Weaver v. The Board of Education of the City of Chicago

2017 IL App (1st) 161764SECOND DIVISION
April 11, 2017
No. 1-16-1764
MARY WEAVER, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) On Petition for Review of a Final
) Administrative Order of the
THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF ) Board of Education of the City
CHICAGO et al., ) of Chicago.
)
Respondents. )
JUSTICE MASON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Presiding Justice Hyman and Justice Pierce concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Mary Weaver was a contract principal at Jonathan Y. Scammon Elementary School in
Chicago. On December 28, 2015, the Chicago Board of Education informed Weaver that she was
being “reassigned to home” as the result of a “substantiated investigation” conducted by the
Board’s Inspector General. Weaver continued to receive her pay and benefits following her
reassignment. Two months after her reassignment, Weaver applied for and was granted leave
pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA) (29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.
(2012)).
¶2 On April 1, 2016, while on leave, Weaver received a letter from Forrest Claypool, the
Board’s Chief Executive Officer. 1 The letter informed Weaver that the Board had approved
charges against her and enclosed the written charges and details supporting those charges.
1
The mayor of the City of Chicago appoints the Board’s Chief Executive Officer, who has the
power and duties of a general superintendent under the School Code. 105 ILCS 5/34-3.3(b) (West 2014).
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Among other things, the Board charged that Weaver (i) falsified student attendance data to
inflate the student attendance rate, which, in turn, enabled Scammon Elementary to obtain a
higher school quality rating; (ii) instructed teachers to cheat on a corporate-sponsored contest by
completing activities that students were required to complete; (iii) improperly used sick time for
vacation and falsely reported vacation plans to her supervisor; (iv) interrogated, harassed or
intimidated Scammon staff members engaged in protected activities under the Illinois
Educational Labor Relations Act (115 ILCS 5/1 et seq. (West 2014)); and (v) mismanaged
Scammon elementary by (1) failing to ensure that bilingual teachers had bilingual materials and
conducted classes in Spanish for non-English speaking students, (2) improperly administering
the Individualized Education Program for various students, (3) paying excessive overtime to
select employees, and (4) allowing personnel that were not properly certified to teach classes.
¶3 Claypool’s letter further advised Weaver:
“Pursuant to statute, a dismissal hearing has been tentatively scheduled for April 29,
2016. However, you will be dismissed from your employment with the Board of
Education of the City of Chicago and no hearing on the charges will be held, unless,
within seventeen (17) calendar days after receiving this notice, you request in writing of
the Chief Executive Officer that a dismissal hearing be scheduled on the charges. If you
wish to request a hearing on the charges, please direct your written communication to Mr.
Ronald L. Marmer, General Counsel, Board of Education of the City of Chicago, Law
Department, 1 N. Dearborn Street, Suite 900, Chicago, Illinois 60602.” (Emphasis in
original.)
The letter informed Weaver that pending a termination hearing, Claypool was requesting that she
be suspended without pay and that she would be afforded a pre-suspension hearing to be held in
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the Board’s Office of Employee Engagement. Weaver was also advised that she would receive
notice of the date and time of the pre-suspension hearing from the Office of Employee
Engagement.
¶4 As Claypool’s letter indicated, Weaver was separately contacted by the Office of
Employee Engagement. On April 1, 2016, Thomas Krieger, Manager of Employee Engagement,
advised Weaver in a letter that her pre-suspension hearing would take place on Friday, April 8,
2016, at 10:30 a.m. in his office.
¶5 Weaver received the letters on April 1. That same day, James Ciesil, the Board’s Deputy
General Counsel, advised Weaver’s attorney, Martin Dolan, via email, of the scheduled pre­
suspension hearing. Dolan promptly responded to Ciesil’s email indicating that he was expecting
to start a trial on Monday, April 4, 2016, and, therefore, he requested that the April 8 hearing be
postponed. Dolan also stated: “As you know, Ms. Weaver is on FMLA leave.” Ciesil responded
that he would agree to a short continuance and advised Dolan to choose any day during the
following week for the pre-suspension hearing. Dolan promised to give Ciesil dates on Monday.
