People v. Carter

2016 IL App (3d) 140196
Opinion filed July 25, 2016
Modified upon denial of rehearing September 2, 2016
_____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
2016
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
ILLINOIS, ) of the 14th Judicial Circuit,
) Rock Island County, Illinois,
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
) Appeal No. 3-14-0196
v. ) Circuit No. 10-CF-821
)
CORNELIUS D. CARTER, ) Honorable
) Walter D. Braud,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
_____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE CARTER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justice McDade specially concurred, with opinion.
Justice Wright dissented, with opinion.
_____________________________________________________________________________
OPINION
¶1 Defendant, Cornelius D. Carter, argues on appeal that his conviction for aggravated
battery with a firearm should be reversed because the trial court abused its discretion in allowing
the State to present an excessive amount of other-crimes evidence related to an alleged escape
attempt from the county jail. We affirm in part, vacate the DNA analysis fee and the fines
improperly imposed by the circuit clerk, and remand for the trial court to modify its judgment on
fine, fees, and costs in accordance with this order.
¶2 FACTS
¶3 Defendant was charged with aggravated battery with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/12-4.2(a)(1)
(West 2010)). In October 2012, while incarcerated in the Federal Bureau of Prisons, defendant
requested a disposition of all pending Illinois charges through the interstate Agreement on
Detainers statute (730 ILCS 5/3-8-9 (West 2012)). The detainer documents listed another
pending Illinois case in addition to the instant case.
¶4 The State filed a motion in limine requesting that the court deem evidence of defendant’s
alleged escape attempt from the county jail in July 2013 to be admissible at defendant’s
aggravated battery trial. Said evidence would include defendant’s audiotaped phone calls from
jail, physical evidence, testimony, and photographs. Defendant objected. Following a hearing on
the State’s motion, the trial court ruled that evidence of defendant’s escape attempt was
admissible. The court advised the State that it wanted “as little [evidence] as possible” regarding
the escape attempt. The court added, “I want the case to be about the shooting, not about the
escape.”
¶5 A jury trial was held. Kameron Angel testified that he had known defendant since he was
10 or 11 years old and they had been close friends. On the evening of August 30, 2010, Kameron
was socializing with his brother, Granvil Angel, defendant, and several other people. Defendant
was wearing a black hooded sweatshirt, dark colored pants, and hospital gloves. Defendant had
been wearing the hospital gloves all day, and Kameron did not think it was strange. Defendant
showed Kameron a handgun that he had in the pocket of his hooded sweatshirt. Kameron asked
if he could purchase the gun, and defendant said Kameron could purchase it after defendant was
done with it. A few minutes later, defendant asked Kameron to go somewhere with him.
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¶6 Kameron walked with defendant to a garage near a store called Jesse Mart. They entered
the garage, and defendant told Kameron there was a gun under a dresser. The garage was dark so
Kameron used his cell phone as a light. Kameron bent down to look for the gun, and defendant
shot him in the back of his neck and his back. Kameron fell to the ground. Defendant took
Kameron’s cell phone and called or texted someone with it. Defendant then shot Kameron three
more times in the back and arm. Kameron lay down and did not move.
¶7 Defendant left the garage. After a minute or two, Kameron got up and jogged to Jesse
Mart. The clerk at Jesse Mart called 911, and several police officers and an ambulance arrived.
Kameron told the officers that defendant shot him. Kameron was taken to the hospital to be
treated. While at the hospital, Kameron picked defendant out of a photographic lineup as the
individual who shot him. Kameron was in the hospital for several days and continued to have
back problems because a bullet was still in his spine.
¶8 Kameron did not have his cell phone after the shooting. Kameron did not send a text
message to Granvil on the night of the shooting saying that he was going to Kia’s house. Kia was
the mother of Kameron’s son.
¶9 Kameron spoke to Tresvour Robertson in jail approximately a year prior to trial, and
Robertson told Kameron that defendant was paid to kill Kameron. Kameron and Granvil had
obtained a pound of cannabis from Marcus Hampton and Robertson’s cousin, T.J. Everett, prior
to the shooting and decided not to pay for the cannabis.
¶ 10 Kameron acknowledged that he had previously pled guilty to the offense of “going armed
with intent” for throwing a golf club at someone, for which he was on probation.
¶ 11 Granvil testified that he was Kameron’s brother. At approximately 9:30 p.m. on the
evening Kameron was shot, Granvil, Kameron, defendant, and several others were smoking
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cannabis together. Defendant asked Granvil to go somewhere with him. Granvil told defendant
he did not feel like walking anywhere. Defendant asked Granvil a second time, and Granvil
again refused. Defendant then asked Kameron, and Kameron agreed. Defendant and Kameron
began walking toward Jesse Mart. Defendant was wearing black clothing and latex gloves.
¶ 12 At approximately 10:15 p.m., the police came to the house where Granvil and his friends
were smoking. The police banged on the door and said someone had been shot. Granvil left and
started walking because he had a “really bad feeling in the gut of [his] stomach.” While he was
walking, Granvil received a text message from his father stating that Kameron had been shot.
Around that time, Granvil also received a “weird text message” from Kameron’s cell phone
which said that Kameron was with Kia. Granvil could not remember if he received the text
message from Kameron’s phone before or after the text message from his father. Granvil later
talked to Kia and learned that she had not spoken with or seen Kameron that night. Kameron
later told Granvil that he did not send that text message.
¶ 13 After he received the text message from his father, Granvil saw a car driving down an
alley and motioned for the car to stop. Granvil recognized the driver as Arletha Farmer and asked
for a ride to the hospital. Granvil then noticed that defendant was in the backseat. Farmer agreed
to give Granvil a ride, and Granvil got in the backseat with defendant. Granvil repeatedly asked
defendant what happened to Kameron. Defendant said, “I don’t know, I just ran.” Defendant was
sweating profusely and smoking cigarettes. Defendant twice asked Farmer to pull over so he
could get out, but she did not pull over. Defendant was wearing different clothes than he had
worn earlier in the evening. Specifically, defendant was wearing blue jeans and a white muscle
shirt. When the car arrived at the hospital and Granvil got out, the car sped off.
