People v. Jackson

2023 IL App (4th) 220421-UNOTICE FILED
This Order was filed under April 19, 2023
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NO. 4-22-0421 Carla Bender
not precedent except in the th
limited circumstances allowed 4 District Appellate
IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
under Rule 23(e)(1).
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Peoria County
ANTHONY L. JACKSON, ) No. 18CF337
Defendant-Appellant. )
) Honorable
) John P. Vespa,
) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE LANNERD delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Cavanagh and Zenoff concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: (1) The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress because
defendant was not in custody before he was provided his Miranda warnings.
(2) Defendant failed to establish the State committed a Brady violation.
(3) Defendant failed to establish the trial court made a clear or obvious error in
imposing a natural life sentence.
¶2 In June 2018, a grand jury indicted defendant, Anthony L. Jackson, on four counts
of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2018)) and one count of unlawful
possession of a weapon by a felon (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2018)). In March 2022, after a
bench trial, the trial court found defendant guilty on all charges. In May 2022, the court sentenced
defendant to consecutive prison terms of natural life for first degree murder and six years for
unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. Defendant raises the following issues on appeal:
(1) the court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the investigating police officers
engaged in a “question first, warn later” custodial interrogation; (2) the State failed to identify and
disclose material, exculpatory evidence in its possession to defendant’s trial counsel; and (3) the
court abused its discretion by imposing a natural life sentence on defendant. We affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 In the early morning hours of June 7, 2018, the victim in this case, Timothy Jackson,
was cut multiple times by defendant, requiring medical care at the local hospital. At 6:18 a.m., the
victim texted his girlfriend, Danyelle Riley, to tell her he was on his way home from the hospital.
Approximately 10 minutes later, Riley heard gunshots outside her house. Riley saw a “bluish
silver” vehicle driving away. Police officers arrived soon thereafter. The victim was deceased.
¶5 On June 19, 2018, a grand jury indicted defendant. According to the indictment,
defendant killed the victim by shooting him with a handgun on or about June 7, 2018.
¶6 On August 18, 2021, citing section 114-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of
1963 (725 ILCS 5/114-11 (West 2018)), defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence, alleging
defendant was subjected to a custodial interrogation at the police station on June 7, 2018, without
being informed of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Defendant also
filed a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence on April 11, 2019. However, only the motion
to suppress filed on August 18, 2021, is at issue in this appeal.
¶7 According to the relevant motion, during his police station interview, defendant
made statements to detectives about an altercation he had with the victim before the murder. After
defendant made this statement, the detectives stopped the interview and informed defendant of his
Miranda rights. After he was Mirandized, defendant continued speaking with the officers.
Defendant’s motion to suppress alleged the detectives deliberately used a two-stage interrogation
technique to elicit incriminating statements from him.
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¶8 On December 16, 2021, the trial court held a hearing on defendant’s motion to
suppress. Defendant called Detective Matt Legaspi to testify. Legaspi testified he was a detective
with the Peoria Police Department in June 2018 and worked on this case. On June 7, 2018, he met
with defendant at the police station. Before meeting at the station, they spoke on the phone.
Defendant had called the police station and asked if someone wanted to talk to him. The dispatcher
connected defendant with Legaspi. Defendant told Legaspi he heard his uncle had been shot and
killed, he had just been with his uncle, and he might have information on who was responsible.
Legaspi told defendant the police were looking for any information they could obtain regarding
the victim’s death. Then, Legaspi offered to meet defendant somewhere or suggested defendant
could come to the police station if defendant was willing to speak with the police.
¶9 When they spoke, defendant was the only person of interest in the case. Danyelle
Riley had told Detective Scott Hulse that the victim said he and defendant had gotten into a fight
and defendant cut him with a knife. Riley said the victim had to go to the hospital because of his
wounds. However, defendant was not an actual suspect in the shooting at that time.
¶ 10 Defendant voluntarily came to the police station without any kind of police escort.
Legaspi was notified defendant was at the station at 10:20 a.m. on June 7, 2018. At 11:27 a.m.,
defendant was escorted to an interview room and audio/video recording commenced. Legaspi and
Detective Hulse came into the room around 11:29 a.m. According to Legaspi, he did not utilize
any tactics during the interview with defendant and was with defendant for about an hour.
Defendant was not handcuffed during the interview.
¶ 11 Legaspi stated he greeted defendant and thanked him for coming to the station. He
believed defendant asked for a drink, which was provided. Detective Hulse and Legaspi then sat
down to talk with defendant. Defendant was not Mirandized at the beginning of the interview.
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Legaspi said the door of the interview room was shut, but he suspected it was unlocked because it
was department policy to leave interview rooms unlocked if a witness was inside. Witnesses were
also allowed to keep their personal belongings. Legaspi indicated he thought defendant had his
cell phone, shoes, and belt with him. According to Legaspi, when a person is a suspect, he or she
is not allowed to keep those items during an interview for safety reasons. Legaspi noted defendant
was even making calls from inside the interview room.
¶ 12 The detectives asked defendant what he wanted to talk to them about, and defendant
responded that he might have some information about his uncle’s death. Defendant then began
talking to the officers about who he thought may have killed the victim. After defendant indicated
he had been in an altercation with the victim before the murder, the officers informed him of his
Miranda rights. Defendant chose to continue speaking with the police.
