Draves v. Thomas

2023 IL App (5th) 220653NOTICE
Decision filed 05/02/23. The
text of this decision may be NO. 5-22-0653
changed or corrected prior to
the filing of a Peti ion for IN THE
Rehearing or the disposition of
the same.
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
SAMANTHA DRAVES and RANDALL DRAVES, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) St. Clair County.
)
v. ) No. 21-L-1011
)
JAMES THOMAS, D.O.; ABIODUN SANGOSENI, )
M.D.; NES ILLINOIS, INC., an Illinois Corporation; and )
RANDOLPH HOSPITAL DISTRICT, d/b/a )
Memorial Hospital, an Illinois Body Politic, ) Honorable
) Heinz M. Rudolf,
Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE BARBERIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Welch and Cates concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 This appeal involves a motion to transfer a medical malpractice action from St. Clair
County, Illinois, to Randolph County, Illinois, based on improper venue. Plaintiff, Samantha
Draves, sought emergency medical services on multiple occasions at Randolph Hospital District,
d/b/a Memorial Hospital, and/or NES Illinois 1 from Drs. James Thomas and Abiodun Sangoseni
(defendants) in Randolph County, Illinois. Allegedly following orders from Samantha’s primary
care physician, plaintiff, Randall Draves, Samantha’s husband, transported Samantha from
1
Memorial Hospital paid NES Illinois, Inc. a contractual rate per physician hour worked at
Memorial Hospital. Drs. Thomas and Sangoseni were employees of Memorial Hospital and NES Illinois,
Inc.
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Chester, Illinois, Randolph County, Illinois, through St. Clair County, Illinois, to Barnes-Jewish
Hospital in St. Louis, Missouri. Plaintiffs argue that the circuit court’s order granting defendants’
motions to transfer venue to Randolph County was improper, where the court’s factual findings
were against the manifest weight of the evidence and the court improperly applied the transactional
venue analysis set forth in section 2-103(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-
103(a) (West 2020)). We affirm.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 We limit our recitation to those facts relevant to our disposition of this appeal. On October
21, 2021, plaintiffs filed a complaint in the circuit court of St. Clair County, alleging defendants—
Drs. James Thomas and Abiodun Sangoseni and their employers, NES Illinois, Inc., and Randolph
Hospital District, d/b/a Memorial Hospital (Memorial Hospital)—breached their duty of care to
Samantha. Plaintiffs specifically alleged that defendants failed to timely and appropriately
diagnose and treat Samantha’s condition, timely refer Samantha to a specialist, and otherwise act
as reasonably prudent physicians under the circumstances.
¶4 Plaintiffs, who were residents of Randolph County, alleged that Samantha sought
emergency medical services at Memorial Hospital on several occasions from December 29, 2020,
to January 4, 2021, from Drs. Thomas and Sangoseni. During this time, plaintiffs alleged that
Samantha’s condition deteriorated. Plaintiffs also alleged that on January 6, 2021, an unidentified
physician “sent [Samantha] from Memorial Hospital to Barnes-Jewish Hospital ***, [where she]
was diagnosed with a parapharyngeal abscess, and underwent multiple surgeries to her neck and
chest.” As a result of defendants’ negligence, Samantha experienced a disability and/or loss of a
normal life, disfigurement, an increased risk of future injuries, pain and suffering, and past and
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future medical expenses. 2 The complaint did not address the question of venue. Additionally,
plaintiffs did not allege that Samantha suffered a cumulative injury while in transit to Barnes-
Jewish Hospital, and plaintiffs did not provide any facts that injury or negligence took place in St.
Clair County.