¶6 When Ciesil did not hear from Dolan on April 4, he sent an email the following day
advising Dolan that he suggested rescheduling the pre-suspension hearing for Friday, April 15, at
9:30 a.m.
¶7 On Wednesday, April 6, Dolan advised Ciesil that Weaver would be on medical leave
until May 25, 2016, and that “[n]o pre-suspension hearing or dismissal hearing can take place
until her leave is over at a minimum.” Dolan also advised Ciesil that, given the extensive charges
against Weaver, he would need to obtain documents relating to the charges from the Board. After
indicating that “more time is necessary on our end,” Dolan stated, “[i]f we need to contact
Ronald Marmer [the Board’s General Counsel] directly please advise.”
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¶8 Ciesil responded to Dolan’s email the same day. Ciesil explained to Dolan that the Board
does not wait for an employee to come off leave before setting a pre-suspension hearing and that
the Board was unwilling to wait until after May 25 to schedule Weaver’s pre-suspension hearing.
Ciesil stated: “If I do not hear back from you by tomorrow, I will have the pre-suspension
hearing automatically scheduled for Friday April 15, 2016.”
¶9 Ciesil went on to address the purpose of the pre-suspension hearing:
“The pre-suspension hearing is to comply with the Loudermill [Cleveland Board
of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985)] requirements of notice and an
opportunity to be heard. Loudermill does not require that I turnover all my documents
relevant for the case before the pre-suspension hearing. Moreover, the [Illinois State
Board of Education] regulations, which govern principal discharge hearings, have a
detailed discovery process. I fully intend on complying with the ISBE discovery rules
which [do] not require the turning over of documents until after the ISBE hearing officer
grants a party’s motion for discovery.
The formal dismissal hearing in this case will not be set until after the parties have
selected a hearing officer. Undoubtedly, the actual discharge hearing will take place
several months from now. That should give you plenty of time to serve discovery
requests on me and prepare for hearing.”
Ciesil told Dolan that if Dolan wanted to contact Marmer directly regarding the foregoing
matters, he was welcome to do so, but that Ciesil was sure Marmer “will just refer this matter
back to me.”
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¶ 10 Dolan responded the same day, stating that Ciesil was violating the FMLA and going on
to say that he was not available on April 15, but that he would give Ciesil “more information” by
Friday, April 8.
¶ 11 The record contains no further communication between Ciesil and Dolan. A pre­
suspension hearing was never held due to Dolan’s failure to provide Ciesil with a date for the
hearing. The record does not indicate whether or when Weaver was suspended without pay.
Weaver further failed to submit a written request for a dismissal hearing within 17 days of
receipt of the Board’s April 1, 2016, letter or at any time thereafter.
¶ 12 On May 25, 2016, the Board passed a resolution terminating Weaver’s employment. The
resolution recited that the Board had not received a written request for a dismissal hearing from
Weaver or anyone acting on her behalf. Ciesil forwarded the resolution to Dolan on May 26 with
a letter that also advised Weaver of her right to seek judicial review.
¶ 13 Dolan responded to Ciesil’s letter on June 3, 2016. Dolan took the position that the
Board’s conduct in dismissing Weaver while she was on leave violated the FMLA. Dolan stated:
“We continuously provided timely notice to you with respect to her leave and willingness to
schedule a hearing after she returned. Despite our communications, the Board chose to go down
the route it had, and we have no option but to litigate the wrongful termination in court.” Dolan
did not inform the Board that he or his client had been confused by the communications they had
received or misled into believing that Weaver was excused from submitting a written request for
a dismissal hearing.
¶ 14 Ciesil responded, pointing out that in light of the lapse of two months between Weaver’s
removal from Scammon Elementary and her request for medical leave, there was no apparent
connection between the two. He pointed out that federal law allows an employer to terminate an
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employee on leave as long as the employer would have discharged the employee anyway for
legitimate reasons other than the absence. Finally, he asserted that a timely written request for a
dismissal hearing is a jurisdictional requirement under Illinois law and, given Weaver’s failure to
make such a request, the Board was entitled to terminate her without a hearing.
