Andrews v. At World Properties, LLC

2023 IL App (1st) 1220950
No. 1-22-0950
Opinion filed June 12, 2023.
First Division
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
ELIZABETH M. ANDREWS and WORLDOLUXE, ) Appeal from the
LLC, an Illinois Limited Liability Company, ) Circuit Court of
) Cook County.
Plaintiffs-Appellants, )
)
v. )
) No. 21 L 11159
AT WORLD PROPERTIES, LLC, an Illinois )
Limited Liability Company; THADDEUS J.R. )
WONG; and MICHAEL P. GOLDEN, ) The Honorable
) Thomas More Donnelly,
Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
PRESIDING JUSTICE LAVIN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Pucinski and Coghlan concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 In 2021, plaintiffs Elizabeth M. Andrews and her company, WorldOLuxe, LLC, filed a
complaint against defendants At World Properties, LLC (d/b/a @properties), a real estate
company, and its chief executive officers, Thaddeus J.R. Wong and Michael P. Golden, alleging
defamation and intentional interference with a business expectancy. The suit was filed after
defendants publicly announced Andrews’ termination from @properties as a real estate agent in
No. 1-22-0950
response to her social media postings regarding the January 6, 2021, Capitol riot in Washington,
D.C. Pursuant to the defendants’ motion (see 735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2020)), the trial court
dismissed the complaint, and plaintiffs now appeal. Plaintiffs argue as they did below that
defendants’ publication was false, it was not substantially true, and it was not subject to an
innocent construction. We affirm.
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 The following factual recitation has been gleaned from the pleadings. On January 6,
2021, Andrews, an independent contractor real estate broker associated with @properties,
attended former President Donald Trump’s “Save America” rally in Washington, D.C. Following
Trump’s live speech, Andrews proceeded to the Capitol, where Vice President Mike Pence and
Congress were certifying the 2020 presidential election results. Andrews, along with a crowd,
was present on the east side of the Capitol building from 1:30 p.m. to about 3:15 p.m. Andrews
posted several photographs to her Facebook account, which identified her as an @properties real
estate broker and linked to her @properties website. One photograph (Photo 1) features Andrews
smiling happily, clad in a Trump stocking cap, and facing the camera some feet from the Capitol
building. See infra ¶ 39. She holds both hands in the air, donning bunny ears as the crowd behind
her throngs at the open doors of the building, pressing towards it. Some appear to be entering the
building through the door. In a split screen (Photo 2), she posted this image, alongside another
photograph of protesters with flags on a fenced veranda overlooking a bigger crowd below with
the caption, “History! It’s not done yet!” 1 Infra ¶ 39. Last, around 3:15 p.m., Andrews posted a
photograph (Photo 3) from a hotel patio bar depicting a glass of champagne, a patio with tables,
1
Per the pleadings, @properties reviewed reposts of Andrews’ Photo 2. We describe Photos 1 and
2 separately for the sake of clarity.
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and unidentified buildings in the background with the caption, “After storming the capital a good
glass of champagne is needed!” (Emphasis added.) Infra ¶ 39.
¶4 The next day, on January 7, @properties received and/or was mentioned in a number of
negative communications regarding Andrews’ postings. For example, in a Facebook posting
directed to @properties and reposting Andrews’ social media account along with the
aforementioned splitscreen Photo 2, one individual commented, “Well, I, for one, will never use
the services of a real estate company that employs a person that wants to violently storm the
Capital.” In another Facebook posting, also directed to @properties, a separate individual again
reposted Andrews’ social media account along with Photo 2, then stated “Dont [sic] give these
folks your business!” after noting that Andrews had participated in “the domestic terrorist
insurgencyand [sic] posted photos of herself at it.” In response to this adverse publicity,
@properties sent a message via e-mail, Facebook, and Twitter, stating:
“Over the past several hours, @properties has received a tremendous amount of
outreach regarding the actions of one of our agents, Libby Andrews, yesterday in
Washington, DC. [sic] Effective immediately, @properties is terminating this agent, who
acknowledged on social media, that she took part in ‘storming the Capitol.’ @properties
does not condone violence, destruction or illegal activities.” 2 (Emphasis added.)
Plaintiffs alleged this message, which was entitled “@properties’ official statement on former
agent, Libby Andrews,” was sent to clients, business associates, and agents of @properties, as
well as the general public.
2
Plaintiffs attached this statement, which was contained in a Tweet on Twitter, to their complaint.
In their response to the motion to dismiss, plaintiffs attached the same statement, sent via e-mail, but it is
signed “Mike & Thad” and is instead entitled, “Agent Termination.”