¶5 On November 18, 2021, Memorial Hospital filed a motion to transfer for improper venue,
pursuant to section 2-103 of the Code, arguing the cause of action—defendants’ alleged negligent
care and treatment of Samantha—took place in Randolph County, not St. Clair County. Memorial
Hospital claimed it was a municipal corporation operated by the government of Randolph County,
with its principal office located in Chester, Illinois, Randolph County, and thus, venue was
determined by the municipal government statute (id.). Similarly, on January 12, 2022, Drs. Thomas
and Sangoseni and their employer, NES Illinois, Inc., filed a combined motion to transfer for
improper venue, pursuant to section 2-103(a) of the Code. Id.¶6 On February 8, 2022, plaintiffs filed a response in opposition to defendants’ motions to
transfer for improper venue and attached an affidavit of Randall. Plaintiffs argued that Samantha’s
unidentified primary care physician instructed Randall to transport Samantha to Barnes-Jewish
Hospital. Plaintiffs, citing Kaiser v. Doll-Pollard, 398 Ill. App. 3d 652, 659 (2010), argued that
Samantha “continued to be exposed to the infectious condition and continued to suffer injury”
when plaintiffs drove from Chester to St. Louis. As such, Samantha’s injury was “active, ongoing,
and ‘cumulative,’ ”—that is, her injury continued “to occur at least until the providers at Barnes-
Jewish Hospital were able to surgically intervene and evacuate the infection over the course of
several surgeries.” Thus, plaintiffs asserted that “part of the transaction and the development of
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Randall requested compensatory damages against defendants, alleging deprivation “of his
spouse’s service, affection, society, guidance, companionship, felicity, and sexual relations.”
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[Samantha’s] injuries occurred” in St. Clair County while plaintiffs were in transit to Barnes-
Jewish Hospital.
¶7 On March 23, 2022, Memorial Hospital filed a reply to plaintiffs’ response in opposition,
arguing that “a drive through a county where no treatment or care was provided does not establish
a proper venue to bring this action in.” Memorial Hospital claimed plaintiffs were forum shopping
in a county that bore no relation to the transaction that was part of plaintiffs’ cause of action.
Similarly, on March 25, 2022, Drs. Thomas and Sangoseni and their employer, NES Illinois, Inc.,
filed a reply to plaintiffs’ response in opposition, arguing that plaintiffs’ 10-mile drive through St.
Clair County, which took 15 to 20 minutes, could not establish venue. Additionally, defendants
asserted that plaintiffs’ decision to drive through St. Clair County was a unilateral act and that
plaintiffs failed to identify any integral facts to the cause of action that occurred in St. Clair County.
¶8 The circuit court held a hearing all on pending motions on August 16, 2022. Attorney Dede
Zupanci, counsel for Memorial Hospital, established that Randall drove 90 minutes from Randolph
County to Barnes-Jewish Hospital, passing through Monroe and St. Clair Counties, on January 6,
2021. Plaintiffs’ drive through St. Clair County took approximately 20 minutes. Additionally,
attorney Shane Chapman, counsel for Drs. Thomas and Sangoseni and NES Illinois, Inc., argued
that Samantha was not transported via ambulance or helicopter. Rather, attorney Chapman argued
that Randall unilaterally and voluntarily drove Samantha through St. Clair County, despite the
availability of alternate routes from Chester to St. Louis.
¶9 Next, attorney Nathaniel Brown, counsel for plaintiffs, argued that the evidence
demonstrated that Samantha’s primary care physician, Dr. Karen Robbins, “advised [Samantha]
needed to go to Barnes.” As such, Randall did not voluntarily and unilaterally decide to transport
Samantha to Barnes-Jewish Hospital. Attorney Brown argued that Samantha’s injury was
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cumulative, where the “infection started in Randolph County[,] and it continued until it was
brought under control at Barnes Hospital in St. Louis.”
¶ 10 In response, attorney Zupanci clarified the previous use of the word “unilateral,” stating
the following:
“Unilateral in this context means the plaintiffs were the only ones acting in St. Clair
County. So when the case law says that venue may not be established by unilateral acts,
that means that in order to establish venue the defendant must have been acting in St. Clair
County and there is no evidence of that because all of the actions that were partaken by
defendant in this case occurred in Randolph County.”
In response, attorney Brown reiterated, with reliance on Kaiser, that the “focus of the inquiry is
where the plaintiff suffered her injury,” thus, “[t]he presence of a defendant or negligent care,
that’s not what venue is predicated upon.” Attorney Chapman briefly responded that Kaiser was
dissimilar to the case at issue, noting that there was “a lot more going on in the Kaiser case to
create venue than a simple passage through St. Clair County.”
¶ 11 Following arguments by the parties, the court took the matter under advisement. 3
¶ 12 On September 2, 2022, the circuit court granted defendants’ motions to transfer venue for
improper venue. Pursuant to section 2-103(a) of the Code, the court determined venue was proper
in Randolph County, where Memorial Hospital’s principal office was located and the transaction
or some part thereof occurred. The court determined that “[t]he crux of Plaintiffs’ cause of action
stems from the treatment received at Memorial Hospital, not from the drive through St. Clair
We note that the circuit court heard argument by the parties on the issue of forum non conveniens.
