Miller v. The Department of State Police

NOTICE
2014 IL App (5th) 130144Decision filed 06/17/14. The
text of this decision may be
changed or corrected prior to
NO. 5-13-0144
the filing of a Petition for
Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE
the same.
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
HEATH LEE MILLER, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Petitioner-Appellee, ) Edwards County.
)
v. ) No. 11-MR-15
)
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICE, ) Honorable
) David K. Frankland,
Respondent-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
____________________________________________________________________________________________
PRESIDING JUSTICE WELCH delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Cates and Schwarm concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 The appellant, the Department of State Police (the Department), by and through its
attorney, Lisa Madigan, Attorney General of the State of Illinois, appeals the judgment
entered by the circuit court of Edwards County, which granted relief to the appellee,
Heath Lee Miller, under section 10 of the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act (the
Act) (430 ILCS 65/10 (West 2012)), by ordering the Department to issue a firearm
owners identification card (FOID card) to Miller. For the reasons which follow, we
affirm the decision of the circuit court.
¶2 On August 27, 2004, the Department notified Miller that it had revoked his FOID
card. The notice indicated that records maintained by the Department revealed that Miller
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had been charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance and domestic
battery. The notice stated that revocation was pursuant to section 8(n) of the Act (430
ILCS 65/8(n) (West 2004)), which authorized the revocation of a FOID card that had
been issued to an individual who was prohibited by federal law from acquiring firearms
or firearm ammunition, and 18 U.S.C. § 922(n), which made it unlawful for Miller to
receive any firearms or firearm ammunition because he was charged with a felony.
¶3 On November 4, 2011, Miller filed a petition for relief from firearm possession
prohibition in the circuit court of Edwards County. The petition was filed pursuant to
section 10 of the Act (430 ILCS 65/10 (West 2010)), which allows an aggrieved party to
appeal directly to the circuit court following a denial or revocation of a FOID card where
the denial or revocation was "based upon," inter alia, a domestic battery or any violation
of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act. The petition alleged that on August 4, 2004,
Miller was convicted of domestic battery, a Class A misdemeanor, and was placed on
probation for 12 months. The petition further alleged that, on the same date, Miller had
pled guilty to unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a Class 4 felony, and was
placed on first-offender probation for 24 months. Miller had successfully completed his
sentences of probation and was discharged from probation. Therefore, Miller was not
under indictment for a felony at the time that the revocation letter was issued.
Additionally, because charges for offenses under the Illinois Controlled Substances Act
(720 ILCS 570/100 et seq. (West 2010)) are dismissed upon successful completion of
first-offender probation under section 410(f) of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act
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(720 ILCS 570/410(f) (West 2010)), Miller did not have a felony conviction for unlawful
possession of a controlled substance at the time that the revocation letter was issued. The
petition therefore alleged that federal law did not prohibit Miller from acquiring or
possessing a firearm or firearm ammunition and requested that the circuit court enter an
order directing the Department to issue him a FOID card.
¶4 On January 13, 2012, the circuit court ordered the Department to issue a FOID
card to Miller. The court made the following findings: that Miller's FOID card had been
revoked "[a]s a result of his conviction for domestic battery"; that he had not been
convicted of a forcible felony within 20 years of his application for a FOID card; that he
would be unlikely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety; that substantial justice
had not been done in denying Miller a FOID card; that granting the requested relief would
not be contrary to the public interest; and that because of the nature of "the domestic
violence conviction," federal law did not prohibit Miller from acquiring or possessing
firearms or firearm ammunition.
¶5 On February 28, 2012, the Department filed a "motion to vacate" the circuit court's
order under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (the Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-
1401 (West 2012)), arguing that federal and state law prohibited Miller from possessing a
firearm because of his domestic-battery conviction and that compliance with the court's
January 2012 order would contravene federal and state law. Therefore, the Department
requested that the court's order be vacated. On March 27, 2012, Miller filed a motion to
dismiss the "motion to vacate," which was thereafter granted by the circuit court. The
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Department appealed, and this court dismissed the appeal on the basis that the
Department's motion was in substance a posttrial motion to vacate and not a section 2-
1401 petition. This court then concluded that the Department's posttrial motion to vacate
was untimely because it had been filed more than 30 days after entry of the final
judgment, but noted that the Department still had the opportunity to file a section 2-1401
petition.
¶6 On December 17, 2012, the Department filed a petition for relief from judgment
pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2012)) in the circuit
court. The Department argued as follows: (1) that the circuit court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to consider Miller's petition for relief from firearm possession prohibition
because the basis for the revocation of Miller's FOID card, which was that Miller was
prohibited from possessing firearms under federal law, was not one of the bases listed
under section 10(a) of the Act (430 ILCS 65/10(a) (West 2012)) that gives the circuit
court jurisdiction; (2) that Miller was required to seek relief for the revocation of his
FOID card through the Department's administrative process; and (3) that Miller was
prohibited from possessing firearms under federal law because of his conviction for
domestic battery pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), which provided that any person
convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence may not ship or transport in
interstate commerce or possess or affect in commerce any firearm or firearm ammunition.