¶ 13 During its cross-examination of Legaspi, the State introduced the audio/video
recording of defendant’s interview. The recording showed defendant coming into the interview
room. A little over 1 minute and 40 seconds later, the detectives entered the room. Approximately
four minutes later, defendant made a comment that he and his uncle “got into it.” At that point, the
detectives began asking defendant for some basic information regarding his name, phone number,
address, etc. About two and half minutes after defendant said he and his uncle “got into it,” the
detectives indicated the room was audio and video recorded and told defendant they wanted to
inform him of his Miranda rights. They did so and asked defendant if he still wanted to talk to the
detectives. His response is not entirely clear from the audio on the recording, but it sounds like he
responded, “Of course.” Defendant then continued to speak with the detectives.
¶ 14 After viewing the recording of defendant’s interview, the trial court denied
defendant’s motion to suppress without explanation. On December 28, 2021, defendant filed a
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motion asking the court to reconsider its denial of the motion to suppress and for specific factual
findings of whether the “interrogation” was custodial, whether the police used an intentional two-
stage interrogation technique, whether Miranda warnings were required during the interview, and
any other factual findings the court determined were necessary.
¶ 15 On December 29, 2021, at a hearing on defendant’s motion to reconsider, the trial
court indicated it was “stunned” the motion was filed. According to the court, the recording showed
the conversation between the officers and defendant was nothing more than an innocent, casual
conversation. The court found the detectives were not asking probing questions at the beginning
of the interview. Further, the court concluded defendant was not in custody until after defendant
indicated he and the victim got into an altercation before the murder. After defendant made the
statement about the altercation, the officers asked defendant for his contact information and then
Mirandized him.
¶ 16 The trial court found the earliest point in time when defendant was in custody was
when he was Mirandized. Further, the court found the police did not use any two-step interrogation
process to circumvent Miranda. The court then denied defendant’s motion to reconsider.
¶ 17 On January 6, 2022, defendant waived his right to a jury trial.
¶ 18 Defendant does not make a sufficiency of the evidence argument on appeal, so an
extensive recitation of the evidence presented at trial and arguments regarding that evidence is
unnecessary. However, for context, a brief discussion of some of the trial evidence is relevant.
¶ 19 Danyelle Riley testified she was living with the victim, who was her boyfriend, on
June 7, 2018. The victim came home around 2 or 2:30 a.m. on June 7 and was preparing for bed
when he received a phone call, which the victim said was from “Ant,” who Riley knew was
defendant. The victim told “Ant” he was trying to go to bed but eventually agreed to come outside.
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The victim told Riley that “Ant” was “tweakin” because he was mad about something the victim
allegedly said.
¶ 20 When the victim left, Riley went back to sleep. Later, the victim woke her up and
said, “that MF stabbed me up.” The victim was covered in blood and had a horseshoe-shaped cut
on his right arm, a “big gouge taken out” of his back, and two puncture wounds to his stomach.
The victim did not want Riley to call an ambulance because he said defendant warned him not to
call the police. The victim then drove himself to the hospital.
¶ 21 The State presented evidence the victim was treated at the hospital for multiple stab
wounds to his left upper abdomen, left lateral flank hip area, left wrist, and right forearm. The
victim declined to tell a police officer at the hospital what happened. Multiple sutures and stitches
were used to treat the victim’s injuries. The victim was released from the hospital around 6:10 a.m.
¶ 22 Riley testified she received a text message from the victim at about 6:18 a.m. saying
he was on his way to her house. About 10 minutes later, she heard five gunshots. She looked out
the window and saw the victim’s car parked in front of her house. She saw a “blueish silver”
vehicle leave the area.
¶ 23 The police arrived quickly and found the deceased victim in the car. Some of
Riley’s neighbors also saw a silver-colored car at the scene. Ahmed Sameer testified the car was a
Chevrolet Impala. In addition, he saw it stop, someone point a gun out of the window, and then
someone fire the gun.
¶ 24 Officer Scott Bowers testified he was in the crime scene unit and collected seven
.40-caliber cartridge casings at the crime scene. He also collected bullets from the victim’s vehicle
and from the victim’s body after his autopsy.
¶ 25 Detective Scott Hulse testified he responded to the scene of the shooting. He spoke
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with Riley at the scene and later interviewed her at the police station. Riley provided him with the
name of a person named “Ant,” who she said was the victim’s nephew.
¶ 26 Officer Matt Lane testified Detective Legaspi told him a possible person of interest
in the shooting went by the name or nickname “Ant.” Lane sent out a message to officers in his
unit to see if anyone had information on a person called “Ant.” He was told defendant’s nickname
was “Ant.” Lane had previously done an investigation involving defendant so he drove to an
apartment building that Lane associated him with. Lane indicated he was also looking for a light
silver Impala with black rims. Lane did not see the car at the first apartment building so he drove
across the street to another apartment complex, Villa Bordeaux, and observed a light blue Impala
with black rims.
¶ 27 According to Lane’s testimony, the car was registered to a male from Dolton,
Illinois. Lane knew defendant and his associates were from that area. He then conducted
surveillance on the vehicle. At 10:35 a.m., he saw a Chevy Tahoe driven by a black female with
two black male passengers inside enter the parking lot. Lane later identified one of the men as
defendant. He watched the man he identified as defendant enter Building 3 and then leave the
building eight minutes later. Defendant returned to the Tahoe, and the vehicle then left the parking
lot.
