
is used in the murder statute. These opinions could be read to hold that whether injuries
amounted to “great bodily harm” is a factual question that the fact finder has wide latitude to
decide even on a given set of facts or when the facts of the injury are not in dispute. See, e.g.,
People v. Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d 335, 344 (2001); People v. Lopez-Bonilla, 2011 IL App (2d)
100688, ¶ 14. 1
1
In Crespo, the court stated that “what constitutes ‘great bodily harm’ to support a charge
of aggravated battery is a question of fact to be determined by the finder of fact.” Crespo, 203
Ill. 2d at 344. Whether the court meant to imply that the jury’s or trial judge’s finding of
ultimate fact is entitled to deference even if the underlying historical facts are undisputed cannot
be ascertained from the opinion. In support of its statement, the court cited People v. Hadley, 20
Ill. App. 3d 1072, 1077 (1974). Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d at 344. In Hadley, the testimony was
conflicting, making the credibility of the witnesses crucial, so it cannot be read to hold that
courts of review should defer to the jury’s or trial judge’s finding of ultimate fact based on
undisputed historical facts. However, it appears that, in two of the opinions that Hadley cited,
People v. Newton, 7 Ill. App. 3d 445, 447 (1972), and People v. Polansky, 6 Ill. App. 3d 773,
775-76 (1972), the pertinent underlying facts were not in dispute.
In Lopez-Bonilla, the issue was whether, at sentencing, the State had proved “great bodily
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¶ 66 Cases construing “great bodily harm” as used in statutes where it is an element of the
offense provide uncertain guidance to the meaning of the same term as it is used in the murder
statute. The statute requires the State to prove that a defendant knew that his act created a strong
probability of great bodily harm. While the fact finder can properly decide whether specific
conduct under specific circumstances created a strong probability of certain consequences—e.g.,
lacerations, contusions, and bruises of whatever severity, etc.—the fact finder ought not decide
whether given potential consequences satisfy the requirement of “great bodily harm.” 2 It is not
the job of juries and trial courts to construe statutes, subject only to deferential review by higher
courts. But allowing the fact finder to decide whether an entire range of hypothetical results
harm” as a prerequisite to limiting the defendant’s good-time credit. We did not set out the
defendant’s argument but noted only that he “addresse[d] the issue as one of statutory
interpretation and ask[ed] [the] court to find a lack of great bodily harm as a matter of law.”
Lopez-Bonilla, 2011 IL App (2d) 100688, ¶ 14. We then stated that the question was one of fact
and that the State had introduced sufficient evidence of great bodily harm. Id. ¶¶ 15-18. The
evidence appears to have been undisputed, but we might merely have been rejecting a proposed
per se rule about the construction of the term. That we considered ourselves bound to decide
whether the evidence was sufficient could be taken as implying that whether given injuries
amount to “great bodily harm” is ultimately a question of law. But the opinion is not clear on
this matter.
2
As courts have long recognized, the application of a legal standard to a given set of facts
is not a question of fact that implicates deferential review but a question of law that courts of
review decide with no deference to the fact finder. See, e.g., City of Champaign v. Torres, 214
Ill. 2d 234, 241 (2005); People v. Lamborn, 185 Ill. 2d 585, 590 (1999).
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contains any that satisfy a statutory term is in effect to delegate the duty of statutory construction
to the fact finder.
¶ 67 We therefore look beyond the foregoing set of cases and address those in which the
murder statute was actually at issue. In particular, we discuss the authority that defendant cites
for the proposition that, ordinarily, a single bare-fisted blow does not support a conviction of
first-degree murder as charged here.
¶ 68 In Mighell, the defendant confronted the victim, a stranger theretofore, and struck him
with his fist. The blow caused a skull fracture, which in turn ruptured the victim’s carotid artery
and caused his death. The supreme court reduced the defendant’s conviction of first-degree
murder to involuntary manslaughter, noting the lack of proof that the defendant had intended to
kill the victim and reasoning that he had not committed “such an unlawful act as in its
consequences would naturally tend to destroy the life of a human being under any conditions
reasonably to be anticipated.” Mighell, 254 Ill. at 59.
¶ 69 In Crenshaw, in a spontaneous confrontation, the defendant killed the victim with a
single blow to the side of the face or head. Crenshaw, 298 Ill. at 414. The supreme court
reversed his conviction of murder and remanded for a new trial. The court explained that murder
required malice, which would be presumed “where the act is deliberate and is likely to be
attended with dangerous or fatal consequences.” Id. at 416. However, the court concluded,
“[t]he striking of a blow with the fist on the side of the face or head is not likely to be attended
with dangerous or fatal consequences.” Id. at 416-17. Also, the disparity in the size and strength
of the two men was not so great that “dangerous or fatal consequences” could reasonably have
been expected from the blow. Id. at 417-18. Thus, the defendant might have committed
manslaughter, but he did not commit murder. Id. at 417. We note that, although Crenshaw,
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unlike Mighell, addressed the likelihood not merely of death but also of “dangerous
consequences,” it did not define that term.