¶7 On January 16, 2013, Miller filed a motion to dismiss the Department's section 2-
1401 petition, arguing, inter alia, that the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over
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his petition for relief from firearm possession prohibition. Miller argued that his
domestic-battery conviction was the only conviction that would have potentially
prohibited him from being issued a FOID card under federal and state law. Miller noted
that he had already successfully completed his sentence of first-offender probation for the
unlawful-possession charge and that consequently the charge had been dismissed. Miller
argued that the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over his petition pursuant to
section 10(a) of the Act (430 ILCS 65/10(a) (West 2012)), which gave the circuit court
authority to grant relief where a FOID card had been revoked or denied based on a
conviction for domestic battery. Miller further argued that his conviction for domestic
battery did not strictly fall within the federal definition of a "misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence" and therefore federal law did not prevent him from possessing a
firearm. On February 20, 2013, the circuit court granted Miller's motion to dismiss the
Department's section 2-1401 petition for relief from judgment. The Department appeals.
¶8 We review de novo the circuit court's dismissal of a section 2-1401 petition.
People v. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d 1, 18 (2007). We also review de novo the issue of whether
the circuit court properly exercised subject matter jurisdiction over a petition for a FOID
card under section 10 of the Act (430 ILCS 65/10 (West 2012)). Schlosser v. State, 2012
IL App (3d) 110115, ¶ 18.
¶9 Generally, to be entitled to relief under section 2-1401 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-
1401 (West 2012)), a petitioner must show by a preponderance of the evidence specific
factual allegations supporting each of the following elements: (1) the existence of a
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meritorious defense or claim; (2) due diligence in discovering this defense or claim; (3)
the error of fact or valid claim or defense was not presented to the circuit court during the
original action through no fault of the petitioner; and (4) due diligence in filing the
section 2-1401 petition for relief. Klose v. Mende, 378 Ill. App. 3d 942, 946-47 (2008);
Johnson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 324 Ill. App. 3d 543, 547 (2001). However, a
meritorious claim or defense and due diligence need not be established where a section 2-
1401 petition is attacking a judgment or order as being void. In re Haley D., 2011 IL
110886, ¶ 58. "[T]he allegation that the judgment or order is void substitutes for and
negates the need to allege a meritorious defense and due diligence." Sarkissian v.
Chicago Board of Education, 201 Ill. 2d 95, 104 (2002).
¶ 10 In the present case, the Department's section 2-1401 petition alleges that the circuit
court's judgment was void because it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider
Miller's petition for relief from firearm possession prohibition filed pursuant to section 10
of the Act (430 ILCS 65/10 (West 2012)). Accordingly, the Department's section 2-1401
petition did not need to establish the existence of a meritorious claim or defense and due
diligence.
¶ 11 The sole issue raised on appeal is whether the circuit court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to consider Miller's petition. The Department argues that the circuit court's
January 13, 2012, order is void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the
Department's stated basis for revoking Miller's FOID card, i.e., Miller was prohibited
under federal law from possessing a firearm as a result of being under indictment for a
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felony, is not one of the bases set forth under sections 10(a) and 10(c) of the Act (430
ILCS 65/10(a), (c) (West 2012)) for giving the circuit court jurisdiction. In response,
Miller contends that he was no longer under indictment for a felony at the time that the
Department had notified him that it was revoking his FOID card. Miller argues that the
circuit court properly granted his request for relief because our supreme court in Coram v.
State, 2013 IL 113867, has ruled that a person who has been convicted of domestic
battery may have his right to a FOID card restored.
¶ 12 Section 9 of the Act (430 ILCS 65/9 (West 2012)) provides that every person
whose application for a FOID card is denied and every holder of a FOID card whose card
is revoked shall receive written notice from the Department stating the specific grounds
upon which the application has been denied or upon which the FOID card has been
revoked. Section 8 of the Act (430 ILCS 65/8 (West 2012)) sets forth the grounds for the
Department to deny an application for or to revoke a previously issued FOID card. The
revocation notice issued by the Department in this case referenced section 8(n) of the Act
(430 ILCS 65/8(n) (West 2012)) as a basis for the revocation of Miller's FOID card.
