People v. Wright

NOTICE 2023 IL App (4th) 210301-UThis Order was filed under
FILED
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is May 22, 2023
NO. 4-21-0301
not precedent except in the Carla Bender
limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate
under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Macon County
LAMONT D. WRIGHT, ) No. 18CF1124
Defendant-Appellant. )
) Honorable
) Phoebe S. Bowers,
) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE LANNERD delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Turner and Knecht concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Appellate court remanded for a preliminary Krankel hearing on alleged issues of
ineffective assistance raised by the defendant during sentencing.
¶2 In August 2018, the State charged defendant, Lamont D. Wright, in part with two
counts of domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(1), (2) (West 2018)) in connection with the
sexual assault and beating of his girlfriend, A.K. During trial, defense counsel, Lars Dunn,
advised the trial court that, after discussing the matter with defendant, Dunn planned to address
defendant’s criminal history during his testimony. When defendant testified, he misstated the
dates of his offenses. By agreement of the parties to correct the misstatement, the court later read
the actual dates to the jury. Also, during trial, the State presented the domestic battery charges as
a single offense, and a single verdict form was submitted to the jury. During sentencing,
defendant made claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during his statement in allocution.
After defendant’s statement, the court did not inquire further with either defendant or Dunn
about the claims.
¶3 The jury found defendant guilty of multiple offenses, including domestic battery.
The trial court sentenced defendant on both charges. Defendant appeals, arguing (1) Dunn
rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to move to suppress evidence of defendant’s
prior convictions and eliciting testimony about them during defendant’s testimony; (2) the court
erred in entering two separate convictions for domestic battery in violation of the one-act,
one-crime doctrine because the State mischaracterized the law and asked the jury to decide only
one charge; and (3) the court erred by failing to conduct a hearing pursuant to People v. Krankel,
102 Ill. 2d 181, 464 N.E.2d 1045 (1984), when defendant raised posttrial allegations of
ineffective assistance of counsel.
¶4 We remand for a preliminary Krankel hearing on defendant’s claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Because we remand for a preliminary Krankel hearing, we
decline to address defendant’s remaining argument on appeal.
¶5 I. BACKGROUND
¶6 On August 8, 2018, the State charged defendant with the two counts of domestic
battery that are the subject of this appeal. The State also charged defendant in part with two
counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/11-1.30(a)(2) (West 2018)), two counts
of aggravated domestic battery (id. § 12-3.3(a), (a-5)), one count of aggravated battery (id. § 12-
3.05(f)(1)), alleging defendant made physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature by use
of a deadly weapon when he held scissors to A.K.’s chin, and one count of resisting a peace
officer (id. § 31-1(a)). The domestic battery charges both alleged that defendant, on or about
August 2, 2018, having been previously convicted of a domestic battery, struck, grabbed,
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pushed, and pulled A.K. One count alleged defendant caused bodily injury, and the other count
alleged he made physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature. The trial court appointed
the public defender to represent defendant.
¶7 On August 9, 2019, defendant filed a pro se “motion to relieve counsel,” alleging
Dunn was providing inadequate representation and requesting appointment of new counsel. On
September 20, 2019, at the pretrial conference, Dunn advised the trial court he was ready to
proceed. The court asked defendant if he wanted to address his motion. Defendant told the court
the following:
“[M]y attorney has been inadequate and ineffective in his assistance of counseling
because he has been ignoring valuable evidence that is pertinent to my innocence.
I asked multiple times to view my police report and wasn’t able to until a month
ago, which I’ve been here fourteen months.
I talked with another inmate, Gary Boyle, who was also a client of Mr.
Dunn, and he informed to me that Mr. Dunn has disclosed relevant information
about my court case to him, which violates the attorney/client privilege.
And after speaking with Officer J. Ross, Badge Number 653, he informed
to me that Mr. Dunn had not been truthful about the reporting of my stolen car.
