People v. Larson

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2023 IL App (3d) 220299-UOrder filed July 31, 2023
____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
2023
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
ILLINOIS, ) of the 21st Judicial Circuit,
) Kankakee County, Illinois,
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
) Appeal No. 3-22-0299
v. ) Circuit No. 16-CF-277
)
CARMELLA S. LARSON, ) Honorable
) Michael C. Sabol,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE PETERSON delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Brennan and Davenport concurred in the judgment.
____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
¶1 Held: Defendant’s sentence was not excessive.
¶2 Defendant, Carmella S. Larson, appeals her 5½ year sentence for aggravated driving while
under the influence (DUI) arguing that her sentence was excessive. We affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 Following a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of two counts of aggravated DUI
resulting in the death of Kameron Allison (625 ILCS 5/11-501(d)(1)(F) (West 2016)) and two
counts of aggravated DUI resulting in great bodily harm, permanent disability or disfigurement of
Kyuss Allison (id. § 11-501(d)(1)(C)). For the purposes of sentencing, the four counts were
merged, and defendant was sentenced solely for the Class 2 felony offense of aggravated DUI
under section 11-501(d)(1)(F). Defendant was originally sentenced to six years’ imprisonment. On
appeal, this court vacated defendant’s sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing,
finding that the circuit court erred in (1) allowing most of the victim impact statements presented
at the sentencing hearing, (2) relying on a factor inherent in the offense, and (3) imposing a three-
year term of mandatory supervised release. People v. Larson, 2022 IL App (3d) 190482, ¶¶ 32, 38,
42.
¶5 On remand, a new sentencing judge presided. An updated drug and alcohol evaluation and
an updated presentence investigation report (PSI) were prepared. The PSI disclosed, among other
things, that defendant had no felony or misdemeanor convictions, no history of juvenile
delinquency, had two children aged 12 and 16 at the time of the hearing, and had been sober since
the accident. The PSI also contained a statement written by defendant expressing remorse and
stating that the only reason she was requesting a shorter prison sentence was to provide care and
support for her minor children.
¶6 At sentencing, the State presented three victim impact statements from the victims’ father,
mother, and sister, which detailed the impact of the accident on their family. Defendant testified
that she completed a DUI treatment course while incarcerated. She also described her work within
the prison and stated that she had not seen her children in two years due to limitations on visitation
during the COVID-19 pandemic. Defendant had avoided receiving any disciplinary infractions and
had attempted to engage in classes prior to pandemic restrictions. Defendant expressed her remorse
and indicated her desire to remain sober and leave prison for the sake of her children.
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¶7 Defendant’s aunt testified regarding defendant’s difficult upbringing and her parents’ drug
and alcohol abuse. Defendant presented letters from friends and family, as well as recorded
statements from her two children, which described the hardship of defendant’s incarceration.
Defendant also presented scholarly articles detailing the impact of incarceration on children.
¶8 The State argued in favor of the maximum allowable sentence, a term of 14 years’
imprisonment. Defendant requested any sentence that would allow her to return home, including
probation or time served as she had already served nearly three years’ imprisonment.
¶9 The circuit court took the matter under advisement. In pronouncing its sentence, the court
stated that it had reviewed and considered the entire trial transcript, the PSI, the evidence presented
at trial, the financial impact of incarceration, the evidence in aggravation and mitigation, exhibits
presented by both parties, arguments as to sentencing alternatives, defendant’s statements in
allocution, victim impact statements, statements on behalf of defendant, defendant’s history and
character, as well as all statutory and nonstatutory factors in aggravation and mitigation. The court
stated that it was explicitly not considering that defendant demanded a jury trial, that defendant
appealed her previous sentence, or the death of Kameron.
¶ 10 In pronouncing its sentence, the court elected to highlight certain factors in aggravation
and mitigation but stated that it had considered each factor in turn, whether discussed explicitly in
its ruling or not. In mitigation, the court noted defendant’s lack of prior criminal activity and the
impact of her incarceration on her children. The court stated it hoped that the circumstances of
defendant’s criminal conduct were unlikely to recur but described that factor as somewhat
speculative. The court noted in aggravation the necessity for deterrence, which it observed was not
a factor considered at the original sentencing hearing. The court then sentenced defendant to
5½ years’ imprisonment. Defendant filed a motion to reconsider the sentence, arguing that the
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court failed to adequately account for the mitigating circumstances of defendant’s case.
Defendant’s motion was denied. Defendant appealed.
¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 12 On appeal, defendant solely argues that the circuit court erred in resentencing her to
5½ years’ imprisonment because of the mitigating evidence, her potential for rehabilitation, and
the lack of applicable aggravating factors.
¶ 13 The legislature has established the range of sentences permissible for a particular offense.
People v. Fern, 189 Ill. 2d 48, 53 (1999). “Within that statutory range, the trial court is charged
with fashioning a sentence based upon the particular circumstances of the individual case,
including the nature of the offense and the character of the defendant.” Id. at 55. The circuit court
has broad discretionary powers in imposing a sentence, and its sentencing decision is entitled to
“great deference,” which is based upon the fact that the circuit court is in a better position to
consider the relevant sentencing factors in both mitigation and aggravation. People v. Stacey, 193
Ill. 2d 203, 209 (2000). The circuit court is also in a better position to consider the particular
circumstances of each case, such as defendant’s credibility, demeanor, general moral character,
mentality, social environment, and habits. People v. Winningham, 391 Ill. App. 3d 476, 485 (2009).
¶ 14 The reviewing court must proceed with great caution when considering the circuit court’s
sentence, and it must not substitute its own judgment for that of the circuit court because it would
have weighed the factors differently. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d at 209. “A sentence within statutory limits
will not be deemed excessive unless it is greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law
or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.” Fern, 189 Ill. 2d at 54. Accordingly,
a reviewing court may not reduce defendant’s sentence unless the sentence constitutes an abuse of
discretion. People v. Spencer, 229 Ill. App. 3d 1098, 1102 (1992). With respect to factors in
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mitigation, we presume the circuit court properly considered all relevant mitigating factors
presented, absent some indication to the contrary. See People v. Jones-Beard, 2019 IL App (1st)
162005, ¶ 21; People v. Madura, 257 Ill. App. 3d 735, 740 (1994). A circuit court need not recite
and assign a value to every mitigating factor upon which it relies. Madura, 257 Ill. App. 3d at 740.
¶ 15 Here, defendant’s argument amounts to an invitation to reweigh the sentencing factors,
which we will not do. See People v. Coleman, 166 Ill. 2d 247, 261-62 (1995); People v. Hageman,
2020 IL App (3d) 170637, ¶ 20. The record shows the court considered all of the evidence before
it, including the mitigating and aggravating factors. It explicitly addressed two of the mitigating
factors in announcing its decision and stated in both its pronouncement of the sentence and ruling
on the motion to reconsider that it had considered each factor in mitigation, whether explicitly
stated in its ruling or not. The mitigating factors described by defendant were brought to the circuit
court’s attention at the resentencing hearing, and we can find no evidence in the record to indicate
that the court ignored or failed to consider them.
¶ 16 Moreover, though the court only discussed one aggravating factor, it considered all the
evidence before it. While defendant disagrees, “DUI is not only deterrable, it is one of the most
deterrable offenses because of the drinking required—and the time this drinking requires—before
the drinker becomes drunk.” People v. Martin, 289 Ill. App. 3d 367, 376-77 (1997); see also
Winningham, 391 Ill. App. 3d at 486 (“A person who makes the conscious and intentional decision
to drive drunk presents an imminent danger to the public.”). Though defendant may believe the
mitigating evidence merited a lesser sentence, the court was not required to agree. We emphasize
that a defendant’s potential for rehabilitation is not entitled to greater weight than the seriousness
of the offense. Coleman, 166 Ill. 2d at 261. “ ‘The seriousness of the offense or the need to protect
the public may outweigh mitigating factors and the goal of rehabilitation. [Citation.] Even where
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there is evidence in mitigation, the court is not obligated to impose the minimum sentence.
[Citation.]’ ” People v. Abrams, 2015 IL App (1st) 133746, ¶ 34 (quoting People v. Sims, 403 Ill.
App. 3d 9, 24 (2010)).
¶ 17 The sentence imposed in this case was within the statutory range and, indeed, was less than
the original sentence imposed. After a thorough review of the record, we do not find any evidence
that the circuit court failed to consider the applicable mitigating factors or considered improper
aggravating factors. Neither do we find that defendant’s sentence is greatly at variance with the
spirit and purpose of the law or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense. See Fern,
189 Ill. 2d at 54. We, therefore, cannot find that the circuit court abused its discretion in fashioning
defendant’s sentence.
¶ 18 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 19 The judgment of the circuit court of Kankakee County is affirmed.
¶ 20 Affirmed.
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