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No. 1-22-0950
¶5 Plaintiffs then filed the present complaint alleging six counts of defamation, insofar as the
statement inferred that Andrews had engaged in violence, property destruction, and criminal
activity, and also that she lacked the character to perform her professional duties. They asserted
@properties’ statement harmed Andrews’ reputation. Andrews and her company also alleged
two counts of intentional interference with a business expectancy against @properties. As to
defamation, plaintiffs alleged that Andrews did not engage in any illegal, violent, or criminal
behavior, and therefore, @properties’ message was false.
¶6 Instead, plaintiffs maintained Andrews exercised her right to free speech and association
by attending the rally. In the complaint, Andrews acknowledged walking to the hotel patio bar
after the presidential speech and posting Photo 3, taken from that bar, on social media. Indeed, an
enlarged Photo 3 is attached to the complaint, along with the Tweet containing @properties’
January 7 statement. Plaintiffs nonetheless alleged Andrews’ statement—“After storming the
capital a good glass of champagne is needed!”—was “innocuous” and simply reflected her
“having rushed that day to the nation’s capital” (emphasis in original) and her “participation,
along with over a hundred thousand other Americans [sic] citizens, in the dynamic convergence
upon the nation’s capital, Washington, D.C., to attend a live Presidential Address.” They
maintained that @properties’ use of the word “Capitol” thus materially altered Andrews’
statement to convey that she was a lawless rioter, committing “violent, illegal criminal activity”
at the Capitol building. Last, plaintiffs alleged that when Andrews posted Photo 3, she was
unaware “certain individuals had engaged in unlawful activities” in Washington, D.C. on
January 6.
¶7 Defendants filed a section 2-619.1 motion to dismiss arguing inter alia that @properties’
statement was substantially true and subject to innocent construction. Defendants relied on
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No. 1-22-0950
various exhibits attached to their motion, including Andrews’ federal court defamation complaint
against NBCUniversal Media, LLC (NBC), wherein she admitted to being present on the east
side of the Capitol building on January 6, 2021, from 1:30 p.m. to about 3:15 p.m. Defendants
attached Photos 1 through 3, which Andrews posted, as well as an affidavit from Alexis
Albertson, @properties’ director of corporate branding and digital marketing. Albertson verified
that she reviewed @properties’ Facebook account on January 7, 2021, which contained social
media posts mentioning @properties and Andrews, as an affiliated broker. Albertson averred that
the attached Facebook posts from the public (which defendants called Exhibit A) were “a small
subset” of many more communications to or about @properties complaining of Andrews’ own
Facebook posts advertising her participation in January 6. See supra ¶ 4.
¶8 Last, defendants cited a federal district court case, United States v. Griffin, 549 F. Supp.
3d 49 (D.C. 2021), discussing the federal statute criminalizing knowingly and unlawfully
entering or remaining in a restricted area, like the Capitol building and its grounds, and
knowingly engaging in disorderly or disruptive conduct that impedes or disrupts government
business in that area. See 18 U.S.C. § 1752 (2018). 3 In addition, defendants attached the criminal
complaint in that case, attested to by Metropolitan Police Department Detective Scott Brown.
Detective Brown averred that he was on duty on January 6 and barriers were placed at the east
side of the Capitol grounds to delineate the area of permissible first amendment activity from the
prohibited, secure areas protecting the governmental process. Congress’s joint session to certify
the vote for the 2020 presidential election began around 1 p.m. with the exterior doors of the
3
A violation of this statute may be charged as either a misdemeanor or felony depending on
whether the offender uses or carries a dangerous weapon or the offense results in bodily injury. See 18
U.S.C. § 1752(b) (2018) (identifying the punishments); United States v. Chrestman, 525 F. Supp. 3d 14,
18 (D.C. 2021) (charging a felony enhancement); Griffin, 549 F. Supp. 3d at 52 (charging a
misdemeanor).
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Capitol building otherwise locked or secured. While the Capitol police attempted to maintain
order, around 2 p.m., individuals in the crowd entered restricted grounds and forced entry into
the Capitol building by breaking windows and assaulting police officers. The congressional
session was suspended around 2:20 p.m.
¶9 Plaintiffs did not file a counteraffidavit or move to strike Albertson’s affidavit or any of
the attached exhibits from defendants’ motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs, in their responsive
pleadings, did not dispute that Photos 1 through 3 were taken on January 6, during Andrews’
time at the Capitol between 1 p.m. and 3:15 p.m. or that Photos 1 and 2 depicted the door to the
Capitol building being breached. Likewise, they did not dispute Andrews’ location on the east
side near the Capitol building on January 6.