Furthermore, Mr. Dunn said that he and his investigator were having
trouble contacting the alleged victim, [A.K.], and Mr. Dunn asked me to try to get
in contact with her without getting caught. I believe Mr. Lars Dunn was
intentionally trying to sabotage my case because now the prosecutor has filed a
motion for discovery investigating the matter of me trying to make contact with
the alleged victim.
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Mr. Dunn and I are having irreconcilable differences any time we have a
meeting, and we continue to argue about whether Mr. Lars Dunn has my life and
my best interest at heart. He has informed to me that this is his trial, and I argue
that this is my life in jeopardy. We have failed to come to a consensus on the
direction of my case, so I pray that this Court allows my motion for ineffective
assistance of counseling.”
¶8 The trial court told defendant his allegations of ineffective assistance would not
be addressed until after trial. Defendant also expressed concern he was unprepared for trial and
told the court Dunn had not gone over his testimony at all. Dunn told the court “[w]e have
prepared ad nauseum.” Defendant disagreed, and the court stated trial was going to start as
scheduled.
¶9 On September 23, 2019, a jury trial was held before a new judge. A full recitation
of the evidence is unnecessary for the determination of this appeal. Generally, the State presented
evidence that, on August 2, 2018, A.K. was engaged to defendant and lived with him, her two
children from a previous relationship, and defendant’s daughter from a previous relationship.
A.K. testified that, on the night of August 2, 2018, defendant questioned her about a man she
previously worked with and accused her of being unfaithful. A.K. testified that, when she denied
any involvement with the other man, defendant repeatedly punched her, strangled her, pushed
her down, and threw water on her face. She testified that, later, defendant held scissors under her
chin and threatened her. Defendant then sexually assaulted her both anally and orally. When
defendant went to sleep, A.K. left with her children and went to the police station. Subsequently,
she went to a hospital, where she was treated for a broken finger and a sexual assault kit was
performed. Exhibits were introduced into evidence showing A.K. had bruising. She also had
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swelling around one of her fingers. DNA evidence from the sexual assault kit was connected to
defendant. When defendant was arrested, he was agitated and repeatedly hit his head on the
police car door and against a concrete wall.
¶ 10 Defendant testified and denied that he beat A.K. or sexually assaulted her. Dunn
also questioned defendant about his previous convictions.
¶ 11 After defendant’s testimony, the State told the trial court defendant misstated the
dates of his convictions and asked that certified copies of the convictions be admitted. The State
noted the convictions were five, six, and nine years ago, but defendant characterized them as all
being seven or eight years ago. Dunn stated he had no objection to the court reading the exact
dates of the convictions to the jury. The State agreed that would be sufficient, and the court
clarified the information for the jury.
¶ 12 Dunn did not offer any instructions at the jury instruction conference or object to
any of the State’s proposed instructions. The State offered an instruction stating, “[a] person
commits the offense of Domestic Battery when he knowingly and by any means causes bodily
harm to or makes physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with any family or
household member.” Another offered instruction provided in part, “[t]o sustain the charge of
Domestic Battery, the State must prove the following propositions: First Proposition: That the
defendant knowingly caused bodily harm to or made physical contact of an insulting or
provoking nature with A.K.” Then, the State provided a single set of guilty and not guilty
verdict forms for a single charge of domestic battery, which the trial court accepted.
¶ 13 During closing arguments, the State told the jury defendant was “charged with
two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault, two counts of aggravated domestic battery, one
count of aggravated battery, one count of domestic battery, and one count of resisting a peace
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officer.” Later, the State argued to the jury that it proved that defendant both caused bodily
injury to A.K. and made contact of an insulting or provoking nature. The trial court instructed the
jury using the instructions offered by the State.
¶ 14 The jury found defendant not guilty of one count of aggravated criminal sexual
assault, the count of aggravated battery involving use of the scissors, and resisting a peace
officer. The jury found him guilty of the remainder of the charges. The trial court entered
judgments of conviction that included convictions of both counts of domestic battery. Dunn did
not object.
¶ 15 On October 11, 2019, Dunn filed a motion for a new trial, alleging (1) the
evidence was insufficient to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, (2) the trial court
erred in overruling objections to cumulative evidence concerning the repeated presentation of
pictures of A.K., and (3) the court erred in sustaining the State’s hearsay objection. The court
denied the motion and conducted the sentencing hearing.
