State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Jenkins

NOTICE 2023 IL App (4th) 220942-UThis Order was filed under
FILED
NO. 4-22-0942 July 19, 2023
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
Carla Bender
not precedent except in the 4th District Appellate
limited circumstances allowed IN THE APPELLATE COURT
Court, IL
under Rule 23(e)(1).
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE ) Appeal from the
INSURANCE COMPANY, ) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Putnam County
v. ) No. 21CH3
VELINDA JENKINS, )
Defendant-Appellant. ) Honorable
) Bruce P. Fehrenbacher,
) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice DeArmond and Justice Zenoff concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The circuit court did not err in granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.
¶2 On October 11, 2022, pursuant to section 2-1005 of the Code of Civil Procedure
(735 ILCS 5/2-1005 (West 2022)), the circuit court granted plaintiff State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company’s (State Farm) motion for summary judgment declaring State
Farm was not obligated to provide uninsured motorist coverage to defendant Velinda Jenkins.
Jenkins appeals and raises several issues, though one is dispositive: whether the court erred by
determining she failed to provide adequate proof of loss, specifically to demonstrate another driver
was an uninsured motorist, to establish her claim fell within the scope of the insurance policy State
Farm had issued to her. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 In May 2017, Jenkins was a passenger in a motor vehicle being operated by her
husband when her husband swerved to avoid striking a vehicle operated by Tanya Haynes, who
turned in front of them. Jenkins suffered personal injuries when their vehicle left the roadway and
came to rest in a cornfield. Jenkins was removed from her vehicle by emergency personnel and
transported to the hospital accompanied by her husband.
¶5 Neither Jenkins nor her husband spoke to Haynes to determine if Haynes or the
vehicle she was driving was covered by an insurance policy. The Illinois Traffic Crash Report
(Crash Report), completed by an officer responding to the accident, listed Haynes as a witness.
The report did not disclose information about the existence of any insurance covering Haynes or
the vehicle she was operating. The Crash Report discloses Haynes was issued a citation for
violating the right-of-way rule pursuant to section 11-901 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS
5/11-901 (West 2016)), but not a citation for failing to carry liability insurance. (625 ILCS 5/3-
707 (West 2017)). The Jenkins vehicle, however, was covered by an insurance policy issued by
State Farm.
¶6 Beginning in April 2018, Jenkins’s attorney wrote Haynes two letters requesting
she forward the correspondence to her insurance carrier, and when Haynes did not respond, filed
a lawsuit against Haynes on Jenkins’s behalf. After the first summons and complaint was returned
unserved, Jenkins served Haynes at a new address an investigator located. After Haynes failed to
respond, Jenkins sought and obtained a default judgment as to liability against Haynes.
¶7 Immediately after obtaining the default judgment in November 2018, Jenkins wrote
to State Farm advising she intended to pursue an uninsured motorist claim under the policy it had
issued to her, and enclosing pleadings from the action against Haynes and the Crash Report. State
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Farm acknowledged receipt of the letter, and Jenkins then provided information about her medical
care and expenses.
¶8 On May 8, 2019, Jenkins made a formal demand for uninsured motorist arbitration,
then subsequently a demand for settlement of the claim for the policy limit, and finally a request
State Farm name an arbitrator if it would not settle for the policy limit.
¶9 The policy State Farm had issued to Jenkins required the insured (1) to “cooperate”
with it, (2) assist “when asked” with “securing and giving evidence,” and (3) when it required,
provide “proof of loss on forms” it would furnish.
¶ 10 On March 26, 2020, State Farm asked Jenkins whether she had discovered any
information about whether Haynes was insured at the time of the accident, or about the vehicle
Haynes was driving. In July 2020, State Farm advised Jenkins (1) arbitration was premature
because it had not yet determined whether Haynes had any insurance available, (2) who its
arbitrator was, and (3) that it sought Jenkins’s examination under oath pursuant to the policy terms.
¶ 11 In August 2020, State Farm again asked Jenkins to provide information evidencing
Haynes was not insured. It sought similar information via written discovery requests in the
arbitration, pursuant to which Jenkins referenced her attempts to communicate with Haynes, the
“police report,” and the pleadings from the lawsuit against Haynes.
¶ 12 In October 2020, State Farm conducted its examination of Jenkins under oath.
