In re C.J.

2023 IL App (5th) 230029-UNOTICE
NOTICE
Decision filed 08/03/23. The
This order was filed under
text of this decision may be NOS. 5-23-0029, 5-23-0030, 5-23-0031,
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
changed or corrected prior to
not precedent except in the
the filing of a Petition for 5-23-0032 cons. limited circumstances allowed
Rehearing or the disposition of
under Rule 23(e)(1).
the same.
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
In re C.J., N.B., N.B., and J.S., Minors ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
(The People of the State of Illinois, ) Jackson County.
)
Petitioner-Appellee, ) Nos. 20-JA-26, 20-JA-27,
) 20-JA-28, 20-JA-29
v. )
)
Sade J., ) Honorable
) Ella L. Travelstead,
Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE VAUGHAN delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Boie and Justice Welch concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court’s finding that it was in the best interest of the children to terminate
respondent’s parental rights is reversed where the court failed to address the
statutory factors and its sole finding in the written order was unsupported by the
evidence presented at the hearing.
¶2 Respondent, Sade J., appeals the trial court’s finding that it was in the best interest of the
children to terminate her parental rights. In the alternative, Sade argues that her trial counsel was
ineffective. For the following reasons, we reverse.
1
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 On July 29, 2020, the State filed four petitions for adjudication of wardship alleging that
Sade’s children, N.B. (born October 6, 2017), N.B. (born August 1, 2016), J.S. (born January 14,
2015), and C.J. (born February 14, 2009), were neglected. The petitions alleged Sade exhibited
“untreated mental illness symptoms” that prevented her from effectively caring for the children.
¶5 A shelter-care hearing was held on July 30, 2020. Rebecca Mills, an Illinois Department
of Children and Family Services (DCFS) investigator, testified that on July 28, 2020, she
responded to a report claiming Sade’s mental health was declining. The informant stated Sade
knocked holes in the dwelling’s walls with a hammer, burned a mattress on her front lawn, and
broke the dwelling’s windows.
¶6 When Ms. Mills arrived at the house, she intended to implement a safety plan, rather than
take the children into protective custody. However, Sade was “erratic, screaming, yelling, stating
that there were people trying to kill her, people had been breaking into the house, she couldn’t
sleep, [and] she had to protect her children because she’d seen people trying to stab her in the
back.” The investigator stated, “it was nonstop the entire time I was there.”
¶7 Ms. Mills contacted her supervisor to call the police, and another caseworker arrived to
assist in taking the children into protective custody. Ms. Mills did not think Sade could adequately
supervise her children due to her mental health issues. She testified to a previous investigation in
which “the children were outside in the vehicle playing [and] set the car on fire.” Ms. Mills stated
that DCFS wanted the children to remain in protective custody until Sade could address her mental
health issues. She opined this could be a long-term issue given Sade’s denials of mental health
issues. On cross-examination, Ms. Mills explained that the children were taken into custody
because Sade would not calm down. She stated Sade became more erratic, as “the hallucinations,
2
the paranoia [was] more apparent the longer I was there.” The circuit court found an immediate
and urgent necessity to remove the children from Sade’s care and placed the children into DCFS’s
care and custody.
¶8 An adjudicatory hearing was held on September 9, 2020. At that time, Sade stipulated that
investigator Mills’s testimony would be similar to that provided during the shelter-care hearing.
The court found the children neglected and continued DCFS’s custody of the children.
¶9 Sade’s service plan was filed on October 1, 2020. The plan called for Sade to cooperate
with Lutheran Social Services of Illinois (LSSI)1 and inform the agency of any changes in her
address, phone number, household composition, or employment. The plan also required Sade to
complete parenting classes, obtain suitable housing, obtain a mental health assessment, and comply
with all recommendations stemming from the mental health assessment.
¶ 10 On October 5, 2020, LSSI filed its dispositional report for the period from July 2020 to
October 5, 2020. The report revealed that upon inspection of Sade’s home, there were no
appliances. There was an air mattress in Sade’s room and a lawn chair in the living room. The
report stated that Sade advised the caseworker that she would refuse to take mental health
medication even if recommended for her services. Visitation was scheduled for one hour once a
week. Sade attended the first three visits but missed the next three because she was out of town.
