People v. Thomas

2022 IL App (2d) 200457-UNo. 2-20-0457
Order filed April 20, 2022
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent
except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS, ) of Lake County.
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) No. 94-CF-2389
)
CHRISTOPHER THOMAS, ) Honorable
) George D. Strickland,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Jorgensen and Hudson concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court erred in characterizing defendant’s postconviction petition as a
successive, and despite defendant’s waiver at sentencing of the right to pursue
collateral relief, a remand for second-stage proceedings was necessary because the
trial court failed to review the petition within 90 days.
¶2 Defendant, Christopher Thomas, appeals from an order of the circuit court of Lake County
dismissing his pro se petition for relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS
5/122-1 et seq. (West 2016)). Contending that the trial court incorrectly construed his petition as a
successive petition rather than a first, defendant argues that the matter must be remanded for
2022 IL App (2d) 200457-Usecond-stage proceedings because the court failed to dismiss the petition within 90 days as required
under the Act. We reverse and remand.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of first-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a) (West
1994)) and sentenced to death. On direct appeal, the supreme court affirmed. People v. Thomas,
178 Ill. 2d 215 (1997). In March 1996, defendant filed a pro se petition under the Act. After
appointed counsel filed an amended petition, the State moved to dismiss it. On September 28,
1999, the trial court granted in part and denied in part the State’s motion, and it set the matter for
an evidentiary hearing.
¶5 Before the evidentiary hearing, defendant and the State resolved the postconviction
proceedings by written agreement and, on December 15, 1999, presented the agreement to the trial
court. Under that agreement, defendant’s death sentence was converted to a prison sentence of 100
years, with day-for-day good-conduct credit, and defendant
“waive[d] all future rights of appeal, post conviction remedy, [and] collateral remedy,
including but not limited to: State and Federal appeals, State and Federal Habeas Corpus
relief, State and Federal Post Conviction relief, or any and every form of direct or collateral
attack now recognized or as yet unrecognized which would have the effect of undermining,
reducing, diminishing, vacating or voiding the conviction for first degree murder, or the
agreed sentence of 100 years.”
Before accepting the agreement, the court engaged in a lengthy colloquy with defendant because
it “want[ed] to make sure that [defendant] clearly underst[ood] the nature of the proceedings.”
Following the colloquy, the court sentenced defendant per the agreement.
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2022 IL App (2d) 200457-U¶6 Despite the agreement, over the next 15 years, defendant filed multiple petitions under
section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2008)). In each case, the
petition was dismissed or denied, defendant appealed, the Office of the State Appellate Defender
(OSAD) was appointed and moved to withdraw under Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551(1987), and we granted OSAD’s motion. See People v. Thomas, 2017 IL App (2d) 150832-U;
People v. Thomas, No. 2-10-1294 (2012) (unpublished summary order under Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 23(c)); People v. Thomas, No. 2-08-0576 (2009) (unpublished summary order under
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(c)); People v. Thomas, No. 2-01-0892 (2002) (unpublished order
under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23).
¶7 On October 11, 2017, defendant filed the pro se postconviction petition at issue here. In it,
he argued that his 100-year sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois
Constitution because the sentence was a de facto life sentence imposed upon defendant without
consideration of his “juvenile characteristics[ ] and his rehabilitative potential.”
¶8 On February 16, 2018, the trial court ruled on the petition. The court, finding that
“defendant has filed several post-convictions [sic] over the last 19 years,” characterized the
petition as a successive postconviction petition under the Act and determined that defendant could
not meet the requisite cause-and-prejudice test. Specifically, the court found that defendant could
not establish prejudice, because he was 21 years old at the time of the offense and, thus, none of
the cases that he relied on applied to him. The court, therefore, denied defendant leave to file the
petition and dismissed it.
¶9 On March 12, 2018, defendant filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the trial
court erred in characterizing the petition as successive, because it was his first postconviction
petition after being resentenced to a 100-year prison term.