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¶ 14 Granvil testified that approximately one week before the shooting, Granvil and Kameron
obtained one pound of cannabis, which was worth approximately $1000, from Everett,
Robertson, and Hampton. Kameron and Granvil later discovered that the cannabis was bad and
refused to pay for it. Everett, Hampton, and Robertson called Granvil a few days later after he
refused to pay for the cannabis and told Granvil that they were going to kill him and Kameron.
They said that the “hit [was] going to be so close that [he was] not going to see it coming.”
¶ 15 Farmer testified that she had known defendant for about five years. On the evening of the
shooting, Farmer was driving around with a friend. At approximately 10:30 or 11 p.m., Farmer
saw defendant walking down the street and gave him a ride. A few minutes later, Farmer saw
Granvil. Farmer did not know Granvil, but she knew of him. Granvil asked for a ride to the
hospital, and Farmer drove him to the hospital. Farmer heard defendant and Granvil greet each
other when Granvil got into the car, but they did not talk much during the ride. Farmer dropped
Granvil off at the hospital and drove away. Farmer did not recall telling a police officer that
defendant told her someone had been shot when she picked him up.
¶ 16 Police Officer Greg Whitcomb testified that when he interviewed Farmer the day after
the shooting, Farmer said that when she picked defendant up, he told her there had been a
shooting.
¶ 17 Police officers who investigated the shooting testified that when they responded to the
911 call, Kameron told them defendant shot him in an abandoned garage. The officers observed
bullet wounds on Kameron’s neck and left arm. An officer later located the garage and found a
pool of blood and what appeared to be bullets. Whitcomb testified that he showed Kameron a
photographic lineup, and Kameron identified defendant as his shooter.
5
¶ 18 Robertson testified that he knew Everett and Hampton. Kameron and Granvil obtained
approximately one pound of cannabis from Everett, who had received the cannabis from
Robertson. Kameron and Granvil did not pay for the cannabis. Prior to the shooting, Robertson
saw Everett speaking with defendant in a car parked in Robertson’s backyard. After Everett
spoke to defendant, Everett told Robertson that defendant was going to “get Kameron.” After the
shooting, defendant asked Robertson to tell Everett to pay defendant. Robertson stated that he
did not hire defendant to kill Kameron. Robertson believed the marijuana Kameron and Granvil
took was worth approximately $800 and was not worth killing someone over. Robertson was
currently incarcerated for the offense of intimidation with a dangerous weapon, which was
unrelated to the instant case. The State agreed not to prosecute Robertson for hiring defendant to
shoot Kameron if Robertson testified against defendant.
¶ 19 The remaining evidence, which concerned defendant’s attempted escape from the county
jail, was admitted over defendant’s objection. Edward Schliltz, a correctional officer, testified
that while working at the county jail on July 23, 2013, he smelled smoke near the inmates’ cells.
Schliltz and other officers thoroughly searched the inmates, the cells, and the day rooms. One
officer found a hacksaw handle, cell phone, cell phone charger, and a mop handle with several
pieces of a torn T-shirt wrapped around it in a garbage can in one of the day rooms. Defendant
had the same T-shirt material that was found in the garbage can wrapped around his hand. The
officers also found a hollowed-out Bible containing a socket cover in one of the common areas.
In defendant’s cell, the officers discovered a four-inch square hole in the window, which was
covered with a piece of plastic. The window’s steel frame and beam had been cut through with a
hacksaw. No other inmate shared a cell with defendant. Schliltz believed that the officers found a
piece of paper in defendant’s cell that contained several phone numbers that were found in the
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cell phone retrieved from the day room. A different inmate claimed that the cell phone the
officers found belonged to him.
¶ 20 Jason Patterson, a sheriff’s department employee, testified that he investigated a hole in
the window of defendant’s cell on July 23, 2013. Defendant had occupied the cell since
December 28, 2012. No one else occupied the cell at the time the hole was found. Sixteen
photographs were admitted into evidence. Patterson identified and described the photographs,
which depicted defendant’s cell, including the hole in the window and the cut marks on the
window’s metal bar, the day room at the county jail, and items of contraband found by the
officers. Patterson found hacksaw blades in defendant’s toilet and strips of fabric in defendant’s
cell. The contraband items found in the common areas included a cell phone and charger, a
hollowed-out book containing a socket plate with burnt edges, strips of a T-shirt that were tied
together, and fabricated paper rods. Some of the pictures showed defendant’s cell window from
outside the building. Electrical tape and a light socket were found on the roof underneath
defendant’s cell window.
¶ 21 The parties stipulated that a sheriff’s department employee would testify that he provided
investigator Mindy Meyers with a compact disc (CD) that included recordings of 14 telephone
and visitation conversations of defendant between June 1 and July 27, 2013. The CD was
admitted into evidence but not played for the jury. Whitcomb was recalled as a witness and
testified that he listened to all the recorded conversations contained on the CD. Whitcomb was
familiar with defendant’s voice and reported that all the recordings contained defendant’s voice
except two or three conversations.
¶ 22 Mindy Meyers, an investigator employed by the sheriff’s department, testified that she
was assigned to listen to defendant’s recorded telephone and visitation conversations. Meyers
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briefly described 12 recorded conversations of defendant, which were contained on the CD
previously offered into evidence but not played for the jury. In one conversation with an
unknown man, defendant asked the man to give someone named DeShawn “a little bit of bread”
because DeShawn was “getting things” for defendant. Most of the other conversations that
Meyers described involved defendant asking various people to obtain a cell phone for him, buy
minutes for his cell phone, call him, or bring him things.
¶ 23 The State also introduced a different CD containing a recording of a visitation
conversation between defendant and Shakera Abbey. Meyers testified that, based on her
investigation, she believed Abbey was defendant’s girlfriend. The CD was played for the jury,
and a transcript of the conversation was introduced into evidence.
¶ 24 During defendant’s conversation with Abbey, defendant told Abbey he would probably
not be there next month. Abbey responded, “You trying to pull it off this month?” Defendant
replied, “I just… there’s a chance that I might not be here next month.” Abbey told defendant not
to do anything he would regret. Defendant replied that he was going to trial. He then stated,
“See, hopefully I won’t make it to trial *** so I’m hoping, but I’m supposed to go to trial, you
know, if I loose [sic] my trial…shhhh…man, I’m trying to breaking [sic] me out or something.
*** I am gonna win in my own way man. Somehow someway [sic] man.” Defendant told Abbey
that she would see him soon under “certain circumstances.” Abbey told defendant to call her.