¶ 16 During his statement in allocution, defendant told the trial court about his pretrial
motion to relieve counsel and specifically used the term “ineffective counsel” when describing
the motion. Defendant claimed a fellow inmate, who was also Dunn’s client, had informed him
that Dunn had disclosed privileged information about the case. Defendant further stated he had
irreconcilable differences with Dunn. Defendant asserted there were matters omitted from the
trial that would have helped him, such as a lie by A.K. that his car had been turned over to their
landlord to pay rent, when it had actually been towed. Further, defendant alleged this
discrepancy could have been established through police testimony. Moreover, defendant
questioned the adequacy of Dunn’s cross-examination of A.K. on the issue of consensual sex and
that this may have accounted for the DNA evidence. In addition, defendant noted Dunn had not
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moved to strike a juror who had conversed with a witness, and defendant expressed concern
about Dunn’s failure to ensure that more men were on the jury. Finally, defendant maintained he
was forced to go through trial with counsel who he believed was unprepared.
¶ 17 The trial court did not acknowledge, respond, or make any reference to
defendant’s assertions of ineffective assistance of counsel or ask defendant or Dunn any
questions about the allegations. Instead, the court took a recess and sentenced defendant when it
returned.
¶ 18 The trial court noted that multiple aggravating factors were present. In particular,
the court found defendant caused serious harm to A.K. and had a violent criminal history. The
court found defendant was likely to repeat his crimes. The court referenced the aggravated
criminal sexual assault and aggravated domestic battery convictions involving a broken finger
and strangling as examples. The court then sentenced defendant to 15 years’ incarceration for
aggravated sexual assault and a mandatory consecutive term of 7 years’ incarceration for one of
the aggravated domestic battery convictions. The court sentenced defendant to concurrent terms
of seven years’ incarceration for the other aggravated domestic battery conviction and concurrent
three-year terms for each domestic battery conviction.
¶ 19 Defendant orally requested that a notice of appeal be filed. A notice was not filed,
and, on April 30, 2020, defendant filed a pro se “motion for appeal in the appellate courts,”
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The Office of the State Appellate Defender was
appointed and filed a motion for a supervisory order asking the Illinois Supreme Court to treat
the document filed on Apri1 30, 2020, as a properly perfected appeal. That motion was granted,
and this appeal followed.
¶ 20 II. ANALYSIS
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¶ 21 Defendant contends (1) Dunn rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing
to move to suppress evidence of defendant’s prior convictions; (2) the trial court erred in
entering two separate convictions for domestic battery in violation of the one-act, one crime rule
because the State mischaracterized the law and asked the jury to decide only one charge; and
(3) the court erred by failing to conduct a Krankel hearing when defendant raised posttrial
allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. We agree with defendant’s third contention and
find that remand for a preliminary Krankel hearing is necessary.
¶ 22 When a defendant raises a pro se posttrial claim of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel, Illinois courts follow the procedure as it has evolved from Krankel. People v. Ayres,
2017 IL 120071, ¶ 11, 88 N.E.3d 732. “The trial court must conduct an adequate inquiry into
allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, that is, inquiry sufficient to determine the factual
basis of the claim.” People v. Banks, 237 Ill. 2d 154, 213, 934 N.E.2d 435, 468 (2010). “[A] trial
court’s method of inquiry at a [preliminary] Krankel hearing is somewhat flexible.” People v.
Flemming, 2015 IL App (1st) 111925-B, ¶ 85, 31 N.E.3d 935. Ordinarily, an adequate inquiry
may include “(1) questioning the trial counsel, (2) questioning the defendant, [or] (3) relying on
[the court’s] own knowledge of the trial counsel’s performance in the trial.” People v. Peacock,
359 Ill. App. 3d 326, 339, 833 N.E.2d 396, 407 (2005).
¶ 23 “If the court determines that the claim lacks merit or pertains only to matters of
trial strategy, then the court need not appoint new counsel and may deny the pro se motion.”