¶ 28 Later that day, Lane helped execute a search warrant on apartment No. 317 in
Building 3 of the Villa Bordeaux apartment complex. Apartment No. 317 was rented by Shakyra
Parkman. A black Smith & Wesson semiautomatic handgun was found in a diaper box that had
been in the closet of a baby’s room during the search of apartment No. 317 in Building 3. A rifle
was also found in the apartment. The State later introduced evidence showing that the cartridge
casings and bullet fragments recovered were fired by the handgun found in apartment No. 317.
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¶ 29 Shakyra Parkman, a friend of defendant, testified she lived on the third floor of a
building at the Villa Bordeaux apartments on June 7, 2018. She indicated her unit could have been
apartment No. 317 in Building 3. Shakyra and her infant daughter lived there. Early on the morning
of June 7, defendant came into her apartment carrying something wrapped in a shirt. He went into
her daughter’s bedroom and Parkman’s bedroom. She heard him rummaging around in the closet
of her daughter’s bedroom. Defendant did not stay very long. Later on the morning of June 7, she
drove defendant to the police station in her black Chevy Tahoe. Parkman testified defendant drove
a silver-colored Chevy car. Her testimony and interviews with the police were inconsistent
regarding whether an individual named Cottrell Mackey came into her apartment with defendant
that morning.
¶ 30 Officer David Buss testified he worked in the crime scene unit on June 7, 2018, and
participated in the execution of search warrants for apartment No. 317 at Villa Bordeaux and for
the Chevy Impala parked there. Inside the Impala, he found a folding knife and driver’s license or
identification (ID) card in the center console. The ID card belonged to defendant and was located
underneath the knife. The knife had red blood-like stains on the handle. In apartment No. 317,
Buss collected a Smith & Wesson .40-caliber handgun and a Hi-Point carbine rifle. The pistol was
loaded and ready to be fired.
¶ 31 Detective Scott Hulse testified defendant arrived at the police station in a black
sport utility vehicle, which remained outside the police station, on June 7, 2018. The desk sergeant
called and informed the detectives a man was in the lobby wanting to talk to them. The man was
defendant. Hulse indicated he talked to defendant that morning in a recorded interview. Fourteen
minutes of the interview was played for the jury. In the interview, defendant told the detectives he
and his uncle “got into it” before his uncle was killed. The detective later asked defendant what he
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meant by “got into it.” Defendant responded that he had a knife, his uncle had a knife, and the two
were fighting with the knives. Defendant said he was not cut and claimed not to know whether his
uncle was cut.
¶ 32 The trial court found defendant guilty on all counts.
¶ 33 On April 18, 2022, defendant filed a posttrial motion requesting a new trial and
additional relief. Defendant argued in part that he should be granted a new trial for the following
reason:
“Officer Buss and Marwan Haj both testified that the video of Defendant and [the
victim] at a gas station on the day of the murder was an edited clip from a longer
video that was thirty (30) minutes to one (1) hour. This longer unedited video
remained in the possession of the Peoria Police Department and was not provided
to Defendant.”
¶ 34 In support of his motion for a new trial, defendant relied on the testimony of Officer
Richard Linthicum. He testified he went to Cooper’s gas station located at the corner of Sheridan
Road and McClure Avenue to review surveillance video because the police had learned defendant
and the victim had met there. He watched the video at the gas station. He downloaded video
footage onto a thumb drive, took it to the police station, uploaded it onto his computer, and then
burned the video footage onto a compact disc. Linthicum indicated People’s exhibit No. 45 was
the video downloaded from Cooper’s gas station. People’s exhibit No. 45 had three video clips on
it. On cross-examination, Linthicum testified the original downloaded video that is in evidence
covers a broader period of time. People’s exhibit No. 45 contained shortened segments of the
video. Linthicum indicated the original video he obtained was either in the case file or in evidence.
On redirect, Linthicum testified he downloaded video for the whole hour between 1 a.m. and 2
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a.m. He then clipped out portions of the video where he saw the victim and the suspect.
¶ 35 On May 4, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on defendant’s posttrial motion and
discussed the gas station video. The State presented a certified copy of additional discovery that
was given to defendant’s prior counsel, attorney Derek Asbury, on July 25, 2019. The court asked
the State if the discovery got from attorney Asbury to defendant’s current counsel, attorney
Christopher Nelson. The State responded it could not “babysit their firm, Judge.” The State argued
the defense had been given the full digital video disc. Later, the State said, “All we’re representing
is that they have the only video we ever received from the gas station. That was the video. I don’t
know if it’s 30 minutes or whatever they’re claiming in their motion. They have the full video.”
The court asked attorney Nelson if he ever subpoenaed the longer video from the Peoria Police
Department. Attorney Nelson said he did not. The State also asserted the defense was given a copy
of an edited part of the video.
¶ 36 The trial court found the State gave defendant everything it had. The court then
noted it is not the State’s job to be an investigator for the defense, noting the defense has equal
subpoena power. Defense counsel responded that the defense may have equal subpoena power,
but the defense was given no indication the video it was given by the State was different from what
the police took from the gas station. Defense counsel argued it was the State’s burden to produce
material that was in the possession of the police. The court disagreed.
¶ 37 The State then made the following statement: “[I]f some other officer made a
comment, well, this edited portion which we use at trial is part of a longer, that’s correct. The
inference that, well, there’s some long video out there that the police and the State’s Attorney have
kept from me is simply wrong, Judge.” The trial court then asked defense counsel if it had any
evidence to present, and counsel said no. Thereafter, the court denied defendant’s posttrial motion.