Defendant replied, “I’m for real man.” Abbey responded, “I know, you probably tired of being in
here.” Defendant then said, “We’re going off in the sunset together.”
¶ 25 Defendant asked Abbey to get a pen and directed her to draw a picture. Defendant asked
Abbey if she remembered what he told someone named “Deshar” to get for him, and Abbey
replied that she remembered. Defendant told Abbey to call Deshar and ask if he was going to get
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it. Defendant asked Abbey to get it for him herself if she could not reach Deshar. Defendant said
that he needed it before Wednesday. Defendant said that Abbey would be able to get the items at
Walmart, Menards, K & K, True Value, or any hardware store. Defendant told Abbey that she
had to be careful because the items would be sharp. Defendant then added: “[Y]ou just got to
make sure, hell, that no matter what kind you get that you got the kind that go through handcuffs
alright?”
¶ 26 Meyers testified that she also took pictures of the outside of the jail in connection with
the investigation into the contraband found in defendant’s cell. She took a photograph of black
electrical tape, which was found on the ground outside the jail. The photograph had previously
been introduced into evidence during Patterson’s testimony. Finally, Meyers testified that when
the inmates were in their jail cells, no one was able to come in or out of the cell without a
correctional officer opening the door. The inmates leave their cells during the day and stay in the
day room. The cell doors are locked, and no inmates are able to access their own cells or other
inmates’ cells during that time.
¶ 27 The State rested. Defendant did not present any evidence. During its initial closing
argument, the State did not mention the escape evidence. Defense counsel argued that defendant
was only using the hole in his jail cell window to smuggle in cigarettes and a cell phone and was
not attempting to escape. During its rebuttal argument, the State contended that defendant was
using the hacksaws to cut through his window in an attempt to escape.
¶ 28 During deliberations, the jury requested a copy of the transcript of defendant’s
conversation with Abbey. The jury found defendant guilty. On January 17, 2014, the trial court
sentenced defendant to 30 years’ imprisonment to be served consecutively with his sentence in
his federal case. On January 24, 2014, the trial court entered a written judgment order, which
9
required defendant to pay “the costs of prosecution.” The written order provided that these costs
were reduced to judgment against defendant. On January 27, 2014, the circuit clerk entered a
judgment against defendant in favor of the State in the amount of $597.
¶ 29 A cost sheet titled “Payment Status Information” and dated April 22, 2014, appears in the
record. The following assessments along with the following descriptions appear on the cost
sheet: (1) $100 “Clerk,” (2) $50 “State’s Atty,” (3) $50 “Court,” (4) $15 “Automation,” (5) $25
“Violent Crime,” (6) $25 “Judicial Security,” (7) $15 “Document Storage,” (8) $10 “Medical
Costs,” (9) $250 “DNA Identification,” (10) $5 “Youth Diversion,” (11) $0.25 “Clerk Op
Deduction,” (12) $4.75 “Drug Court,” (13) $10 “Clerk Op Add-Ons,” (14) $10 “State Police
Svcs,” (15) $15 “State Police Ops,” (16) $2 “SA Automation Fee,” and (17) $10 “Probation Ops
Fee.”
¶ 30 ANALYSIS
¶ 31 I. Other-Crimes Evidence of Attempted Escape
¶ 32 Defendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing an excessive amount of other-
crimes evidence regarding defendant’s attempted escape from the county jail such that the trial
court conducted a trial within a trial on defendant’s escape attempt.
¶ 33 It is a longstanding proposition of Illinois law that evidence of the crime of attempted
escape and the related crime of flight is admissible for the purpose of showing a defendant’s
consciousness of guilt. Jamison v. People, 145 Ill. 357, 376 (1893) (attempted escape); People v.
Duncan, 261 Ill. 339, 352-53 (1913) (suicide attempt as attempted escape); People v. Bundy, 295
Ill. 322, 329-30 (1920) (flight); People v. Limeberry, 298 Ill. 355, 370 (1921) (attempted flight);
People v. Spaulding, 309 Ill. 292, 306 (1923); People v. Talbe, 321 Ill. 80, 91 (1926) (attempted
escape); People v. Rappaport, 362 Ill. 462, 468 (1936) (flight); People v. Gambino, 12 Ill. 2d 29,
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32 (1957) (escape and attempted escape); People v. Harper, 36 Ill. 2d 398, 403-04 (1967)
(attempted escape); People v. Yonder, 44 Ill. 2d 376, 392 (1969) (two hacksaw blades hidden in
the defendant’s shoe were evidence of attempted escape); People v. Gaines, 88 Ill. 2d 342, 366
(1981) (escape); People v. Gacho, 122 Ill. 2d 221, 246 (1988) (letter indicating that defendant
wanted to escape admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt).
¶ 34 Other-crimes evidence is admissible only if the probative value of the evidence is not
outweighed by its prejudicial effect. People v. Adkins, 239 Ill. 2d 1, 23 (2010); Ill. R. Evid. 403
(eff. Jan. 1, 2011) (“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.”). A trial court’s decision to admit other-crimes evidence will not be
overturned absent a clear abuse of discretion. Adkins, 239 Ill. 2d at 23. Even if relevant, other-
crimes evidence should not become a focal point of the trial. People v. Boyd, 366 Ill. App. 3d 84,
94 (2006). “Courts have warned against the dangers of putting on a ‘trial within a trial,’ with
detail and repetition greatly exceeding what is necessary to establish the particular purpose for
the evidence.” Id. (quoting People v. Bartall, 98 Ill. 2d 294, 315 (1983)).
¶ 35 We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the State’s evidence
regarding defendant’s escape attempt. First, the escape evidence had high probative value in that
it showed defendant’s consciousness of guilt. We find the evidence offered by the State was
reasonably necessary to show defendant’s escape attempt. Defendant’s recorded conversation
with Abbey was needed to show that defendant intended to escape from jail. During the
conversation, defendant told Abbey, “I’m trying to breaking [sic] me out or something.” He also
directed Abbey to obtain an item from a hardware store for him that could cut through handcuffs.
11
Defendant’s conversation with Abbey showed that the items of contraband that were
subsequently connected to him were related to an escape attempt rather than a smuggling
operation, as defense counsel argued at trial.
