People v. Enge

No. 1-21-1050
Order Filed July 21, 2023
FIFTH DIVISION
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) of Cook County.
Respondent-Appellee, )
)
v. ) No. 08 CR 23813
)
CHOICE ENGE, )
) Honorable
Petitioner-Appellant. ) Diana L. Kenworthy,
) Judge Presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE DELORT delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Mitchell and Lyle concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirm the circuit court’s denial of defendant’s motion for leave to file a
successive postconviction petition, because he failed to establish cause for his ineffective
assistance of counsel claim.
¶2 Petitioner Choice Enge appeals the circuit court’s denial of his motion for leave to file his
successive petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122–1 et seq. (West
2020)), arguing the court erred by denying the motion because the petition demonstrated both
cause and prejudice regarding his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. We affirm.
No. 1-21-1050
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 We discuss only the facts necessary for the disposition of the issues in this appeal. A more
thorough recitation of the facts is included in our order on petitioner’s first postconviction appeal.
See People v. Enge, 2016 IL App (1st) 132879-U.
¶5 After a bench trial, the circuit court found Enge guilty of felony murder and home invasion
involving the discharge of a firearm, and sentenced him to concurrent terms of 35 years and 15
years for home invasion, respectively. On direct appeal, Enge filed a motion for summary remand
and for vacation of the home invasion conviction. Id. ¶ 11. The State did not object, and this court
vacated the latter conviction on July 19, 2006. Id. People v. Enge, No. 1-05-0205 (2006)
(dispositional order).
¶6 On July 22, 2009, Enge filed his initial postconviction petition. Id. ¶ 12. Enge alleged that
(1) the circuit court erroneously failed to sever his trial from his codefendants’ trial, (2) the State
knowingly presented perjured testimony, (3) the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove
several elements of his offense beyond a reasonable doubt, and (4) his term of mandatory
supervised release was unconstitutional. Id. ¶12. Enge did not argue ineffective assistance of
counsel. The circuit court dismissed the petition. Enge appealed, and this court affirmed. People v.
Enge, 2016 IL App (1st) 132879-U.
¶7 On May 17, 2021, Enge filed a motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition,
alleging in relevant part that his trial counsel was ineffective because she erroneously advised Enge
that at trial, his maximum sentence would be 20 years’ imprisonment because he could only be
convicted of second-degree murder. Specifically, regarding counsel’s advice on what degree of
murder he could be found guilty of at trial, Enge explained that his trial counsel failed to properly
advise him self-defense and defense of others were not valid defenses to felony murder. Regarding
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cause as to why he did not raise this claim in his initial postconviction petition, Enge alleged he
first learned of this potential claim in 2019 after discussing his case with his “jailhouse lawyer”
Ellean Nance. Nance’s affidavit explains he is a “jailhouse lawyer” who assists inmates in their
legal affairs. Nance agreed to assist Enge in his criminal case. Nance concluded Enge’s trial
counsel incorrectly advised him during plea negotiations causing Enge to accept an uninformed
plea deal. As to prejudice, Enge alleged had he known he could have been subject to a felony
murder conviction and the corresponding longer sentence, he would have accepted the State’s plea
bargain offer of 20 years’ imprisonment.
¶8 On June 28, 2021, the circuit court denied Enge’s motion for leave to file a successive
postconviction petition in a written order. This appeal followed.
¶9 ANALYSIS
¶ 10 On appeal, Enge contends that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for leave to file
the successive postconviction petition. Specifically, he argues that his petition demonstrated
prejudice because his trial counsel erroneously advised him to accept the plea deal, and cause,
because he did not learn about his claim until 2019, and then diligently pursued it thereafter.
¶ 11 The Act allows a petitioner to challenge a conviction or sentence for violations of federal
or state constitutional rights. People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458, 471 (2006). The Act provides
that only one petition may be filed by a petitioner as of right. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2020).
Unless the petition alleges actual innocence, a circuit court will not grant a petitioner leave to file
a successive postconviction petition unless the petition satisfies the cause-and-prejudice test,
which “is composed of two elements, both of which must be met in order for the petitioner to
prevail.” People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 464 (2002).
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¶ 12 A defendant establishes cause by demonstrating that some objective factor external to the
defense impeded his ability to raise the claim at an earlier proceeding. People v. Clark, 2023 IL
127273, ¶ 60 (referencing 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f)(1) (West 2018); Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at 460).
“To establish ‘prejudice,’ the defendant must show the claimed constitutional error so infected his
trial that the resulting conviction violated due process.” Id. ¶ 70 (referencing Pitsonbarger, 205
Ill. 2d at 460). We review the denial of leave to file a successive postconviction petition de novo.
People v. Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 33.
¶ 13 We first address cause. A defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel applies to the
plea-bargaining process. People v. Hale, 2013 IL 113140, ¶ 15. The record shows that Enge did
not raise any argument with respect to his attorney’s advice on the potential length of sentence
until he filed his successive postconviction petition. He contends on appeal that this claim was not
previously available because he only learned of it in 2019 after consulting with Nance, whose
affidavit is in the record. Enge claims that he had limited understanding of the legal system and
relies on “fundamental fairness” for excusing his failure to bring the claim earlier.