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2022 IL App (2d) 200457-U¶ 10 On July 9, 2020, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration without addressing
defendant’s argument. Defendant timely appealed.
¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 12 Defendant contends that the trial court erred in characterizing his October 2017 pro se
postconviction petition as a successive petition. Defendant argues that, because the 100-year
sentence was a new conviction for purposes of the Act, which could not have been challenged
before December 15, 1999, his October 2017 petition was an initial petition. Thus, according to
defendant, because the trial court did not dismiss the petition within 90 days as required by the
Act, the matter must be remanded for second-stage proceedings. In response, the State does not
dispute that the court erred in characterizing the petition as successive. Nevertheless, the State
contends that the dismissal should be affirmed. According to the State, the Act’s provisions do not
apply to defendant because he waived his right to file the petition.
¶ 13 The Act provides a means by which a defendant may challenge his conviction or sentence
based on violations of federal or state constitutional rights. People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458,
471 (2006). There is a three-stage process for the adjudication of a defendant’s postconviction
petition. See id. at 471-72. At the first stage of postconviction proceedings, the trial court has 90
days to examine the petition and may within that period summarily dismiss the petition if the court
finds the allegations are frivolous and patently without merit. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West
2016); Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d at 472. “The 90-day time requirement is mandatory and a trial court’s
noncompliance with the time requirement renders a summary dismissal order void.” People v.
Swamynathan, 236 Ill. 2d 103, 113 (2010). If the petition is not dismissed within 90 days, the
petition proceeds to the Act’s second stage of consideration, where an indigent defendant can
obtain appointed counsel and the State can move to dismiss his petition. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(b),
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2022 IL App (2d) 200457-U122-4, 122-5 (West 2016); Swamynathan, 236 Ill. 2d at 114. In the second stage, the trial court
determines whether the defendant has made a substantial showing of a constitutional violation. If
a substantial showing is made, the defendant’s petition proceeds to the third stage for an
evidentiary hearing; if not, the petition is dismissed. People v. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239, 246 (2001)
¶ 14 The Act generally contemplates the filing of one postconviction petition. 725 ILCS 5/122-
1(f) (West 2016); People v. Smith, 2013 IL App (4th) 110220, ¶ 20. A defendant must obtain leave
of court to file a successive petition. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2016); People v. Lusby, 2020 IL
124046, ¶ 27. To obtain leave, a defendant must demonstrate “cause” for failing to raise the claim
in the initial petition and “prejudice” resulting from that failure. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2016);
Lusby, 2020 IL 124046, ¶ 27. We review de novo the denial of a motion for leave to file a
successive petition. Id.¶ 15 First, as noted, the parties do not dispute that the trial court improperly treated defendant’s
October 2017 petition as a successive petition. We agree. Because defendant agreed to a new
sentence after his original death sentence, the resentencing order constituted a separate conviction
for purposes of the Act and, thus, his first petition challenging that new sentence was not a
successive petition. See, e.g., People v. Inman, 407 Ill. App. 3d 1156, 1162 (2011).
¶ 16 Therefore, as the petition was an initial petition, the provisions of the Act required that the
trial court examine it within 90 days and determine if it was frivolous or patently without merit.
See 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2016). “Illinois case law provides that the statutory time limit
of 90 days is mandatory [citation], and it begins to run upon the ‘filing and docketing of each
petition.’ [Citation.] There are no exceptions to this rule.” People v. Smith, 312 Ill App. 3d 219,
223 (2000).
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2022 IL App (2d) 200457-U¶ 17 Here, because the trial court did not determine that the petition was frivolous or patently
without merit within 90 days, we agree that it must be remanded for second-stage proceedings.
See People v. Little, 2012 IL App (5th) 100547, ¶¶ 2-24 (holding that a remand for second-stage
proceedings is required “even if by honest mistake the trial court disposes of a postconviction
petition on the erroneous belief that the petition was a successive petition brought without leave
of court” and declining the State’s request to independently determine whether the petition at issue
was frivolous or patently without merit); Inman, 407 Ill. App. 3d at 1162-1163 (remanding for
second-stage proceedings where the trial court erroneously treated the defendant’s initial
postconviction petition as a successive petition and failed to dismiss it within 90 days); People v.