¶ 70 In Jones, the appellate court reduced the defendant’s conviction from first-degree murder
to involuntary manslaughter. The case did not involve a fatal punch; the victim died of asphyxia
after the defendant held him down on the ground by placing his foot between the victim’s chest
and head for approximately one minute. Jones, 404 Ill. App. 3d at 737-38. The court explained
that a knowing-murder conviction required proof that a defendant “is consciously aware that his
conduct is practically certain to cause a particular result.” Id. at 742. In holding that the
defendant’s conduct did not meet this standard, the court relied partly on “[the] long-standing
principle in Illinois that death is not ordinarily contemplated as a natural consequence of blows
from bare fists,” except “where there is a great disparity in size and strength between the
defendant and the victim.” Id. at 748.
¶ 71 In Nibbe, the defendant approached the victim on a sidewalk and punched him in the
head, causing him to fall and hit his head on the pavement, suffering a skull fracture, which
caused the victim’s death. The appellate court held that the State did not prove knowing murder.
The court found applicable “the principle that death is not ordinarily contemplated as a natural
consequence of blows from bare fists.” Nibbe, 2016 IL App (4th) 140363, ¶ 34. In Yeoman, the
court reversed the defendant’s conviction of second-degree murder (which required proof of
first-degree murder). The defendant exited his car, confronting another driver who had exited his
car, and punched him once in the face. The victim fell back, hit his head on the pavement, and
suffered a fatal hematoma. Yeoman, 2016 IL App (3d) 140324, ¶¶ 4-5. The court relied on the
bare-fist rule and found no exception applicable. Id. ¶¶ 20-22. In both Nibbe and Yeoman, the
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courts did not consider the meaning of “great bodily harm,” and indeed, their recitation of the
one-punch rule included the word “death” but not the phrase “great bodily harm.”
¶ 72 Defendant contends that the foregoing opinions dictate the result here. He notes that
there is no direct evidence of what happened in the bedroom—of the two participants, one was
left unconscious and soon died, and the other did not testify—and no indirect evidence that
Stone’s fatal subarachnoid hemorrhage was caused by anything more than a single blow to the
head with his bare fist. He also asserts that the State produced no evidence that he was greatly
larger or stronger than Stone. Finally, he cites the medical testimony that the type of injury that
Stone suffered is extremely rare, at least when there is only one blow with a bare fist.
¶ 73 The State contends that the opinions that we have cited are distinguishable. Primarily, it
argues, defendant’s knowledge could be inferred from the injury that he had inflicted on Stone
shortly before the fatal blow. The State notes that the judge specifically stated that defendant
had already caused Stone great bodily harm by battering her into unconsciousness. Thus, the
State reasons, the judge could infer that, a short time later, defendant was practically certain that
another punch would probably cause equally serious harm. The State notes that the law did not
require the judge to find that defendant foresaw the particular type of great bodily harm that he
actually inflicted. See People v. Willett, 2015 IL App (4th) 130702, ¶ 53.
¶ 74 We agree with the State that this case differs from those on which defendant relies in one
crucial respect. In each of the cited cases, the defendant inflicted the fatal blow during his initial
and sole confrontation with his victim, or at least the only one in which he used force. There was
no basis for the defendant to infer that the victim had been weakened to the point where one
blow with a bare fist could inflict great bodily harm. More important, there was nothing to put
the defendant on notice that he had the ability to cause great bodily harm to the victim with one
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blow. Here, however, having already knocked Stone unconscious and bruised her, defendant
punched her again.
¶ 75 Accordingly, we are compelled to conclude that the judge reasonably inferred that, when
he delivered the fatal blow, defendant knew that it was highly probable that he would inflict as
much bodily harm on Stone as he did the last time that he battered her. Common sense dictated
the inference that she was no more able to withstand the third blow than the second one. More
important, defendant knew that he had just inflicted bruising and unconsciousness with a single
punch.
¶ 76 The opinions on which defendant relies did not prevent the judge from concluding that
Stone’s loss of consciousness was “great bodily harm” per the murder statute. These opinions do
not define the term or even hint at a definition; indeed, Jones, Nibbe, and Yeoman cite the bare-
fist rule with reference only to death.
¶ 77 We have found no Illinois opinion that addresses whether, or when, loss of consciousness
by itself is “great bodily harm” under the murder statute or any other statute that uses the term.