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¶ 38 On May 18, 2022, the trial court held defendant’s sentencing hearing. The court
indicated the sentencing range for defendant’s murder conviction was 45 years to life and would
be served in its entirety. The range for the unlawful possession conviction was 2 to 10 years. The
court stated the presentence investigation report (PSI) indicated defendant had three prior felony
convictions. In addition, based on its review of the PSI, the court stated defendant did not complete
high school, was unemployed, had four children, “is a member of a street gang,” and drinks two
to three beers and a pint of “Remy” daily. The court asked the State if it disputed any of what the
court said. The State said, “No, Your Honor.” The court then asked defense counsel, “Defense, do
you dispute any of that?” Defense counsel responded, “No, Judge.”
¶ 39 At the sentencing hearing, Mary McFadden testified for the State. She read a letter
she wrote to defendant stating she had hated him for four years because he killed her daughter’s
father. The victim’s daughter was seven years old at the time of the murder. According to
McFadden, the victim meant more to his daughter than anyone else and a piece of her daughter
died when he was murdered. While indicating she forgave defendant so she could have peace and
be a stronger mother for her daughter, she still believed defendant needed to pay for his crimes by
spending the rest of his life in prison. She said she hoped defendant would go to sleep every night
knowing he killed one of the only men who was always there for him, never doubted him, and
never gave up on him. McFadden noted she thought defendant sat emotionless throughout the trial
and was heartless for both killing his own family member and showing no remorse for doing so.
¶ 40 Neither the State nor defendant presented any other sentencing evidence, and the
case proceeded to arguments. The State indicated this was a cold-blooded, heartless murder. The
State also noted defendant did not have a terrible childhood to blame for his behavior. He had a
loving family and reported no abuse. However, according to the State, defendant spent too much
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time on the streets enjoying the gang life.
¶ 41 When defendant was 18, he was given the opportunity to move to Peoria to live
with the victim, who was his uncle. Defendant reported he was very close with his uncle and spent
a lot of time with him. In defendant’s interview with the police, defendant said he and his uncle
were in a knife fight. After the knife fight, defendant’s uncle had wounds to his body requiring a
hospital visit. Defendant had no wounds. The State noted that while the victim was at the hospital,
defendant kept texting him, waiting for him to be released.
¶ 42 According to the State, after the victim was released from the hospital, defendant
killed him while they were on the phone together. The victim was in his car, and defendant shot
him five times. The State asserted defendant showed no remorse during the trial and showed no
reaction when trial court pronounced him guilty. The State asked the trial court to sentence
defendant to something on the higher end of the sentencing range for the murder conviction and
10 years on the weapon charge.
¶ 43 Defense counsel noted defendant had not acknowledged his culpability. Counsel
also argued this case only made sense if defendant was high on alcohol and/or drugs when his
uncle was murdered. According to defense counsel, only a person struggling with addiction would
continue a lifestyle like defendant’s after being shot numerous times as a teenager. Defense counsel
asserted a situation like this was unlikely to reoccur based on defendant’s conduct while in custody.
While sober in jail, defendant had enrolled in general equivalency diploma (GED) preparation
courses, completed numerous vocational courses, and was on track to obtain his GED. Defense
counsel argued defendant’s actions while in jail should inform the court as to his rehabilitative
potential. Further, based on defendant’s rehabilitative potential, defense counsel asked the trial
court to consider a sentence closer to 45 years on the murder conviction followed by a consecutive
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2-year sentence on the weapon conviction.
¶ 44 The trial court responded the defense only wanted the court to consider defendant’s
actions while in custody and not while he was free. The court also indicated defendant had
opportunities to maintain sobriety in the past, including after he served six months in jail, but failed
to do so.
¶ 45 Defendant provided a statement to the trial court. Other than saying, “I’m sorry for
us being here,” defendant mainly discussed the evidence in the case and why the State did not
prove he murdered the victim. The court occasionally asked him questions during his statement.
For example, at one point, the court asked defendant whether he told the police he fought his uncle.
Defendant said he did fight with his uncle because of Cottrell Mackey. Defendant asserted Mackey
killed the victim and set defendant up to take the blame. The court then asked defendant if Mackey
made defendant fight his uncle. Defendant responded:
“He didn’t do anything. He just—they just was arguing, and I just was like,
[‘]hold on, uncle. You’re tripping.[’] Then he’s all like, [‘]you’re sticking up for
him.[’] And, like, it was, like, little things between them. So that’s what made me,
you know, try to get in the middle of it. This what everybody needs to know. He
decided to do whatever he did.
There’s no evidence whatsoever I committed no murder. Yeah, we got into
a little stabbing or whatever, you know, a little family issue, a little aggravated
domestic battery. Whatever it was. But a murder, I didn’t commit no murder.”
The court then interjected, “All you did was a little stabbing?” Defendant responded he did not
“know that even occurred,” although he admitted he had a knife. Defendant asserted he and the
victim talked several times while the victim was at the hospital, and they were “cool.” In fact,
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defendant said the victim called him later and wanted some drugs.
¶ 46 Defendant acknowledged he had a drinking problem but was a “happy drinker.” In
addition, he asserted he had taken some 12-step substance abuse classes while in jail before the
programs were stopped because of COVID-19. According to defendant, he started to remember
things that happened on the day of his uncle’s murder when he felt sober. Defendant stated he
thought his trial might have gone differently if Mackey had been there to testify.