The report noted Sade had no working telephone that would allow for supervised telephone visits
with the children. When Sade attended the in-person visitations, she was attentive, active, and
revealed a bond with her children. She also understood her children’s needs by providing asthma
medication for one of the children, along with food and clothing.
1
LSSI was a subcontractor of DCFS in this matter.
3
¶ 11 The dispositional hearing was held on October 7, 2020. Due to difficulties in filing the
dispositional report, the supervisor, Mallory Bollinger, testified as to the contents of the report.
The main issue continued to be Sade’s mental health. Ms. Bollinger testified that Sade had not
visited the children in about four weeks and only had sporadic contact with her caseworker. Sade
had a counselor at Centerstone, and they were doing telehealth. The children were doing well in
foster care and Sade was working on obtaining housing. Following Ms. Bollinger’s testimony, the
court found the children neglected, the service plan was appropriate, and it was in the best interest
of the minors to remain outside the home. Custody of the minor children remained with DCFS.
¶ 12 Following the court’s ruling, Sade’s counsel asked the court if a psychological evaluation
was needed. The court deferred to Ms. Bollinger who stated she believed respondent’s diagnoses
were schizophrenia and bipolar and the “main thing would be for her to participate in mental health
treatment, to be seen by a counselor.” Ms. Bollinger also stated:
“At this point, I mean, I’m not sure that maybe counseling is enough. I think there’s
probably some more intensive treatment that needs to happen, which [Sade] isn’t
very open to right now so that’s definitely something to explore. *** It’s been
reported that she’s been out of town for a week. So[,] we haven’t had much chance
to have contact with her.”
¶ 13 Sade advised the court that she had “been going through Cornerstone.” She also indicated
that she has been taking all of her steps without any help or assistance from family or the
caseworkers. She disagreed with the court’s finding that her children should have been removed
because when she was contacting the agency for assistance, no one would help her. She did not
feel “that was okay.” She further disagreed with the counselor’s opinion that she “needed
something further than Centerstone.” The court admonished Sade that she needed to cooperate
4
with LSSI and participate in those mental health services. Thereafter, Sade requested, no less than
eight times, that LSSI be removed from the case because they would not help her, and she believed
the agency was failing her. She further indicated that the prior caseworker “did not just leave
Lutheran Social Services,” insinuating that the caseworker was fired. The court admonished Sade
to cooperate with LSSI or she risked losing her children. Sade stated, “You all already did that
anyway. You’ve already even took my kids from me.” The court explained that the children could
be returned if she corrected the conditions. Thereafter, Sade advised the court that her children
were not getting daycare and did not have winter coats. The court expressed its understanding and
set the case for a permanency hearing on February 3, 2021.
¶ 14 On January 25, 2021, the DCFS permanency hearing report was filed. The report indicated
Sade had not participated in a parenting program and there were “large portions of this reporting
period when LSSI did not have a current address or phone number” for her. The report indicated
Sade became “agitated” when mental health was addressed, and Sade continued to state she did
not need mental health treatment. The report stated Sade had not participated in services to correct
the conditions that brought her children into care and was not consistent in attending visitation.
¶ 15 At the permanency hearing, the court asked the caseworker for a brief overview. With
regard to Sade, the caseworker advised the court that Sade “has not complied with services and
has not participated in any of them.” Sade disagreed stating, “I have been compliant with my
service plan” and had done everything except the parenting class. She stated that she had reached
out to Centerstone and her counselors, but a lot of the workers no longer worked in those positions.
She also reached out to the supervisor to determine how she was not complying with the service
plan. The court advised Sade to contact her attorney and the caseworker. Sade’s attorney advised
the court that Sade had taken steps to begin the parenting program and stated there was confusion,
5
but it was clarified. Counsel further indicated Sade was still in counseling and was willing to
continue counseling, however, one of the counselors moved or relocated which delayed things.
Sade did understand and was willing to undergo those services. The court admonished Sade to
continue to participate in her services.
