People v. Bond

2020 IL App (4th) 180584-UFILED
NOTICE October 7, 2020
This order was filed under Supreme Carla Bender
Court Rule 23 and may not be cited NO. 4-18-0584 th
as precedent by any party except in 4 District Appellate
the limited circumstances allowed Court, IL
under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Macon County
KEIRSEAN M. BOND, ) No. 17CF1732
Defendant-Appellant. )
) Honorable
) Thomas E. Griffith Jr.,
) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices DeArmond and Turner concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: (1) The State’s evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find defendant guilty
of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt based on the theory of
accountability.
(2) The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion in limine to exclude
cell phone records obtained without a search warrant.
(3) Counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing to object to the
admission of a Snapchat message, as defendant could not demonstrate prejudice.
¶2 In May 2018, a jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder (720 ILCS
5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2016)), attempt (first degree murder) (id.), and armed robbery (id. § 18-2(a)(3))
based on an accountability theory from a drug transaction that ended in a shooting. The trial court
sentenced defendant to 30 years’ imprisonment on the first degree murder conviction to run
consecutive to two 10-year concurrent terms on the attempt and armed robbery convictions.
Defendant appeals on three grounds.
¶3 First, defendant argues the evidence is legally insufficient to sustain his convictions
when the State’s only evidence against him was the “incredible” testimony of one of the victims—
testimony which arguably also did not establish an accountability theory of guilt. We disagree.
When we consider the question of defendant’s accountability for the offenses, and we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that a rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crimes to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt and
that defendant engaged in a common criminal design with the shooter.
¶4 Second, defendant contends his convictions must be reversed because the trial court
erred in allowing the admission of defendant’s cell phone location records without first obtaining
a search warrant in violation of his fourth amendment rights (U.S. Const., amend. IV). We hold
the State relied on the existence of probable cause in its application for the order to obtain
defendant’s cell phone records. Because the trial court, in its order, specifically found the State’s
request was based on probable cause, it satisfied the requirements generally relied upon for
obtaining a search warrant, and the application and order were the functional equivalents thereto.
¶5 Third, defendant claims he was denied the effective assistance of counsel when his
trial attorneys failed to object to the admission of a Snapchat message. Defendant claims the
message was not properly authenticated as documentary evidence and was therefore inadmissible.
We conclude the victim’s testimony was sufficient to authenticate the message and the jury was
entitled to rely on this authentication to determine how the crimes occurred. Thus, we find
counsels’ failure to object to the admissibility of the message did not constitute deficient
performance when defendant was unable to demonstrate he suffered prejudice.
¶6 Therefore, we affirm the judgment.
¶7 I. BACKGROUND
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¶8 The jury trial began on May 14, 2018, and continued for four consecutive days. The
following is a summary of the evidence we find relevant to the issues presented on appeal.
¶9 A. The Testimony of Scottie Bone
¶ 10 Scottie Bone was one of the two victims in this case. Upon taking the witness stand,
Bone acknowledged his criminal history, which included weapon and theft charges, and his
pending cases, which included drug and domestic battery charges. Bone testified he met defendant
in 2015 while they were both housed at Graham Correctional Center. They were then transferred
to the Du Quoin Impact Incarceration Program where they were “bunkies.” Bone considered
defendant a friend. For the two months or so they spent together, they discussed conducting drug
transactions upon release. They exchanged telephone numbers.
¶ 11 Bone said he and defendant communicated “off and on” by text or Snapchat after
their release, trying to get “stuff situated” to “make a deal” (meaning they were planning a
marijuana transaction). Bone testified that on November 18, 2017, he messaged defendant and told
him he had five pounds of marijuana to sell him. The agreement was five pounds at $2700 per
pound. Bone lived in Effingham and defendant lived in Decatur. Bone said he wanted to meet
defendant in Shelbyville, where they would both be out of their “comfort zone.” Instead, they
agreed to meet at the Mt. Zion Walmart, but “things got complicated.” Defendant told Bone he
would pay $300 more per pound if Bone would meet at defendant’s house in Decatur. Bone agreed.
¶ 12 Bone asked his friend Todd Feldkamp to accompany him and Feldkamp agreed.