¶ 36 Evidence of the discovery of hacksaw blades in defendant’s toilet and other items of
contraband linked to defendant showed that the escape plan defendant discussed with Abbey
went beyond mere fantasy and that defendant was actually in the process of executing the plan.
The additional recordings of defendant’s telephone and visitation conversations in which he
sought cell phones and other items helped link him to the items of contraband that were
ultimately found.
¶ 37 We reject defendant’s contention that the probative value of the attempted escape
evidence in the instant case was low because it is unlikely that defendant would have been able
to cut a sufficiently large hole in his window to actually escape. We note Illinois courts have
admitted evidence of possession for the means of escape or the intent to escape to show
consciousness of guilt even when no actual escape was attempted. See Yonder, 44 Ill. 2d at 392
(hacksaw blades hidden in the defendant’s shoe); Gacho, 122 Ill. 2d at 245-46 (letter defendant
sent from jail stating that he believed he could escape).
¶ 38 Similarly, we find no merit to defendant’s contention that the probative value of the
escape evidence was somehow lessened due to the fact that he was serving a federal sentence and
was facing charges in another Illinois case. Evidence of attempted escape is admissible even
when a defendant is incarcerated on multiple charges. See In re L.F., 119 Ill. App. 3d 406, 409
(1983); People v. Day, 76 Ill. App. 3d 571, 585 (1979). As defendant presented no evidence
either at the hearing on the State’s motion in limine or at trial that his escape attempt was related
to anything other than the instant case, for which he was awaiting trial at the time of the escape
12
attempt, we decline to find that the probative value of the escape attempt was lessened due to
defendant’s other charges. See People v. Ligon, 15 Ill. App. 3d 746, 751 (1973).
¶ 39 In addition to finding that probative value of the attempted escape evidence was high, we
find that the prejudicial impact of the escape evidence was low. That is, evidence that defendant
wished to escape from jail and acquired various items of contraband including hacksaw blades to
do so was unlikely to inflame the passions of the jury. This is especially true when compared
with the strong evidence of the relatively more heinous offense of attempted murder. Kameron
testified that defendant, who had been his friend since childhood, shot him multiple times in an
abandoned garage. The testimony of police officers confirmed that Kameron adamantly claimed
that defendant was his shooter immediately after the shooting. Kameron’s, Granvil’s, and
Robertson’s testimony tended to establish defendant’s motive for shooting Kameron—namely,
that he had been paid to do it.
¶ 40 Thus, due to the high probative value and low prejudicial impact of the attempted escape,
we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the evidence of defendant’s
escape attempt. The amount of escape evidence presented did not greatly exceed what was
necessary to establish the escape attempt such that a trial within a trial occurred. See Boyd, 366
Ill. App. 3d at 94.
¶ 41 In coming to this conclusion, we reject defendant’s reliance on People v. Nunley, 271 Ill.
App. 3d 427 (1995), People v. Bedoya, 325 Ill. App. 3d 926 (2001), People v. Richee, 355 Ill.
App. 3d 43 (2005), and People v. Thigpen, 306 Ill. App. 3d 29 (1999), in support of his argument
that his conviction should be reversed because the admitted evidence of his escape attempt was
too extensive. Initially, we note that none of those cases involved other-crimes evidence of
escape or other-crimes evidence showing consciousness of guilt. Nunley, 271 Ill. App. 3d at 432
13
(other-crimes evidence admitted to show the “continuing narrative” of the defendant’s arrest and
confession); Bedoya, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 939-40 (intent); Richee, 355 Ill. App. 3d at 58-59
(modus operandi); Thigpen, 306 Ill. App. 3d at 36 (common plan or scheme). Additionally, all
four of defendant’s cited cases, unlike the instant case, either found the other-crimes evidence to
lack probative value or be unduly prejudicial.
¶ 42 In Bedoya and Richee, the courts first found that the other-crimes evidence at issue was
irrelevant to the purpose for which it was admitted and should not have been admitted at all.
Bedoya, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 939-40; Richee, 355 Ill. App. 3d at 58-59. Both cases found in the
alternative that even assuming the other-crimes evidence was relevant, the probative value of the
evidence was outweighed by its prejudicial impact due to the excessive amount of evidence
presented at trial and its inflammatory nature. Bedoya, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 939-40 (other-crimes
evidence that the defendant shot at three buildings, including the residence of a cardinal); Richee,
355 Ill. App. 3d at 58-59 (other-crimes evidence of multiple burglaries).
¶ 43 Similarly, in Thigpen, a murder case, the trial court found that some other-crimes
evidence that defendant had previously committed a double murder may have been relevant to
show a common plan or scheme. Thigpen, 306 Ill. App. 3d at 37-38. The court held, however,
the detailed evidence of the double murder that was admitted at trial—including the introduction
of a photograph of the victims’ corpses, which was subsequently sent to the jury room—was not
relevant. Id. It was not only the amount of evidence of the double murder that the court found
constituted reversible error, but the inflammatory and prejudicial effect of detailed evidence of a
double murder on the jury. Id. at 38-39.
¶ 44 In Nunley, extensive other-crimes evidence that the defendant was under arrest for
stabbing his mother and killing her dog at the time he confessed to the robbery and murder for
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which he was on trial was admitted to show the “continuing narrative” of the defendant’s arrest
and confession. Nunley, 271 Ill. App. 3d at 432. On review, the Nunley court held that due to the
“extremely inflammatory nature of the prior conduct evidence,” it was an abuse of discretion to
allow other-crimes evidence beyond the fact that defendant was in custody for the aggravated
battery of his mother at the time of his confession. Id.
¶ 45 In the instant case, unlike in Bedoya, Richee, and Thigpen, all the other-crimes evidence
was relevant to the purpose for which it was introduced, that is, to show defendant’s
consciousness of guilt by way of his attempted escape from jail. Unlike in Nunley, Bedoya,
Richee, and Thigpen, the other-crimes evidence in this case—namely, that defendant planned to
escape from jail and possessed contraband items in connection with his attempted escape—was
not particularly inflammatory or unduly prejudicial. Additionally, the evidence of the escape
attempt in the instant case was largely based on inferences drawn from defendant’s statements,
actions, and the surrounding circumstances. Consequently, a greater amount of evidence was
needed to show the escape attempt in this case than in Nunley, Bedoya, Richee, and Thigpen,
where the other-crimes evidence at issue was either completely irrelevant or could serve its
relevant purpose in small amounts.
