In re M.B.

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2023 IL App (3d) 220413-UOrder filed March 13, 2023
____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
2023
In re M.B., ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) of the 12th Judicial Circuit,
a Minor ) Will County, Illinois,
)
(The People of the State of Illinois, )
)
Petitioner-Appellee, ) Appeal No. 3-22-0413
) Circuit No. 22-JD-119
v. )
)
M.B., ) Honorable
) Paula A. Gomora,
Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge, Presiding.
____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE Brennan delivered the judgment of the court.
Justice Davenport concurred in the judgment.
Justice McDade dissented.
____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
¶1 Held: The court did not err by denying respondent’s amended motion to withdraw guilty
plea.
¶2 Respondent, M.B., appeals following the Will County circuit court’s order denying the
amended motion to withdraw her guilty plea. Respondent argues the court failed to ensure her
guilty plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Specifically, (1) the court failed to ensure
that respondent knew that she was pleading guilty to a Class 3 felony, given respondent’s below-
average intelligence quotient (IQ), and the court’s failure to question defense counsel or
respondent’s mother, and (2) the State failed to provide a sufficient factual basis to support the
admission. We affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On May 20, 2022, the State filed a petition for juvenile adjudication, alleging that
respondent committed aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(d)(3) (West 2022)), in that she
“made physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with Christine Reed, knowing ***
Reed to be a school employee.” Respondent was present in court with her mother. The court
appointed the public defender and ordered a psychological evaluation. The court informed
respondent that the petition “allege[d] one count of aggravated battery, a Class 3 felony. The
named alleged victim is a school employee.”
¶5 On August 4, 2022, respondent was present with counsel and her mother in court. The
State informed the court that respondent would be admitting the allegation in the petition and
that there was an agreement. The State advised specifically that respondent was admitting to
“one count of aggravated battery, a Class 3 felony.” The agreement was for one year of probation
with nominal fines and costs, evaluations and counseling, and “a letter of apology to Christine
Reed . . . a teacher at Gompers Junior High[.]” Respondent’s counsel confirmed that was the
agreement. The following colloquy occurred:
“THE COURT: *** [Y]ou have had an opportunity to review the admission form
with your attorney, is that right?
***
[RESPONDENT]: Yes.
2
THE COURT: *** And you are now 13 years old, correct?
[RESPONDENT]: Yes.
THE COURT: And you have indicated that you are not taking any medication, is
that statement true?
[RESPONDENT]: Yes
***
THE COURT: Is there anything that would affect your ability to understand
anything that’s going on during this proceeding?
[RESPONDENT]: No.
THE COURT: You understand that the State is charging you with aggravated
battery, a Class 3 felony, which would have a maximum sentence of five years in the
Department of Juvenile Justice, is that your understanding?
[RESPONDENT]: Yes.
THE COURT: You also understand that you have the right to continue in your
plea of not guilty and make the State prove the allegations in the petition beyond a
reasonable doubt? ***
[RESPONDENT]: Yes.
THE COURT: You also understand that you have the right to have a trial?
[RESPONDENT]: Yes.
THE COURT: That trial would be before me, and during that trial, you would
have the right to confront the State’s witnesses. That means you have the right to be
present in court, listen to the witnesses testify and then have your attorney cross-examine
those witnesses; then, after the State has presented all of its witnesses, you would have
3
the right to present your own witnesses in your defense. In addition, you would have the
right to testify, but the law does not require that you do so, however, by admitting to me
that you are guilty of the offense with which the State has charged you, you are giving up
those rights. Do you understand?
[RESPONDENT]: Yes.”