¶ 16 Permanency reports were filed on March 24, 2021, and September 13, 2021. Both reports
stated Sade was noncompliant with the mental health services. The March report also stated Sade
missed the majority of her visits with the children. The September report indicated that Sade was
being evicted and jeopardizing the children’s current placement with public accusations of abuse
against the foster parents. The September report recommended the case proceed to legal screening.
Following a status hearing on November 16, 2021, the court docket entry stated, “Mom not fully
cooperating—needs new releases to determine whether she is completing mental health counseling
& parenting classes.” The entry further ordered a “psych eval” for Sade.
¶ 17 On November 12, 2021, LSSI submitted its status report to the court. The report indicated
that since the September hearing, Sade stopped doing in-person visits with her children and was
using Zoom. During those visits, Sade hinted that she was in Minnesota and would not provide the
agency with her location. The report stated Sade was online shopping during visitation and the
children did not appear attentive. The report further stated that Sade talked negatively about people,
towns, and the agency during the November 3, 2021, visitation. When Sade did not stop, the
agency warned her that the visit would end if she could not be “positive.” Sade responded with an
insulting response and the agency immediately terminated the visit. When Sade failed to confirm
the next week’s visit, she was denied visitation. The report stated Sade indicated she would not
comply with services and would refuse her psychological assessment once it was scheduled. On
6
September 28, 2021, Centerstone issued a report indicating Sade was not consistently attending
counseling and was not making progress when she did attend.
¶ 18 At the November 16, 2021, hearing, Sade refused to provide her location to the court. The
caseworker confirmed that the case was proceeding to legal screening. The court admonished Sade
to comply with the service plan or risk termination of her parental rights. The case was set for
hearing on March 22, 2022.
¶ 19 The agency permanency report was filed on March 9, 2022. The report indicated Sade
completed parenting courses at Centerstone but was noncompliant with counseling. Sade was
referred for a psychological assessment, but it was denied by the DCFS clinician who reviewed
the request due to Sade’s lack of involvement in services. Sade continued to maintain that she did
not need help for mental health or have mental health issues. After being advised that the agency
would be reporting her as not having made satisfactory progress, Sade sent the agency a profane
email. Sade continued to refuse to disclose her current location although some of her family
members thought she was living in a shelter in Carbondale.
¶ 20 At the March 22, 2022, hearing, Ms. Bollinger advised the court that Sade often missed
visitation. Sade was living at the “Warming Center” in Carbondale. Ms. Bollinger acknowledged
that Sade completed a mental health assessment, and was recommended for individual counseling,
“but then they dropped the counseling portion for nonattendance. She’ll have to get going again.”
The court admonished Sade of the need to complete mental health services, to which she
responded, “I never needed mental health from the beginning.”
¶ 21 The June 15, 2022, report described Sade as noncompliant with treatment and mentally
unstable, continuing to refuse services, and sending threatening or degrading emails to the agency.
Visitations continued to take place via Zoom, and there were several instances where Sade did not
7
join in the call and would then email the caseworker cussing at her, calling her names, threatening
her, and stating she was not provided the correct link to join. Sade requested in-person visits, but
they were denied by the agency because they did not believe it would be in the children’s best
interests. The report stated that Sade obtained housing but had not completed her services. She had
contacted Centerstone and was put on a waiting list.
¶ 22 At the June 28, 2022, hearing, Sade stated that she had not received a copy of the
permanency report and, upon request from the court, provided the court with her current address.
The court then provided Sade with information in the report. The court asked the caseworker if
there were any updates from the report. The caseworker advised that Sade had not completed any
of her services, her emails to the agency were “belligerent, filled with profanity, [and] threatening
in nature,” and Sade failed to participate in visitation. Sade disputed the caseworker’s statements.