¶ 46 Lastly, even if we were to accept defendant’s argument that an excessive amount of
evidence was presented regarding the escape attempt, we find that any error in the admission of
the escape evidence was harmless. We acknowledge that the jury requested to view the transcript
of defendant’s conversation with Abbey during deliberations. However, in light of the
overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt, we do not believe that the result of the proceedings
would have been different even if no evidence of the escape attempt had been presented. People
v. McKown, 236 Ill. 2d 278, 311 (2010) (“Error will be deemed harmless and a new trial
15
unnecessary when ‘the competent evidence in the record establishes the defendant’s guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt and it can be concluded that retrial without the erroneous admission of the
challenged evidence would produce no different result.’ ” (quoting People v. Arman, 131 Ill. 2d
115, 124 (1989))). Additionally, we are mindful of the decisions in People v. McKibbins, 96 Ill.
2d 176, 186-87 (1983), and Bartall, 98 Ill. 2d at 315, where the court held that no prejudicial
error occurred where an excessive amount of relevant other-crimes evidence was admitted at
trial.
¶ 47 II. Fines and Fees
¶ 48 Defendant argued in his appellate brief that this matter should be remanded to the trial
court for entry of a proper order of fines and fees because the circuit clerk improperly assessed
fines against defendant after it was too late to challenge them. The State conceded that the matter
should be remanded for the trial court to address the issues defendant raised regarding the fines
and costs assessed against him. However, after the filing of the appellant’s brief in this case, our
supreme court issued its opinion in People v. Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916. Defendant now
contends that Castleberry abrogated the procedure of remanding cases for the proper imposition
of fines and fees. For the reasons that follow, we agree.
¶ 49 Prior to Castleberry, the appellate court could correct an illegally low sentence to
conform with minimum statutory requirements without running afoul of Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 615(b)(4), pursuant to the void sentence rule—i.e., the rule that a sentence that does not
conform to statutory requirements is void. People v. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d 107, 113 (1995), abrogated
by Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916. In Castleberry, however, the supreme court abolished the void
sentence rule. Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, ¶ 19.
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¶ 50 Castleberry’s holding applies to the instant case, as it was pending on appeal when
Castleberry was decided. See People v. Granados, 172 Ill. 2d 358, 365 (1996) (“As a general
rule *** this court’s decisions apply to all cases that are pending when the decision is
announced, unless this court directs otherwise.”); see also Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314,
328 (1987) (“We therefore hold that a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be
applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final ***.”).
¶ 51 After Castleberry, we may no longer remand a cause to the trial court for the imposition
of an increased sentence, even if the sentence given by the trial court is illegally low. See
Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, ¶¶ 20-26 (holding that the appellate court was without authority to
add a 15-year firearm enhancement to the defendant’s sentence pursuant to Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 615(b)(4) even though the sentence was illegally low without the enhancement).
Fines are part of a criminal sentence. People v. Graves, 235 Ill. 2d 244, 250 (2009). Therefore,
we will merely vacate improperly imposed fines rather than remanding for the reimposition of
such fines. We now turn to the question of whether any fines were improperly imposed in this
case.
¶ 52 “Because the imposition of a fine is a judicial act, and the circuit clerk has no authority to
levy fines, any fines imposed by the circuit clerk are void from their inception.” People v. Larue,
2014 IL App (4th) 120595, ¶ 56. We find that the following fines were imposed by the circuit
clerk and are therefore void: (1) the $50 court fund fee (People v. Smith, 2013 IL App (2d)
120691, ¶ 21); (2) the $5 youth diversion fee (Graves, 235 Ill. 2d at 255); (3) the $4.75 drug
court fee and the $0.25 “Clerk Op Deduction” (People v. Johnson, 2015 IL App (3d) 140364,
¶ 9); (4) the $15 State Police Operations Assistance Fund fee (People v. Millsap, 2012 IL App
(4th) 110668, ¶ 31); (5) the $25 Violent Crime Victims Assistance Fund fine (People v. Dillard,
17
2014 IL App (3d) 121020, ¶ 11); and (6) the $10 medical costs fine (Johnson, 2015 IL App (3d)
140364, ¶ 9). Accordingly, we vacate the foregoing fines.
¶ 53 We also find that a $30 juvenile records expungement fine was improperly imposed in
this case. Section 5-9-1.17 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.17 (West
2012)) provides:
“(a) There shall be added to every penalty imposed in sentencing for a
criminal offense an additional fine of $30 to be imposed upon a plea of guilty or
finding of guilty resulting in a judgment of conviction.
(b) Ten dollars of each such additional fine shall be remitted to the State
Treasurer for deposit into the State Police Services Fund to be used to implement
the expungement of juvenile records as provided in Section 5-622 of the Juvenile
Court Act of 1987, $10 shall be paid to the State’s Attorney’s Office that
prosecuted the criminal offense, and $10 shall be retained by the Circuit Clerk for
administrative costs associated with the expungement of juvenile records and
shall be deposited into the Circuit Court Clerk Operation and Administrative
Fund.”
¶ 54 This assessment is a fine, as it is punitive in nature. People v. Wynn, 2013 IL App (2d)
120575, ¶ 16. Because the fine was imposed without authority by the circuit clerk in this case, it
is void. See Larue, 2014 IL App (4th) 120595, ¶ 56. In the instant case, this $30 fine appears in
three places on the clerk’s cost sheet: (1) the $10 State Police Services Fund assessment, (2) the
$10 “Clerk Op Add-Ons” assessment, and (3) as a portion of the $50 State’s Attorney fee.
Accordingly, we vacate the $10 State Police Services Fund assessment, the $10 “Clerk Op Add-
18
Ons” assessment, and $10 of the $50 State’s Attorney fee, thereby reducing the State’s Attorney
fee to $40.