Bone drove Feldkamp’s 2011 Lincoln MKZ to Decatur. They were to meet defendant at the Family
Video on Water Street and then follow defendant to his house. Once Bone and Feldkamp arrived
at Family Video, Bone said he called defendant. According to Bone, defendant said he was five
minutes away and would be in a white car. Defendant then sent Bone a Snapchat message that said
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“Lac.” To Bone, the message meant defendant would be in a white Cadillac. Bone identified the
white Cadillac pulling into the parking lot from a surveillance video. The car pulled into the
parking lot and then Bone followed the car to a house at 1660 North Edward in Decatur.
¶ 13 Bone had put $700 in the center console of the Lincoln “just in case something
would go wrong that [they] would still have money.” The marijuana was vacuum sealed in a duffel
bag with $5000 that Bone was going to use afterward to purchase more marijuana.
¶ 14 Bone said the Cadillac pulled into the driveway of the residence, backed out, and
parked on the street directly in front of the house. Bone also parked on the street behind the
Cadillac. Defendant exited the driver’s side of the Cadillac and walked toward Bone and
Feldkamp. Defendant greeted only Feldkamp, shook his hand, walked back to the Cadillac, and
began talking to someone in the back passenger seat. Bone retrieved the duffel bag with the
marijuana from the trunk. Bone said defendant was wearing a black Jordan sweatshirt and black
pants. The backseat passenger, who was also wearing all black, including a hoodie pulled tight
around his head, exited the Cadillac and all four individuals walked up the driveway toward the
house. Bone and defendant walked side-by-side with Feldkamp and the unknown male behind
them. It was very dark and difficult to see. Bone thought maybe defendant used the flashlight on
his cell phone to light their path.
¶ 15 Defendant walked to the backdoor of the residence and opened the screen door.
Bone would have been first to enter the house, then Feldkamp, and then the unknown male, while
defendant held open the door. Bone admitted he had a knife in his pocket and thought he may have
kept his hand on it, though he denied brandishing it. As they stood at the door, the unknown male
pulled a gun, pointed it at Feldkamp, and told him not to move. He shot Feldkamp, who fell to the
ground. He then shot Bone in the forearm. He turned back to Feldkamp and shot him again. Bone
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yelled, “just take it,” referring to the duffel bag. After defendant and the unknown male left the
scene, Bone called the police.
¶ 16 B. Testimony of Officer Oldham
¶ 17 Anna Oldham, a Decatur police patrol officer, testified that, at approximately 8:45
p.m. on November 18, 2017, she responded to a call at 1660 North Edward. There, she met Bone
in the driveway. He was bleeding from his arm and “was frantically pacing back and forth telling
[her] to help his friend, help his friend, who was in the back of the residence.” She saw Feldkamp
lying on his back unresponsive, so she began chest compressions. Oldham asked Bone if he knew
the suspects. Bone advised one of the suspects was defendant and they had both fled in a white
Cadillac.
¶ 18 C. Testimony of Farry Jones
¶ 19 Farry Jones testified he lived at 1632 North Edward Street. At approximately 8:30
p.m. on November 18, 2017, he was sitting on his front porch smoking a cigarette when he heard
four to five gunshots. He said he crawled into his house. He did not see or hear anyone. When
inside the house, he looked out the window and saw “a car speeding off and that was it.” Jones
said he could not tell the make or model of the car; he said it “was just a dark-colored vehicle.” He
said it was “dark down through there” and he was watching through “black sheer curtains.”
¶ 20 D. Testimony of Teona Dandridge
¶ 21 Teona Dandridge testified that defendant is related to her two sons on their father’s
side. She said since 2011, she had owned the house at 1600 North Edward in Decatur where the
shooting took place. The house had been vacant for approximately five years. She believed it was
likely defendant knew the house was vacant.
¶ 22 E. Testimony of Detective Borowczyk
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¶ 23 Ronald Borowczyk, a Decatur police detective, testified he conducted a data
extraction from Bone’s cell phone. He said the last Snapchat activity between Bone and defendant
occurred at 8:37 p.m. on November 18, 2017, when defendant (username “Sodabox”) sent the
message “Lac.”