¶ 47 The trial court indicated it had considered the PSI, the evidence presented, the
arguments of the parties, defendant’s statement, the financial impact of incarceration, statutory
mitigating and aggravating factors, defendant’s history, character, education, and employment
history, statements on defendant’s behalf, his rehabilitation, and the nature and circumstances of
the offense in this case. After finding no statutory mitigating factors applied, the court noted
defendant’s criminal history and the need to deter others were applicable statutory aggravating
factors. In addition, the court found defendant’s rehabilitation prospects were not good and his
statement in allocution did not enhance his prospects. The court then sentenced defendant to life
in prison for first degree murder and a consecutive six-year sentence for unlawful possession of a
weapon by a felon.
¶ 48 This appeal followed.
¶ 49 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 50 A. Motion to Suppress
¶ 51 Defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress for two
reasons. First, defendant asserts he was in custody at the police station while speaking to the police
detectives before the detectives informed him of his Miranda rights. Second, although defendant
continued to talk to the detectives after they advised him of his Miranda rights, defendant contends
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his statements should have still been suppressed because he alleges the detectives deliberately used
a “question first, warn later” interrogation tactic on him.
¶ 52 When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we apply a two-part
standard of review. People v. Hunt, 2012 IL 111089, ¶ 22, 969 N.E.2d 819. We will not disturb
the trial court’s factual findings unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Hunt,
2012 IL 111089, ¶ 22. However, the court’s ultimate determination whether suppression is
warranted is reviewed de novo. Hunt, 2012 IL 111089, ¶ 22.
¶ 53 We first address defendant’s argument he was in custody at the police station when
he told the detectives he and the victim “got into it” before the victim was killed. Prior to a custodial
interrogation, the police must inform the individual in custody of his Miranda rights. To determine
whether an individual is in custody for Miranda purposes, a court must examine the circumstances
surrounding the interrogation and, given those circumstances, whether a reasonable person would
have felt free to terminate the interrogation and leave. People v. Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d 492, 505-06,
810 N.E.2d 472, 481 (2003).
“[T]he following factors have been found relevant in determining whether a
statement was made in a custodial setting: the location, time, length, mood, and
mode of the interrogation, the number of police officers present, the presence or
absence of the family and friends of the accused, any indicia of formal arrest, and
the age, intelligence, and mental makeup of the accused.” Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d at
506.
As for whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave, “the accepted test is what a
reasonable person, innocent of any crime, would have thought had he or she been in the defendant’s
shoes.” Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d at 506.
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¶ 54 Defendant’s brief did not contain a significant amount of analysis addressing the
trial court’s conclusion defendant was not in custody when he told the detectives he and the victim
“got into it” prior to the victim’s murder. According to defendant, he was in custody the moment
he was escorted into the interview room at the police station. Defendant concedes the police did
not bring him to the police station. However, he asserts his mother told him the police wanted to
talk to him. He then spoke with a police officer on the phone. According to defendant, the detective
did not tell him he did not have to speak with the police. Further, defendant argues the detective
made it seem like he did not have a choice whether to talk to the police. In other words, defendant
was going to talk to the police at the station or where he was located. Defendant asserts in his brief:
“Under these circumstances, with detectives contacting [his] parents in an attempt
to find him and then telling him ‘come to us or we will come to you,’ no reasonable
person in Anthony’s position would feel they were free to refuse to surrender
themselves to police custody. [Citation.] Nor, once placed in a secure interrogation
room in the middle of a police station and subjected to questioning, would any such
person reasonably feel free to remain silent and walk away.”
We disagree.
¶ 55 Based on the record in this case, the trial court did not err in determining defendant
was not in custody prior to defendant telling the officer he and the victim “got into it” before the
victim was murdered. Defendant came to the police station on his own. While it appears defendant
may have been waiting somewhere in the police station for approximately an hour before the
detectives met with him, he was not confined in the interview room during that period of time.
Defendant was only in the interview room by himself before the interview for under two minutes.
He was asked if he wanted anything to drink and was given water at his request. The video
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recording of the interview shows defendant was not handcuffed and was allowed to keep his cell
phone and made a call. He was also allowed to keep his shoes and his belt with him, which was
common practice for witnesses. In addition, the interview was not adversarial. The police officers
essentially asked defendant what he wanted to talk to them about and asked a few clarifying and
follow-up questions while defendant was providing the officers with information as to who he
thought may have killed the victim. Nothing the police officers did would have given a reasonable
person any indication he was not free to leave the police station at any time. Further, the interview
only lasted approximately seven minutes before the detectives told defendant they were going to
provide him with his Miranda rights.
¶ 56 We next turn to defendant’s argument the police used a “question first, warn later”
interrogation technique. Courts are critical of this technique when it is used to subvert Miranda.
Defendant relies heavily on People v. Lopez, 229 Ill. 2d 322, 892 N.E.2d 1047 (2008), to support
his argument his motion to suppress should have been granted because the police used this
technique during his interview.
¶ 57 In Lopez, the Illinois Supreme Court discussed the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004). In Seibert, the defendant was arrested for
murder and interrogated before receiving Miranda warnings. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 605. After the
defendant made an incriminating statement, the police stopped the interview, took a 20-minute
break, started a tape recorder, and then provided Miranda warnings. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 605. The
defendant then signed a written waiver of his Miranda rights, and the interrogating officer
questioned the defendant using information the defendant had provided before the Miranda
warnings were given. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 605.