¶ 10 Following briefing, the circuit court struck the oral argument hearing date and granted
defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding @properties’ statement was not defamatory. This appeal
followed.
¶ 11 ANALYSIS
¶ 12 Section 2-619.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2020)) allows
a party to file a combined section 2-615 and section 2-619 motion to dismiss. Henderson Square
Condominium Ass’n v. LAB Townhomes, LLC, 2015 IL 118139, ¶ 32. Here, we focus on section
2-619(a)(9) (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2020)), which we find dispositive. A motion to
dismiss filed pursuant to section 2-619(a)(9) admits as true all well-pleaded facts, along with the
reasonable inferences that can be gleaned from those facts, but asserts an affirmative defense or
other matter that avoids or defeats the claim. LAB Townhomes, LLC, 2015 IL 118139, ¶ 34; Carr
v. Koch, 2012 IL 113414, ¶ 27. The “affirmative matter” must be apparent on the face of the
complaint or supported by affidavits or certain other evidentiary materials. Doe v. University of
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No. 1-22-0950
Chicago Medical Center, 2015 IL App (1st) 133735, ¶ 37. If facts within an affidavit dispute the
allegations of the complaint and are not contradicted by a counteraffidavit, the court must accept
the facts in the affidavit as true. Goldberg v. Brooks, 409 Ill. App. 3d 106, 112 (2011); see also
Piser v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 405 Ill. App. 3d 341, 352 (2010) (noting
a plaintiff cannot rely on the allegations in his own complaint to refute a section 2-619 affidavit).
¶ 13 Once a defendant satisfies the initial burden of establishing an affirmative matter to
defeat the plaintiff’s claim, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the
proffered defense is unfounded or requires the resolution of a material fact. Doe, 2015 IL App
(1st) 133735, ¶ 37. If the plaintiff fails to carry the shifted burden of going forward, the
complaint will be dismissed. Id. We interpret the pleadings and supporting documents in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. LAB Townhomes, LLC, 2015 IL 118139, ¶ 34. We
review the trial court’s granting of a motion to dismiss de novo. Illinois Ass’n of Realtors v.
Stermer, 2014 IL App (4th) 130079, ¶ 16.
¶ 14 On appeal, plaintiffs challenge the circuit court’s dismissal contending that defendants’
publication was defamatory per se, meaning the injury was obvious and apparent on its face. See
Benton v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 2020 IL App (1st) 190549, ¶ 43. To prove
defamation per se, a plaintiff must present facts showing that the defendant made a false
statement about the plaintiff, the defendant made an unprivileged publication of that statement to
a third party, and the publication caused damages. Seitz-Partridge v. Loyola University of
Chicago, 2013 IL App (1st) 113409, ¶ 21. A defamatory statement is one that harms a person’s
reputation to the extent that it lowers the person in the eyes of the community or deters others
from associating with that person. Moore v. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc.,
402 Ill. App. 3d 62, 68 (2010).
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¶ 15 There are five categories of such statements, only several of which are relevant in this
case. Those include words that impute the commission of a criminal offense, words that impute a
person lacks the integrity to perform her employment duties, and words that impute a person
lacks ability or otherwise prejudice the person in her profession. Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill. 2d
478, 491-92 (2009). Under the first category, generally the crime must be an indictable one
involving moral turpitude, with death or imprisonment as punishment. Dobias v. Oak Park &
River Forest High School District 200, 2016 IL App (1st) 152205, ¶ 87. If a defamatory
statement is actionable per se, the plaintiff need not plead or prove actual damage to her
reputation to recover. Bryson v. News America Publications, Inc., 174 Ill. 2d 77, 87 (1996).
Rather, those statements that fall in the actionable per se categories are considered so obviously
and materially harmful to the plaintiff that injury to her reputation is presumed. Id. As a result, a
defamation per se claim must be pled with a heightened level of precision and
particularity. Green, 234 Ill. 2d at 495.
¶ 16 However, even if a statement falls into one of the five categories of defamation per se, it
will not be actionable if it is reasonably capable of an innocent construction. Hadley v. Doe,
2014 IL App (2d) 130489, ¶ 21. This occurs if the words and their implications, when considered
in context and given their natural, obvious meaning, are reasonably capable of an innocent
interpretation or construction. Tuite v. Corbitt, 224 Ill. 2d 490, 502 (2006); Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at
90. Whether a statement is susceptible to such interpretation is a question of law for the court to
decide. Kapotas v. Better Government Ass’n, 2015 IL App (1st) 140534, ¶ 58. Similarly, truth is
an absolute defense to defamation, and only the “substantial truth” is required for this defense.