¶ 24 F. Testimony of Lieutenant Thompson
¶ 25 Kristopher Thompson, the Macon County jail superintendent, testified that when
defendant was booked into the jail on November 20, 2017, he gave his address as 306 South
McClellan Street in Decatur and listed his wife, Ciara Dickens Bond, as his emergency contact.
¶ 26 G. Testimony of Detective Dailey
¶ 27 David Dailey, a Decatur police detective, testified as an expert in the interpretation
of cell phone records. When analyzing defendant’s cell phone call records, he discovered a call at
8:45 p.m. on November 18, 2017, that utilized a cell site and sector in the area of the homicide
scene. After that call, a “large number” of incoming calls for the next 14 hours went to voicemail,
which Dailey described as “abnormal activity” for that phone based upon its historical records.
¶ 28 H. Testimony of Detective Kuchelmeister
¶ 29 Jason Kuchelmeister, a Decatur police detective, testified he was assigned as
primary detective for the case. He had recovered surveillance video from Little Caesars, which
shared a parking lot with the Family Video on Water Street. The video showed the Lincoln enter
the parking lot at approximately 8:30 p.m. on November 18, 2017, and park.
¶ 30 Kuchelmeister testified the investigation remained open as to the identity of the
second suspect, the shooter, as he had confirmed that defendant was not the shooter. Bone had
been shown six separate photo line-ups and was unable to identify the man who shot him and
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Feldkamp. Kuchelmeister said he had found several text messages on Bone’s phone that indicated
Bone was planning other cannabis transactions in Decatur on November 18, 2017.
¶ 31 After considering the evidence presented, the arguments of counsel, and the jury
instructions, the jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder, attempt (first degree murder),
and armed robbery. Defendant filed a posttrial motion, which the trial court denied.
¶ 32 At sentencing, the trial court “considered the facts of this case, the factors in
aggravation and mitigation, and the presentence investigation report.” The court sentenced
defendant to 30 years’ imprisonment on his first degree murder conviction and two 10-year terms
on his attempt and armed robbery convictions. The 10-year terms were ordered to run concurrently
with each other but consecutively to his 30-year term.
¶ 33 This appeal followed.
¶ 34 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 35 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶ 36 Defendant claims the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was
legally accountable for the shooter’s conduct. He claims the State failed to prove he engaged in a
common criminal design with the shooter when the only evidence linking him to the crimes was
Bone’s testimony. He contends, because Bone’s testimony was “so fraught with contradictions
and inconsistencies,” no rational trier of fact could have found him guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. We disagree.
¶ 37 In this case, to find defendant guilty of first degree murder, attempt (first degree
murder), and armed robbery under the accountability theory, the State had to prove defendant
engaged in a common criminal design with the shooter, as it is undisputed that defendant was not
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the shooter. Therefore, to be held criminally responsible for the actions of the shooter, the State
must have convinced the jury that defendant and the shooter shared a common criminal design.
¶ 38 When presented with a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the question
before the reviewing court is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted.) People v.
McLaurin, 2020 IL 124563, ¶ 22 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). This
standard applies in all criminal cases regardless of the nature of the evidence. Id.; see also People
v. Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 64 (“This standard of review applies in all criminal cases, whether
the evidence is direct or circumstantial.”). “This standard of review gives full play to the
responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence,
and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” (Emphasis added and
internal quotation marks omitted.) McLaurin, 2020 IL 124563, ¶ 22. “All reasonable inferences
from the evidence must be drawn in favor of the prosecution.” People v. Hardman, 2017 IL
121453, ¶ 37. Further, the reviewing court must “not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of
fact on questions involving the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses.” People
v. Gray, 2017 IL 120958, ¶ 35. “A criminal conviction will not be reversed for insufficient
evidence unless the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory that it justifies a
reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.” Id.¶ 39 As stated, in this case, the State relied on the theory of accountability to prove
defendant’s guilt. Under this theory, a person is legally accountable for the conduct of another
person when,
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“(c) either before or during the commission of an offense, and with the
intent to promote or facilitate that commission, he or she solicits, aids, abets, agrees,
or attempts to aid that other person in the planning or commission of the offense.
