People v. Walker

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Appellate Court Date: 2021.03.22
15:03:49 -05'00'
People v. Walker, 2020 IL App (1st) 162305Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
Caption PIERRE WALKER, Defendant-Appellant.
District & No. First District, Sixth Division
No. 1-16-2305
Filed March 20, 2020
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 16-CR-2717; the
Review Hon. Arthur F. Hill Jr., Judge, presiding.
Judgment Reversed.
Counsel on James E. Chadd, Patricia Mysza, and Erin Sostock, of State Appellate
Appeal Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg
and Kathryn Schierl, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the
People.
Panel JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Justices Connors and Harris concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Defendant-appellant Pierre Walker 1 appeals his April 2016 conviction for unlawful use of
a weapon by a felon, for which he was sentenced to eight years and six months imprisonment.
On appeal, the defendant argues that (1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to
quash the search warrant and suppress evidence, (2) the State failed to prove that he possessed
a firearm in his own abode, and (3) the order for fines and fees should be amended. For the
reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 On October 28, 2015, Chicago Police Officer Matthew Diblich swore a complaint for a
search warrant requesting to search the defendant and the premises of the second floor
apartment located at 4249 West Jackson Boulevard in Chicago in order to seize a firearm that
was evidence of the crime of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon. Officer Diblich averred that
he had probable cause to believe that the firearm would be found with the defendant at that
location, referring to a conversation with a registered confidential informant who had provided
accurate information in the past. The circuit court issued the warrant and Officer Diblich and
Chicago Police Officer Ohle executed the warrant along with 6 to 10 other police officers. The
officers arrested the defendant after finding him in the apartment along with two boxes of
ammunition.
¶4 In November 2015, the defendant was indicted for unlawful use or possession of a weapon
by a felon. The indictment alleged that he “knowingly possessed in his own abode any firearm
ammunition, after having been previously convicted of the felony offense of
manufacture/delivery [of cocaine].”
¶5 A bench trial commenced in April 2016 with testimony from Officers Diblich and Ohle.
The officers testified that when they entered the three-bedroom apartment at 4249 West
Jackson Boulevard, they found the defendant sleeping on a “makeshift” bed in the dining room
area. There were five people in the apartment, besides the defendant, who were all detained
while the search was underway. Officer Diblich could not recall where in the apartment those
five people were when the officers entered to execute the search warrant.
¶6 Officer Diblich testified that during the search of the second bedroom, which did not have
a bed, another officer found two boxes of ammunition in the top drawer of a dresser. After
Officer Diblich photographed the ammunition and placed it into an evidence bag, he brought
the defendant into the room and showed him the ammunition as well as some cannabis that
was also recovered from the bedroom. Officer Diblich then read the defendant his rights, and
the defendant agreed to give a statement, admitting the bullets were his. Later, after the
defendant was arrested and taken to the police station, he told Officer Ohle, “I can’t wait to
find your kids. If you think *** that all I got is the bullets.”
¶7 On cross-examination, Officer Diblich admitted that he did not find anything linking the
defendant to the room where the bullets were found.
1
Pierre Walker is also known as Jamal or Jamel Walker. The State’s witnesses at trial referred to
the defendant as Pierre, while the defense witnesses referred to him as Jamal.
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¶8 Following the officers’ testimony, the State introduced into evidence a certified copy of
the defendant’s 2004 conviction for manufacture and delivery of cocaine. The defendant then
moved for a directed verdict, which was denied.
¶9 The defendant’s girlfriend of 13 years, Dana Johnson, testified on his behalf. According to
Johnson, in 2015, she lived with the defendant at two different addresses. Between January
and August 2015, the defendant and Johnson lived at 615 East Gunderson Drive in Carol
Stream, Illinois. After that, they lived at 619 North Meadows Boulevard in Melrose Park,
Illinois. Johnson produced a check stub and a traffic ticket mailed to the defendant at the East
Gunderson address, as well as a W-2 sent to the defendant at the North Meadows address.
¶ 10 Johnson testified that the defendant’s family lived at the Jackson Boulevard address where
the defendant was arrested. She further stated that when the defendant was not sleeping at their
house, he would sleep there. In October 2015, the defendant slept the “majority” of nights with
Johnson at their house but spent at least eight nights at Jackson Boulevard. Johnson explained
that he would visit his family at Jackson Boulevard and would stay overnight if he was “drunk
or something.”