One opinion held that the infant victim’s concussion was “great bodily harm” under the
aggravated-battery statute. People v. Morgan, 62 Ill. App. 3d 279, 284 (1978). However, a
concussion is not synonymous with a loss of consciousness, and the medical testimony did not
allow a solid inference that Stone suffered a concussion in the second of the violent encounters.
¶ 78 We therefore turn to foreign authority for its persuasive value. There is support for the
proposition that a loss of consciousness can be “great bodily harm.” In State v. Stafford, 340
N.W.2d 669, 670 (Minn. 1983), a State appeal from a pretrial order, the issue was whether the
State had demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it could withstand a motion to dismiss the
charge of felony assault in the third degree, which required proof of “great bodily harm.” The
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State’s offer of proof included testimony that the defendant had struck the victim, knocking her
unconscious and fracturing her nose. Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court held for the State. It
stated, “Arguably, ‘great bodily harm’ is inflicted if one knocks someone out briefly, as alleged
here. See Minn. Stat. § 609.02(8) (1982); State v. Jones, 266 N.W.2d 706 (Minn. 1978). We
need not decide this because we are satisfied that if the state can establish that defendant
unjustifiably assaulted the victim and broke her nose, the state will be able to withstand a motion
to dismiss.” Id.
¶ 79 In State v. Larkin, 620 N.W.2d 335 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), the defendant appealed his
conviction of third-degree assault, arguing that the State did not prove that he had caused the
victim “ ‘substantial bodily harm.’ ” Id. at 336; see Minn. Stat. § 609.223(1) (1998). The court
affirmed. It noted that the defendant, a jail inmate, had choked a cellmate, causing him to lose
consciousness until jailers called his name several times. This satisfied the statutory definition of
“ ‘substantial bodily harm,’ ” which included “ ‘bodily injury *** which causes a temporary but
substantial loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.’ ” Larkin, 620
N.W.2d at 336 (quoting Minn. Stat. § 609.02(7a) (1998)). The court noted Stafford’s statement
that a loss of consciousness is arguably “great bodily harm,” a higher standard, but ultimately
relied on the plain language of the definition of “substantial bodily harm.” Id. at 337-38.
¶ 80 Larkin also noted that, in Jones, which Stafford had cited, the victim had not merely been
knocked unconscious but had been on the verge of shock, did not regain consciousness until the
following day, and had suffered several other injuries and the Minnesota Supreme Court had
concluded that her injuries as a whole met the statutory definition of great bodily harm, which
included a catch-all provision for “ ‘other serious bodily harm.’ ” Id. at 337 (quoting Jones, 266
N.W.2d at 710, quoting Minn. Stat. § 609.02(8) (1996)).
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¶ 81 Although the Minnesota cases are not closely on point and rely in part on specific
statutory definitions, they (and the statutes that they cite) provide support for the proposition that
a loss of consciousness can amount to “great bodily harm” as that term is used in the murder
statute.
¶ 82 Persuasive authority is present elsewhere. In People v. Fuentes, 169 P.2d 391 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1946), the court did agree with the defendant that he had not been proved guilty of
committing an assault on the victim “ ‘by any means of force likely to produce great bodily
injury.’ ” Id. at 392 (quoting Cal. Penal Code § 245 (West 1945)). The defendant had punched
the victim in the jaw, knocking him down and rendering him unconscious. The victim regained
consciousness at home shortly afterward, and he also suffered some bruising and a small
laceration. Id. The court conceded that the use of fists could produce the type of force that the
statute required for a conviction, but it then held that “[a] blow to the jaw sufficient to knock out
the recipient is not *** ordinarily considered a great bodily injury for it is usual for the victim to
recover consciousness and the use of his normal faculties within a short time[,] which [the
victim] did.” Id. at 393. Also, the cut and bruising to the head were too slight to show that the
defendant’s punch had been likely to cause great bodily injury. Id. at 394.
¶ 83 Fuentes would militate strongly in favor of defendant here—except that it has been
thoroughly repudiated. In People v. Muir, 53 Cal. Rptr. 398, 399 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1966), the
defendant punched the victim once, causing her to lose consciousness for a short period and to
have limited recall of the events shortly after she returned to consciousness. He was convicted of
assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (the same offense as in Fuentes).
On appeal, he argued that the trial court had erred in not giving the jury an instruction based on
Fuentes. Id. at 401. The court of appeals disagreed. It stated flatly that “the apparent holding
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[of Fuentes], that a blow to the jaw sufficient to knock out the recipient cannot prove such an
assault, is wrong.” Id. at 401-02. The statute prohibited an assault by force likely to produce
great bodily injury, even if it did not in fact do so. Whether the force used in a given case met
this standard was primarily a question of fact, and “[a] rule which declares as a matter of law that
the force behind a blow to the head which causes unconsciousness [is not such a force] may have
had some value in the more robust past *** but it is plainly contradicted by everyday experience
and is *** bad law.” Id. at 402; see also People v. Rupert, 98 Cal. Rptr. 203, 206 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1971) (agreeing with Muir).