The caseworker’s supervisor advised the court that the case would proceed to legal screening the
following day and they would recommend a goal change thereafter. The guardian ad litem (GAL)
agreed with the goal change. The GAL also stated that the oldest child no longer wanted to visit
with Sade and was indicating that he wanted and needed permanency. Sade’s counsel disagreed
with a goal change prior to legal screening. The trial court found no reasonable effort by Sade and
admonished her to cooperate with and complete the service plan or she risked termination of her
parental rights. Thereafter, Sade requested a different judge, preferably a black judge. She also
requested a black attorney and, again, for LSSI to be removed from the case. Sade’s requests were
denied. Sade was advised that her attorney could file any motions regarding the judge’s removal.
¶ 23 On July 12, 2022, LSSI filed a status report indicating that Sade continued to send
inappropriate emails and acted inappropriately with the children’s caregivers. She had housing but
was noncompliant with other service goals. The case passed legal screening, a goal change to
8
“substitute care pending termination” was requested, and the children were doing well. Following
a permanency hearing on July 26, 2022, the trial court issued a docket entry noting Sade’s attempt
to reengage with counseling but further noted Sade “refused to re-enroll with psych and take
recommended mental health medication, critical decision made to discontinue visitations last week
because of harassment and threatening nature of emails.” The court found no reasonable effort by
Sade. On July 28, 2022, Sade filed a pro se motion requesting a substitution of judge. The trial
court denied the motion on August 9, 2022, because the motion was not filed by Sade’s counsel.
¶ 24 On October 27, 2022, the State filed a petition for termination of parental rights for each
child. The petitions alleged that Sade failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern,
or responsibility as to the minor children pursuant to section 1(D)(b) of the Adoption Act (750
ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2020)) and failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of the
minor children for the nine-month period from January 1, 2022, to September 30, 2022, pursuant
to section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act (id. § 1(D)(m)(ii)).
¶ 25 The petitions proceeded to hearing on January 10, 2023. The State called Ms. Bollinger
who testified that she evaluated the service plan four or five times since July 31, 2020. Each time,
Sade was rated unsatisfactory. Ms. Bollinger opined that Sade frequently lived out of state and the
agency had no way to contact her. When the agency did have contact with her, “it was just a
barrage of emails with obscenities and phone calls and voicemails and ‘Give me my kids back.’ ”
The video visits were “not very successful” because Sade “was usually agitated.” Although visits
were offered weekly, Sade participated in less than five between November 2021 and July 2022
when LSSI suspended the visits. Ms. Bollinger confirmed that Sade’s mental health was the
agency’s chief concern. She was not participating in the recommended psychiatric services. From
January 2022 through the end of September 2022, she did not participate in any mental health
9
services. During that time, Sade continued to demonstrate the same mental issues as before. On
cross-examination, Ms. Bollinger testified that Sade was discharged for unsuccessfully completing
mental health services at Centerstone. She reengaged in March 2021, attended one session, and
then dropped out. Ms. Bollinger conceded that she had not recently contacted Centerstone to
determine Sade’s status at the facility and was unsure when they last checked with the facility.
¶ 26 Sade testified that she had been going to counseling “back and forth.” She stated she
performed a psychological evaluation, had it updated, told her caseworker several times that she
was enrolled in services and provided the requisite consent forms that would allow the agency to
receive that information. She disagreed that reunification was ever a true goal, stating that
beginning at the first meeting the agency was asking her to sign her rights over. She testified that
when she was sent back for another psychological evaluation the facility told her that she had
already done one and she should not have to do another. She testified that she gave this information
to LSSI several times. She eventually redid the psychological evaluation in May, gave the agency
her address, and asked if LSSI would come do a home safety check.
¶ 27 Sade testified that the place she obtained to live was large enough to hold her and the four
children, but the agency refused to do a safety check. They told her that her children were well
taken care of, and she was not going to get her children back. Thereafter, she let the place go. With
regard to visitation, Sade testified about her inability to log in and stated that when she was able
to log on, not all of the children were there. She stated she had no problems getting to or attending
in-person visitation. Sade further testified that she left the state to obtain medical treatment and
when she returned the agency would not assist her in finding housing.
¶ 28 After all the parties declined the opportunity to provide closing argument, the court found
Sade was an unfit parent, having failed to make reasonable progress towards the return of the
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children for any nine-month period following the adjudication of neglect. The court also found
Sade failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility for the children’s
welfare.