Jenkins advised: (1) neither she nor her husband had ever spoken to Haynes about insurance; (2) at
the accident scene, they assumed the responding officer would put that information in the police
report; (3) she had received no information from any State of Illinois office or any insurance
company related to any insurance that may have covered Haynes; and (4) she did not know whether
Haynes had insurance coverage.
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¶ 13 On May 26, 2021, State Farm sent Jenkins a reservation of rights letter, delineating
the reasons it questioned whether Jenkins qualified for uninsured motorist benefits. In response,
Jenkins advised she had provided sufficient information to demonstrate Haynes was not insured at
the time of the accident.
¶ 14 On September 17, 2021, State Farm filed its complaint seeking a declaration it did
not owe Jenkins coverage under the uninsured motorist provisions of the policy because she failed
to provide adequate proof of loss Haynes was uninsured at the time of the loss. Jenkins answered
and asserted several affirmative defenses, after which neither party sought discovery. State Farm
then filed a motion for summary judgment, to which Jenkins responded and sought summary
judgment in her favor.
¶ 15 On October 11, 2022, the circuit court granted State Farm’s motion, and denied
Jenkins’s. The court found (1) Jenkins failed to meet her burden of establishing Haynes was
uninsured, (2) Jenkins failed to provide State Farm with sufficient information to determine
whether Haynes had insurance coverage available, and (3) the “circumstantial evidence” did not
establish Haynes was uninsured or an “uncooperative insured.”
¶ 16 This appeal followed.
¶ 17 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 18 A. Standard of Review
¶ 19 Our review of a circuit court’s determination to grant a party’s motion seeking
summary judgment, including one construing an insurance policy and declaring the rights of the
parties thereunder, is de novo. Hanover Insurance Co. v. MRC Polymers, Inc., 2020 IL App (1st)
192337, ¶ 26.
¶ 20 B. Jenkins Failed to Produce Sufficient Evidence Haynes Was Uninsured
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¶ 21 Jenkins’s claims boil down to her assertion she provided State Farm with adequate
proof of loss to demonstrate Haynes was not insured at the time of the loss.
¶ 22 It is well established the burden is on the insured to demonstrate a claim falls within
the coverage provisions of an insurance policy. Addison Insurance Co. v. Fay, 232 Ill. 2d 446, 453
(2009). For example, where the policy’s proof of loss provisions required the claimant to give
“particulars sufficient” to identify the insured and witnesses along with information “with respect
to the time, place and circumstances” of the loss, and the claimant, as an insured under the policy’s
uninsured motorist provisions, provided the police and fire department reports in addition to
medical records and bills, the “information was sufficient” for the insurer to identify the
“particulars” as required by the policy. American Access Casualty Co. v. Tutson, 409 Ill. App. 3d
233, 237, 239 (2011). Thus, because the claimant complied with the policy’s proof of loss
provisions, the circuit court committed error by granting the insurer’s motion for summary
judgment based on the claimant failing to file an appropriate proof of loss. Id. at 239-40.
¶ 23 Proof of loss in the uninsured motorist context is “proof that there is no other
insurance available to cover the insured’s claim.” State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Leon, 2019 IL App (1st) 180655, ¶ 28. Therein, the insured asserted she had provided sufficient
information to her insurance carrier about the auto accident in which she was involved, while a
passenger in a non-owned vehicle working as a driving instructor for her employer, to bring her
within her policy’s uninsured motorist provisions. Id. ¶¶ 5, 25. Specifically, the insured provided
a police report, which contained the contact information for the driver and the owner of the vehicle
in which she was a passenger, and a letter from her employer’s insurance carrier advising it would
not provide coverage for the loss because the injuries were suffered during the course of
employment. Id. ¶¶ 6, 25. Notably, the insurance policy, under which the insured sought uninsured
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motorist benefits, excluded from coverage injuries for which there were workers’ compensation
benefits available. Id. ¶ 3. Understandably, the insured’s carrier repeatedly sought information
from her verifying there was no workers’ compensation policy available, and no coverage
available through the driver or owner of the vehicle. Id. ¶¶ 7-12. However, the insured never
provided any information relating to other potential coverage. Id. ¶ 18. Thus, because the insured
did not provide the carrier “with the relevant information it needed to investigate,” it was “evident”
the insured did not provide “a sufficient proof of loss pursuant to the policy.” Id. ¶¶ 29-30.
