Hudson v. Human Rights Comm'n

2021 IL App (1st) 200508-UNo. 1-20-0508
FIFTH DIVISION
MARCH 31, 2021
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
BRANDON HUDSON, ) Petition for Direct
) Administrative Review of a
Petitioner-Appellant, ) Decision of the Illinois Human
) Rights Commission
v. )
) Charge No. 2018 CR 3185
THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, ) Charge No. 2018 CR 3186
THE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, and )
COOK COUNTY STATE’S ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, )
)
Respondents-Appellees. )
JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Delort and Justice Rochford concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirm the orders of the Human Rights Commission sustaining the dismissal of
petitioner’s charges of employment discrimination.
¶2 Petitioner Brandon Hudson appeals from the orders of the Illinois Human Rights
Commission (Commission) sustaining the Illinois Department of Human Rights’ (Department)
dismissal of his charges of discrimination against Hudson’s former employer, the Cook County
No. 1-20-0508
State’s Attorney’s Office. The Department and Commission found the charges were barred by
operation of section 7-109.1 of the Illinois Human Rights Act (775 ILCS 5/7-109.1 (West 2018)),
given Hudson’s pending federal lawsuit based on the same facts. On appeal, Hudson argues that
section 7-109.1 is not implicated, because resolution of his federal lawsuit would not preclude the
charges as a matter of res judicata. For the following reasons, we affirm the ruling of the
Commission.
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 Hudson was employed by the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office before his
termination on December 4, 2017. On June 1, 2018, Hudson filed two substantially identical
charges of discrimination with both the Department and the federal Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), naming Kimberly Foxx and the Cook County State’s
Attorney’s Office as respondents. 1 In both charges, Hudson alleged discrimination in violation of
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.) and the Illinois Human Rights
Act (the Act) (775 ILCS 5/1 et seq. (West 2018)). Specifically, he alleged that he was subjected to
unequal terms and conditions of employment based on his race and sex, as an African-American
male, and that he was retaliated against when he engaged in protected activity to oppose that
discrimination.
¶5 Separately, on December 17, 2018, Hudson filed a lawsuit in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois naming Kimberly Foxx, Cook County, and the State’s
1
One of the charges was labeled with IDHR charge number 2018 CR 3185 and EEOC charge
number 440-2018-05719. The second charge was labeled with IDHR charge number 2018 CR 3186 and
EEOC charge number 440-2018-5720. The record reflects that on September 28, 2018, the EEOC issued a
determination indicating that the EEOC was terminating its processing of the charges.
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Attorney’s Office as defendants. Hudson v. Foxx, No. 1:18-cv-08243 (N.D. Ill.). The complaint in
the federal lawsuit contained counts of gender discrimination, racial discrimination, and retaliation
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.) (“Title VII”). 2
In the federal complaint, Hudson alleged that shortly after beginning his employment as an
Assistant State’s Attorney in June 2015, he was the target of verbal harassment and disparate
treatment until his eventual termination on December 4, 2017. In the federal complaint’s prayer
for relief, Hudson sought, inter alia, compensatory and punitive damages.
¶6 On August 16, 2019, the Department entered orders of administrative dismissal for both
charges, pursuant to section 7-109.1 of the Act. 775 ILCS 5/7-109.1. In those orders, the
Department notified Hudson that the charges were being dismissed because he had “initiated
litigation for the purpose of seeking final relief in a State or federal court” and “[a] final decision
on the merits in that litigation or administrative hearing would preclude the charging party from
bringing another action based on the charge.”
¶7 On October 11, 2019, Hudson filed with the Commission, a request for review of the
Department’s orders of dismissal. In submissions accompanying that request, Hudson averred that
administrative dismissal under section 7-109.1 of the Act was “premature as the federal court [has]
not made any substantive findings.” He asserted that the charges should not be dismissed “unless
2
Although the complaint initiating Hudson’s federal lawsuit is not contained in the record on
appeal, we may take judicial notice of filings in other courts that are matters of public record. See Aurora
Loan Services, LLC v. Kmiecik, 2013 IL App (1st) 121700, ¶ 37 (an appellate court may take judicial
notice of “readily verifiable facts” if doing so will aid in the efficient disposition of a case, and “a
reviewing court may take judicial notice of a written decision that is part of the record of another court”);
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. American Nat. Bank and Trust Co., 288 Ill. App. 3d 760, 764 (1997) (“This
court may take judicial notice of public documents that are included in the records of other courts.
[Citation.]”). The docket in the federal lawsuit reflects that, as of March 9, 2021, the lawsuit remains
pending while the court considers a motion to dismiss filed by certain defendants.
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and until the federal court makes a final decision on the merits and determines whether or not the
federal court will retain jurisdiction of [his] state law claims.”
¶8 On November 19, 2019, the Department filed a response to Hudson’s request for review,
urging that administrative dismissal pursuant to section 7-109.1 of the Act was proper, as a final
decision on the merits in Hudson’s federal court lawsuit “would preclude [Hudson] from bringing
another action based on the pending charge.”