Seitz-Partridge, 2013 IL App (1st) 113409, ¶ 21; see also Vachet v. Central Newspapers, Inc.,
816 F.2d 313, 316 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting it is not necessary to establish the literal truth of the
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No. 1-22-0950
statement). Such demonstration is made where the defendant shows that the “gist” or “sting” of
the allegedly defamatory material is true. Harrison v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 341 Ill. App. 3d
555, 563 (2003). The “gist” or “sting” of the alleged defamation means the heart of the matter in
question—the hurtfulness of the utterance. Vachet, 816 F.2d at 316. Additionally, where no
reasonable jury could find that substantial truth had not been established, the question is one of
law, and the matter may be raised in a motion to dismiss. Seitz-Partridge, 2013 IL App (1st)
113409, ¶ 21; Lemons v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 253 Ill. App. 3d 888, 890 (1993).
¶ 17 While plaintiffs maintain the statement at issue by @properties was false, not
substantially true, and not subject to an innocent construction, for the reasons to follow, we
disagree. Here, @properties initially wrote, “Over the past several hours, @properties has
received a tremendous amount of outreach regarding the actions of one of our agents, Libby
Andrews, yesterday in Washington, D.C.” In their motion to dismiss, defendants provided the
affidavit by Albertson, director of their social media, averring that she had received numerous
communications to or about @properties complaining of Andrews’ own Facebook posts, which
advertised her presence and activity at the Capitol on January 6. Albertson then attached exhibits
of Facebook posts from the public referencing Andrews’ social media account and postings
(including Photo 2). Defendants thus established the statement by @properties was true—they
received a high volume of communications regarding Andrews’ actions in Washington, D.C. See
Seitz-Partridge, 2013 IL App (1st) 113409, ¶¶ 21, 25-26.
¶ 18 The company @properties next wrote, “Effective immediately, @properties is
terminating this agent, who acknowledged on social media, that she took part in ‘storming the
Capitol.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Plaintiffs do not dispute that Andrews was terminated from
@properties as a real estate agent, so that too is true. Moreover, it was Andrews who first
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reported around 3:15 p.m. on her Facebook page that, “After storming the capital a good glass of
champagne is needed!” (emphases added), along with a photo depicting a glass of champagne on
a patio and unidentified buildings in the background. See infra ¶ 39 (Photo 3). Where, as here,
Andrews’ own characterization is not substantially different from the allegedly defamatory
language, that language may be deemed substantially true. See Harrison, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 563;
see also Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 517 (1991) (“Put another way, the
statement is not considered false unless it ‘would have a different effect on the mind of the
reader from that which the pleaded truth would have produced.’ ” (quoting Robert D. Sack,
Libel, Slander, and Related Problems 138 (1980)); Hnilica v. Rizza Chevrolet, Inc., 384 Ill. App.
3d 94, 97 (2008) (“Harmful statements are defamatory only if they are false.”).
¶ 19 The evidence attached to defendants’ section 2-619 motion further defeats and negates
plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations of falsity and support defendants’ substantial truth defense. See
Economy Fire & Casualty Co. v. GAB Business Services, Inc., 155 Ill. App. 3d 197, 201 (1987).
Plaintiffs, for example, conveniently omitted from Andrews’ state defamation action a number of
facts, including that Andrews was present on the east side of the Capitol building from 1:30 p.m.
to 3:15 p.m. and posted Photos 1 and 2 of herself there. See infra ¶ 39. During that time, the
crowds entered prohibited areas by the Capitol and, around 2 p.m., breached the previously
secured doors of the building, leading to the disruption and suspension of official governmental
proceedings. These details have been gleaned from Andrews’ federal defamation complaint
against NBC, supplied by defendants, and the other exhibits. See infra ¶ 30; American
Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees, Council 31 v. Illinois Labor Relations
Board, State Panel, 2017 IL App (5th) 160046, ¶ 18 (noting a court may take judicial notice of
documents in the records of other courts or administrative tribunals); O’Callaghan v. Satherlie,
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2015 IL App (1st) 142152, ¶ 18 (noting, the court can also consider judicial admissions in the
record and matters of which the court is entitled to take judicial notice); Village of Riverwoods v.
BG Ltd. Partnership, 276 Ill. App. 3d 720, 724 (1995) (noting a court may take judicial notice of
public record documents for a section 2-619 motion).