Section 8(n) of the Act (430 ILCS 65/8(n) (West 2012)) gives the Department the
authority to revoke a previously issued FOID card where the person is prohibited from
acquiring or possessing firearms or firearm ammunition by any Illinois state statute or by
federal law. The revocation notice also referenced section 922(n) of the federal Gun
Control Act of 1968, which makes it "unlawful for any person who is under indictment
for a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year to ship or transport
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in interstate or foreign commerce any firearm or ammunition or receive any firearm or
ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce."
18 U.S.C. § 922(n) (2012). The notice indicated that Miller had been charged with
unlawful possession of a controlled substance and domestic battery.
¶ 13 After a FOID card has been revoked, the aggrieved party may seek relief from
either the Director of State Police or the circuit court pursuant to the limitations set forth
in section 10(a) of the Act, which is set forth as follows:
"Whenever *** a [FOID] Card is revoked or seized as provided for in Section 8 of
this Act, the aggrieved party may appeal to the Director of State Police for a
hearing upon such *** revocation ***, unless the *** revocation *** was based
upon *** domestic battery[ ] [or] any violation of the Illinois Controlled
Substances Act, *** in which case the aggrieved party may petition the circuit
court in writing in the county of his or her residence for a hearing upon such ***
revocation ***." 430 ILCS 65/10(a) (West 2012).
Further, section 10(c) of the Act states as follows:
"Any person prohibited from possessing a firearm under Sections 24-1.1 or 24-3.1
of the Criminal Code of 2012 or acquiring a [FOID] Card under Section 8 of this
Act may apply to the Director of State Police or petition the circuit court in the
county where the petitioner resides, whichever is applicable in accordance with
subsection (a) of this Section ***." 430 ILCS 65/10(c) (West 2012).
¶ 14 In the present case, the Department appears to acknowledge that the stated basis
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contained in the revocation letter, i.e., being barred from possessing a firearm because
Miller was under indictment for a felony, was incorrect as Miller had already been
convicted of domestic battery and had pled guilty to the unlawful-possession offense at
the time that the Department issued the revocation letter. However, the Department cites
Schlosser v. State, 2012 IL App (3d) 110115, for the proposition that it is the stated basis
contained in the revocation letter, not the correctness of that basis, that determines
whether the Director of State Police or the circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction
over a petition seeking relief under section 10 of the Act.
¶ 15 In Schlosser, 2012 IL App (3d) 110115, ¶ 1, the Department denied Schlosser's
application for a FOID card on the basis that he had been convicted of indecent
solicitation of a child. Schlosser filed a petition for hearing in the circuit court arguing,
inter alia, that the Department had wrongfully denied his application for a FOID card
because indecent solicitation of a child was not a forcible felony. Id. ¶ 12. The circuit
court determined that the offense of indecent solicitation of a child fell within the
definition of forcible felony and therefore denied Schlosser's petition. Id. ¶ 15. Schlosser
appealed, arguing that indecent solicitation of a child was not a forcible felony. Id. ¶ 17.
¶ 16 In response, the State argued that if indecent solicitation of a child was not a
forcible felony, then Schlosser could not appeal the denial of his FOID card application
directly to the circuit court and that he should have instead appealed to the Director of
State Police. Id. The State contended that pursuant to section 10(a) of the Act (430 ILCS
65/10(a) (West 2010)), the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction only where the
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denial was based on, inter alia, a forcible felony. Schlosser, 2012 IL App (3d) 110115,
¶¶ 17-19. The Schlosser court determined that the denial of Schlosser's FOID card
application was based upon a determination that he had a prior forcible-felony conviction
and therefore the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction to consider his petition. Id.
¶ 21. The court then determined that indecent solicitation of a child was a forcible felony
and that the circuit court had properly denied Schlosser's FOID card application. Id. ¶ 28.
Justice Wright concurred in part and dissented in part, agreeing that the plain language of
the Act required Schlosser to seek relief in the circuit court and that the circuit court had
jurisdiction, but disagreeing that Schlosser's conviction for indecent solicitation of a child
constituted a forcible felony. Id. ¶ 33 (Wright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
¶ 17 The Schlosser majority did not address the question of whether the Department's
stated basis for denial or revocation of a FOID card controls whether the Director of State
Police or the circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction, regardless of whether the stated
basis is correct. Rather, the Schlosser court found that an appeal to the circuit court was
proper because Schlosser's application had been denied on the basis that he had
committed a forcible felony, indecent solicitation of a child. However, we need not
determine whether the Department's stated basis for revoking a FOID card controls
regardless of whether that stated basis is correct because we find that the central issue in
this appeal involves the interpretation of section 10(a) of the Act (430 ILCS 65/10(a)
(West 2012)).
