People v. Quezada

2020 IL App (1st) 170532SIXTH DIVISION
September 25, 2020
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of
) Cook County
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) No. 98 CR 11748 (01)
)
SAMUEL QUEZADA, )
) Honorable Paula M. Daleo
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding
JUSTICE GRIFFIN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Pierce and Walker concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶2 This appeal concerns the application of our supreme court’s decision in People v. Buffer,
in which the court held that, under most circumstances, a prison sentence of more than 40 years
imposed on a juvenile offender constitutes a de facto life sentence in violation of the eighth
amendment. People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶¶ 41-42. The defendant in this case was a minor
at the time he committed the offense at issue here and he was sentenced to 68 years in prison.
However, defendant’s sentence is such that he is set to receive day-for-day credit, meaning that
he is scheduled to only serve 50% of his sentence, or 34 years, in prison.
¶3 The State argues that, because defendant will receive day-for-day credit, his sentence
does not run afoul of Buffer, and it urges us to affirm his sentence. We reject the State’s
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argument. We find that defendant’s sentence is at odds with the letter and spirit of Buffer, so we
vacate his sentence and remand the case for a new sentencing hearing.
¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 Defendant Samuel Quezada was the shooter in a drive-by shooting that killed Robert
Delosantos and injured Edward Puente. The shooting was gang related. Defendant was 15 years
old when he committed the crimes. Defendant pled guilty to one count of first-degree murder and
one count of attempted murder. He was sentenced to 50 years in prison for the murder and 18
years in prison for the attempted murder, with the sentences to run consecutively. The trial court
noted in sentencing defendant that his sentence was to be served with day-for-day credit.
¶6 In November 2016, defendant filed a postconviction petition. In his petition, defendant
argued that his 68-year sentence constituted a de facto life sentence that was unconstitutional
under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718(2016). The circuit court summarily dismissed his petition.
¶7 Defendant appealed the summary dismissal of his postconviction petition. Initially, the
Office of the State Appellate Defender moved to withdraw under Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481
U.S. 551 (1987), finding that the contentions in defendant’s appeal lacked merit. We granted
counsel’s motion to withdraw, and we affirmed the circuit court’s judgment dismissing
defendant’s postconviction petition.
¶8 Defendant filed a petition for rehearing. Just around the time that counsel had filed its
motion to withdraw under Finley, our supreme court announced its decision in People v. Buffer,
2019 IL 122327. In Buffer, the supreme court held that, under most circumstances, a prison
sentence of more than 40 years imposed on a juvenile offender constitutes a de facto life
sentence in violation of the eighth amendment. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶¶ 41-42.
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¶9 We granted defendant’s petition for rehearing. In our order granting rehearing, we
vacated the order granting counsel’s motion to withdraw under Finley, and we directed defendant
to address the issues in this case insofar as they were affected by the supreme court’s intervening
judgment in Buffer. The parties briefed the issues, and their contentions are now before us for
determination.
¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 11 Defendant raised the issue of the constitutionality of his sentence in a postconviction
petition. The trial court dismissed the petition at the first stage, albeit before our supreme court
decided Buffer. The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122–1 et seq.) provides a process
by which a criminal defendant may challenge his or her conviction by filing a petition in the
circuit court. 725 ILCS 5/122–1 (West 2018). The Act provides for a three-stage process for
adjudicating postconviction petitions. People v. Harris, 224 Ill. 2d 115, 125 (2007). At
the first stage, the court independently assesses the merit of the petition. 725 ILCS 5/122–2.1
(West 2012). If the court finds the petition to be “frivolous” or “patently without merit,” the
court shall dismiss the petition. 725 ILCS 5/122.1(a)(2) (West 2012). A postconviction petition is
considered frivolous or patently without merit only if the allegations in the petition, taken as true
and liberally construed, fail to present the “gist” of a constitutional claim. People v. Edwards,
197 Ill. 2d 239, 244 (2001). We review the dismissal of a postconviction petition at the first
stage de novo. People v. Boyd, 347 Ill. App. 3d 321, 327 (2004).
¶ 12 Defendant’s position is that his 68-year sentence is unconstitutional under People v.
Buffer, 2019 IL 122327. In Buffer, the Illinois Supreme Court held that, under most
circumstances, prison sentences imposed on defendants for crimes committed as juveniles that
are for a period longer than 40 years are unconstitutional. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶¶ 41-42. In
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response to defendant’s argument, the State argues that defendant’s sentence does not exceed the
bounds set forth in Buffer because defendant is entitled to receive day-for-day credit on his
sentence. Thus, the State contends, defendant’s sentence really only imposes 34 years in prison
because defendant is only required to serve out 50% of his 68-year sentence when his day-for-
day credit is considered.
¶ 13 We considered the same arguments raised by the parties here in People v. Peacock, 2019
IL App (1st) 170308, ¶¶ 3-4. In Peacock, we held that an 80-year sentence that included day-for-
day credit was a de facto life sentence that could not stand in light of Buffer. Peacock, 2019 IL
App (1st) 170308, ¶ 19 (pet. for leave to appeal pending, No. 125340 (filed Oct. 4, 2019)). The
parties in this case acknowledge the applicability of Peacock: defendant urges us to follow it;
and the State argues that it was wrongly decided.