Carter, 383 Ill. App. 3d 795, 797-98 (2008) (remanding for second-stage proceedings where the
trial court erroneously treated the defendant’s initial postconviction petition as a successive
petition and failed to dismiss it within 90 days; also declining the State’s invitation to examine the
record and determine whether the petition was frivolous or patently without merit).
¶ 18 Although the State argues that the Act’s procedural requirements do not apply because
defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to file the postconviction petition, the State
fails to support this argument with authority. In fact, the State recognizes that People v. Alfonso,
2016 IL App (2d) 130568, supports defendant’s request for a remand. In Alfonso, despite finding
that the defendant was properly admonished as to the waiver of his rights to file a postconviction
petition, we held that the trial court erred in striking, without first reviewing, the defendant’s pro se
postconviction petition based on the defendant’s waiver. Id. ¶ 38 (“[B]ecause waivers of rights to
file collateral petitions will be upheld only if they are knowing and voluntary [citation], a defendant
may still file a postconviction petition claiming that his waiver was not knowing and voluntary.”).
Noting that 90 days had passed since the defendant filed the petition, and that the filing of a notice
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2022 IL App (2d) 200457-Uof appeal does not toll the 90 days, we remanded for second-stage proceedings. Id. ¶ 39. Thus,
under Alfonso, defendant’s waiver does not render the Act’s procedural safeguards inapplicable to
his petition.
¶ 19 The State relies on People v. Reid, 2014 IL App (3d) 130296, in support of its request that
we affirm the trial court’s judgment on a basis not relied on by the trial court, i.e., defendant’s
waiver. However, Reid is readily distinguishable. There, despite waiving his right to file a
postconviction petition when he pleaded guilty, the defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition
raising 13 claims of error. Id. ¶ 8. The trial court dismissed the petition as frivolous and patently
without merit, without addressing the defendant’s waiver. Id. On appeal, the defendant argued that
one of his claims should be advanced to the second stage. Id. In addition, the defendant argued that
any waiver was not knowing and intelligent, because he was improperly admonished concerning
his right to file a postconviction petition. Id. The Third District first determined that the defendant
was properly admonished regarding the waiver of his right to file a postconviction petition and
that, thus, he knowingly and voluntarily waived that right. Id. ¶¶ 10-18. The court acknowledged
that the trial court did not consider the waiver issue, instead ruling on the merits of the petition. Id.
¶ 19. However, noting the principle that a reviewing court considers the correctness of the result
reached by the trial court and not the correctness of its reasoning, the court held that, because the
defendant waived his right to file the petition, it was properly dismissed. Id.¶ 20 Reid is readily distinguishable because the petition there was dismissed in compliance with
the Act’s 90-day requirement. Here, to affirm based on waiver would require us to ignore the plain
language of the Act. This we cannot do.
¶ 21 Because the trial court did not review defendant’s pro se petition within 90 days to
determine whether it was frivolous or patently without merit, we reverse the dismissal of the
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2022 IL App (2d) 200457-Upetition and remand this case for further proceedings under sections 122-4 through 122-6 of the
Act (725 ILCS 5/122-4-122-6 (West 2016)). Id. § 122-2.1(b); People v. Taylor, 2022 IL App (2d)
190951, ¶ 36; Little, 2012 IL App (5th) 100547, ¶ 24. We note that nothing in our disposition
would prevent the State, or even postconviction counsel (People v. Kuehner, 2015 IL 117695,
¶ 21) from arguing at the second stage that defendant waived his right to file a petition, or that the
petition was untimely—the latter claim of course being exclusive to second-stage proceedings
(People v. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d 89, 97-103 (2002)).
¶ 22 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 23 For the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County and
remand for second-stage postconviction proceedings.
¶ 24 Reversed and remanded with directions.
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