3
However, only venue is at issue in this appeal.
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County.” As such, the court concluded that Randall “unilaterally driving his wife to Barnes-Jewish
through St. Clair County is insufficient to establish proper venue.”
¶ 13 This interlocutory appeal followed.
¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 15 On appeal, plaintiffs argue the circuit court’s factual findings were against the manifest
weight of the evidence. Additionally, by finding venue improper in St. Clair County, plaintiffs
argue that the court improperly applied the transactional venue analysis set forth in section 2-
103(a) of the Code. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
¶ 16 As a threshold matter, we observe that plaintiffs’ opening brief does not comply with
several mandatory supreme court rules governing appellate review. The purpose of the appellate
rules of procedure is to require the parties before the reviewing court to present clear and orderly
arguments so the court can properly ascertain and dispose of the issues presented. Hall v. Naper
Gold Hospitality LLC, 2012 IL App (2d) 111151, ¶ 7. The procedural rules governing the content
and format of appellate briefs are not suggestions; they are mandatory. Rosestone Investments,
LLC v. Garner, 2013 IL App (1st) 123422, ¶ 18. This court has the discretion to strike an
appellant’s brief and dismiss an appeal for failure to comply with the applicable rules of appellate
procedure. McCann v. Dart, 2015 IL App (1st) 141291, ¶ 12. With these principles in mind, we
turn to plaintiffs’ opening brief.
¶ 17 Plaintiffs’ brief violates several mandatory supreme court rules governing appellate
review, including failing to (1) provide a proper table of contents, which contains the headings of
the points and subpoints in the argument section with a summary statement, entitled “Points and
Authorities” (Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(1) (Nov. 1, 2017)), (2) include page references to the record on
appeal for all facts recited in the statement of jurisdiction (Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(4)(ii) (Nov. 1,
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2017)), and (3) attach an adequate appendix that contains the notice of appeal, as required by Rule
342 (Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(9) (Nov. 1, 2017); R. 342 (eff. Oct. 1, 2019)). Because the dismissal of
an appeal is such a severe sanction and these violations do not preclude our review of the appeal
(In re Detention of Powell, 217 Ill. 2d 123, 132 (2005)), we address plaintiffs’ contentions in turn.
¶ 18 Plaintiffs argue the circuit court’s factual findings were against the manifest weight of the
evidence, where the court determined that (1) none of Samantha’s injuries occurred in St. Clair
County while in transit to Barnes-Jewish Hospital and (2) Randall “unilaterally” drove Samantha
through St. Clair County to Barnes-Jewish Hospital. Additionally, plaintiffs contend that the court
erroneously applied the transactional venue analysis under section 2-103 of the Code when it
concluded that venue was improper in St. Clair County. We do not agree with plaintiffs.
¶ 19 A defendant who objects to a plaintiff’s chosen venue bears the burden of proving that the
venue is incorrect. Corral v. Mervis Industries, Inc., 217 Ill. 2d 144, 155 (2005) (citing Weaver v.
Midwest Towing, Inc., 116 Ill. 2d 279, 285 (1987)). The defendant must be able to identify specific
facts clearly establishing that the plaintiff’s choice of venue is improper. Id. In considering a
defendant’s motion based on improper venue, the circuit court should construe the statute liberally
in favor of effecting a change of venue. Tabirta v. Cummings, 2020 IL 124798, ¶ 17 (citing
Stambaugh v. International Harvester Co., 102 Ill. 2d 250, 261 (1984)). Our Illinois Supreme
Court has clarified that a reviewing court will not disturb the circuit court’s factual findings unless
they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Corral, 217 Ill. 2d at 154. “ ‘A decision is
against the manifest weight of the evidence only when an opposite conclusion is apparent or when
the findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence.’ ” Id. at 155(quoting Eychaner v. Gross, 202 Ill. 2d 228, 252 (2002)). A reviewing court may not substitute its
own judgment for the judgment of the trier of fact. Id. (citing Kalata v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., 144
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Ill. 2d 425, 434 (1991)). After reviewing the circuit court’s factual findings, we review the court’s
legal conclusions de novo. Id. (citing Eychaner, 202 Ill. 2d at 252).