People v. Roddis, 2020 IL 124352, ¶ 35, 161 N.E.3d 173. “However, if the allegations show
possible neglect of the case, new counsel should be appointed.” Id. We review de novo whether
the trial court properly conducted a preliminary Krankel inquiry. People v. Jolly, 2014 IL 117142,
¶ 28, 25 N.E.3d 1127.
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¶ 24 Here, defendant clearly raised multiple issues of ineffective assistance of counsel
during his statement in allocution. Defendant told the trial court about his pretrial motion to
relieve counsel and specifically used the term “ineffective counsel” when describing the motion.
In addition, defendant then stated a fellow inmate, who was also Dunn’s client, had informed
him that Dunn had disclosed privileged information about the case. Also, defendant raised issues
concerning Dunn’s decision to not challenge portions of testimony and questioned the adequacy
of his cross-examination of witnesses. Furthermore, he noted Dunn had not moved to strike a
juror who had conversed with a witness and expressed concern about Dunn’s failure to ensure
that more men were on the jury. Finally, defendant stated he was forced to go through trial with
counsel who he believed was unprepared. However, despite clearly stating claims of ineffective
assistance, the court not only failed to make an adequate inquiry, it failed to conduct any inquiry
at all to determine the factual basis of the claims. That failure was error under Krankel.
¶ 25 The State does not dispute that defendant raised claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel. Instead, the State argues defendant’s allegations were untimely when he made them
during his statement in allocution without filing a new written motion or providing support for
the allegations. However, the State misstates the law. A pro se defendant is not required to do
anything specific other than bring his or her claim to the trial court’s attention. Peacock, 359 Ill.
App. 3d at 340. A defendant is entitled to a Krankel inquiry when he or she makes an explicit or
clear complaint, either orally or in writing, of trial counsel’s ineffective assistance. Ayres, 2017
IL 120071, ¶ 18. Further, even a bare assertion of “ineffective assistance of counsel” is sufficient
to trigger a Krankel inquiry. See id. ¶¶ 9, 18. The claim need not be supported by facts or
specific examples because, if the rule were otherwise, the supreme court would not require the
trial court to conduct an inquiry into the underlying factual basis for the claim. See id. ¶ 19.
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¶ 26 The timing of the assertion of the posttrial claim is also not determinative. See
People v. Vargas, 409 Ill. App. 3d 790, 800-02, 949 N.E.2d 238, 248-49 (2011) (finding a
Krankel inquiry was required where, during allocution, the defendant spoke extensively to the
trial court about alleged instances of ineffective assistance of his trial counsel); People v. Pence,
387 Ill. App. 3d 989, 995, 902 N.E.2d 164, 170 (2009) (holding the trial court should have
conducted a Krankel inquiry when defendant stated in allocution defense counsel did not
thoroughly represent him, omitted issues of facts, and denied the trial court the full picture of
what happened). Without a preliminary inquiry into the factual bases of defendant’s claims, the
question remains unanswered as to whether defendant has raised meritorious issues.
Accordingly, we remand for the trial court to conduct a preliminary Krankel inquiry into
defendant’s claims.
¶ 27 Because we conclude a Krankel inquiry is required, we need not consider
defendant’s other arguments on appeal at this time. People v. Bell, 2018 IL App (4th) 151016,
¶ 37, 100 N.E.3d 177 (“Depending on the result of the *** Krankel inquiry, defendant’s other
claims may become moot.”). While we remand for further proceedings on defendant’s pro se
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we retain jurisdiction over defendant’s remaining
claims. People v. Wilson, 2019 IL App (4th) 180214, ¶ 26, 137 N.E.3d 868. If “defendant is not
satisfied with the outcome of the proceedings on remand, he may again appeal and raise any
supplementary claims relating to the remand proceedings, and the State may have an opportunity
to respond to those claims.” Id.¶ 28 III. CONCLUSION
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¶ 29 For the reasons stated, we remand with directions for the trial court to conduct a
preliminary Krankel hearing on the alleged issues of ineffective assistance of counsel that
defendant raised during sentencing.
¶ 30 Remanded with directions.
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