¶ 20 As set forth, Photos 1 and 2 show Andrews some feet from the Capitol building, smiling
and holding two sets of bunny fingers in the air while wearing a Trump hat, as the crowd behind
her throngs at the open doors of the building and presses towards it, with some appearing to enter
the building. See infra ¶ 39. Photo 2 also shows protesters with flags on a fenced veranda
overlooking a larger crowd below with the caption, “History! It’s not done yet!” See infra ¶ 39.
These photos, their captions, and the facts further demonstrate defendants’ language was
substantially true: Andrews “acknowledged on social media, that she took part in ‘storming the
Capitol.’ ” And, it was for that reason that defendants terminated Andrews.
¶ 21 Plaintiffs nonetheless argue that Andrews’ statement—“After storming the capital a good
glass of champagne is needed!” (see infra ¶ 39 (Photo 3))—conveyed she “was part of a heavy
influx of people rushing” to the “capital” of Washington, D.C., on January 6 to simply attend an
event. They alleged @properties’ substitution of the word “Capitol,” the building, when
considered with the balance of defendants’ statement, altered the meaning of Andrews’ post to
falsely convey that she had engaged in violence, destruction, or other illegal criminal acts. See
infra ¶ 39 (Photo 3). Plaintiffs complain that latter message was the gist or sting of defendants’
defamatory per se statement.
¶ 22 Plaintiffs’ proposed inferences and arguments are unreasonable for several reasons. See
LAB Townhomes, LLC, 2015 IL 118139, ¶ 34. Again, it was Andrews’ own social media
postings and words that imputed a crime or at least that she was part of the agitating crowd on
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January 6 and therefore condoned its activity of impeding official government proceedings. See
18 U.S.C. § 1752 (2018) (prohibiting knowingly engaging in disorderly or disruptive conduct
that impedes or disrupts government business in that area); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 583
(1977) (noting “the consent of another to the publication of defamatory matter concerning [her]
is a complete defense to [her] action for defamation”). Defendants’ affidavit and corresponding
attachments betray the reasonable readers’ view of Andrews’ social media postings. Several
individuals wrote: “Well, I, for one, will never use the services of a real estate company that
employs a person that wants to violently storm the Capital” and “Dont [sic] give these folks your
business!” after noting that Andrews had participated in “the domestic terrorist insurgencyand
[sic] posted photos of herself at it.” Notably, Andrews’ post did not state, “After a peaceful
protest in Washington, D.C., a good glass of champagne is needed!” or “After exercising one’s
first amendment rights in Washington, D.C., a good glass of champagne is needed!” Rather, she
used the word “storm.” Excluding any reference to weather, the word “storm” when used as a
transitive or intransitive verb means “to attack by storm,” as in “stormed ashore at zero hour,”
“to be in or to exhibit a violent passion: RAGE,” such as “storming at the unusual delay,” “to
rush about or move impetuously, violently, or angrily,” as in “the mob stormed through the
streets,” and “to attack, take, or win over by storm,” as in “storm a fort.” Merriam-Webster
Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/storming (last visited May 23,
2023) [https://perma.cc/NVN8-DZ8Q].
¶ 23 Simply put, storming the seat of government, whether it is the city (capital) or building
and its grounds (Capitol) signifies an agitation, violent disruption, or forced taking. Andrews
reported that she partook in that storm and was present at the Capitol on January 6,
notwithstanding plaintiffs’ contention that Andrews herself did not specifically engage in any
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violent or criminal activity. The slight inaccuracy in defendants’ statement (using Capitol instead
of capital) therefore did not substantively alter Andrews’ own statement. Indeed, the common
law of libel takes but one approach to the question of falsity, insofar as it overlooks minor
inaccuracies to concentrate upon substantial truth; a defendant need not “justify every word of
the alleged defamatory matter; it is sufficient if the substance of the charge be proved true,
irrespective of slight inaccuracy in the details.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Masson, 501
U.S. at 516-17; see also Coghlan v. Beck, 2013 IL App (1st) 120891, ¶ 42 (noting that as to
substantial truth, “allegedly defamatory material is not actionable even where it is not technically
accurate in every detail”). Regardless, the issue in this case is not whether Andrews actually
committed destructive or criminal acts on January 6 but rather whether she acknowledged on
social media participating in an event wherein such acts were committed.
¶ 24 In that sense, this case may be likened to Vachet, wherein the court found a newspaper
stated the substantial truth as to the plaintiff Michael Vachet, even though the paper incorrectly
reported he was arrested on a warrant, when no warrant had issued. The court wrote:
“Here, the ‘gist’ or ‘sting’ of which Vachet complains is his association with a
suspected rapist of an elderly woman because he was arrested for harboring a fugitive.
