People v. Grocesley

No. 3--07--0610
_________________________________________________________________
Filed August 1, 2008
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
A.D., 2008
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS, ) of the 12th Judicial Circuit,
) Will County, Illinois,
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) No. 06--CF--684
)
MARCUS GROCESLEY, ) Honorable
) Amy Bertani-Tomczak,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
Justice Carter delivered the opinion of the court:
_________________________________________________________________
The defendant, Marcus Grocesley, was convicted of three
counts of criminal sexual assault, and sentenced to three
consecutive terms of 50 months imprisonment. 720 ILCS 5/12--
13(a)(4) (West 2004). The defendant contends that the State
failed to prove that he held a position of trust, authority, or
supervision in relation to the victim. We affirm.
The defendant was indicted on three counts of criminal
sexual assault and three counts of aggravated criminal sexual
abuse for engaging in sexual penetration with M.C.R. Each count
of criminal sexual assault alleged that during certain time
periods the defendant, who was 17 years of age or older,
knowingly committed an act of sexual penetration with M.C.R., who
was at least 13 but under 18 years old, and the defendant held a
position of trust, authority or supervision in relation to M.C.R.
in that the defendant was a track coach for the Joliet Township
High School District (school district). The school district is
comprised of two schools, Joliet Central High School and Joliet
West High School. The two schools are combined into one school
district-wide sports program. There is one team for the school
district in any given sport comprised of students from both
schools who practice and compete together. The three aggravated
criminal sexual abuse charges alleged that during specific time
periods the defendant knowingly committed an act of sexual
penetration with M.C.R., who was at least 13 but under 17 years
old, and the defendant was at least five years older than her.
At trial, M.C.R. testified that she was born in August 1990.
She met the defendant at a high school football game in October
2005. She was 15 years old, and was a sophomore at Joliet West
High School. She was a cheerleader and on the girls' track team
for the school district. She had attended a different high school
during the 2004-2005 school year.
The night she met the defendant, she was cheering for the
school football team, and she was wearing her cheerleading
uniform. She next spoke to the defendant at a high school
basketball game, where she was cheering. When she saw the
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defendant at another basketball game in December 2005, she gave
him her phone number.
He called her that night, and she told him that she was 15
years old. He told her that he was 21 years old. The defendant
asked M.C.R. if he could come to her home, and she said yes. He
arrived at her home around midnight, when her parents were
asleep. M.C.R. let the defendant into the house. They went to
her bedroom, and engaged in oral and vaginal sex.
In January 2006, the defendant went to M.C.R.'s home again,
and they had oral and vaginal sex. M.C.R. also testified that
she and the defendant engaged in vaginal sex in his car, and at
the home of the defendant's friend. On January 28, 2006, the
defendant went to M.C.R.'s home late at night, and engaged in
oral and vaginal sex with M.C.R. and her 16-year-old friend.
In late January or early February 2006, M.C.R. saw the
defendant at Joliet Central High School talking to the coaches of
the boys' track team during track practice. Sometime after this
day, in February 2006, the defendant went to M.C.R.'s home.
After they had oral and vaginal sex, the defendant told M.C.R.
that he could not see her anymore because he was trying to
straighten out his life and become a track coach.
Andrew Harris testified that he was a teacher and a boys'
track team coach for the school district. The indoor track
season typically began around February 1, but there may have been
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practices held before that date. In 2005, Harris was the head
coach of the boys' indoor track team. The defendant worked with
the team daily during the 2005 season. Harris introduced the
defendant to the team as a coach, and the defendant was present
during team meetings. The defendant had authority to organize
and conduct practices with the sprinters, and to impose penalties
on students who were late for practice. The defendant also
attended indoor track meets. Harris also observed the defendant
assisting coaches during outdoor track practices and meets. The
defendant appeared in the team yearbook picture in 2005, which
referred to him as coach Marcus Grocesley.
The 2006 indoor track season began on or around February 1,
2006. The defendant again acted as an assistant coach. The
defendant assisted during practices, and attended team meetings.
The defendant was also in the team picture taken in 2006.
In January 2006, the school district's athletic director
informed Harris that all of the assistant coaches must be
certified by the State of Illinois. The defendant was not
certified. Harris and the defendant discussed certification
approximately three times. The defendant never told Harris that
he had become certified.
Christopher Olson testified that he had been the athletics
director at the school district since July 2004. Sometime during
the 2005-06 school year, Olson noticed the defendant in the
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hallways and working with the boys' track team. The defendant
was not a paid staff member or a certified volunteer. Olson
discussed the certification requirement with the defendant, and
Olson told the defendant he could not assist the team until he
was certified. To Olson's knowledge, the defendant was never
certified as a coach.
Several other school district athletics coaches also
testified that he or she observed the defendant assisting during
the boys' track practices in 2005 and 2006. The school district
superintendent testified that the defendant had never been an
employee or official volunteer at the school district. The
defendant admitted to a police officer that he had engaged in
sexual acts with M.C.R. The defendant also told an officer that
he had been assisting the school district's boys' track team
since 2005.