When 2 or more persons engage in a common criminal design or agreement,
any acts in the furtherance of that common design committed by one party are
considered to be the acts of all parties to the common design or agreement and all
are equally responsible for the consequences of those further acts.” 720 ILCS
5/5-2(c) (West 2016).
¶ 40 In order to prove the defendant had the intent to promote or facilitate an offense,
the State must prove (1) there was a common criminal design with the principal offender or (2) the
defendant shared the criminal intent of the principal offender. People v. Fernandez, 2014 IL
115527, ¶ 13. “In common-design rule cases, the rule is and remains that of Kessler, namely, that
‘where one aids another in the planning or commission of an offense, he is legally accountable for
the conduct of the person he aids; and that the word “conduct” encompasses any criminal act done
in furtherance of the planned and intended act.’ ” Id. ¶ 21 (quoting People v. Kessler, 57 Ill. 2d
493, 497 (1974)). That is, “[a]ll members of the group in common-design cases who are bent on
illegal acts are equally responsible for ‘any acts in the furtherance of that common design.’ ”
(Emphasis in original.) People v. Jackson, 2020 IL App (4th) 170036, ¶ 45 (quoting Fernandez,
2014 IL 115527, ¶ 13).
“Accordingly, common-design cases focus on whether a defendant was part of such
a group and not on whether the defendant intended for any particular crime to occur.
A defendant’s ‘intent’ to commit any specific crime is not relevant in
common-design cases. Instead, ‘[e]vidence that a defendant voluntarily attached
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himself to a group [or individual] bent on illegal acts with knowledge of its design
supports an inference that he shared the common purpose and will sustain his
conviction for an offense committed by another.’ ” (Emphases in original.) Jackson,
2020 IL App (4th) 170036, ¶ 45 (quoting Fernandez, 2014 IL 115527, ¶ 13).
¶ 41 We note a “group” consists of two or more people. See People v. Phillips, 2014 IL
App (4th) 120695, ¶ 34 (the defendant’s conviction of first degree murder under accountability
theory upheld when the evidence showed the defendant and another individual, who fired the shot
that killed the victim, shared a common design to commit a crime). Thus, the State was not required
to present evidence of words of an agreement to prove a common design between defendant and
the shooter, nor was it required to prove defendant actively participated in the shootings or armed
robbery in order to hold him accountable. See People v. Taylor, 164 Ill. 2d 131, 141 (1995). Rather,
common design can be inferred from the circumstances of the crime, such as the defendant’s aid
in the planning, his presence during its commission, his continued close association with other
offenders after its commission, his failure to report the crime, and his flight from the scene.
Jackson, 2020 IL App (4th) 170036, ¶ 47. Thus, as this court explained in Phillips, even if the
defendant is completely unaware of the other offender’s true intentions, he remains legally
accountable for any crimes committed by the other offender to whom defendant attached himself,
knowing the other offender was bent on illegal acts. Phillips, 2014 IL App (4th) 120695, ¶ 44.
¶ 42 Again, as a reviewing court, we will not overturn a jury’s verdict under the
accountability theory unless the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, is
so improbable or unsatisfactory that a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s accountability and, thus,
of his guilt, exists. See People v. Willis, 2013 IL App (1st) 110233, ¶ 79. Applying this standard,
we conclude the State sufficiently proved defendant guilty when the evidence supported an
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inference that defendant attached himself to a group bent on illegal acts, namely the armed robbery
and shootings of Feldkamp and Bone.
¶ 43 In this case, reasonable inferences from the evidence presented show the following.
Defendant and Bone had discussed in 2015 arranging a sale of marijuana at a future date. Two
years later, on November 18, 2017, they communicated through Snapchat about the transaction
coming to fruition. As they went back and forth on a meeting place, Bone finally agreed, against
his wishes, to drive to defendant’s house in Decatur, as this was not a location where both were
outside of their “comfort zones.” It is reasonable to assume defendant offered to pay more money
per pound in order to lure Bone to, what he knew to be, a vacant house in Decatur. Defendant
asked Bone to meet at the Family Video and then follow him to the vacant house. Defendant told
Bone over the phone he would be in a white car. He followed that conversation with a Snapchat
message, saying he would be in a Cadillac, or “Lac,” as the message read. Because of the nature
of the Snapchat application, previous messages had disappeared and, according to Detective
Borowczyk, this “Lac” message was the “last activity.”