¶ 84 The California opinions provide considerable support for the finding that defendant’s
second blow to Stone, which rendered her unconscious and also caused bruising and swelling to
the area of her left eye and cheek, resulted in “great bodily harm,” thus strengthening the
inference that, when defendant battered Stone shortly afterward in the bedroom, he knew that
there was a strong probability of inflicting great bodily harm then as well. We see no meaningful
difference between section 9-1(a)(2)’s “great bodily harm” and the California statute’s “great
bodily injury.” In the California line of cases, it appears that defining “great bodily injury” was
left primarily to the courts; so too here. We see nothing in our jurisprudence that would prevent
the adoption of the sound reasoning of Muir and Rupert.
¶ 85 To be clear, we do not adopt a per se rule that any loss of consciousness, no matter how
temporary, always amounts to “great bodily harm.” We do, however, repudiate any per se rule
to the contrary. Most important, we hold that the trial court properly concluded that Stone had
suffered “great bodily harm” from the second blow and that this conclusion amply supported the
crucial finding that the State proved defendant’s guilty knowledge in connection with the fatal
third blow.
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¶ 86 We also note that, in addition to the loss of consciousness, the second blow produced
substantial swelling and bruising that lasted through the time of the fatal strike. To the extent
that the loss of consciousness might not be considered “great bodily harm” in itself (a conclusion
that we need not reach), the combination of the loss of consciousness and the physical
disfigurement did so.
¶ 87 Moreover, the weakening of Stone by the second blow was an additional reason for
defendant to realize that a third punch was highly likely to cause equally severe if not even worse
harm. Less than an hour passed between the two attacks. Although Stone had regained
consciousness, it was reasonable for the trial judge as fact finder to infer that the severity of the
second blow had clearly weakened Stone and that defendant was aware of as much.
¶ 88 For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the State proved defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of first-degree murder.
¶ 89 Defendant’s second argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in admitting Stone’s
statement to Jordan, “ ‘[defendant] is going to kill me.’ ” Defendant contends that the statement
did not meet the third requirement of the spontaneous-declaration exception to the hearsay rule:
that it relate to the circumstances of the startling occurrence. See Ill. R. Evid. 803(2) (eff. Jan. 1,
2011); Williams, 193 Ill. 2d at 352. Defendant reasons that Stone’s statement related only to
what he would do sometime in the future.
¶ 90 The admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its
decision will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. People v. DeSomer, 2013 IL
App (2d) 110663, ¶ 12. A trial court abuses its discretion when no reasonable person would take
the view adopted by the trial court. People v. Fretch, 2017 IL App (2d) 151107, ¶ 47.
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¶ 91 We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion. Although the statement explicitly
referred only to defendant’s future conduct, it implicitly related to his very recent past conduct.
Had Stone merely fallen off a chair, as defendant later claimed, she would not have told Jordan
that defendant was going to kill her. Her prediction tended to prove that defendant had just
committed an act of violence against her. Thus, the remark related to the startling event that
preceded it, and it was relevant to prove a contested and important fact.
¶ 92 In any event, even if we could say that the court abused its discretion, we would conclude
that the error was harmless. The evidence overwhelmingly proved that defendant battered Stone
in the kitchen and not that she fell off a chair. In any other respect, there was little if any danger
that the remark would unduly prejudice defendant. That it might have unfairly implied that
defendant had intended to kill Stone was not crucial here. The State did not contend that, when
he administered the fatal blow, defendant intended to kill Stone. Instead, it contended only that
he knew that his act would create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm. The judge
accepted that argument, on the basis of the medical evidence and defendant’s prior batteries of
Stone. Stone’s remark to Jordan could not reasonably have affected the decision.
¶ 93 We turn to defendant’s final contention on appeal. He requests that, if we affirm his
conviction, we correct the judgment order to state that he was convicted under the knowing-
murder statutory subsection (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 2012)) and not the intentional-murder
subsection (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2012)). We exercise our power to enter any order that
the trial court could have entered (see Ill. S. Ct. R. 366(a)(5) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994)) and hereby
amend the judgment. As part of our judgment, we grant the State’s request that defendant be
assessed $50 as costs for this appeal. 55 ILCS 5/4-2002(a) (West 2016); see also People v.
Nicholls, 71 Ill. 2d 166, 178 (1978).
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¶ 94 The judgment of the circuit court of Lake County is affirmed as modified.
¶ 95 Affirmed as modified.
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