Yet, he admits that he was arrested on the charge of harboring Saucerman, who was
suspected of committing such an act. Likewise, Vachet’s arrest for harboring a fugitive is
the highlight of the articles as they relate to him.” Vachet, 816 F.2d at 316.
Similarly, here, plaintiffs’ essentially admitted the gist or sting of the hurtful utterance, of which
they now complain. See also Parker v. Bank of Marion, 296 Ill. App. 3d 1035, 1038 (1998)
(noting the truth barred the plaintiff’s defamation action against his employer for stating he was
“fired for touching women,” where the plaintiff admitted to touching women, albeit not in a
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sexual manner). We thus decline Andrews’ invitation to innocently construe her own language
and then hold the defendants’ legally accountable for any negative implications that might have
arisen from it.
¶ 25 As such, the final sentence in the statement at issue—“@properties does not condone
violence, destruction or illegal activities”—can likewise be interpreted as substantially true. 4
This sentence conveyed that @properties did not regard as acceptable, forgivable, or harmless
the representations conveyed by Andrews on her social media posts. See Condone, Merriam-
Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/condone (last visited
May 24, 2023) [https://perma.cc/7WCF-EZDQ]. The sentence also could be considered
nonactionable opinion. See Seitz-Partridge, 2013 IL App (1st) 113409, ¶ 29 (noting statements
that are capable of being proven true or false are actionable, whereas opinions are not); Brennan
v. Kadner, 351 Ill. App. 3d 963, 969 (2004) (noting where the writer is exploring a subjective
view or an interpretation, the statement is nonactionable opinion).
¶ 26 Alternatively, the statement, when considered in context and given its natural and
obvious meaning, may be innocently construed. 5 See Tuite, 224 Ill. 2d at 502; Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d
at 90. “ ‘[I]f, as so construed, the statement may reasonably be innocently interpreted or
reasonably be interpreted as referring to someone other than the plaintiff it cannot be actionable
per se.’ ” Tuite, 224 Ill. 2d at 503 (quoting Chapski v. Copley Press, 92 Ill. 2d 344, 352 (1982)).
4
We note that the cornerstone of defamation is the issuance of a false statement. See Seitz-
Partridge, 2013 IL App (1st) 113409, ¶ 21 (“true statements cannot support a claim of defamation”).
Whether a statement imputes a criminal offense, that a person lacks integrity in her employment duties, or
a person lacks ability or otherwise prejudice her in her profession are matters relevant only as to the
damages that must be proven. See Benton, 2020 IL App (1st) 190549, ¶ 43 (distinguishing per se and per
quod actions). How a statement qualifies as per se defamation becomes irrelevant if the substantial truth
of the statement is established, as in this case.
5
We note that whether a statement can be innocently construed may also be considered under
section 2-619. Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 92.
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In other words, if a statement is reasonably capable of a nondefamatory interpretation in context,
it must be so interpreted. Green, 234 Ill. 2d at 500; Harrison, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 570 (same); see
also Jacobsen v. Gimbel, 2013 IL App (2d) 120478, ¶ 30 (noting, such statements are not
actionable per se). There is no balancing of reasonable constructions. Dubinsky v. United
Airlines Master Executive Council, 303 Ill. App. 3d 317, 324 (1999). This tougher standard is
warranted because of the presumption of damages in per se actions. Id.¶ 27 Here, this final sentence says nothing about Andrews specifically and generally
repudiates violence, destruction, and illegal activity. Thus, to the extent it refers to anyone, it
could be someone other than Andrews. See Patlovich v. Rudd, 949 F. Supp. 585, 591 (N.D. Ill.
1996). Given the public accusations against @properties and the violence, destruction, and
illegal activity that ensued on January 6, which plaintiffs do not dispute, the statement may
reasonably be construed innocently in defense of @properties’ reputation, rather than an attempt
to defame Andrews. See Jacobsen, 2013 IL App (2d) 120478, ¶ 32; Dubinsky, 303 Ill. App. 3d at
327 (statements that do not make a direct accusation of crime against the plaintiff may be
innocently construed).
¶ 28 Also, given the import of the entire statement (see Harrison, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 570),
together with the photos, the statement may be innocently construed to convey @properties’
termination of Andrews due to her social media posts and actions in celebrating the storming of
the capital/Capitol, rather than accusing her of specifically engaging in any criminal or
destructive acts herself. See, e.g., id. at 569-71 (mother’s alleged “kidnapping” of her child may
be reasonably capable of an innocent construction and not the commission of a criminal act). The
precedent of our supreme court requires us to interpret statements that are reasonably capable of
an innocent construction as nondefamatory, instead of balancing a reasonable innocent
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construction of a statement against a reasonable defamatory construction. See Tuite, 224 Ill. 2d at
504. For the reasons stated, plaintiffs have failed to establish an actionable claim of defamation
as a matter of law.