¶6 The State gave its factual basis to support the petition contending that the “evidence
would show on or about May 19, 2022, *** [respondent] was at school, *** [and] was in a
physical altercation. *** Reed is a teacher *** [and] was trying to assist the situation, and
[respondent] struck *** Reed about the body with her hands.” Respondent agreed that the
witnesses would testify substantially the same as the State represented and the court found that
the factual basis supported the allegations. The court continued, “did anyone force you to enter
into this plea?” and “[d]id anyone make any promises to you or threaten you, in order to get you
to plead guilty?” Respondent replied “[n]o” to both questions. The court found that respondent
knew and understood the nature of the charges contained in the petition and the sentencing order
and thus, “knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waive[d] her right to a hearing on the petition
and to the allegations contained therein.” Respondent indicated that she did not have any
questions. The court sentenced respondent to one year of probation.
¶7 Respondent’s “Order Following *** Plea on Delinquency *** Petition” indicated that
respondent admitted the allegations in the original petition, being “aggravated battery” a “Cl. 3.”
Respondent’s separate admission document shows that she admitted to the offense of
“[a]ggravated battery (Class 3)” on August 4, 2022. The document states:
“I understand that by admitting to this offense I am giving up my right to a trial.
The hearing which I am giving up would be held to determine if I committed the offense
4
in question. I am presumed not to have committed this offense and it is the responsibility
of the petitioner to prove beyond a reasonable doubt *** that I committed the offense. By
signing this admission, I am giving up my right to this trial.
I understand that by admitting to this offense, I am giving up my right to have the
people who know about the offense brought to Court and testify about the offense after
they are given an oath to tell the truth. I understand that none of these people will be
present in Court and the Court will proceed as if they had been in Court and testified
about what I had done.
I understand that I can require people to come to Court to testify on my behalf. If
requested by me, these people would be directed by the Court to appear and to testify. I
understand that by signing this admission, I am giving up the right to have people brought
to Court to testify.
No one has threatened me to get me to sign this document.
No promises have been made to me to get me to sign this document, other than
any agreement which may have been reached between my attorney and the petitioner.
I have been given an opportunity by the Court to ask any questions that I may
have about this proceeding, about this document and about my rights. All my questions
have been answered.
I have signed this admission in open Court ***.”
The document has respondent’s signature. Respondent’s counsel signed the document certifying
that she represented respondent during the plea proceeding and was present when the admission
was read to respondent. Counsel affirmed that she answered respondent’s questions and
5
respondent “understood *** her rights and that *** she was waiving those rights by signing this
admission.”
¶8 Respondent’s psychological evaluation showed that her “Word Reading score, which
measures [respondent’s] letter and word decoding through letter identification and word
recognition was in the low average range (16th percentile). [Her] Sentence Comprehension
score, which measures [the] ability to gain meaning from words and comprehend ideas and
information contained in sentences was average range.” Respondent was “below average” with
no marked deficits for verbal skills. Respondent’s “IQ Composite” “Standard Score” was 80.
Respondent was 13 years old and in eighth grade at the time of the evaluation. The evaluation
estimated her intellectual age at nine years old. Respondent reported receiving grades consisting
of A’s and B’s and did not have an individual education program (IEP) or a learning disability.
¶9 On August 25, 2022, respondent filed a “Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea” alleging that
she (1) “was not aware that this case was a felony,” and (2) “did not commit the offense in
question.”
¶ 10 On September 20, 2022, respondent filed an “Amended Motion to Vacate Judgment and
Withdraw Guilty Plea.” The amended motion added that respondent “entered a plea of guilty to
the charge of Aggravated Battery (class 3) and was sentenced to one year probation.”
¶ 11 On October 13, 2022, the court held a hearing on the amended motion to withdraw guilty
plea. Counsel informed the court that respondent and her mother wanted to “convey to the Court
that [respondent] never intentionally struck a teacher. [Respondent] was fighting with another
student and the teacher became involved ***.” Respondent’s mother informed the court that they
“would have never made the plea” if they had known the charge was a felony offense. The
6
mother also stated that she “didn’t know” she could speak during the plea proceeding. The court
denied respondent’s motion. Respondent appealed.
¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 13 Respondent argues the court erred by denying the amended motion to withdraw her guilty
plea, as she showed that it failed to ensure her guilty plea was knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary. According to respondent, (1) the court failed to ensure that respondent knew that she
was pleading guilty to a Class 3 felony, given respondent’s below average IQ, and the court’s
failure to question respondent’s counsel or respondent’s mother, and (2) the State failed to
provide a sufficient factual basis to support the admission.
¶ 14 A. Plea Withdrawal
¶ 15 A respondent has no absolute right to withdraw his guilty plea. People v. Delvillar, 235
Ill. 2d 507, 520 (2009). To withdraw a guilty plea, a respondent must demonstrate that: (1) the
plea was entered on a misapprehension of the facts or law, or (2) her agreement to the plea was
the result of misrepresentations by counsel, the State, or another authority. People v. Davis, 145
Ill. 2d 240, 244 (1991). “[T]he burden is on the [respondent] to establish that the circumstances
existing at the time of the plea, judged by objective standards, justified the mistaken impression.”
Id. The decision to grant or deny the motion to withdraw a guilty plea lies with the circuit court
and is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Delvillar, 235 Ill. 2d at 519.
¶ 16 The standard for determining what due process requires in any juvenile proceeding is
“fundamental fairness.” People v. Taylor, 76 Ill. 2d 289, 302 (1979). “An admission of a
delinquent act by a minor in a juvenile court proceeding is entitled to protections at least equal to
that which are constitutionally required for the making of guilty pleas in criminal trials [citation]
thereby ensuring that admissions are made intelligently and voluntarily.” In re B.R., 164 Ill. App.
73d 784, 789 (1987). “[A] plea of guilty may be accepted when the court has informed the minor
of the consequences of his or her plea and of the maximum penalty provided by law.” 705 ILCS
405/5-605(2)(a) (West 2022). To satisfy due process requirements, it must be “apparent from the
record that the minors were aware of the consequences of their admissions; that is, that they
understood their rights against self-incrimination, their rights to confront their accusers and their
rights to a trial.” In re Beasley, 66 Ill. 2d 385, 392 (1977); 705 ILCS 405/5-605(2)(a) (West
2022). A reviewing court must assess whether the guilty plea was affirmatively shown to have
been made voluntarily and intelligently. Delvillar, 235 Ill. 2d at 520. In terms of voluntariness,
the court looks to whether respondent had knowledge of the direct consequences of his plea prior
to its acceptance. Id.¶ 17 In the present case, respondent argues that she did not understand the consequences of
her plea, in that she was pleading guilty to a Class 3 felony. To support her claim, respondent
points to her below average IQ and the court’s failure to question defense counsel or
respondent’s mother. The State argues that respondent failed to ask for plain error review in her
opening brief, and thus forfeits the argument. Although respondent’s below-average IQ claim
was not raised in her amended motion to withdraw guilty plea, we find that the overarching
argument is close enough to avoid the procedural bar of forfeiture. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d
176, 186 (1988) (to preserve an issue for appellate review, a defendant must object to it at trial
and raise it in a posttrial motion); see In re Amanda H., 2017 IL App (3d) 150164, ¶ 33
(“forfeiture is a limitation on the parties, not on the court [citation], and a reviewing court may
ignore forfeiture in order to achieve a just result”).