¶ 58 At a hearing to suppress the defendant’s statements in Seibert, the interrogating
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officer admitted “ ‘he made a “conscious decision” to withhold Miranda warnings, thus resorting
to an interrogation technique he had been taught: question first, then give the warnings, and then
repeat the question “until I get the answer that she’s already provided once.” ’ ” Lopez, 229 Ill. 2d
at 357 (quoting Seibert, 542 U.S. at 605-06).
¶ 59 Justice Souter authored a plurality opinion, holding the “question first, warn later
technique utilized by the officer rendered the resulting statement inadmissible.” Seibert, 542 U.S.
at 617. According to the Illinois Supreme Court:
“The plurality *** created a new test to determine whether warnings
delivered after questioning could be effective enough to protect a suspect’s rights.
The test required consideration of ‘the completeness and detail of the questions and
answers in the first round of interrogation, the overlapping content of the two
statements, the timing and setting of the first and the second, the continuity of police
personnel, and the degree to which the interrogator’s questions treated the second
round as continuous with the first.’ Seibert, 542 U.S. at 615. Applying this test to
the facts before it, the plurality determined that the statements made by the
defendant were obtained through a police strategy designed to
undermine Miranda and were thus inadmissible.
Justice Kennedy wrote a concurrence agreeing with the plurality’s overall
decision that the two-step interrogation technique utilized by the officer was
improper. However, Justice Kennedy concluded that the test fashioned by the
plurality, which ‘envisions an objective inquiry from the perspective of the suspect,
and applies in the case of both intentional and unintentional two-stage
interrogations[,] *** cuts too broadly.’ Seibert, 542 U.S. at 621-22 (Kennedy, J.,
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concurring). Justice Kennedy proposed a ‘narrower test applicable only in the
infrequent case *** in which the two-step interrogation technique was used in a
calculated way to undermine the Miranda warning.’ Seibert, 542 U.S. at 622(Kennedy, J., concurring). Under Justice Kennedy’s test, the principles
of Elstad would govern admission of statements made without the benefit
of Miranda warnings unless the evidence demonstrated that police officers
deliberately employed a question first, warn later interrogation strategy. If that
strategy was deliberately used, statements taken after Miranda warnings would be
excluded unless ‘curative measures were taken,’ such as a substantial break in time
and circumstances between the statements, that would allow the accused ‘to
distinguish the two contexts and appreciate that the interrogation has taken a new
turn.’ Seibert, 542 U.S. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring).” (Emphases added.)
Lopez, 229 Ill. 2d at 358-59.
The Illinois Supreme Court has adopted the analysis found in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence.
Lopez, 229 Ill. 2d at 360.
¶ 60 In this case, we do not need to determine whether the detectives used a “question
first, warn later” interrogation technique because defendant was not in custody before the
detectives provided him with Miranda warnings. The detectives in this case did not need to provide
defendant with Miranda warnings initially because he was not in custody. As a result, the
detectives were not undermining Miranda by questioning defendant without warnings before he
was in custody.
¶ 61 The facts in this case are easily distinguishable from the facts in Lopez on the issue
of custody. The defendant in Lopez was found to have voluntarily come to the police station
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(Lopez, 229 Ill. 2d at 352) like the defendant here. However, the similarities end there. In Lopez,
the defendant was 15 years old. Lopez, 229 Ill. 2d at 362. The police escorted him to the station
without a parent. He was placed in an interrogation room at the police station at 1 p.m., where he
was questioned and told he had been implicated in a murder. The juvenile provided the detectives
with information and was then left by himself in the interview room, with the door closed, for four
to five hours while the detectives continued to investigate the murder. Lopez, 229 Ill. 2d at 362.
While the juvenile was not handcuffed and the door to the room was unlocked, he was not allowed
to leave the room without an escort and was never told he was free to leave the police station.
Lopez, 229 Ill. 2d at 362. At 6 p.m., the same detectives questioned the defendant again, informing
the juvenile he had been implicated in the murder again by the same person and that person had
admitted his own involvement in the murder. Lopez, 229 Ill. 2d at 362.
¶ 62 Without providing Miranda warnings to the juvenile, the detectives asked him
whether he was involved in the murder. After the juvenile confessed, the detectives provided him
with his Miranda warnings. Lopez, 229 Ill. 2d at 362. Noting one of the detectives indicated the
juvenile would not have been free to leave the station based on information the detectives received
before questioning him at 6 p.m., the Illinois Supreme Court stated: “[W]e can think of no
legitimate reason why the detectives failed to give defendant his Miranda warnings prior to the 6
p.m. confrontation, other than a deliberate decision to circumvent Miranda in hopes of obtaining
a confession, which would ultimately lead to a handwritten statement.” Lopez, 229 Ill. 2d at 363-
64.
¶ 63 Based on the facts here, defendant was not in custody before he was informed of
his Miranda rights, which he was given seven minutes after he started talking to the officers.
Further, we see no reason why the detectives could have detained him at that time based on the
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information they had. We need not address defendant’s “question first, warn later” argument any
further. Because defendant was not in custody prior to being Mirandized, the detectives did not
undermine Miranda by talking to defendant without advising him of his Miranda rights. Therefore,
the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress.
¶ 64 B. Brady Violation
¶ 65 Defendant next argues the State failed to identify and disclose material, exculpatory
evidence in its possession to defendant’s trial counsel, violating his right to due process pursuant
to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433 (1995),
defendant contends that “[b]ecause the State failed to identify and disclose material, exculpatory
evidence (including, but not likely limited to the full video from the gas station parking lot), the
ensuing conviction was obtained in violation of [defendant’s] right to due process.” As a result,
defendant asks this court to vacate his conviction and remand for a new trial.