¶ 20 Plaintiffs first argue that the circuit court’s factual findings were against the manifest
weight of the evidence, where the court determined that (1) none of Samantha’s injuries occurred
in St. Clair County while in transit to Barnes-Jewish Hospital and (2) Randall “unilaterally” drove
Samantha through St. Clair County to Barnes-Jewish Hospital. We cannot agree.
¶ 21 We agree with the circuit court that there is no evidence that defendants were negligent in
such a way that caused Samantha to suffer injury in St. Clair County. Moreover, there is no
evidence in the record that Samantha’s condition deteriorated in such a way that Samantha
experienced injury during plaintiffs’ 20-minute drive through St. Clair County. Additionally, the
record supports the circuit court’s factual finding that plaintiffs’ act of driving from Chester to
Barnes-Jewish Hospital was a unilateral act. Defendants in no way acted in St. Clair County, and
plaintiffs’ actions of driving through St. Clair County did not give rise to the nature of plaintiffs’
medical malpractice action. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the circuit court’s factual
findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 22 Next, in addressing the circuit court’s legal conclusions, plaintiffs do not challenge that
Memorial Hospital is a governmental body covered under section 2-103(a) of the Code. Thus, we
focus only upon the transactional portion of section 2-103(a) of the Code, which relates specifically
to public or municipal corporations and states the following:
“Actions must be brought against a public, municipal, governmental or quasi-municipal
corporation in the county in which its principal office is located or in the county in which
the transaction or some part thereof occurred out of which the cause of action arose.” 735
ILCS 5/2-103(a) (West 2020).
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¶ 23 The term “transaction,” which has been interpreted broadly, “has been defined to include
every fact which is an integral part of a cause of action.” Kenilworth Insurance Co. v. McDougal,
20 Ill. App. 3d 615, 617 (1974). Under transaction-venue principles, to determine whether the facts
that plaintiffs alleged took place in St. Clair County formed a “part” of the transaction, two
dependent variables must be analyzed to establish whether a particular venue is proper, including
(1) the nature of the cause of action and (2) the place where the cause of action sprang into
existence. Kaiser, 398 Ill. App. 3d at 656 (citing Rensing v. Merck & Co., 367 Ill. App. 3d 1046,
1050 (2006)).
¶ 24 In determining “the place where the cause of action sprang into existence,” courts have
determined this to include “the place where the parties carried on significant negotiations or signed
an agreement, or where the agreed-upon action was supposed to be or was performed” (Jackson v.
Reid, 363 Ill. App. 3d 271, 276 (2006)), or “ ‘where matters occurred that plaintiff has the burden
of proving’ as part of the cause of action” (Lake County Riverboat L.P. v. Illinois Gaming Board,
313 Ill. App. 3d 943, 953 (2000) (quoting People ex rel. Carpentier v. Lange, 8 Ill. 2d 437, 441
(1956)). Additionally, “[t]his is generally the place where the parties’ direct dealings occurred
while in an adversarial position or where events occurred that altered the parties’ legal
relationship.” Id. (citing Williams v. Illinois State Scholarship Comm’n, 139 Ill. 2d 24, 69 (1990)).
Moreover, “ ‘third-party dealings that have a definite and direct bearing on the cause of action may
be considered a part of the transaction out of which the cause of action arose.’ ” Jackson, 363 Ill.
App. 3d at 276 (quoting Southern & Central Illinois Laborers’ District Council v. Illinois Health
Facilities Planning Board, 331 Ill. App. 3d 1112, 1117 (2002), abrogated on other grounds by
Corral, 217 Ill. 2d at 149). We review the court’s legal conclusions de novo. Corral, 217 Ill. 2d at155 (citing Eychaner, 202 Ill. 2d at 252).
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¶ 25 Plaintiffs allege that Samantha received negligent medical care in Randolph County when
Drs. Thomas and Sangoseni and their employers failed to timely and appropriately diagnose and
treat Samantha, resulting in the deterioration of her condition that necessitated surgery. On the
instruction of Dr. Robbins, plaintiffs traveled to Barnes-Jewish Hospital, in St. Louis, Missouri,
where Samantha underwent multiples surgeries that, plaintiffs claim, left her with permanent and
ongoing injuries. Accordingly, plaintiffs rely heavily on Kaiser, 398 Ill. App. 3d 652, arguing that
Samantha suffered a cumulative injury, occurring from the time her condition went undiagnosed
at Memorial Hospital to the time she was diagnosed and received surgical care at Barnes-Jewish
Hospital. Thus, plaintiffs assert that Samantha experienced injury when she drove through St. Clair
County. We find plaintiffs’ reliance on Kaiser misplaced.