¶ 29 Thereafter, the case proceeded immediately to a best interest hearing. The State declined
the opportunity to present any witnesses or evidence. The GAL called Ms. Bollinger who initially
testified regarding the children’s fathers never visiting the children or expressing any interest in
the children. As to Sade, Ms. Bollinger testified that C.J. indicated a few times that he did not want
to attend visits with his mother. She stated this was due to the children waiting for Sade to appear
during the Zoom visitations. She stated the children resided in stable, loving homes throughout the
case. Sade interjected stating, “No. Them ain’t loving homes. They are hurtful homes.” The court
admonished Sade about interrupting. Sade again stated, “Them ain’t loving homes. They are
hurtful homes.” Ms. Bollinger stated the children were currently placed in appropriate, loving, and
stable homes. She stated the children were not in the same home but had contact with each other
at least four hours a month. Sade interrupted stating, “No, they do not.” Ms. Bollinger stated one
of the foster mothers had the brothers for a sleep over so occasionally the children would see each
other more than four hours a month.
¶ 30 Ms. Bollinger testified that she did not personally go to the foster homes monthly, but a
staff member did. She believed the children were all well cared for, happy, and loved. Sade
interrupted again stating, “They done trash my kids. They’ve got my kids in rags, looking like
bums.” Ms. Bollinger testified that it was her professional opinion, based on her knowledge of the
record and contacts with the parties involved, that all parental rights should be terminated. Sade
stated, “Fuck on here. She don’t even have a right over nobody kids trashy ass.” The court directed
Sade to refrain from using profane language in court. Sade replied, “You about to sit up there and
11
take my rights and—” The court admonished Sade to stop. After the court determined that no other
witnesses were being called, the court asked the parties if anyone wished to provide argument. All
of the parties declined.
¶ 31 Thereafter, the court stated, “Based upon the testimony of the Court, the Court finds by the
preponderance of the evidence it is in the best interests of the minor that all parental rights and
residual parental rights flowing to and through *** Sade ***, with respect to the minor children
*** be hereinafter terminated.” Sade repeatedly asked what she was supposed to do without her
kids. The court stated, “I need to tell you—” but Sade interrupted saying, “No. Don’t say shit to
me. What am I supposed to do without my kids? That’s all I ever had was my kids.” The court
advised Sade that she had the right to appeal. Sade interrupted saying, “I am. I hate you all. I hate
white people.” The court stated, “That’s all you need to say, that you know you have the rights to
appeal.” Sade replied, “Rights? Bitch, you took my rights from my kids.” Sade left the courtroom,
and the court stated the minors would be placed in the care of DCFS and changed the goal to
adoption. Written orders for each child were filed on January 18, 2023, finding that Sade “had not
had the best interest of the minor, *** in mind for several years” and terminated Sade’s parental
rights. Sade timely appealed and this court consolidated the appeals.
¶ 32 ANALYSIS
¶ 33 Prior to discussing the merits of this case, we address the timeliness of our decision. This
case was designated as “accelerated” pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 311(a) (eff. July 1,
2018) due to it involving a matter affecting the best interest of a child. Rule 311(a)(5) requires this
court to issue “its decision within 150 days after filing the notice of appeal” unless good cause is
shown. Ill. S. Ct. R. 311(a)(5) (eff. July 1, 2018). In this case, our disposition was due on June 20,
2023. Sade’s appellate counsel initially filed an Anders motion (see Anders v. California, 386 U.S.
12738 (1967)) and supporting brief requesting withdrawal as appointed counsel finding no
meritorious issue for review. Upon review of respondent’s pleadings, as well as the record, this
court determined that Sade’s counsel failed to address an issue and provided counsel with the
opportunity to either supplement the Anders supporting brief or brief the issue as one of merit.
Counsel chose the latter and we extended the original briefing deadline to allow the State to file a
responsive brief, which it did. “We cannot properly review a case and render our decision until we
are fully briefed on the issues and the arguments of the parties.” In re Chance H., 2019 IL App
(1st) 180053, ¶ 35. This case was not ready for disposition until after the 150 days expired.