¶ 11 As his final witness, the defendant called Keith Terrell, who lived at the Jackson Boulevard
address with three other people. Terrell, who was not related to the defendant, said that the
defendant did not live at that address and did not keep any belongings there. However, he
testified that the defendant stayed the night on October 28, 2015, because the defendant was
drunk. Terrell further testified that the bedroom where the bullets were found was Antoine
Walker’s bedroom. Indeed, Terrell testified that Antoine Walker was in that bedroom with a
woman who lived in the apartment when the police entered to execute the warrant. The police
then took all the occupants of the apartment into the front room while they searched the
premises.
¶ 12 Following closing arguments, the court found the defendant guilty of unlawful possession
of a weapon by a felon.
¶ 13 The court ultimately sentenced the defendant to eight years and six months of
imprisonment. Following the denial of his motion to reconsider sentence, the defendant timely
appealed.
¶ 14 ANALYSIS
¶ 15 We note that we have jurisdiction to review this matter, as the defendant filed a timely
notice of appeal following sentencing. Ill. S. Ct. R. 603 (eff. Feb. 6, 2013); R. 606 (eff. July 1,
2017).
¶ 16 On appeal, the defendant raises three contentions of error, but because we find that his
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is dispositive, we address it first.
¶ 17 A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence requires the reviewing court to consider
whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v.
Newton, 2018 IL 122958, ¶ 24. We will not substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact,
nor will we reverse a conviction unless the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory so as
to raise a reasonable doubt of a defendant’s guilt. People v. Wright, 2017 IL 119561, ¶ 70.
¶ 18 The defendant argues that the State failed to prove that he possessed the firearm
ammunition in his own abode pursuant to section 24-1.1(a) of the Criminal Code of 2012
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(Code). (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2014)). Section 24-1.1(a) of the Code, under which the
defendant was charged, provides in relevant part that
“[i]t is unlawful for a person to knowingly possess on or about his person or on his land
or in his own abode or fixed place of business *** any firearm or any firearm
ammunition if the person has been convicted of a felony under the laws of this State or
any other jurisdiction.” Id.¶ 19 Initially, the parties dispute whether the State was required to prove that Jackson Boulevard
was the defendant’s abode as an element of the offense of unlawful possession of a weapon by
a felon. Our supreme court has held that the “essential elements” of the offense of unlawful
possession of a weapon by a felon are (1) the knowing possession of a firearm and (2) a prior
felony conviction. People v. Gonzalez, 151 Ill. 2d 79, 85 (1992). 2 The court has explicitly held
that there is “no requirement” that an offender be using or possessing the weapon “in any
particular place.” Id. at 87; see also People v. Hester, 271 Ill. App. 3d 954, 956 (1995) (“[T]he
situs of the defendant’s possession does not constitute a material element of the offense [of
unlawful use of a weapon by a felon].”); People v. Lindsey, 324 Ill. App. 3d 193, 201 (2001)
(same). Accordingly, we agree with the State that, notwithstanding its representations to the
contrary at trial, it was not in fact required to prove that the defendant was in his own abode
when he possessed the ammunition as an element of the offense of unlawful possession of a
weapon by a felon.
¶ 20 That leaves us to address whether the State’s evidence was sufficient to prove the defendant
knowingly possessed the ammunition recovered from the dresser drawer. (Neither party
disputes that the defendant was a convicted felon.) Possession may be either actual or
constructive. People v. Terrell, 2017 IL App (1st) 142726, ¶ 18. Here, the defendant did not
actually possess the ammunition, and so the State was required to prove constructive
possession. Constructive possession is almost always subject to proof by circumstantial
evidence. Id. In order to establish the defendant’s constructive possession, the State was
required to prove that (1) the defendant had knowledge of the contraband and (2) the defendant
exercised immediate and exclusive control over the area where the contraband was found.
People v. Maldonado, 2015 IL App (1st) 131874, ¶ 23.
¶ 21 In support of its argument that it proved the defendant constructively possessed the
ammunition, the State points to his statements to Officers Diblich and Ohle. Specifically, the
defendant admitted to Officer Diblich that the bullets were his and later admitted the same to
Officer Ohle when he suggested that he had more than merely bullets to threaten the officer’s
children.
¶ 22 But in criminal proceedings, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt two
propositions—namely, that a crime was committed, also known as the corpus delicti, and that
the defendant committed the crime. People v. Smith, 2015 IL App (1st) 132176, ¶ 18.