¶ 26 In Kaiser (id. at 653), the plaintiffs (wife and husband) alleged negligence of the defendant
physician for the performance of the wife’s hysterectomy at St. Joseph’s Hospital in Clinton
County, Illinois. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant both negligently failed to identify the
source of the wife’s continued bleeding before finishing surgery and then failed to timely diagnose
the wife’s condition after surgery when she continued to deteriorate. Id. at 654. Following surgery,
a cardiologist at St. Joseph’s Hospital transferred the wife to St. Elizabeth’s Hospital in St. Clair
County. Id. at 653. Surgeons at St. Elizabeth’s Hospital performed exploratory surgery,
discovering the source of the wife’s continued bleeding. Id. Nearly two years later, the plaintiffs
filed a complaint in St. Clair County, where the wife’s diagnosis and treatment occurred following
her initial surgery. Id. at 654. Defendants filed a motion to transfer the cause to Clinton County.
Id.
¶ 27 In determining that St. Clair County was an integral part of the plaintiffs’ cause of action,
this court considered the nature of the plaintiffs’ claim. Id. at 659. The plaintiffs alleged that the
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wife suffered injury from hemorrhaging that started when the defendant negligently performed a
hysterectomy in Clinton County. Id. The plaintiffs also alleged that the wife suffered injury in St.
Clair County as a result of the exploratory surgery. Id.
¶ 28 This court determined that the wife’s alleged injury was “cumulative”—that is, the
hemorrhaging started in Clinton County and did not end until surgeons stopped the bleeding in St.
Clair County. Id. As such, this court noted that any injuries the wife suffered as a result of third-
party intervening acts by the surgeons in St. Clair County could be attributed to the risk the
defendant physician’s negligence created. Id. Importantly, this court determined that defendant’s
failure to provide the wife with appropriate postoperative care constituted “ongoing negligence”
that continued until the wife was released from the hospital in St. Clair County. Id. at 662.
Accordingly, this court determined that the postoperative care the wife received in St. Clair County
“simply cannot be considered anything other than an integral part of the surgery the defendant
performed in Clinton County.” Id. This court further opined that St. Clair County had a “substantial
connection” to the plaintiffs’ cause of action, because “[m]uch of the evidence regarding the cause
and extent of the plaintiff’s injuries will come from St. Clair County because that is where she was
diagnosed and treated.” Id. at 663.
¶ 29 Here, unlike in Kaiser, Samantha’s injuries are not substantially connected to St. Clair
County. In considering the nature of plaintiffs’ claim, plaintiffs’ complaint alleged defendants
failed to timely diagnosis Samantha with an infectious condition in Randolph County and then
appropriately refer her to a specialist. Unlike in Kaiser, where the wife suffered a cumulative injury
in both St. Clair County and Clinton County, here, Samantha received treatment in Randolph
County and St. Louis City. Samantha received no care or treatment in St. Clair County. As stated
above, there is simply no evidence in the record that defendants diagnosed or treated Samantha in
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St. Clair County while she was in transit to St. Louis. Additionally, there is no evidence that
defendants’ negligence caused Samantha’s condition to deteriorate in such a way that injury
occurred in St. Clair County. As such, dissimilar to Kaiser, no evidence regarding the cause and
extent of Samantha’s injuries will come from St. Clair County to demonstrate Samantha suffered
an ongoing injury.
¶ 30 Moreover, unlike in Kaiser, here, there are no intervening acts of third parties in St. Clair
County that may also be attributable to defendants’ negligence. Unlike the plaintiffs in Kaiser,
here, plaintiffs do not allege that surgical complications following the exploratory surgery
performed in St. Louis contributed to Samantha’s injury. Instead, plaintiffs argue that Samantha
suffered severe and permanent injuries as a result of defendants’ untimely diagnosis and treatment
of her condition in Randolph County. We note that even if plaintiffs alleged that surgical
complications following the exploratory surgery contributed to Samantha’s injury, any intervening
third-party actions that may also be attributable to defendants’ negligence would have taken place
in St. Louis City, not St. Clair County. We simply cannot conclude that plaintiffs’ act of driving
through St. Clair County can be considered an integral part of her cause of action.