¶ 18 The record shows that, at the detention hearing on May 20, 2022, the State informed the
court and respondent that the petition alleged that respondent committed “aggravated battery, a
8
Class 3 felony.” On August 4, 2022, the State told the court that respondent was admitting the
allegations in the petition, that being “one count of aggravated battery, a Class 3 felony.” Later,
the court stated that respondent’s “aggravated battery, *** Class 3 felony” offense had a
maximum sentence of five years’ imprisonment. Further, respondent’s signed admission
indicated that she was pleading guilty to “[a]ggravated battery (Class 3)” and that her counsel
had read the form to respondent and answered any of her questions. Respondent informed the
court during the plea proceeding that she had no questions and that there was nothing that would
affect her ability to understand the proceeding. At no time did the court, the State, or defense
counsel mention a different charge, suggest that the charge had been amended, or that the State
filed a new charge. While respondent’s reading and verbal comprehension were below average,
she reported receiving average grades, and did not have a learning disability or IEP. Importantly,
respondent indicated that she understood the rights that she was waiving. Therefore, respondent
has not established by a “substantial objective proof” that her claimed misunderstanding of the
consequences of the charge was “reasonably justified.” See Davis, 145 Ill. 2d at 244.
¶ 19 Respondent also argues that the court’s failure to question defense counsel and
respondent’s mother contributed to her unknowing and involuntary plea. We note that
respondent fails to cite any authority requiring the court to question a minor’s defense counsel or
parents during the plea proceeding or inform the parents of their ability to participate in the
proceeding. See People v. Edwards, 2012 IL App (1st) 091651, ¶ 29 (“A reviewing court is
entitled to have issues clearly defined with *** cohesive arguments presented; this court is not a
repository into which an appellant may foist the burden of argument and research.”).
Accordingly, respondent has forfeited this argument by failing to develop it with appropriate
authority.
9
¶ 20 Forfeiture aside, the record shows that counsel and respondent’s mother were present
with respondent on both court dates and at the plea proceeding. Cf. In re Marcus W., 389 Ill.
App. 3d 1113, 1126-27 (2009) (it is considered error when the State, circuit court, or
respondent’s counsel fails to give notice of the juvenile delinquency proceedings to respondent’s
parents or guardians and neither parent nor guardians appear for the proceedings). Further,
respondent’s counsel signed the admission, certifying that (1) she was present in court with
respondent when the admission was read to respondent, (2) she answered respondent’s questions,
and (3) respondent “understood *** her rights and that *** she was waiving those rights by
signing this admission.” In Beasley, our supreme court stated, “courts can, to a degree, at least,
rely upon the protection which a minor receives through the representation of counsel in assuring
that the admissions are voluntary and are not made in ignorance of his rights.” 66 Ill. 2d at 397.
Simply put, the record affirmatively shows that respondent entered a knowing and intelligent
plea.
¶ 21 B. Factual Basis
¶ 22 Respondent contends that the court erred by accepting the State’s factual basis although it
did not comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402(c) and section 5-605(2)(a) of the Juvenile
Court Act of 1987 (Act). See Ill. S. Ct. R. 402(c) (eff. July 1, 2012); 705 ILCS 405/5-605(2)(a)
(West 2022). Specifically, respondent alleges the State’s factual basis failed to assert that
respondent acted knowingly when she struck the teacher. Respondent contends that had the case
proceeded to trial, “the evidence would have been insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that [respondent] intentionally struck [Reed]” because respondent “was fighting another
student and [Reed] became involved when she was trying to break up the fight.*** [Respondent]
struck [Reed] inadvertently.” See 720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(d)(3) (West 2022).
10
¶ 23 The State argues initially that respondent’s sufficiency claim is forfeited where it was not
specifically raised in her motion to withdraw plea. See Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d at 186. Respondent
counters that her insufficient factual basis claim is preserved by her argument that she “did not
commit the offense in question.” Alternatively, respondent requests that we review the claim
under plain error. We find that respondent forfeited review of this claim as she did not object to
the factual basis during the plea hearing and this specific issue was not included in her motion to
withdraw guilty plea. Id. Therefore, we will review the claim under the plain error doctrine.
People v. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598, 611 (2010) (“When a defendant has forfeited appellate
review of an issue, the reviewing court will consider only plain error.”).