Importantly, a confession alone is insufficient to prove the corpus delicti of an offense; there
must be some corroborating evidence tending to prove that a crime has been committed. People
2
To be sure, this case is several decades old, but the relevant language of section 24-1.1(a) of the
Code has not changed. Indeed, the fact that the legislature has amended section 24-1.1 of the Code
many times in the intervening years without a change in the relevant language of subsection (a) leads
us to conclude that the legislature acquiesced in Gonzalez’s interpretation. See People v. Phagan, 2019
IL App (1st) 153031, ¶ 104 (citing Bruso v. Alexian Brothers Hospital, 178 Ill. 2d 445, 458-59 (1997)).
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v. Lara, 2012 IL 112370, ¶ 17. This corroborating evidence need only tend to show the
commission of an offense. Id. ¶ 18. It is not necessary that the independent evidence establish
that the defendant committed a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Rather, it is sufficient if
the evidence tends to connect the defendant with a crime. Id. ¶ 44.
¶ 23 Before addressing the merits of this issue, we first acknowledge that the defendant did not
explicitly argue that the State failed to prove the corpus delicti. Instead, on appeal, he generally
maintained that the evidence was insufficient to prove he constructively possessed the
ammunition. Ordinarily (and as the State took pains to point out in its petition for rehearing),
a reviewing court should not search the record for reasons to reverse a trial court judgment.
See People v. Givens, 237 Ill. 2d 311, 325 (2010). But when a “clear and obvious error”
occurred in the trial court, this court does not lack the authority to address unbriefed issues. Id.We will not turn a blind eye to an obvious error merely because it may not have been presented
with complete clarity by the parties.
¶ 24 Corpus delicti and the sufficiency of the evidence (which the defendant indisputably
challenged) are closely related. See People v. McCullough, 2015 IL App (2d) 121364, ¶¶ 72,
76 (addressing corpus delicti where defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence);
People v. Hurry, 2013 IL App (3d) 100150-B, ¶ 11 (“Defendant argues that the State failed to
prove the corpus delicti of 8 of the 10 charges ***. Defendant’s contention is a challenge to
the sufficiency of the evidence.” (Emphasis added.)). People v. Harris, 333 Ill. App. 3d 741(2002), is particularly instructive. There, the court held that the evidence was insufficient to
convict defendant where no corroboration supported his confession. Id. at 752. In reaching this
conclusion, the court explained, “[i]n the context of a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence, it is the defendant’s statements, together with the corroborating evidence taken as a
whole, that are required to pass the rational fact finder test.” Id. In other words, the evidence
to convict a defendant cannot be sufficient unless there is proof of corpus delicti beyond a
reasonable doubt. See Smith, 2015 IL App (1st) 132176, ¶ 18. Because the defendant explicitly
challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, we reject the State’s contention that it was error for
this court to address the more specific issue of whether the State proved the corpus delicti.
¶ 25 Turning then to the merits of the corpus delicti issue, we hold that, even viewed in the light
most favorable to the State, there was insufficient corroborating evidence to show that the
defendant constructively possessed the ammunition. The only connection that the defendant
had to the bullets was that he was sleeping in the apartment where they were found. But this
alone was insufficient to tend to show the defendant had knowledge or immediate and
exclusive control over the ammunition under the unique circumstances of this case. First, the
defendant was in a different room from where the bullets were located; he was sleeping on a
makeshift bed in the dining room, while the bullets were in an adjacent bedroom. Second, the
bullets themselves were inside a dresser drawer in the bedroom and not in plain view. Third,
two other individuals were in the room where the bullets were found when the police entered.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, there was nothing linking the defendant to the
residence, such as bills, clothing, or personal belongings. Contra People v. Spencer, 2012 IL
App (1st) 102094, ¶¶ 4, 24 (finding that State proved corpus delicti of offense of unlawful use
of a weapon where police recovered gun from top of kitchen cabinet and where, in addition to
defendant’s incriminating statement, police recovered two photographs of defendant, an
identification card listing the address as defendant’s residence, men’s clothing, and mail
addressed to defendant from inside a bedroom of the house).
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¶ 26 In this case, in addition to the fact that there was no evidence other than the defendant’s
statement linking him to ownership of the bullets, there was no evidence linking him to the
room where the bullets were found. However, there was evidence that the defendant actually
lived elsewhere. Also, there was evidence that two of the other five occupants of the house
were actually in the room where the bullets were found. When all of this is taken together, it
cannot be said that the State’s evidence met its burden of proof, beyond a reasonable doubt.
For this reason, we find the evidence insufficient to sustain the defendant’s conviction and
reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County. And because we reverse the
defendant’s conviction, we need not address his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel or
his contentions of error in the imposition of fines and fees.
¶ 27 CONCLUSION
¶ 28 The defendant’s conviction for unlawful use of a weapon by a felon is reversed.
¶ 29 Reversed.
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