The jury found the defendant guilty on all counts.
Following a sentencing hearing, the court found that the
convictions for aggravated criminal sexual abuse merged into the
convictions for criminal sexual assault. The court imposed three
consecutive terms of 50 months imprisonment.
On appeal, the defendant presents four claimed errors, each
of which argue that the State failed to prove he was guilty of
criminal sexual assault because the evidence did not establish
that he held a position of trust, authority or supervision in
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relation to M.C.R. First, the defendant claims the court erred
by denying his motion for a directed verdict because the State
failed to present a prima facie case that he was guilty of
criminal sexual assault. A motion for a directed verdict asserts
that as a matter of law the evidence is insufficient to support a
finding of guilt. People v. Cazacu, 373 Ill. App. 3d 465, 869
N.E.2d 381 (2007). Considering the evidence most strongly in the
State's favor, the court determines whether a reasonable jury
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Cazacu, 373 Ill. App. 3d 465, 869 N.E.2d 381. On review, we
consider the question de novo. Cazacu, 373 Ill. App. 3d 465, 869
N.E.2d 381.
A person commits criminal sexual assault if he commits an
act of sexual penetration with a victim who is at least 13 years
of age but under 18 years of age, and the defendant was 17 years
of age or older and held a position of trust, authority or
supervision in relation to the victim. 720 ILCS 5/12--13(a)(4)
(West 2004). The statute does not define the terms trust,
authority or supervision. This court, however, has previously
stated that these words are presumed to have their ordinary and
popularly understood meanings. People v. Secor, 279 Ill. App. 3d
389, 664 N.E.2d 1054 (1996). "It is evident that, in enacting
section 12--13(a)(4), the legislature sought to prevent sex
offenses by those whom a child would tend to obey, such as a
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teacher or coach, as well as those in whom the child has placed
his trust[.]" Secor, 279 Ill. App. 3d at 396, 664 N.E.2d at
1059.
In this case, the State alleged that the defendant held a
position of trust, authority or supervision in that he was a
track coach for the school district where M.C.R. was a student.
The defendant maintains that the evidence did not establish that
he held a position of trust, authority or supervision in relation
to M.C.R. because he was not an official coach, and M.C.R. did
not know he was a coach when they began their sexual
relationship. The defendant does not dispute that he had a
sexual relationship with M.C.R.
First, we find that the evidence was sufficient to prove
that the defendant was a coach. Harris, the boys' head track
coach, testified that the defendant acted as an assistant coach
for the school district during the 2005 and 2006 track seasons.
Harris introduced the defendant to team members as a coach, and
allowed the defendant to participate in team meetings as well as
practices and meets. Olson noticed the defendant working with
the boys' track team in 2006, and discussed the certification
requirement with the defendant. Several other school district
employees also testified that they witnessed the defendant acting
as a coach with the team in both 2005 and 2006. The defendant
was included in team pictures in both of these years. The
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defendant also admitted to police that he assisted the track team
in 2005 and 2006. This evidence was sufficient to prove that the
defendant was an assistant boys' track coach, even if he was not
properly certified.
Next, we disagree with the defendant's position that he did
not hold a position of trust, authority or supervision in
relation to M.C.R. because she did not know he was a coach when
they began their sexual relationship. Section 12--13(a)(4) of
the Criminal Code of 1961 does not require that the victim
possess knowledge of the perpetrator's position of trust,
authority or supervision in relation to her. 720 ILCS 5/12--
13(a)(4) (West 2004). Although there are possible scenarios
where a victim's knowledge of a defendant's position contributes
to the defendant's manipulation or undue influence of the minor,
which then results in sexual penetration, this knowledge is not a
required element of the statute. The statute is also applicable
where a defendant's position of trust, authority or supervision
in relation to a victim provides access and opportunity for an
offense to occur. People v. Kaminski, 246 Ill. App. 3d 77, 615
N.E.2d 808 (1993).
In People v. Reynolds, 294 Ill. App. 3d 58, 689 N.E.2d 335
(1997), the court considered whether an elected public official
occupied a position of trust, authority or supervision in
relation to a minor with whom he had sex. The court stated that
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the defendant did not hold such a position simply because he was
an elected public official, and pointed out that the position
held by the defendant must exist in relation to the victim.
Reynolds, 294 Ill. App. 3d 58, 689 N.E.2d 335. The court then
found sufficient evidence to prove such a relationship existed in
that case because the defendant engaged in acts that established
trust in relation to the victim. The focus in that case was not
on the victim's knowledge, but on the defendant's conduct which
resulted in creating a position of trust, authority or
supervision in relation to the victim. As stated in Reynolds, if
a defendant occupies a position of trust, authority or
supervision at any time that he engages in sexual penetration
with a minor, his conduct is prohibited by the statute.