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¶ 18 The Department argues that Illinois courts have interpreted section 10(a) of the Act
(430 ILCS 65/10(a) (West 2012)) as vesting subject matter jurisdiction in the circuit court
only where the revocation of a FOID card is based upon a conviction for one of the
enumerated offenses. Therefore, the Department argues that because the basis for the
revocation of Miller's FOID card was an indictment for one of the enumerated offenses
and not a conviction, the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. In contrast,
Miller argues that the circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction regardless of whether
the basis for revocation was for pending charges or for a conviction of one of the
enumerated offenses because section 10(a) of the Act does not require a conviction.
¶ 19 As previously stated, section 10(a) of the Act (430 ILCS 65/10(a) (West 2012))
sets forth circumstances under which a petitioner can obtain relief from a firearm
prohibition in the circuit court. Specifically, section 10(a) of the Act provides that an
aggrieved party may appeal to the circuit court if the revocation of his FOID card was
"based upon" one of the enumerated offenses, inter alia, domestic battery and any
violation under the Illinois Controlled Substances Act. 430 ILCS 65/10(a) (West 2012).
Here, the revocation of Miller's FOID card was not "based upon" a conviction for one of
the enumerated offenses, but instead upon his being charged with a felony and therefore
prohibited by federal law from possessing firearms. The charges referenced in the
revocation letter were domestic battery and a violation of the Illinois Controlled
Substances Act, both of which are listed offenses in section 10(a) of the Act.
¶ 20 To determine the proper interpretation of section 10(a) of the Act, we first look to
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the plain language of the statute. The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain
and give effect to the legislature's intent. People v. McChriston, 2014 IL 115310, ¶ 15;
Williams v. Tazewell County State's Attorney's Office, 348 Ill. App. 3d 655, 659 (2004).
The best evidence of legislative intent is the statutory language, given its plain and
ordinary meaning. McChriston, 2014 IL 115310, ¶ 15; Williams, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 659.
Where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we must apply the statute without
resort to further aids of statutory construction. McChriston, 2014 IL 115310, ¶ 15
¶ 21 In this case, the Department cites Schlosser v. State, 2012 IL App (3d) 110115, ¶¶
19-21, and Williams, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 659, for the proposition that Illinois courts have
interpreted section 10(a) of the Act to require a conviction for the circuit court to have
subject matter jurisdiction over a petition for relief from firearm possession prohibition.
In Schlosser, 2012 IL App (3d) 110115, ¶ 21, the court determined that Schlosser's FOID
card application was denied based on his having been convicted of a forcible felony.
Similarly, in Williams, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 656, Williams' application for a FOID card was
denied based upon his having been convicted of a domestic battery. Therefore, in both
cases, the petitioners' FOID card applications were denied because they had been
convicted of one of the enumerated offenses, and those courts were not required to
determine whether circuit court jurisdiction was limited to cases where the denial or
revocation of a FOID card was based upon a conviction for one of the offenses set forth
in section 10(a) of the Act.
¶ 22 The plain language of section 10(a) of the Act provides that an aggrieved party
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may appeal to the circuit court if the revocation of his FOID card was "based upon" one
of the enumerated offenses. Nowhere in the statute did the legislature impose the
limitation that the aggrieved party must be convicted of one of the enumerated offenses as
opposed to merely being charged. See 430 ILCS 65/10(a) (West 2012). "Courts should
not, under the guise of statutory construction, add requirements or impose limitations that
are inconsistent with the plain meaning of the statute." Williams, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 659.
Therefore, we conclude that section 10(a) of the Act (430 ILCS 65/10(a) (West 2012))
encompasses a denial or revocation of a FOID card based on the applicant's being
prohibited by federal law from possessing firearms, which is based on the applicant's
having been charged with a felony, where that felony is one of the enumerated offenses in
section 10(a) of the Act. Accordingly, the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction to
consider Miller's petition, and we affirm the circuit court's judgment ordering the
Department to issue a FOID card to Miller.
¶ 23 For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the circuit court of Edwards County is
hereby affirmed.
¶ 24 Affirmed.
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2014 IL App (5th) 130144NO. 5-13-0144
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
HEATH LEE MILLER, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Petitioner-Appellee, ) Edwards County.
)
v. ) No. 11-MR-15
)
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICE, ) Honorable
) David K. Frankland,
Respondent-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
________________________________________________________________________
Opinion Filed: June 17, 2014
________________________________________________________________________
Justices: Honorable Thomas M. Welch, P.J.
Honorable Judy L. Cates, J., and
Honorable S. Gene Schwarm, J.,
Concur
________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys Lisa Madigan, Attorney General of Illinois, Carolyn E. Shapiro,
for Solicitor General, Timothy M. McPike, Assistant Attorney General,
Appellant 100 West Randolph Street, 12th Floor, Chicago, IL 60601
________________________________________________________________________
Attorney Alan C. Downen, Attorney at Law, 204 North Washington Street,
for McLeansboro, IL 62859
Appellee
________________________________________________________________________