¶ 31 Contrary to plaintiffs’ argument, the case before us is more analogous to Jackson, 363 Ill.
App. 3d at 277. In Jackson, the plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action in McLean County,
Illinois, alleging defendant physician and her employer breached their duty of care in the
performance of a bilateral ureteral implantation. Id. In finding venue was proper in Peoria County,
Illinois, our colleagues in the Fourth District determined that the parties had no direct dealings
with each other in McLean County because defendant physician provided all medical services,
treatment, and care to the plaintiff in Peoria County. Id. In addition, the Fourth District determined
that the plaintiffs’ cause of action sprang into existence in Peoria County, because the defendant’s
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determination of the necessity of the procedure, performance of the procedure, and all
postoperative care occurred in Peoria County. Id.
¶ 32 Lastly, the Fourth District rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the tests ordered and
performed by third parties in McLean County constituted an integral part of the cause of action.
Id. In support of this determination, the Fourth District noted that it was the defendant’s
interpretation of the test results in Peoria County, not the mere testing that was performed in
McLean County, that formed the basis of the defendant’s decision to perform the surgical
procedure in question. Id. Thus, the Fourth District was not persuaded that the tests performed in
McLean County constituted an integral part of the cause of action. Id.
¶ 33 Here, nothing in the record demonstrates that the parties had any direct dealings with each
other in St. Clair County. Plaintiffs allege that defendants breached their duty of care to Samantha
by failing to timely and appropriately diagnose and treat Samantha’s condition, timely refer
Samantha to a specialist, and otherwise act as reasonably prudent physicians under the
circumstances. The parties interacted in Randolph County on several occasions from December
29, 2020, to January 4, 2021, before physicians at Barnes-Jewish diagnosed Samantha, performed
surgery, and provided postoperative care to Samantha in St. Louis City. Similar to Jackson, where
the defendant’s interpretation of test results and decision to perform surgery constituted an integral
part of the plaintiff’s cause of action in Peoria County, here, the integral parts of plaintiffs’ cause
of action occurred in Randolph County, where Samantha failed to receive a timely and appropriate
diagnosis. As such, the record before us supports a finding that the cause of action sprang into
existence in Randolph County.
¶ 34 Based on the foregoing, we cannot conclude that Samantha experienced an ongoing injury
in St. Clair County that formed an integral part of plaintiffs’ cause of action, provided St. Clair
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County had little or no relation to the defendants or the transaction that was part of plaintiffs’ cause
of action. Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in applying the transactional venue analysis set
forth in section 2-103(a) of the Code. To find otherwise would run counter to the legislative
purpose of venue that “ ‘a party should not be required to defend an action in a county that has
little or no relation to the party or the transaction that is the subject of the suit.’ ” (Emphasis in
original.) Id. at 275-76 (quoting Johnson v. Compost Products, Inc., 314 Ill. App. 3d 231, 236
(2000), abrogated on other grounds by Corral, 217 Ill. 2d at 150-54).
¶ 35 Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the circuit court properly granted defendants’
motions to transfer for improper venue.
¶ 36 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 37 For these reasons, we affirm the order of the circuit court of St. Clair County granting
defendants’ motions to transfer for improper venue, where the court’s factual findings were not
against the manifest weight of the evidence and the court properly applied the transactional venue
analysis pursuant to section 2-103(a) of the Code.
¶ 38 Affirmed.
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Draves v. Thomas, 2023 IL App (5th) 220653Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of St. Clair County, No. 21-L-
1011; the Hon. Heinz M. Rudolf, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys Nathaniel O. Brown, Weilmuenster Keck & Brown, P.C., of
for Belleville, for appellants.
Appellant:
Attorneys Kenneth M. Burke and Shane A. Chapman, of Brown & James,
for P.C., of Belleville, for appellees James Thomas, Abiodun
Appellee: Sangoseni, and NES Illinois, Inc.
Dawne K. Zupanci, of HeplerBroom LLC, of Edwardsville, for
other appellee.
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