¶ 55 Defendant also argues that the probation operations assistance fee is a fine because it
does not compensate the State or county for the costs of prosecuting a particular defendant but
rather is a flat amount imposed upon conviction regardless of the amount of probation services
used by defendant. Defendant further argues that the imposition of the probation operations
assistance fee violates ex post facto principles because its effective date was subsequent to the
date of the offense. Section 27.3a(1.1) of the Clerks of Courts Act (705 ILCS 105/27.3a(1.1)
(West 2012)), which establishes the probation operations assistance fee, states as follows:
“Starting on July 6, 2012 (the effective date of Public Act 97-761) and pursuant to
an administrative order from the chief judge of the circuit or the presiding judge
of the county authorizing such collection, a clerk of the circuit court in any county
that imposes a fee pursuant to subsection 1 of this Section shall also charge and
collect an additional $10 operations fee for probation and court services
department operations.
This additional fee shall be paid by the defendant in any felony, traffic,
misdemeanor, local ordinance, or conservation case upon a judgment of guilty or
grant of supervision, except such $10 operations fee shall not be charged and
collected in cases governed by Supreme Court Rule 529 in which the bail amount
is $120 or less.”
¶ 56 We determine that this assessment is overall a fine. “Broadly speaking, a ‘fine’ is a part
of the punishment for a conviction, whereas a ‘fee’ or ‘cost’ seeks to recoup expenses incurred
by the state—to ‘compensat[e]’ the state for some expenditure incurred in prosecuting the
19
defendant.” People v. Jones, 223 Ill. 2d 569, 582 (2006). “[T]he most important factor [in
determining whether a charge is a fine or fee] is whether the charge seeks to compensate the state
for any costs incurred as the result of prosecuting the defendant.” Graves, 235 Ill. 2d at 250.
“Other factors to consider are whether the charge is only imposed after conviction and to whom
the payment is made.” Id. at 251. The probation operations assistance fee is assessed against all
criminal defendants “upon a judgment of guilty or grant of supervision” regardless of whether
probation services were actually utilized in each defendant’s case. 705 ILCS 105/27.3a(1.1)
(West 2012). As such, we conclude the probation operations assistance assessment qualifies as a
fine, created to generate a fund to support probation and court services, regardless of a
defendant’s actual utilization of those services.
¶ 57 In reaching our conclusion, we recognize that our approach is contrary to the holding of
People v. Rogers, 2014 IL App (4th) 121088, ¶ 37. In Rogers, the court held that a probation
operations assistance assessment was compensatory in nature—and, consequently, a fee rather
than a fine—because the defendant received a sentence of probation and the probation office
prepared a presentence investigation report. Id. The Rogers court found, however, that the
probation operations assistance fee would be a fine in cases where the probation office was not
involved in a defendant’s prosecution. Id. ¶ 38. We decline to follow Rogers.
¶ 58 Having found the probation operations assistance fee to be a fine, we find that it is void
because it was improperly assessed by the circuit clerk. Larue, 2014 IL App (4th) 120595, ¶ 56.
Additionally, the imposition of the fine violates ex post facto principles because the date of the
offense—August 30, 2010—was prior to the effective date of the legislation that created the
fine—July 6, 2012. Pub. Act. 97-761 (eff. July 6, 2012) (adding 705 ILCS 105/27.3a(1.1) (West
2012)). See People v. Prince, 371 Ill. App. 3d 878, 880 (2007) (“A fine *** is a pecuniary
20
punishment imposed as a part of a criminal sentence and is subject to the prohibition against ex
post facto laws.”).
¶ 59 Defendant argues that the $250 DNA analysis fee imposed by the circuit clerk was
improper because he previously provided a DNA sample as a result of a prior conviction.
“[S]ection 5-4-3 [of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4-3 (West 2008))]
authorizes a trial court to order the taking, analysis and indexing of a qualifying offender’s DNA,
and the payment of the analysis fee only where that defendant is not currently registered in the
DNA database.” People v. Marshall, 242 Ill. 2d 285, 303 (2011). At defendant’s request, we take
judicial notice of a document from the Illinois State Police Division of Forensic Services
showing that he had previously submitted a DNA specimen, which defendant included in the
appendix to his appellate brief. See People v. Garrett, 62 Ill. 2d 151, 163 (1975) (holding that the
appellate court may take judicial notice of the contents of public records). Accordingly, we
vacate the $250 DNA fee assessed in this case, as defendant has already submitted a DNA
specimen. See Marshall, 242 Ill. 2d at 303.
¶ 60 We find that the remaining assessments, which total $197, were fees properly imposed by
the circuit clerk: (1) the $100 clerk fee (705 ILCS 105/27.1a(w)(1)(A) (West 2012)); (2) the $30
State’s Attorney fee and $10 preliminary hearing fee, for a total of $40 (55 ILCS 5/4-2002(a)
(West 2012)); (3) the $15 automation fee (705 ILCS 105/27.3a(1) (West 2012)); (4) the $25
judicial security fee (55 ILCS 5/5-1103 (West 2012)); (5) the $15 document storage fee (705
ILCS 105/27.3c(a) (West 2012)); and (6) the $2 State’s Attorney automation fee (55 ILCS 5/4-
2002(a) (West 2012)).
¶ 61 CONCLUSION
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¶ 62 We affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Rock Island County in part, vacate in part
as to the fines imposed by the circuit clerk and the $250 DNA analysis fee, and remand for the
trial court to enter a modified judgment on fines, fees and costs in accordance with this order.
¶ 63 Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded with directions.
¶ 64 JUSTICE McDADE, specially concurring.
¶ 65 I agree with Justice Carter that existing Illinois law requires a holding that the circuit
court did not err when it admitted the other-crimes evidence regarding the defendant’s activities
while in the Rock Island county jail. I also agree with Justice Carter that those assessments
properly characterized as fines and the $250 DNA fee should be vacated for the reasons stated
and that the other fees were properly imposed. I write separately to express my strong
disagreement with the propriety of using the concept of consciousness of guilt in the context of
incarceration.
¶ 66 I recognize that the supreme court has consistently demonstrated its belief in the concept,
but I believe that evidence related to an escape or an attempted escape from incarceration should
not be admissible at a defendant’s trial as evidence of consciousness of guilt for multiple reasons.
As a general premise, I find consciousness of guilt to be a flawed concept in any context because
it runs afoul of the foundational principle of our jurisprudence that a criminal defendant is
presumed innocent until proven guilty. More specifically, to be used as consciousness of guilt of
the charged offense, evidence that one has escaped or attempted to escape from incarceration
invites—indeed, requires—the fact-finder to presume that the individual is guilty of that
underlying crime.