¶ 14 We decline to depart from our holding in Peacock. We agree with the rationale expressed
in our opinion in that case that we should not consider day-for-day credit in determining whether
a sentence is a de facto life sentence because day-for-day credit is a function of the Illinois
Department of Corrections, not the judiciary. Id. As defendant states in his brief, “[b]ecause the
application of day-for-day credit is dependent on [the] IDOC and not the actions of the trial
court, any consideration of whether Quezada's sentence constitutes a de facto life sentence
should be based on the sentence actually imposed by the trial court, and not the number of years
he might serve if he is awarded all potential credit.”
¶ 15 The State argues that Peacock was wrongly decided because it overlooked the fact that
Miller and the cases applying its precepts are concerned only with sentences that constitute life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The State points out that Miller and Buffer
prohibit life imprisonment (or its functional equivalent) without providing the offender a
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meaningful opportunity at rehabilitation. The State contends that the opportunity to receive day-
for-day credit is just the type of opportunity for the offender to demonstrate rehabilitation that
Miller and Buffer contemplated. The State further contends that the “opportunity for release”
from prison contemplated by the availability of day-for-day credit is consistent with our supreme
court’s decision in Buffer and with the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Montgomery v.
Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).
¶ 16 The State’s argument is well reasoned. However, the fact stands that the judicially
imposed sentence in this case is 68 years. The possibility that defendant will serve only 34 of
those 68 years in prison is beyond the control of the judiciary and is instead within the sole
discretion of the Illinois Department of Corrections. See People v. Castano, 392 Ill. App. 3d 956,
959-60 (2009).
¶ 17 Were we to adopt the State’s argument, we would be leaving it up to the IDOC as to
whether defendant serves an unconstitutional de facto life sentence. As we recognized in
Castano, “the trial court does not control the manner in which good-conduct credit is earned and
lost by a prisoner.” Id. at 960. The Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/1-1-1 et seq.) tasks
the Illinois Department of Corrections, not the trial court, with prescribing the rules and
regulations for awarding and revoking sentencing credit. 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3 (West 2018). The
Director of the Department of Corrections has the “sole discretion” to determine whether an
inmate receives sentencing credit and in what amount. Lee v. Godinez, 2014 IL App (3d)
130677, ¶ 9. As such, we conclude, like we did in Peacock, that the judicially imposed sentence
cannot exceed the bounds of Buffer, irrespective of the availability of sentencing credit. With this
result, we take the matter out of the hands of the IDOC and ensure that the defendant does not
serve a sentence that is incompatible with our supreme court’s pronouncements in Buffer.
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¶ 18 In the State’s brief, it repeatedly states that defendant is “expected to serve” only 34
years, so he has not been issued a de facto life sentence. That language is demonstrative of the
problem with allowing a defendant to have a prison sentence in which he is at the mercy of the
Department of Corrections in regard to whether he serves an unconstitutional de facto life
sentence. We decline to let an otherwise unconstitutional sentence stand based on an expectation
that the defendant will be released sooner. There are no serious ramifications in applying
Peacock. All that its holding demands is that the trial court resentence the defendant in a manner
that complies with Buffer and does not rely on the IDOC’s discretion in order to avoid a conflict
with the supreme court’s judgment.
¶ 19 Another issue presented on appeal is that, even under Buffer, de facto life sentences for
juveniles can stand in those situations where the sentencing court adequately considers the
offender’s youth and makes a finding that the offender’s conduct showed irretrievable depravity,
permanent incorrigibility, or irreparable corruption beyond the possibility for rehabilitation.
People v. Jackson, 2020 IL App (1st) 143025-B, ¶ 49. Thus, we must determine whether
defendant’s sentence can stand regardless of the fact that it meets the definition of a de facto life
sentence under Buffer.
¶ 20 A review of the record demonstrates that the sentencing court did not sufficiently
consider defendant’s youth or make the other irreparability finding that would allow for
defendant to be permissibly subject to a de facto life sentence. In sentencing defendant, the court
certainly took note that defendant was “young” when he committed the offense, but the court did
not thoroughly look at defendant’s youth in a way that would be tantamount to a consideration of
the factors set forth in Miller. See People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 47. Similarly, while the
court certainly took note of the senselessness of the killing and noted that defendant’s conduct
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was “outrageous, murderous, and cannot be tolerated in *** any civil society,” the sentencing
court did not necessarily find that defendant exhibited “irretrievable depravity, permanent
incorrigibility, or irreparable corruption beyond the possibility of rehabilitation.” Id. at ¶ 46.
Accordingly, we find that defendant’s de facto life sentence, as defined in Buffer, cannot stand
based upon the considerations of his original sentencing hearing.
¶ 21 Because we find that defendant’s sentence constitutes a de facto life sentence under
Buffer and cannot stand based on the considerations in his original sentencing hearing, we do not
address his arguments under the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill.
Const. (1970) art. 1, § 11).
¶ 22 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 23 The proper remedy under the circumstances presented in this case is to vacate the
defendant’s sentence and remand the case for a new sentencing hearing. See Peacock, 2019 IL
App (1st) 170308, ¶ 25. Accordingly, we vacate defendant’s sentence, and we remand the case to
the circuit court for the purpose of resentencing.
¶ 24 Sentence vacated. Cause remanded.
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