Accordingly, we find good cause for issuing our decision after the 150-day time limit.
¶ 34 Turning to the merits, Sade raises two issues. She contends the trial court’s finding that it
was in the best interest of the children to terminate her parental rights was against the manifest
weight of the evidence. In the alternative, she contends her trial counsel was ineffective.
¶ 35 To terminate a party’s parental rights, a circuit court must make two separate and distinct
findings: that the State has proven (1) that the parents are “unfit persons” within the meaning of
section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2020)) and (2) that it is in the children’s
best interests to terminate that party’s parental rights. In re M.H., 2015 IL App (4th) 150397, ¶ 20
(citing 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2014)). Our courts have recognized that parental rights and
responsibilities are of deep importance and should not be terminated lightly. In re C.P., 191 Ill.
App. 3d 237, 244 (1989). As such, the State must first establish, by clear and convincing evidence,
that a parent is unfit under one of the grounds set forth in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750
ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2020)). In re Tiffany M., 353 Ill. App. 3d 883, 889 (2004). “If the court makes
a finding of unfitness, the court then considers whether it is in the best interests of the child that
13
parental rights be terminated.” In re C.W., 199 Ill. 2d 198, 210 (2002). In this case, no argument
regarding Sade’s fitness was raised, and therefore, we move to the second stage.
¶ 36 At the best interests hearing “the parent’s interest in maintaining the parent-child
relationship must yield to the child’s interest in a stable, loving home life.” In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d
347, 364 (2004). To make the best interest determination, the trial court must consider 10 statutory
factors. 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2020). These factors include (1) the physical safety and
welfare of the child, (2) the development of the child’s identity, (3) the child’s background and
ties, (4) the child’s sense of attachments, (5) the child’s wishes, (6) the child’s community ties,
(7) the child’s need for permanence, (8) the uniqueness of every family and child, (9) the risks
attendant to entering and being in substitute care, and (10) the preferences of the people available
to care for the child. Id. “The court may also consider the nature and length of the child’s
relationship with his present caretaker and the effect that a change in placement would have upon
his or her emotional and psychological well-being.” In re Ca. B., 2019 IL App (1st) 181024, ¶ 30.
¶ 37 The court’s best interest determination is not required to “contain an explicit reference to
each of these factors.” In re Tajannah O., 2014 IL App (1st) 133119, ¶ 19. We will only overturn
a court’s best interest determination if it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Tiffany
M., 353 Ill. App. 3d at 892. “A decision will be found to be against the manifest weight of the
evidence in cases ‘where the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or where the findings are
unreasonable, arbitrary, and not based upon any of the evidence.’ ” In re Shru. R., 2014 IL App
(4th) 140275, ¶ 24 (quoting In re Tasha L.-I., 383 Ill. App. 3d 45, 52 (2008)).
¶ 38 On appeal, Sade argues that the State failed to meet its burden of proof because it presented
no evidence at the best interest hearing. Sade further argues that there is no evidence the trial court
considered the statutory factors in reaching the conclusion to terminate Sade’s parental rights. In
14
response, the State contends that the GAL’s procurement of testimony was sufficient to replace
the State’s failure to present any evidence itself, stating the issue of who presents the evidence was
irrelevant. The State’s response further contends it was unnecessary for the trial court to address
any of the statutory factors when rendering its decision and argues that even if it was error for the
trial court to fail to address the factors, this court is not bound by the trial court’s findings and can
affirm based on any evidence in in the record.
¶ 39 It is the State’s burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it is in a child’s
best interest to terminate parental rights. In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 366. While it matters not from
whom the evidence is elicited, we find it incredulous that the State failed to produce any evidence
or present any argument at the best interest hearing. Despite such failure, we note the GAL
attempted to obtain evidence, via testimony from the caseworker, to serve as a basis for the court
to determine whether termination of Sade’s parental rights was in the best interest of the children.
The testimony obtained, however, was paltry and generic at best.