¶ 67 The consciousness-of-guilt concept also offends logic in that its operation is circular. In
the instant case, for example, in order to serve as proof of the defendant’s guilt of the charged
22
crime, the concept requires the fact-finder to presume his unproven guilt and find that his
conduct at the jail—arguably an attempt to escape—was solely motivated by his awareness of
that guilt. This is a logical fallacy.
¶ 68 But I am certainly not alone in questioning the validity of the concept and its use in the
courts. While consciousness of guilt has long been accepted as admissible evidence, the
problematic nature of the concept has also long been recognized. See, e.g., Robert M. Hutchins
& Donald Slesinger, Some Observations of the Law of Evidence—Consciousness of Guilt, 77 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 725 (1929) (critiquing consciousness of guilt for being scientifically unverifiable and
citing, inter alia, John Henry Wigmore’s treatise on evidence and his book, The Principles of
Judicial Proof (1913)). Context is extremely important when consciousness-of-guilt evidence is
proffered:
“ ‘The same symptom is often the result of exactly opposite psychological
conditions. This sort of evidence is admitted because there is a certain degree of
uniformity in its meaning, but the variations from uniformity are so frequent, and
depend so much upon personal character and local circumstances that no fixed
rules should be laid down. Repeated judicial warnings tell us that the evidence is
merely to be estimated as best we can in the light of our knowledge of human
nature in general and of the accused in particular. … The general principle, as
applied to the conduct of one accused of crime, finds illustration in a great variety
of instances. In those which have led to judicial rulings, there has seldom resulted
an exclusion, because usually none but conduct having at least plausibly a guilty
significance is commonly offered.’ ” Id. at 728-29 (quoting John Henry Wigmore,
23
A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law
§ 273 (2d ed. 1923)).
Additionally, it was noted as early as 1846 that the flight of an accused:
“is not necessarily an admission of guilt; it may proceed from an unwillingness to
stand a public prosecution, or from a fear of the result, from an inability to explain
certain false appearances, indicating guilt, though the party was innocent. The
conduct of one accused of crime, is the most fallible of all competent testimony.
Those emotions or acts which might be produced in one person by a sense of
guilt, or by the stings of conscience, might be exhibited by another, differently
constituted, by an overwhelming sense of shame, and the degradation consequent
upon a criminal accusation. The same cause producing opposite effects in
different persons, owing to weakness or strength of nerve, and other inexplicable
moral phenomena.” (Emphasis added.) Smith v. State, 9 Ala. 990, 995 (1846).
Even if one (like Wigmore) is not troubled by the inability to scientifically verify consciousness
of guilt, notable objections to its use in the courts include that “its manifestations are equivocal;
[citation] it may be caused by guilt of another crime than the one charged; [citation] or it may be
caused by other emotional disturbances [citation].” Hutchins & Slesinger, supra, at 734.
¶ 69 Particular to the prison context, I find such evidence problematic because there are a
multitude of reasons why an individual may attempt to escape from incarceration that are wholly
unrelated to whether he or she committed the charged offense. In this regard, I note Justice
Seymour Simon’s dissent in People v. Gacho, 122 Ill. 2d 221 (1988). In Gacho, a defendant had
been arrested and incarcerated based on his suspected involvement in the murders of two people.
Id. at 231. While incarcerated, he wrote a letter to his girlfriend that included the statement, “ ‘I
24
still believe I can escape from here one way or the other.’ ” Id. at 245. The supreme court held
that the statement from the letter was admissible at trial as consciousness-of-guilt evidence. Id. at
246. Justice Simon dissented, in part due to the fact that the two cases cited by the majority
(People v. Gaines, 88 Ill. 2d 342 (1988) and People v. Harper, 36 Ill. 2d 398 (1967)) involved
actual escapes or attempts to escape, which was not the case in Gacho. Id. at 265 (Simon, J.,
dissenting). Justice Simon then stated:
“Here, the defendant was simply writing about the possibility of leaving prison
sometime in the future. He may have meant that he thought he would be found
innocent and be released or he may have been thinking of escaping because of
harsh conditions in prison. In any case, his statement is not relevant to the issue of
whether he is guilty of murder, and permitting the State to cross-examine the
defendant about the statement was reversible error.” Id.
¶ 70 I recognize that case law states that whether an escape or an attempted escape was
motivated by consciousness of guilt or by some other reason is a question for the fact-finder to
decide. See, e.g., People v. Sheridan, 51 Ill. App. 3d 963, 967 (1977). However, as I stated
above, considering, even as a broader inquiry, whether evidence of an actual or attempted escape
shows consciousness of guilt requires the fact-finder to presume that the defendant is guilty of
the underlying offense. Moreover, it is also dangerous to allow the evidence because of the
likelihood of it being used as evidence of a defendant’s general bad character, rather than
evidence of his or her consciousness of guilt for the charged offense.
¶ 71 The problematic nature of such evidence is exacerbated in a case like the one before us.
Here, whether the defendant’s actions even constituted an escape attempt were particularly
suspect. First, at the time the defendant was transferred to the Rock Island County jail to face the
25
charges in this case, he had been incarcerated on a federal charge. He was also facing other state
criminal charges. Any purported plan to escape could have been an attempt to evade any or all of
those charges and not the instant aggravated battery with a firearm charge. Second, it is not at all
clear that the defendant was even planning an escape. His actions—including his recorded
statements—could as easily have been the implementation of an operation to smuggle drugs into
the jail as an attempt by the defendant to escape from it.
¶ 72 Unfortunately, despite long-standing doubts of legal scholars and judges about the
general validity of the concept of consciousness of guilt and, more specifically about the
reliability of its application in the context of actual or attempted escapes from incarceration, I am
compelled to concur with the decision to affirm the defendant’s conviction.
¶ 73 JUSTICE WRIGHT, dissenting.
¶ 74 I respectfully dissent on the issue of the admissibility of the other crimes evidence in this
case. I would find the excessive other-crimes evidence constitutes reversible error arising out of
a trial within a trial.
¶ 75 I am not persuaded by the case law relied on by the majority. First, many of the cases
cited in the majority decision involve prearrest flight to avoid arrest. I distinguish those cases on
the grounds that this defendant did not attempt to flee in order to avoid arrest. Instead, this
defendant voluntarily requested to be returned to Rock Island County, from federal prison, to
answer to two outstanding Rock Island County warrants.