Reynolds, 294 Ill. App. 3d 58, 689 N.E.2d 335.
Here, the evidence shows that the defendant acted as a coach
for the same high school district where M.C.R. attended classes
and participated in cheerleading and girls' track. Regardless of
whether M.C.R. knew at the beginning of their sexual relationship
that the defendant acted as a coach for her school district, the
defendant himself knew that he occupied a position of trust in
relation to all the students of that school district, including
M.C.R. By assuming the position of assistant track coach, the
defendant assumed a position of trust that our society imposes
upon those who undertake to teach and mentor our children.
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In addition, the defendant did not escape criminal conduct
under this statute just because he happened to coach the boys'
track team, rather than the girls' team. His position presented
him with a heightened opportunity to engage in sex with a victim
that he knew from the outset was a student at the school,
regardless of the victim's knowledge. In Reynolds, the court
held that an adult who has sex with a minor cannot shield himself
from criminal liability under the statute by showing that the
first sex act took place before there was evidence of trust,
authority or supervision. Reynolds, 294 Ill. App. 3d 58, 689
N.E.2d 335. Likewise, this defendant cannot shield himself from
the statute by showing that the first sex act occurred before the
victim knew he was a coach.
We find that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the
defendant guilty of criminal sexual assault based upon the
evidence presented. Thus, the trial court did not err by denying
the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of not guilty.
The defendant's remaining arguments are that (1) the
evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt; (2) the court erred by denying his motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict; and (3) the evidence was
insufficient to prove him guilty for the time period of December
2005. These arguments likewise fail. As discussed above, the
evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
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the defendant was guilty of criminal sexual assault. The
defendant acted as an assistant track coach for the school
district in 2005 and 2006. The fact that track season had not
yet started in December 2005 is of no consequence here. The
jury's verdict is sufficiently supported by the evidence, and the
trial court did not err by denying his motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. Accordingly, the judgment of the
Will County circuit court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
SCHMIDT, J. concurs.
JUSTICE LYTTON, specially concurring:
I concur with the majority that the defendant's conviction
should be affirmed. I agree with the majority that the defendant's
status as a coach is sufficient, without more, to put him in a
position of "trust" under the statute. However, I concur only
because the victim in this case discovered that the defendant was
a coach during the period of their assignations; any sexual
relations they had after her discovery renders the defendant guilty
under the statute. See 720 ILCS 5/12--13(a)(4) (West 2004).
In its overly broad interpretation of the statute, the
majority believes that as long as "the defendant himself knew that
he occupied a position of trust in relation to M.C.R. and all
students of that school district," his liability under the statute
is complete. By finding that the defendant held a position of
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trust in relation to "all the students of that school district,"
the majority has virtually negated the requirement that the
offender's position of trust be "in relation to the victim." 720
ILCS 5/12--13(a)(4) (West 2004). In this situation, where
defendant's status as a coach is the sole evidence of a "trust"
relationship, the victim's knowledge or, at least, awareness of
defendant's position is critical.
Though the majority sets out a proper ethical response to the
defendant, it does not state the appropriate legal definition
required for a criminal sexual assault. In enacting section 12--
13(a)(4), the legislature sought to "prevent sex offenses by those
whom a child would tend to obey as well as those in whom the child
has placed his trust." People v. Secor, 279 Ill. App. 3d 389, 396.
It is this trust that makes the child particularly vulnerable and
it is the betrayal of the trust that makes the offense unusually
devastating. Secor, 279 Ill. App. 3d at 396. Thus, if the status
of the defendant is the sole indicator of "trust," then the
relationship must be known to the victim. Otherwise, "trust" is a
meaningless word, signifying both everything and nothing. Here, no
other indicia of "trust, authority or supervision" is alleged, only
defendant's status as a coach. Under these circumstances, there
can be no criminal liability unless that status is perceived by the
victim.
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In People v. Reynolds, 294 Ill. App. 3d 58, 689 N.E.2d 335
(1997), the court said that although Reynolds was a congressman
when he and the victim met, "[t]he language [of the statute] does
not suggest that the position of trust *** may result from the role
of the offender alone, but that it must exist 'in relation to the
victim'". Reynolds, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 66, 689 N.E.2d at 469.
The majority would have us believe that trust in relation to the
"victim" is the legal equivalent of trust in relation to every
student in the school district. One might ask if the defendant is
also in a trust relationship to the adjoining school district. How
far does criminal liability extend under the statute if no one
knows he is a coach.
While I agree with the majority that defendant's coaching
position puts him in a position of trust, I believe that the
victim's awareness of the defendant's status is an integral part of
the defendant's criminal liability. See Secor, 279 Ill. App. 3d at
396. In this case, since the victim acquired knowledge of the
defendant's position during their relationship, and the sexual
relationship continued after that, the defendant violated the
statute.
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