¶ 15 Weaver filed her complaint for administrative review in this court. See 105 ILCS 5/34­
85(a)(8) (West 2014) (providing for judicial review of teacher dismissals under the
Administrative Review Law by petition filed in the appellate court). The Board filed a motion to
dismiss, arguing that Weaver failed to exhaust her administrative remedies by requesting a
dismissal hearing, and so deprived this court of jurisdiction. We took the Board’s motion with
the case.
¶ 16 Section 34-85 of the School Code provides that “[n]o hearing upon [dismissal] charges is
required unless the teacher or principal within 17 calendar days after receiving notice requests in
writing of the general superintendent that a hearing be scheduled.” 105 ILCS 5/34-85(a)(2)
(West 2014). It is undisputed that Weaver failed to submit a written request for a hearing either
within the time set forth in Claypool’s April 1, 2016, letter or at any later time. Thus, on May 25,
2016, the Board entered a resolution dismissing Weaver based on its finding that the dismissal
charges of April 1, 2016, were “true and correct.” Following this resolution, there was no further
opportunity for review with the agency. 105 ILCS 5/34-85(a)(7) (West 2014); see also Hearne v.
Chicago School Reform Board of Trustees of the Board of Education for the City of Chicago,
322 Ill. App. 3d 467, 477 (2001) (“[T]he decision of the Board in teacher and principal dismissal
cases terminates the proceedings before the administrative agency and constitutes the final
administrative decision.”). Accordingly, we conclude that Weaver, though she failed to request a
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hearing, did in fact exhaust her administrative remedies, and we deny the Board’s motion to
dismiss.
¶ 17 But while Weaver’s failure to request a dismissal hearing does not mandate dismissal of
her appeal, it certainly limits both the scope of our review and the relief we can afford her.
Weaver’s failure to request a hearing pursuant to section 34-85 of the School Code severely
circumscribes our review of her dismissal order, given that there is no administrative record on
the merits of the Board’s decision. But here, Weaver does not contest the substantive findings of
the Board; instead, she seeks what she characterizes as a “non-substantive” reversal of her
termination on the ground that the method by which the Board accomplished her removal
violated her due process rights, and she requests a remand to the Board with directions to
conduct an evidentiary hearing on the charges against her. The record is sufficient to permit us to
review these claims.
¶ 18 Initially, we note that Weaver has abandoned the position she took when first advised of
her dismissal, i.e., that no pre-suspension or dismissal hearing could be scheduled while she was
on FMLA leave. Ciesil correctly informed Dolan that the FMLA does not prohibit an employer
from dismissing an employee when reasons—apart from the FMLA leave—support that action.
See Simpson v. Office of the Chief Judge, 559 F.3d 706, 714-15 (7th Cir. 2009) (defendants’
conduct in terminating plaintiff’s employment while plaintiff was on medical leave did not
violate FMLA because charges of wrongdoing leveled against plaintiff justified her termination,
regardless of her leave); Kohls v. Beverly Enterprises Wisconsin, Inc., 259 F.3d 799, 805 (7th
Cir. 2001) (“an employee may be fired for poor performance when she would have been fired for
such performance even absent her leave”).
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¶ 19 Notwithstanding her failure to pursue this argument on appeal, Weaver’s brief alludes to
“doctor’s orders” to avoid stress. In the same vein, Weaver also references her claim that the
charges against her were politically motivated because she “spoke out” against Mayor Emanuel.
None of these assertions is supported by any evidence in the limited record before us and,
therefore, we disregard them.
¶ 20 Changing tack, Weaver now argues that she was confused and misled by the
communications she received from the Board and by its counsel’s communications with her
attorney.
¶ 21 We do not understand how Weaver could have been confused by the two letters she
received on April 1, 2016. The first letter from the Board’s CEO Claypool informed Weaver that
the Board had approved charges against her and advised her of the tentative date set for her
dismissal hearing. That letter further indicated that pending the dismissal hearing, Claypool
proposed that Weaver be suspended without pay and that she would be afforded a pre-suspension
hearing. As to the latter hearing, Claypool told Weaver that she would be contacted separately by
the Office of Employee Engagement, which she was. Given that it is commonly understood that
a suspension without pay and a dismissal from employment are two distinct employment actions,
the only way Weaver could have failed to appreciate the import of the two letters is if she failed
to read them. Moreover, it is clear that her attorney understood that there would be two different
hearings as he specifically informed Ciesil (wrongly, as it turns out) that “[n]o pre-suspension
hearing or dismissal hearing can take place until her leave is over.” Given that the letters from
Claypool and the Office of Employee Engagement clearly advised Weaver of two separate
hearings, we reject her argument that these communications were misleading.