¶ 24 In the instant matter, Jenkins provided State Farm with the pleadings from the
action against Haynes resulting in a default judgment, the Crash Report, and information about her
medical bills and expenses. The relevant insurance policy described Jenkins’s duty to cooperate
and provide proof of loss. To that end, because Jenkins sought coverage pursuant to the policy’s
uninsured motorist provisions, State Farm requested that Jenkins provide information relating to
whether Haynes was insured. The information Jenkins provided her carrier utterly failed to address
this ultimate issue or provide any useful information to permit State Farm to investigate.
¶ 25 In short, Jenkins bore the burden to provide adequate proof of loss, and she simply
did not. Similar to Leon, Jenkins provided no information relating to Haynes’s uninsured status.
In fact, Jenkins admitted at her examination under oath she had no relevant information and did
not actually know whether Haynes was insured or not. We acknowledge, given the circumstances,
it may have been difficult for Jenkins to provide helpful information or meet her burden, but the
policy had no exclusion for “unless the insured cannot obtain.” Further, Jenkins cites no authority
supporting the existence of an exception for difficulty in obtaining proof of loss.
¶ 26 Therefore, the circuit court committed no error in determining Jenkins failed to
provide adequate proof of loss, and entering judgment for State Farm.
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¶ 27 C. Jenkins’s Other Arguments Fail as Well
¶ 28 The other arguments Jenkins makes are subsumed by her failure to comply with the
policy terms, but we will briefly address them.
¶ 29 First, Jenkins posits the circumstantial evidence constituted sufficient proof Haynes
was uninsured. Such a conclusion is one of many that could flow from the circumstances herein.
We note it would be just as easy to conclude Haynes was insured because it appears she was not
issued a citation for having no insurance. What Jenkins seeks is for us to speculate Haynes was
uninsured based on the difficulty Jenkins had gaining any cooperation from Haynes. Jenkins
provides no authority supporting such a result, and we will not so conclude.
¶ 30 Second, Jenkins asserts State Farm should be barred, based on its unclean hands,
from asserting the policy defense because State Farm was unable to recover from Haynes what it
paid her husband for property damage. We fail to see how State Farm’s insistence Jenkins comply
with the terms of the policy constitutes unclean hands, and Jenkins cites no relevant authority in
support of such claim.
¶ 31 Next, Jenkins argues we should conclude, because Haynes was uncooperative, she
could be deemed uninsured. Doing so would require us to assume multiple facts and engage in
rampant speculation. In support of this proposition, Jenkins cites Zurich v. Country Mutual
Insurance Co., 65 Ill. App. 3d 608 (1978). However, Zurich presents an entirely different set of
facts. Therein, the at-fault driver’s insurance company’s attorneys moved to withdraw from
representing the at-fault driver for noncooperation in the injured party’s suit against him. Id. at
609. Because the at-fault driver’s carrier took that position, the injured driver was entitled to assert
an uninsured motorist claim against her own insurance company. Id. at 612-13. In the instant case,
it is not Haynes’s insurance company’s position, relative to its own insured, which forms the basis
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for Jenkins’s claim Haynes was an uncooperative insured and thus can be deemed uninsured.
Instead, it is Haynes’s failure to cooperate with Jenkins that is urged as the reason we should deem
Haynes uninsured. We decline Jenkins’s invitation.
¶ 32 Finally, Jenkins claims State Farm was barred by laches from seeking declaratory
relief based on Jenkins’s failure to provide acceptable proof of loss. Specifically, Jenkins
complains it took State Farm over 1000 days from the time she first asserted her uninsured motorist
claim until it sought declaratory relief, and over 600 days to first request proof that Haynes was
uninsured. First, it is reasonable to assume State Farm was waiting for Jenkins to file an appropriate
proof of claim. Second, given the nature of the claim, it is also reasonable to assume, even without
an explicit request, State Farm would likely have wanted information about Haynes’s uninsured
status. But ultimately, this argument fails because Jenkins has not demonstrated prejudice. See,
e.g., Tully v. State, 143 Ill. 2d 425, 432 (1991) (One of the elements of laches is “prejudice to the
opposing party resulting from the delay.”). It is difficult to understand how any prejudice flowed
from State Farm’s “delay” in filing its complaint for declaratory relief, given that any delay only
provided Jenkins additional time to make an adequate proof of claim.
¶ 33 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 34 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.
¶ 35 Affirmed.
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