¶ 24 The plain error doctrine allows a reviewing court to consider an otherwise forfeited clear
or obvious error when “ ‘(1) the evidence is close, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or
(2) the error is serious, regardless of the closeness of the evidence.’ ” People v. Piatkowski, 225
Ill. 2d 551, 564 (2007) (quoting People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 187 (2005)). The defendant
bears the burden of persuasion under both prongs. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 187. The first step of the
plain error analysis is to determine whether an error occurred. People v. Eppinger, 2013 IL
114121, ¶ 19.
¶ 25 Initially, we note that the State contends that Rule 402 is inapplicable in juvenile
proceeding where proceedings under the Act are not considered criminal. See In re W.C., 167 Ill.
2d 307, 320 (1995). Nonetheless, the State contends that the court did comply with both Rule
402(c) and section 5-605(2)(a) of the Act. We agree.
¶ 26 Rule 402 requires that a court “shall not enter final judgment on a plea without first
determining that there is a factual basis for the plea.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 402(c) (eff. July 1, 2012).
Additionally, section 5-605(2)(a) of the Act requires that “[u]pon acceptance of a plea of guilty,
11
the court shall determine the factual basis of a plea.” 705 ILCS 405/5-605(2)(a) (West 2022). In
the case of a juvenile delinquency adjudication where the respondent admits the charge, “ ‘the
State’s Attorney did not need to present all—or even most—of the evidence he possessed in
support of respondent’s guilt of the charge to which he was offering to admit.’ ” People v.
Bassette, 391 Ill. App. 3d 453, 456 (2009) (quoting In re C.K.G., 292 Ill. App. 3d 370, 376
(1997)). The factual basis requirement is satisfied if there is a basis anywhere in the record from
which the court could reasonably reach the conclusion that the respondent actually committed
the acts with the intent required to constitute the offense being admitted. In re C.K.G., 292 Ill.
App. 3d 370, 376 (1997). Further, when determining whether a factual basis exists, the trial
court need not “ferret out possible defenses” for the respondent. Id.¶ 27 As charged in this case, the State was required to show that respondent committed an
aggravated battery in that respondent knowingly made physical contact of an insulting or
provoking nature with an individual, knowing that the individual battered was a teacher or school
employee upon school grounds. 720 ILCS 5/12-3(a)(2), 12-3.05(d)(3) (West 2022). The factual
basis established that respondent knowingly made contact of an insulting or provoking nature by
striking Reed, a teacher, while on school grounds.
¶ 28 Here, respondent only alleged that she did not intend to strike Reed. Illinois courts have
long held that a battery offense does not require the State to prove that respondent specifically
intended to commit a battery on a particular person. See People v. Hickman, 9 Ill. App. 3d 39, 44
(1973) (“[W]here one in the commission of a wrongful act commits another wrong not meant by
him, or where in the execution of an intent to do wrong, an unintended act resulting in a wrong
ensued as a natural and probable consequence, the one acting with wrongful intent is responsible
for the unintended wrong.”). Even accepting that respondent intended to commit a battery on a
12
student and instead struck a teacher, causing her to commit aggravated battery, she remains liable
for the unintended consequences that are the natural and probable consequences of her act. See
People v. Dorn, 378 Ill. App. 3d 693, 698 (2008). The State’s factual basis sufficiently
establishes the elements of aggravated battery and the court complied with Rule 402(c) and
section 5-605(a)(2) of the Act when it accepted respondent’s guilty plea. Therefore, respondent
cannot establish plain error where no error occurred.
¶ 29 Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion when it denied respondent’s motion to
withdraw her guilty plea.
¶ 30 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 31 The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed.
¶ 32 Affirmed.
¶ 33 JUSTICE McDADE, dissenting:
¶ 34 Respondent in this case is a 13-year-old child who stands convicted, pursuant to a
negotiated guilty plea, of a felony growing out of her involvement in a fight with a fellow student
at her junior high school. During the course of the altercation, a teacher who was attempting to
stop the fight stepped in and was struck by a punch thrown by M.B. and intended to strike the
other student. After pleading guilty, M.B. was sentenced to one year of probation.