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¶ 22 Further, Weaver does not explain how she could have overlooked the indented and
underscored language in Claypool’s letter that plainly advised her that she would be dismissed
from her employment and no hearing would be held unless within 17 days of Claypool’s letter,
Weaver made a written request for a hearing directed to the Board’s General Counsel. She
nevertheless contends that her attorney’s communications with Ciesil led her and her attorney to
believe that she was excused from requesting a dismissal hearing in writing. She thus seeks to
estop the Board from relying on her failure to submit a written request for a dismissal hearing.
¶ 23 Generally, to make out a claim for detrimental reliance or promissory estoppel, the party
asserting the claim must allege facts supporting each of the following elements: (i) an
unambiguous promise, (ii) detrimental reliance on that promise, and (iii) reliance that was
expected and foreseeable by the person making the promise. Newton Tractor Sales, Inc. v.
Kubota Tractor Corp., 233 Ill. 2d 46, 51 (2009). The circumstances under which an individual
can justifiably rely on oral representations by a government employee to excuse failure to
comply with statutory requirements are rare. As our supreme court recently observed in
Matthews v. Chicago Transit Authority, 2016 IL 117638, ¶ 94: “Illinois courts have consistently
held that the doctrine of equitable estoppel will not be applied to governmental entities absent
extraordinary and compelling circumstances.” Compelling circumstances may include the need
to prevent fraud and injustice. Boswell v. City of Chicago, 2016 IL App (1st) 150871, ¶ 31.
¶ 24 We do not believe Weaver’s case presents extraordinary or compelling circumstances,
but even assuming that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is applicable, Weaver’s claim
nevertheless fails. There is no evidence that the Board unambiguously promised that a dismissal
hearing would be held in the absence of a formal request by Weaver within the appropriate time
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frame, nor is there evidence that the Board could have reasonably foreseen Weaver’s reliance on
that alleged promise.
¶ 25 To support her claim for estoppel, Weaver relies heavily on Ciesil’s statements in his
April 6 email to Dolan. Specifically, in that email, Ciesil explained that Dolan was not entitled to
discovery until Dolan made a motion before a duly appointed hearing officer. Then, Ciesil stated
“[t]he formal dismissal hearing in this case will not be set until after the parties have selected a
hearing officer. Undoubtedly, the actual discharge hearing will take place several months from
now.” While Weaver claims that she read these statements to mean that she need not comply
with the April 1 directive to make a written request for a hearing directed to Marmer, the Chief
Executive Officer, Ciesil’s statements cannot be read in isolation. The parties had been
discussing scheduling the pre-suspension hearing. Ciesil only referenced the dismissal hearing
(that he reasonably assumed Weaver would request) to explain why he was not required to turn
over the documents Dolan requested at this stage and why the pre-suspension hearing could go
forward without this discovery. He did not unambiguously promise to hold the dismissal hearing
without a written request from Weaver to Marmer within the statutory time frame.
¶ 26 Similarly, Ceisil’s statement in the same email, implying that an attempt by Dolan to “to
go over [Ciesil’s] head” and contact Marmer would be futile, when read in context, simply
responded to Dolan’s question asking whether he needed to call Marmer regarding obtaining
more time to prepare for the pre-suspension hearing. The statement in no way suggested that
Weaver did not need to contact Marmer for the separate purpose of requesting a dismissal
hearing.
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¶ 27 For these reasons, we find Weaver’s estoppel argument meritless. Weaver’s failure to
make a timely request for a dismissal hearing to the appropriate party is not excused by the
Board’s conduct and she is not entitled to the relief she seeks.
¶ 28 Affirmed.
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