¶ 44 Defendant drove to the house, pulled into the driveway, but backed out to park on
the street. Bone followed defendant’s lead and parked on the street as well. Until Feldkamp exited
the car, defendant may not have realized Bone had a passenger with him. It is reasonable to assume
defendant greeted only Feldkamp, as he was surprised to see him with Bone. It is also reasonable
to assume he went back to the Cadillac to inform the shooter, who was in the backseat, that Bone
had brought someone with him. Bone had the marijuana and cash that he intended for another
transaction in a duffel bag that he carried to the house. All four men walked to the backdoor of the
house where it was extremely dark. Defendant acted as if he was intending to enter the house by
opening the screen door while Feldkamp and Bone stood close by. The shooter pulled the gun,
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shot Feldkamp twice and Bone once, grabbed the duffel bag, and fled the scene with defendant in
the Cadillac.
¶ 45 Defendant claims Bone’s testimony should be wholly discredited due to
inconsistencies related to statements he made to police regarding (1) the amount of marijuana he
intended to sell, (2) his reported physical descriptions of defendant and the shooter, (3) who it was
that opened the screen door, (4) the exact order of the shots fired and who was hit when, (5) the
change in plans on the meeting place, (6) whether he brandished a knife found in his pocket, (7) the
contents of the duffel bag, and (8) his description of the length of defendant’s hair and beard.
Apparently, the jury was not affected by these inconsistencies or most likely considered them
insignificant or inconsequential. After all, it is within the jury’s province to determine a witness’s
credibility and that determination is afforded great deference on appeal. People v. Cunningham,
212 Ill. 2d 274, 280 (2004).
¶ 46 From all this, when taken in the light most favorable to the State, and considering
in particular Bone’s testimony as the victim, defendant’s planning and coordination of the meeting,
defendant’s flight from the scene, and all reasonable inferences taken from the totality of the
evidence presented, we find that any rational trier of fact could have found defendant guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt pursuant to an accountability theory. We find the State sufficiently proved
defendant and the shooter had a criminal intent as it related to this drug transaction, be it to rob at
gunpoint or actually shoot Bone and/or Feldkamp. Because defendant voluntarily attached himself
to the shooter, thereby forming a “group,” with knowledge of the group’s common design,
defendant was legally accountable for the actions of the shooter. Accordingly, a reasonable jury
could find defendant was legally accountable for the murder of Feldkamp, the attempted murder
of Bone, and armed robbery.
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¶ 47 B. Cell Phone Records
¶ 48 Defendant next contends the trial court erred in denying his motion in limine to
exclude his cell phone location records obtained without a search warrant. Although that was not
the basis for defendant’s motion in limine, we will address defendant’s argument as stated in his
brief. In his motion in limine, he sought exclusion of the cell phone location records, not because
they were obtained without a search warrant, but because they would be presented to the jury as
“complicated scientific evidence” by a lay witness. In defendant’s brief in this appeal, citing
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018), he argues the historical cell phone location
evidence was improperly admitted because the cell phone records were improperly obtained
without a warrant.
¶ 49 In Carpenter, decided in June 2018 after defendant’s trial in May 2018, the United
States Supreme Court held that a person has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the record of
his or her physical movements as captured through cell-site location information (CSLI). Id. at
2217. Thus, the collection of CSLI from a wireless carrier is a “search,” within the meaning of the
fourth amendment, and so generally requires a warrant. Id. at 2220-21. Therefore, law enforcement
“must generally obtain a warrant supported by probable cause before acquiring such records.” Id.
at 2221.