¶ 66 This court has stated that for a defendant to receive a new trial pursuant to Brady,
the defendant must show the State suppressed evidence, the evidence was favorable to defendant,
and the evidence was material to his guilt or punishment. People v. Snow, 2012 IL App (4th)
110415, ¶ 35, 964 N.E.2d 1139 (citing Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433).
“A Brady claim may arise in the following three circumstances: (1) where
previously undisclosed evidence reveals the prosecution introduced trial testimony
it knew or should have known was perjured, (2) where the State fails to comply
with a defense request for disclosure of some specific exculpatory evidence, and
(3) where the State fails to voluntarily give the defense exculpatory evidence never
requested or requested only in a general manner.” Snow, 2012 IL App (4th) 110415,
¶ 35.
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Defendant fails to specify which circumstance is applicable to this case. However, based upon
defendant’s arguments, it appears his claim would fall under either the second or third
circumstance.
¶ 67 Relying on Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433-34, this court has noted, “favorable evidence is
material if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense,
the result of the proceeding would have been different” and “[a] reasonable probability of a
different result exists when the State’s evidentiary suppression undermines confidence in the
outcome of the trial.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Snow, 2012 IL App (4th) 110415, ¶ 36.
¶ 68 A trial court’s ruling regarding whether a Brady violation occurred is reviewed for
manifest error and will only be reversed where the court’s error is “clearly evident, plain, and
indisputable.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Beaman, 229 Ill. 2d 56, 73, 890 N.E.2d
500, 510 (2008). Based on the record, defendant has failed to establish the State neglected to turn
over anything to the defense that was material or that a reasonable probability exists the result of
the case would have been different had defendant been given that evidence. The State argued that
defendant was given the full video. Officer Linthicum testified the video clips show all the video
of defendant and the victim. Although defendant claims the police had a video recording from the
gas station that he did not receive in its entirety, defendant apparently failed to obtain the full video
from the police after learning about it during defendant’s trial for purposes of his posttrial motion.
As a result, neither the trial court nor this court can determine whether anything on the part of the
video defendant claims he was not provided was material to the case.
¶ 69 Defendant rightfully points out the trial court erred by indicating the prosecutor
only had a duty to turn over the evidence that was provided to him by the police. The Illinois
Supreme Court had stated, “the prosecution cannot escape its duty under Brady by contending that
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the suppressed evidence was known only to police investigators and not to the prosecutors.” People
v. Page, 193 Ill. 2d 120, 159, 737 N.E.2d 264, 285 (2000). Regardless, we can affirm a trial court’s
decision for any reason found in the record. Baumgartner v. Green County State’s Attorney’s
Office, 2016 IL App (4th) 150035, ¶ 41, 52 N.E.3d 654.
¶ 70 As stated above, defendant failed to establish the State did not turn over material
evidence to the defense. As a result, we do not find the trial court’s decision to deny defendant’s
claim the State committed a Brady violation was manifestly erroneous.
¶ 71 C. Sentence
¶ 72 Defendant next argues the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a natural
life sentence on his first degree murder conviction. Defendant contends a natural life sentence is
objectively excessive. While acknowledging murder is a serious offense, defendant asserts the
circumstances of this particular offense and the general weakness of the State’s evidence did not
warrant a natural life sentence. Defendant asks this court to vacate his sentence and remand this
case for a new sentencing hearing.
¶ 73 Defendant concedes he forfeited his sentencing challenge on appeal because he did
not file a motion to reconsider his sentence in the trial court. See Illinois Supreme Court Rule
605(a)(3)(C) (eff. Oct. 1, 2001). However, defendant asks this court to consider his arguments
pursuant to the plain-error doctrine.
¶ 74 The Illinois Supreme Court has held “[t]he plain-error doctrine is a narrow and
limited exception” to forfeiture. People v. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539, 545, 931 N.E.2d 1184, 1187
(2010). For the plain-error rule to provide relief, a defendant must first establish a clear or obvious
error occurred. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d at 545. “In the sentencing context, a defendant must then show
either that (1) the evidence at the sentencing hearing was closely balanced, or (2) the error was so
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egregious as to deny the defendant a fair sentencing hearing.” Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d at 545. A
defendant has the burden of persuasion under either prong of the plain-error doctrine. Hillier, 237
Ill. 2d at 545. “If the defendant fails to meet his burden, the procedural default will be honored.”
Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d at 545.
¶ 75 Defendant alleges the trial court erred by (1) arbitrarily determining without
evidence defendant could not maintain sobriety unless he was incarcerated, (2) stating defendant,
who was 27 when the murder occurred, was in a gang when the murder occurred when evidence
showed he had not been affiliated with a gang since he was 20, (3) interrupting defendant’s
statement in allocution to cross-examine and deride him, (4) penalizing defendant for exercising
his rights to trial, allocution, and an appeal in which he maintained his innocence, and
(5) disregarding uncontested evidence both defendant and the victim suffered from substance
abuse problems and were both intoxicated on the night in question to conclude substance abuse
did not play a significant part in the murder. Defendant’s brief fails to establish any of these
criticisms amount to clear or obvious errors.
¶ 76 After reviewing the transcript of the sentencing hearing and considering
defendant’s argument, the trial court did not arbitrarily determine defendant could not maintain
sobriety unless he was incarcerated. Instead, the court essentially noted the only time defendant
had been able to maintain sobriety was when he was incarcerated. The evidence showed defendant
had not been able to maintain sobriety after a prior six-month period of incarceration.