¶ 29 In reaching this conclusion, we reject plaintiffs’ argument that the third sentence in
defendants’ statement must first be considered under the innocent construction rule without
regard to whether the remainder of the sentences are substantially true. Plaintiffs’ suggestion that
we do so turns on its head the requirement that we consider the statement as a whole and the
words in context.
¶ 30 We also reject plaintiffs’ challenge to Albertson’s affidavit and its exhibits. Plaintiffs
argue the exhibits of the public’s Facebook postings lacked any foundation and should have been
disregarded as inadmissible and therefore improper under section 2-619(a)(9). 6 However, a party
cannot attack the sufficiency of an affidavit for the first time on appeal. Stone v. McCarthy, 206
Ill. App. 3d 893, 899-900 (1990). Plaintiffs did not move to strike the affidavit or object to it
before the circuit court. Likewise, they did not file a counteraffidavit, and thus the court accepted
the facts in Albertson’s affidavit and referenced exhibits as true. See Goldberg, 409 Ill. App. 3d
at 112; see also Fayezi v. Illinois Casualty Co., 2016 IL App (1st) 150873, ¶ 44 (noting as to a
section 2-619 motion, a plaintiff’s failure to submit a counteraffidavit is “fatal to [her] cause of
6
Plaintiffs argue, without adequate citation to the record or law, that the Facebook documents
attached to the affidavit were inadmissible as business records and inadmissible hearsay. Plaintiffs
thereby violate Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020), which requires an appellant to
support her contentions with citation to legal authority and the record relied on. “A reviewing court is
entitled to have the issues clearly defined and supported by pertinent authority and cohesive arguments; it
is not merely a repository into which parties may dump the burden of argument and research, nor is it the
obligation of this court to act as an advocate.” See v. Illinois Gaming Board, 2020 IL App (1st) 192200,
¶ 24. We reach the same conclusion regarding plaintiffs’ statement in their brief: “No Defendant took the
time to confirm with Andrews what exactly happened on January 6, 2021 or what her participation in any
of those events were.” They fail to cite any legal authority for the proposition that a defendant must
investigate the factual basis underlying a plaintiff’s own public representations before commenting on
them. See id.; Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020).
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No. 1-22-0950
action” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Piser, 405 Ill. App. 3d at 352 (noting the failure to
challenge or contradict supporting affidavits filed with a section 2-619 motion results in
admission of the facts stated therein).
¶ 31 Plaintiffs now claim that they intended to argue the matter orally in court at the scheduled
hearing on May 17, 2022. The “case summary” in the common law record, which is the only
record before this court, suggests that the oral argument was canceled and stricken on May 17.
There was a “continued case management.” The court’s own final written order, entered May 27,
also demonstrates that the court struck the hearing date, which was certainly within its discretion.
See CitiMortgage Inc. v. Lewis, 2014 IL App (1st) 131272, ¶ 42. We presume the circuit court’s
ruling was in conformity with the law and the facts, and an appellant bears the burden of
overcoming that presumption. McCann v. Dart, 2015 IL App (1st) 141291, ¶ 15. Plaintiffs have
not done so. Plaintiffs also had ample time to challenge the affidavit prior to the court’s final
judgment, and they could have filed a motion to reconsider the stricken hearing date. See Ill. S.
Ct. R. 303(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017). As they did nothing, we cannot countenance their claims on
appeal. They are forfeited. See Helping Others Maintain Environmental Standards v. Bos, 406
Ill. App. 3d 669, 695 (2010) (noting, generally, a party who does not raise an issue in the trial
court forfeits the issue and may not raise it for the first time on appeal).
¶ 31 Forfeiture aside, Albertson’s affidavit, including the attached exhibits and the photos
referenced therein, was admissible. See Ill. S. Ct. 191(a) (eff. Jan. 4, 2013) (requiring that an
affiant in an involuntary dismissal be able to testify competently about facts admissible in
evidence). A party must lay a proper foundation for the introduction of documentary evidence,
which occurs when the evidence is identified and authenticated. See People v. Ziemba, 2018 IL
App (2d) 170048, ¶ 51; Piser, 405 Ill. App. 3d at 348. Authentication requires a party to present
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evidence demonstrating the document is what the party claims it to be. Ziemba, 2018 IL App
(2d) 170048, ¶ 51; Piser, 405 Ill. App. 3d at 348; see also People v. Curry, 2020 IL App (2d)
180148, ¶ 56 (same). The proponent need prove only a rational basis upon which the fact finder
can conclude the documents accurately portray what they purport to show, and the proponent can
meet this burden by using circumstantial evidence of authenticity such as content, substance, and
surrounding circumstances. Ziemba, 2018 IL App (2d) 170048, ¶¶ 51-52; People v. Vaden, 336
Ill. App. 3d 893, 899 (2003).