¶ 50 Searches conducted without a warrant are per se unreasonable under the fourth
amendment subject only to a few exceptions. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
However, in this case, although a search warrant was not obtained, the police filed an “application”
seeking an order from the trial court directing the cell provider to furnish location records for
defendant’s cell phone. The “application” was filed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2018) (the
federal statute authorizing the collection of CSLI without a warrant or the showing of probable
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cause required to obtain one). Pursuant to this federal statute, the government may obtain a
disclosure order upon a showing of “specific and articulable facts” demonstrating “reasonable
grounds to believe” the records are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation. Id.However, in this case, the State went beyond the requirements of the statute and sought the
provision of the records under the higher standard. The court’s order granting the application
specifically stated it was “based on probable cause.”
¶ 51 Prior to Carpenter, there were no Illinois state court decisions examining the
relationship between the fourth amendment and acquisition of CSLI, nor was there any specific
statute requiring a warrant for the acquisition of CSLI. We have found no Illinois case law that
expressly allowed or prohibited the acquisition of CSLI without a search warrant.
¶ 52 Nevertheless, we need not reach the issue of whether the exclusionary rule, which
justifies the exclusion of the records from trial because they were obtained without a warrant,
applies in this case. This is so because the application, according to the trial court’s order, was
based on probable cause. The officers sought the CSLI to locate defendant and to obtain records
“relevant and material to a murder investigation.”
¶ 53 The test for sufficiency of a complaint for a search warrant is whether, as a whole,
it adequately establishes a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
place. People v. Gacy, 103 Ill. 2d 1, 22 (1984). Defendant could be afforded no more protection
had a warrant been issued. Thus, we conclude the trial court did not err by admitting the CSLI, as
those records were obtained on the basis of probable cause. Indeed, at the August 2018 hearing on
defendant’s posttrial motion, where he raised the fourth amendment claim citing Carpenter, the
trial court denied the motion, stating, “I do think the application and order really works in place of
the search warrant and complaint for search warrant” because the “application and order” were
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supported by probable cause. Based on the above, we find defendant’s claim asserting a fourth
amendment violation is, at best, disingenuous.
¶ 54 C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
¶ 55 Finally, defendant contends his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when
he failed to object to the admission of the Snapchat message. He claims the Snapchat message
lacked proper authentication and, as a result, was inadmissible. We disagree.
¶ 56 Counsel may be found ineffective if the failure to move for the suppression of
evidence was objectively unreasonable, given the state of the law at the time the motion would
have been filed, and if that failure prejudiced defendant. People v. Henderson, 2013 IL 114040,
¶ 15; People v. English, 2013 IL 112890, ¶ 34; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668(1984). To show prejudice in this context, defendant must show both that the suppression argument
counsel failed to raise was meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome
of the trial would have been different had the evidence been suppressed. Henderson, 2013 IL
114040, ¶ 15.
¶ 57 Regardless of any potential error, we conclude the outcome of defendant’s trial
would not have been any different had the trial court suppressed the “Snapchat message evidence.”
Although defendant does not make clear what specifically he considers the “Snapchat message
evidence,” we must assume it is solely the admission of the Snapchat message “Lac.”
¶ 58 Bone testified he spoke with defendant on the phone when they were discussing the
meeting place. Bone said: “Well, [defendant] said on the phone that it was going to be a white car.
Then in Snapchat, he said a ‘Lac.’ ” The surveillance video evidence showing a white Cadillac
pull into the parking lot where Bone and Feldkamp were waiting was sufficient to identify the
vehicle. The Snapchat message could be deemed insignificant in the eyes of the jury when the
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jurors saw a white Cadillac as Bone had described. It was reasonable for the jury to believe Bone’s
testimony that it, in fact, was defendant in the vehicle given that the shooting occurred at a house
that defendant had reason to know was vacant. As fully explained earlier in our decision, the jury
was entitled to judge the credibility of Bone’s testimony. The jury apparently believed Bone that
it was defendant in the white Cadillac and, based upon the totality of the evidence, the jury’s
determination was not unreasonable. Defendant cannot demonstrate prejudice from the admission
of the Snapchat message “Lac,” in light of the overwhelming evidence otherwise suggesting his
guilt. In other words, defendant cannot reasonably argue the outcome of the trial would have been
different had the Snapchat evidence not been admitted.
¶ 59 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 60 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 61 Affirmed.
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