¶ 35 Shortly thereafter, M.B., through her public defender, sought to withdraw her guilty plea.
Her attorney filed a motion and an amended motion to vacate the judgment and withdraw the
guilty plea, asserting M.B. “was not aware that this case was a felony” and “did not commit the
offense in question.” A hearing on the motion was held and a different public defender made the
following argument:
13
“[M.B.’s COUNSEL]: In order to supplement the record, mother wishes me—
mother and the minor wishes [sic] me to convey to the Court that minor never
intentionally struck a teacher. She was fighting with another student and the teacher
became involved I guess trying to break up the fight. The other student hit the teacher as
well, but was never charged and the minor and other student are now friends.
THE COURT: Okay.
[M.B.’s COUNSEL]: I stand on our motion.”
When asked by the court if the State had anything to add, the prosecutor said: “Judge, the State
just objects to the motion.”
¶ 36 In its ruling on the motion, the judge noted that both the court and the State had recited
several times that M.B. was charged with a Class 3 felony. The court concluded, saying:
“The original petition also alleges that it’s a Class 3 felony, so the State gave a factual
basis, [M.B.] agreed to the factual basis during the course of the plea, and I have no
reason—no legal reason to reject the plea and vacate the guilty plea and judgment based
upon the transcript and having gone through the admission form. So motion denied.”
A discussion then ensued between M.B.’s mother and the court, in which the mother made the
following halting comments: “I wanted to appeal because we—I don’t know if you made a
mistake thinking I said it, but we were not of knowledge that it was—I would have never made
the plea—we were not of knowledge that it was going to be a felony.” After reiterating that both
the prosecutor and the court had made it clear that M.B. was charged with a Class 3 felony, the
judge concluded:
“I am not going to vacate the plea based upon the information that you have provided to
me, that you have changed your mind as far as what the occurrence was.
14
When the factual basis was stated, [M.B.] agreed to the factual basis, that that is
what the State’s witnesses would testify to, and I went through with the plea. So on that
basis, I won’t vacate it. You have the right to take an appeal.”
¶ 37 DISCUSSION
¶ 38 A. Sufficiency of the Plea
¶ 39 The sole crime with which M.B. was charged was the Class 3 felony of aggravated
battery. That crime is defined by two statutory provisions. As set out in section 12-3(a)(2) of the
Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/12-3(a)(2) (West 2020)), “[a] person commits battery if he
or she knowingly without legal justification by any means *** (2) makes physical contact of an
insulting or provoking nature with an individual.” This crime is a misdemeanor.
¶ 40 The factor which could, in this case, elevate the misdemeanor battery to felony status is
set out in section 12-3.05(d)(3) (id. § 12-3.05(d)(3)), which states: “(d) Offense based on status
of victim. A person commits aggravated battery when, in committing a battery, other than by
discharge of a firearm, he or she knows the individual battered to be any of the following: (3) A
teacher *** upon school grounds ***.” Thus, to commit the Class 3 offense of aggravated
battery, M.B. had to knowingly, without legal justification and by any means, make physical
contact of an insulting or provoking nature with a person knowing that she would be making that
contact with a teacher. Put another way, to commit the felony, M.B. had to know when she threw
the punch that it would hit a teacher; she had to mean to hit the teacher.
¶ 41 As shown by the transcripts of the four substantive hearings in this case, at no point in
any of the proceedings in this matter was that explained to M.B. M.B.’s counsel waived a
probable cause hearing at which the elements of aggravated battery would necessarily be
discussed. M.B. was told multiple times, as recited by the court, that she was charged with
15
aggravated battery, a Class 3 felony, but she was never told what the elements of the crime were
or that it was knowing she was hitting a teacher that made it a felony. 1 Nor did the court verify
on the record that M.B.’s attorney had explained the elements to her and that she understood
them. Significantly, the elements were not included in the factual basis or in the written
admission statement, set forth above (supra ¶ 6). What was clearly explained to this 13-year-old
who functioned at the level of a 9-year-old was that if she chose to be tried and she was
convicted of the Class 3 felony, she could be incarcerated for up to five years, but if she agreed
she was guilty, she would go home.