¶ 32 Here, Albertson averred that the exhibits attached to her affidavit were Facebook posts
from the public that appeared on @properties’ Facebook account, which she copied from
Facebook. In them, the public references and reposts Andrews’ social media and postings.
Similarly, in her affidavit, Albertson wrote that the public reposted “Facebook posts by Andrews
depicting her in front of the United States Capitol on January 6, 2021,” and the posts “related to
her [Andrews] participation in the events of January 6, 2021, in Washington, D.C.” This was
sufficient to authenticate the exhibits of the public commentary, and it also established the
photos were what defendants claimed them to be, images of Andrews’ activities and actions on
January 6. See People v. Brand, 2021 IL 125945, ¶ 41 (noting social media messages may
constitute documentary evidence for admissibility purposes, despite the digital nature).
¶ 33 We thus reject plaintiffs’ argument that Photos 1 and 2 depicting Andrews lacked a
proper foundation because Albertson did not, for example, identify the time they were taken or
aver they were true and accurate representations of “the scene itself.” See Ill. S. Ct. 191(a) (eff.
Jan. 4, 2013). Again, Andrews did not move to strike these photo exhibits or file a
counteraffidavit. In her responsive pleadings, Andrews did not dispute these were her own
Facebook posts on January 6, or that they depicted her standing nearby the Capitol building then,
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No. 1-22-0950
where she was admittedly present from 1 p.m. to about 3:15 p.m. on the east side. The photos
F
were properly referenced and plaintiffs regardless have forfeited any challenge to them by failing
to raise the matter before the circuit court. See Bos, 406 Ill. App. 3d at 695.
¶ 34 Last, plaintiffs contend defendants refuted only factual pleadings in the complaint and did
not introduce an affirmative matter to defeat their claim, as required by section 2-619(a)(9). They
argue dismissal was therefore inappropriate. We disagree. Defendants presented evidence
demonstrating that their statement, when viewed in light of Andrews’ own representations, was
substantially true and also could be innocently construed. These defenses negated the defamation
claim and, at the very least, refuted crucial conclusions of law and unsupported material facts in
the complaint. See Glass Specialty Co. v. Litwiller, 147 Ill. App. 3d 653, 655 (1986). No
reasonable jury could find plaintiffs presented an actionable claim as a matter of law. See Seitz-
Partridge, 2013 IL App (1st) 113409, ¶ 21; Kapotas, 2015 IL App (1st) 140534, ¶ 58.
Defendants therefore fulfilled their burden of defeating plaintiffs’ claim, and plaintiffs did not
demonstrate the defense was unfounded or required resolution of a material fact. See Doe, 2015
IL App (1st) 133735, ¶ 37.
¶ 35 As plaintiffs’ defamation claim fails, so too does their claim of intentional interference
with business expectancy against @properties. See Antonacci v. Seyfarth Shaw, LLP, 2015 IL
App (1st) 142372, ¶ 33. Plaintiffs also have not argued that claim, thus forfeiting it. See Ill. S. Ct.
R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020).
¶ 36 CONCLUSION
¶ 37 For the reasons stated, we affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaint.
¶ 38 Affirmed.
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¶ 39 APPENDIX
Photo 1
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No. 1-22-0950
Photo 2
a Crystal A Sahler ► @properties
......J' 7h ·0
Thought you should know one of your employees went to DC for a Covid
super spreader event then st ormed the capital.
rfJ Like Q Share
Libby McCarten Andrews
6 hrs· 0
History! It's not done yet!
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Photo 3
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Andrews v. At World Properties, LLC, 2023 IL App (1st) 220950Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 21-L-11159;
the Hon. Thomas More Donnelly, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys Michael R. Pieczonka, of Pieczonka Law LLC, and Tim Biasiello,
for both of Park Ridge, for appellants.
Appellant:
Attorneys Aaron H. Stanton, Victoria R. Collado, Joshua J. Cauhorn, and
for Brittany A. Martin, of Burke, Warren, MacKay & Serritella, P.C.,
Appellee: of Chicago, for appellees.
23