¶ 77 Further, it is not clear the trial court thought defendant was in a gang at the time of
the murder. The court did indicate the PSI said defendant is in a gang, which defense counsel did
not correct. However, before sentencing defendant, when the court was discussing defendant’s
history, the court indicated defendant “was” a gang member. The court’s statement was made in
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the following sentence: “He does not have a job but has four children, was a gang member, bad,
bad, bad, bad.” If the court thought defendant was currently in a gang, we presume the court would
have said, “He does not have a job but has four children, is a gang member, bad, bad, bad, bad.”
¶ 78 The trial court did interrupt defendant and ask him questions. However, defendant
has failed to establish this was improper. Defendant cites People v. Kokoraleis, 132 Ill. 2d 235,
281, 547 N.E.2d 202, 224 (1989), for the proposition a statement in allocution is not subject to
cross-examination. However, defendant does not explain how questions from the court amount to
cross-examination. In People v. Iseminger, 202 Ill. App. 3d 581, 599, 560 N.E.2d 445, 456 (1990),
this court rejected an argument that a trial court at a sentencing hearing may not question a
defendant unless he has either testified or exercised his right of allocution. This court indicated a
defendant is often the best source of information for sentencing purposes and it makes no sense to
cut trial courts off from questioning their best source of information. Iseminger, 202 Ill. App. 3d
at 599.
¶ 79 As for defendant’s argument the trial court penalized defendant for exercising his
rights to a trial, a statement in allocution, and an appeal, we see nothing in the record indicating
the court increased defendant’s sentence merely because he maintained his innocence.
¶ 80 Finally, as to defendant’s assertion the trial court disregarded uncontested evidence
both defendant and the victim suffered from substance abuse problems and were both intoxicated
on the night of the murder, defendant gives no analysis or explanation of what the court should
have done but did not do.
¶ 81 As a result, defendant has failed to establish the trial court made any clear or
obvious errors regarding factors it considered when sentencing defendant.
¶ 82 Turning to the sentence itself, defendant cannot establish the trial court committed
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a clear or obvious error by imposing a natural life sentence on defendant. Trial courts have wide
latitude to determine what is an appropriate sentence, and we will not reverse a sentence absent an
abuse of the court’s discretion. People v. Snyder, 2011 IL 111382, ¶ 36, 959 N.E.2d 656. “[T]he
trial court is in a better position to judge the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the
evidence at the sentencing hearing.” People v. Ramos, 353 Ill. App. 3d 133, 137, 817 N.E.2d 1110,
1115 (2004). It is not this court’s role to substitute our judgment for the trial court’s merely because
we may have weighed the factors in the case differently. People v. Fern, 189 Ill. 2d 48, 53-54, 723
N.E.2d 207, 209-10 (1999). Moreover, “[a] sentence which falls within the statutory range is not
an abuse of discretion unless it is manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.” People
v. Franks, 292 Ill. App. 3d 776, 779, 686 N.E.2d 361, 363 (1997). Defendant does not argue the
sentences he received fell outside the statutory sentencing range.
¶ 83 Based on the record, the trial court’s sentencing decision was not a clear or obvious
error. A natural life sentence is not disproportionate to the nature of the murder defendant was
convicted of committing. In sentencing defendant, the court found no statutory mitigating factors
applied. However, the court did find defendant’s criminal history was an aggravating factor and
also indicated it needed to deter others from committing similar offenses. Defendant was not new
to the criminal justice system. He had prior felony convictions for aggravated unlawful use of a
weapon, aggravated battery of a peace officer, and unlawful possession of a controlled substance.
¶ 84 The trial court also found defendant’s rehabilitative potential was poor. Based on
the record, we do not disagree. In addition to defendant’s criminal history, defendant’s statement
in allocution supports the court’s determination regarding defendant’s rehabilitation potential. For
example, in his statement in allocution, defendant admitted he and his uncle got into a knife fight
before his uncle was murdered. However, according to defendant, the fact he cut his uncle in a
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manner requiring medical attention was not a serious matter. Defendant stated: “There’s no
evidence whatsoever I committed no murder. Yeah, we got into a little stabbing or whatever, you
know, a little family issue, a little aggravated domestic battery. Whatever it was. But a murder, I
didn’t commit no murder.” Defendant’s attitude about a knife fight strongly supports the court’s
sentencing decision in this case.
¶ 85 In addition, we note defendant’s statement in allocution focused on why he should
not have been convicted of his uncle’s murder. While a defendant cannot be given a more severe
sentence simply for refusing to abandon his claim of innocence, a trial court may consider a
defendant’s lack of remorse when imposing a sentence because a defendant’s lack of remorse
could have an impact on his rehabilitative potential. People v. Donlow, 2020 IL App (4th) 170374,
¶ 84, 178 N.E.3d 1148. As stated earlier, the record does not indicate the trial court improperly
imposed a more severe sentence on defendant because he refused to abandon his claim of
innocence. However, the fact defendant showed no remorse for his uncle or concern for his own
children or his uncle’s daughter, especially after Mary McFadden testified the victim’s daughter
had been devastated by her father’s murder, provides additional support for both the court’s
determination defendant’s prospects for rehabilitation were minimal and the court’s sentencing
decision.
¶ 86 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 87 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 88 Affirmed.
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