¶ 14 The State makes several counterarguments in response to Enge’s allegations. First, the
State highlights statements in the affidavits of Jerome and Charles Howard that suggest that when
Enge rejected the original plea deal, Enge’s trial counsel in fact did advise him the State wanted
more than 20 years, and thus Enge’s own filing rebuts his claim that counsel erroneously advised
Enge his maximum sentencing exposure was 20 years’ imprisonment. Second, the State argues
when Enge was offered a plea deal of 20 years, logically he must have understood that the
maximum sentence would have to be greater than the term in the plea offer. Finally, the State notes
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that Enge did not object during sentencing when the court announced that his conviction carried a
maximum sentence between 20-60 years. 1
¶ 15 We find that Enge has failed to establish the cause prong of the cause-and-prejudice test.
His claim rests entirely on the allegation that his trial counsel advised him not to accept the State’s
plea deal, and that the plea deal offered was the maximum sentence that he could receive because
he would only be convicted of second-degree murder, and was not subject to a felony murder
charge because he could argue self-defense and defense of others. It necessarily follows that when
the circuit court found Enge guilty of felony murder, not second-degree murder, and then sentenced
him to a longer term than 20 years’ imprisonment, he would have understood that his attorney’s
advice was erroneous. At this point, to avoid waiver, it was incumbent upon Enge to raise the
ineffective assistance at plea bargaining claim as soon as possible. See People v. Scott, 194 Ill. 2d
268, 274 (2000) (regarding claims in postconviction petition, “issues that could have been raised
in the earlier proceedings, but were not, will ordinarily be deemed waived”). But Enge did not do
so; instead, he failed to raise this theory of ineffective assistance in his initial postconviction
petition. To overcome this wavier and now receive leave to pursue this claim in a successive
postconviction petition, Enge had to identify in the motion for leave some objective external factor
that prevented him from including that claim in the initial petition. See Clark, 2023 IL 127273,
¶ 60. His motion for leave is completely devoid of any such allegations, and it follows that he has
failed to satisfy the cause prong of the cause-and-prejudice test, and the circuit court was correct
to deny his motion for leave.
1
In part, the State’s arguments address the merit of the claims which we will not address because
we find that Enge has not demonstrated “cause” to proceed with a successive postconviction petition.
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¶ 16 Enge argues he only learned the advice was erroneous in 2019. But again, the record is
clear that defendant knew immediately after sentencing, let alone by the time he filed his initial
postconviction petition, that his conviction and prison term did not align with his counsel’s alleged
advice at plea bargaining. In fact, Enge does not argue that this claim was unavailable to him when
he filed the initial postconviction petition; instead, he argues that he should be excused from the
cause requirement because he had limited legal knowledge up until 2019, when he consulted with
Nance. The Illinois Supreme Court considered, and rejected, a similar claim in People v Evans,
2013 IL 113471. In Evans, the defendant alleged he could establish cause because he “just
discovered” after filing his motion for leave, he would be subject to a three-year mandatory
supervisory release term following his release from imprisonment. People v. Evans, 2013 IL
113471, ¶ 5. The Court rejected this theory, explaining that, “[i]gnorance of the law or legal rights
will not excuse a delay in filing a lawsuit.” Id. ¶ 13 (quoting People v. Lander, 215 Ill.2d 577, 588
(2005)). Similarly here, Enge’s claimed ignorance of the law does not excuse his failure to raise
the ineffective assistance at plea bargaining claim in his initial postconviction petition.
¶ 17 Enge also raises the notion of “fundamental fairness” to argue his failure to demonstrate
cause should be generally excused. The Illinois supreme court has made clear that unless a petition
claims actual innocence, “[t]he cause-and-prejudice test is the analytical tool that is to be used to
determine whether fundamental fairness requires that an exception be made to section 122–3 so
that a claim raised in a successive petition may be considered on its merits.” Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill.
2d. at 459. While there is no precise definition of this term, in the context of a successive
postconviction petition, the procedural bar of waiver is not merely a principle of judicial
administration; it is an express requirement of the statute.” Id. at 458. Thus, fundamental fairness
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is not a viable work-around of the cause-and-prejudice test. Id. at 462. Once the cause-and-
prejudice test has been applied, fundamental fairness has been sufficiently addressed.
¶ 18 Because we have determined that Enge’s successive postconviction petition fails as he did
not show cause as required by statute, we need not address prejudice or the ineffective assistance
of counsel and self-defense claims that lie therein. When one element fails, we need not address
the other. People v. Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 37 (holding that when a defendant cannot show
prejudice the court need not address cause).
¶ 19 CONCLUSION
¶ 20 Because Enge’s petition does not satisfy the cause-and-prejudice test, we affirm the circuit
court’s order denying Enge leave to file his successive postconviction petition.
¶ 21 Affirmed.
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