¶ 40 Here, despite there being four children at issue, the testimony only addressed one child
specifically, and that testimony merely revealed that C.J. did not want to participate in visitation
with Sade due to difficulties stemming from the Zoom visitation. No testimony regarding the other
three children’s desire to spend time, even if only by Zoom, with Sade was presented. The children
were 5, 6, 8, and 13 years old at the time of the hearing. Despite their ages, no testimony was
provided, and no evidence was submitted, regarding the medical conditions, developmental
concerns, schooling, adjustment to new communities, the children’s attachments, wishes and long-
term goals, or their adjustment to being in foster care.
¶ 41 Equally lacking was any evidence specifically addressing any of the foster homes. Contrary
to the State’s argument, there was no testimony revealing when each child was placed in the current
15
foster home. Further there was no evidence submitted addressing the stability of the foster parents,
the number of other children in the foster homes, the relationships between the children and the
parties residing in the foster homes, or even information regarding the willingness of any of the
foster parents to continue in their current roles. While the caseworker answered affirmatively when
asked whether the children were in stable, loving homes, no supportive details or information was
elicited. Further, the evidence failed to show any benefit to the children by terminating Sade’s
parental rights. See In re M.F., 326 Ill. App. 3d 1110, 1118 (2002) (“As no benefits were shown
to be gained by the termination, the only result was to deprive T.R. of an already established
relationship with her mother *** who loved her child and was only prevented from a more hands-
on relationship by her mental disability.”). Here, all four children were of sufficient age to develop
a relationship with Sade, and no evidence regarding the status of the mother-child bond was
presented.
¶ 42 The State, citing In re Ca. B., 2019 IL App (1st) 181024, ¶ 31, and In re Davon H., 2015
IL App (1st) 150926, ¶ 78, argues that we need not rely on any basis cited by the trial court and
invites us to affirm the decision on any basis in the record. We decline to accept the State’s
invitation. While we are well aware that this court is not required to rely on any basis provided by
the trial court, we could not here even if we wanted because no basis was provided.
¶ 43 Despite the legislature providing 10 statutory factors for consideration by the trial court
and case law providing additional factors, the trial court failed to address any factor or provide any
basis for its finding that termination of Sade’s parental rights was in the best interest of the children.
In fact, the trial court did not even mention the statutory factors or state that it considered them
when issuing its ruling.
16
¶ 44 The State also contends the GAL-acquired testimony is sufficient to address 3 of the 10
statutory factors. We disagree and find the record insufficient to make a determination on the issue.
While no single factor is dispositive (In re S.K.B., 2015 IL App (1st) 151249, ¶ 48), we find the
testimony lacking as to every factor given the lack of specificity provided for any child or foster
family.
¶ 45 The trial court ultimately decided that it was in the best interest of the children to terminate
Sade’s parental rights. The State claims “it would be folly to speculate that the trial court was
somehow unaware of its obligation to consider the statutory requirements.” We place little merit
in the State’s argument considering its own failure to provide evidence or argument at the hearing.
The court cannot make findings involving the statutory factors without evidence. Here, while no
findings were made in the court’s oral proclamation, the court’s only finding in the written order
stated that Sade *** had not had the best interest of the minors *** in mind for several years.”
However, no testimony or evidence supporting that statement was provided at the best interest
hearing. As the record provides no basis for us to determine the propriety of the trial court’s
ultimate decision, we cannot affirm the decision.
¶ 46 The State also argues that if this court were to find that the lack of factual findings inhibited
our review, we should remand the case to the trial court to make those findings, instead of reversing
the trial court’s order. We again disagree. As noted throughout this decision, there is a complete
lack of evidence on which the decision was issued. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order
finding it was in the best interest of the children to terminate Sade’s parental rights and remand
the case to the trial court for new hearing on the children’s best interests. 2
2
Although we note a similar lack of evidence submitted and argument presented by Sade’s counsel
at the best interest hearing, in light of our holding regarding the best interest factor, we find it unnecessary
to address Sade’s alternative argument.
17
¶ 47 CONCLUSION
¶ 48 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s order finding it was in the best
interest of the children to terminate Sade’s parental rights.
¶ 49 Reversed and remanded.
18