¶ 42 While M.B. was accurately and frequently advised what her alleged crime was called, she
was never told what it was that she was accused of doing wrong and what made it a felony. In
light of these facts, she has amply demonstrated that her guilty plea was not made knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily. She had no knowledge of the criminal offense she was pleading to;
she only knew what category of crime it fell into.
¶ 43 For this reason, the guilty plea is fatally infirm from its inception, and it cannot stand. See
Boykin v Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244 (1969).
¶ 44 B. Sufficiency of the Factual Basis
¶ 45 The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const., amend V. The same
protection is guaranteed by the Illinois Constitution. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2. In our judicial
system, to enable that deprivation through conviction of a crime, the State must meet a burden of
1
I believe, for what it is worth, that this is what M.B.’s mother was trying to convey when
she told the judge they did not know it was a felony.
16
proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, each critical element of a charged crime. If the defendant
persists in a denial of guilt, the State must meet its burden through the presentation and testing of
evidence in an adversarial proceeding (a bench or jury trial). If the conviction is secured by a
negotiated guilty plea, the State’s ultimate burden is no less stringent; it still has to prove
defendant guilty of the crime, it just does so in a different manner. Rather than adversarial
testing, the State negotiates with defendant to arrive at “terms” pursuant to which defendant will
forgo a trial and plead guilty. Procedurally, the State presents, for the court’s assessment and
acceptance, a “factual basis” showing that it has sufficient evidence to prove defendant guilty of
the specified crime if he or she were to demand a trial. Defendant then agrees that the factual
basis shows the State could satisfy its burden and prove him guilty and so pleads.
¶ 46 A negotiated plea was the method used to secure M.B.’s conviction. In the juvenile court
she challenged that plea, claiming through counsel at the hearing on her postplea motion that she
“never intentionally struck a teacher,” and in the motion itself that she (1) “was not aware that
this case was a felony,” and (2) “did not commit the offense in question.” These claims
challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting her guilty plea. In this court, M.B. denies
the sufficiency of the State’s factual basis to support her guilty plea on the element of knowing
she was striking a teacher, which was critical to proving her guilt because without that
knowledge there is no felony. A claim of insufficiency of evidence can be raised at any time; it is
not subject to forfeiture and can be raised for the first time on appeal. People v. Woods, 214 Ill.
2d 455, 470 (2005). Moreover, I would find that insufficiency of the evidence was asserted
below, further obviating any consideration of forfeiture or plain error in this review.
¶ 47 Turning to the claimed insufficiency of the factual basis in the support for the guilty plea,
the State’s factual basis alleged, in its entirety:
17
“[THE STATE]: Yes, Judge. The State’s evidence would show on or about May
19, 2022, within Joliet, Will County, Illinois, the minor was at school, that being
Gompers Junior High School, was in a physical altercation. *** Reed is a teacher at
Gompers Junior High, was trying to assist the situation, and the minor struck *** Reed
about the body with her hands.”
As can plainly be seen, nothing in the factual basis asserts the requisite knowledge to prove the
felony. Nor was M.B. asked any questions about her knowledge in conjunction with the taking of
the plea. Consequently, the critical element, the only element supporting the felony conviction
was never, to the child’s knowledge, on the table or part of her guilty plea.
¶ 48 I would find the guilty plea should be vacated as legally insufficient, find that the
inadvertent striking of the teacher in the circumstances of this case cannot support conviction of
a felony, and suggest that, under the specific circumstances in this case, any further pursuit of
this charge against M.B. should be reviewed for possible double jeopardy impact.
18