¶ 76 Next, I also distinguish three of the decisions cited by the majority that are more
analogous to the facts in this appeal because those cases involve a postarrest escape. In the oldest
postarrest case, People v. Talbe, 321 Ill. 80, 86 (1926), defendant was arrested, placed in the
local jail, and then forcefully removed the jailer’s keys before leaving his jail cell without
26
permission. Similarly, in People v. Gambino, 12 Ill. 2d 29, 32 (1957), defendant was first
arrested, placed in the local jail, and then left the jail itself without permission. I do not find these
two cases to be helpful because this defendant did not physically depart from either his Rock
Island jail cell or the Rock Island County jail, without permission, at any time.
¶ 77 A third case cited by the majority, People v. Yonder, 44 Ill. 2d 376 (1969), appears to be
on all fours with the facts in the case now before this court. For example, both the facts in the
case at bar and the facts in Yonder involved an inmate who was discovered to be in possession of
hacksaw blades while incarcerated in the jail and awaiting trial.
¶ 78 However, upon closer examination, I submit the holding in Yonder does not provide
persuasive authority in this appeal. Specifically, in Yonder, the defense challenged the
correctness of the trial court’s evidentiary ruling extending the reach of consciousness of guilt
evidence to apply where the correctional officers thwarted the plan to escape before the inmate
began to execute an escape. Id. at 392.
¶ 79 In Yonder, unlike the case at bar, the jury received minimal evidence showing Yonder
possessed hacksaw blades in his shoes while in jail. The evidence linking defendant to the
hacksaw blades paled in comparison to the extensive evidence the jurors received pertaining to
the armed robbery. In that case, the State’s accomplice witnesses and the victims described for
the jury how Yonder woke up the family by attacking the husband as he slept. The armed
robbers, including Yonder, then dragged the other household occupants out of bed; bound them
with tape; gouged out the eyes of the husband causing blindness; forced the wife to witness her
husband’s mutilated face; threatened to cut off the wife’s finger to remove her ring; announced
an intent to have a “sex orgy” with the couple’s 11-year-old son; and encouraged the others to
continue to beat, injure, and burn the women present in the home by applying cigarettes to their
27
breasts and pubic hairs while “lying naked” on their backs. Further, the jury learned that the
armed robbery yielded $130 in cash, two pairs of pearls, and a ring.
¶ 80 Not surprisingly, our supreme court engaged in a cursory analysis in Yonder, which
explained that, in that particular case, the possession of hacksaw blades was admissible evidence
showing consciousness of guilt. Here, defendant concedes in his brief on this appeal that the trial
court correctly decided some limited evidence of consciousness of guilt could be introduced by
the State in their case-in-chief. However, unlike Yonder, defendant agues the details of the
escape plan, which this jury received, became quite excessive and prejudicial.
¶ 81 Here, the State’s theory was that defendant did not simply acquire and possess
contraband while housed in the Rock Island County jail but, rather, acquired the various items of
contraband, not limited to the hacksaw blades, as part of a bigger plan to escape from the jail. In
support of the State’s escape theory, this jury received 16 photographic exhibits depicting
contraband found in common day areas of the jail and other evidence discovered outside the jail
below defendant’s window.
¶ 82 Further, the jury learned about defendant’s 14 recorded telephone calls from the jail
where defendant made incriminating statements about getting cell phone access and other
unspecified contraband to defendant. Finally, the jury heard one recording of a visitation
between defendant and his girlfriend that took place on June 8, 2013. During this conversation,
defendant dramatically advised his girlfriend that he might not be in jail “next month” and
promised they would be “going off in the sunset together.” Yet, it is undisputed that defendant’s
prediction did not come true and he remained in jail the next month. Thus, the issue of whether
defendant actually intended to escape or was expressing simple bravado on June 8, 2013, created
28
a trial within a trial documented by the jurors’ request to review a transcript of the conversation
on June 8, 2013.
¶ 83 I also distinguish the facts in Yonder from the instant case because, here, the jury did not
learn that this defendant may have been planning his escape to avoid returning to federal prison
to serve the balance of a 10-year sentence. For obvious reasons, defendant could not
counterbalance the excessive other-crimes evidence—about possessing contraband in a penal
institution while hoping to escape—by informing the jury of an equally plausible reason for his
desire not to return to federal prison to complete a 10-year sentence.
¶ 84 Had the State limited the evidence to the items and physical evidence found in
defendant’s cell on July 27, 2013, I could adopt the majority’s harmless error analysis. However,
my views are premised on the excessive amount of evidence the State elected to introduce, in
spite of the court’s warning to minimize the evidence of escape long before the trial began. I
dissent. Finally, with respect to fines and costs, I agree in the majority’s analysis of the
application of Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, to the case at bar. I also agree with the majority’s
view of the decision in Rogers, 2014 IL App (4th) 121088.
¶ 85 I strongly agree with the majority that Castleberry bars this court’s prior practice of
remanding cases to the trial court with instructions to add the statutorily required fines originally
omitted by the sentencing judge. Yet, I respectfully dissent because I would not adjust or reduce
the amounts included in the clerk’s tally sheet as a “void” component of defendant’s sentence.
¶ 86 In People v. Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, ¶ 19, our supreme court wisely abolished the
void sentence rule. In doing so, our supreme court clarified that a void sentence exists only
where the trial court lacked jurisdictional authority to enter an erroneously low (or high) sentence
and judgment against defendant. In this case, the defendant does not assert the trial court lacked
29
jurisdictional authority to order the payment of costs only for purposes of this appeal. I contend
this court should not correct the circuit clerk’s errors when the trial court has not been requested
to do so. This does not mean defendant is without a remedy in this case.
¶ 87 I note that either the State or a defendant may file a writ of mandamus directed to the
circuit clerk. Mandamus is the proper method for any trial court to be instructive to the circuit
clerk. Alternatively, I respectfully suggest either party could present an agreed bench order for
the trial court to sign, which clarifies those amounts recognized by existing case law as true court
“costs.” Either approach would result in a reduction of costs for purposes of the clerk’s records.
¶ 88 For these reasons, I would affirm the defendant’s sentence including court “costs” and
encourage the parties to initiate any request to correct the clerk’s tally sheet in the trial court.
30