¶9 On February 11, 2020, the Commission entered two substantively identical final orders
sustaining the dismissal of Hudson’s charges pursuant to section 7-109.1 of the Act. In those
orders, the Commission reasoned that the language of that section was “mandatory” and thus the
Department “does not have the discretion to allow a charge to proceed once it has been presented
with evidence that Petitioner has filed a complaint ‘seeking final relief on some or all of the issues
that are the basis of the charge.’ ”
¶ 10 The Commission rejected Hudson’s argument that administrative dismissal was premature
because there has not been any fact-finding or decision on the merits in the federal lawsuit. The
Commission explained:
“[T]the only requirement for a dismissal under [section 7-109.1] is that ‘the
complainant has initiated litigation in a federal or State court for the purpose of
seeking final relief on some or all of the issues that are the basis of the charge.’
Because [Hudson] does not dispute that the federal litigation seeks final relief on
some or all of the issues that are the basis of his charge, the Commission cannot
vacate the Respondent’s dismissal of the charge.”
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¶ 11 The Commission thus sustained the Department’s dismissal of both charges. The
Commission notified Hudson that he could appeal to this court by filing a petition for review within
35 days of service of the orders. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 335(a) (eff. July 1, 2017).
¶ 12 The record reflects that the Commission’s orders were served by mail on February 11,
2020. Service of the orders was thus complete four days later, February 15, 2020. See 56 Ill. Adm.
Code 5300.20 (eff. June 1, 1992) (“Whenever a time period commences upon a Person’s receipt
of service or notice, and service is by mail, receipt shall be deemed to occur on the fourth day after
mailing.”). Hudson’s petition for review was filed with our court within 35 days, on March 17,
2020, and was thus timely. 3 See 775 ILCS 5/8-111(B)(1) (West 2018) (A petitioner may seek
“judicial review of a final order of the Commission * * * by filing a petition for review” directly
with the Appellate Court within 35 days of service of the decision). We review the final order of
the Commission, not the Department’s decision. See Zaderaka v. Human Rights Comm’n, 131 Ill.
2d 172, 179 (1989); Marinelli v. Human Rights Comm’n, 262 Ill. App. 3d 247, 253 (1994) (“It is
the decision of the Commission, not the Department, which we review.”).
¶ 13 ANALYSIS
¶ 14 On appeal, Hudson contends that both charges were erroneously dismissed because section
7-109.1 of the Act is inapplicable.4 He acknowledges that, in addition to filing charges with the
3
Hudson’s petition for review specified that he sought review of the Commission’s orders
sustaining the dismissal of both charges, 2018 CR 3185 and 2018 CR 3186.
4
Notably, although Hudson’s petition for review and the captions to his briefs refer to both charges
with the Department (2018 CR 3185 and 2018 CR 3186), the argument in his briefing refers to only a single
“charge.” This apparent oversight does not impact our review, as both charges were dismissed for the same
reason, i.e., application of section 7-109.1 of the Act, and the substance of Hudson’s argument applies
equally to both charges.
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Department, he initiated litigation in federal court seeking relief under Title VII, and that the
federal lawsuit was based on the same factual allegations as his charges with the Department.
However, he suggests that a final decision on the merits of his federal lawsuit could not preclude
him “from bringing another action on his pending Charge[s] in state court.” He asserts that “even
if the federal district court were to have adjudicated [his] federal discrimination claim under Title
VII * * * any such judgment would have had absolutely no impact upon [his] State law claims
under the Illinois Human Rights Act.” He maintains that, regardless of the outcome of his federal
lawsuit, “he still could have filed a State court lawsuit alleging discrimination under State law (the
Illinois Human Right Act), even though both cases arose out of the exact same set of underlying
facts.” He requests that we vacate the Commission’s orders and remand to allow him “to ultimately
bring his State law claims under the Illinois Human Rights Act in State Court.”
¶ 15 At the outset, we note that the parties dispute the standard of review to be applied to the
Commission’s orders sustaining the Department’s dismissal of Hudson’s charges. Hudson asserts
that the issue on appeal is one of statutory construction, such that our review is de novo. On the
other hand, the Department and Commission (respondents) urge that a deferential standard of
review applies, and that we may reverse only if the Commission’s decision was “clearly
erroneous.”
¶ 16 The standard of review applied to an administrative agency’s decision “turns on whether
the issue presented is a question of fact, a question of law, or a mixed question of law and fact.”
Comprehensive Community Solutions, Inc. v. Rockford School District No. 205, 216 Ill. 2d 455,
471 (2005) (citing AFM Messenger Service, Inc. v. Department of Employment Security, 198 Ill.
2d 380, 390 (2001)). An agency’s conclusion on a question of law is reviewed de novo. Id. An
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agency’s decision on a question of fact is entitled to more deference and is reviewed for whether
it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. at 471-72.
¶ 17 “A mixed question of law and fact asks the legal effect of a given set of facts. [Citation.]
That is, in resolving a mixed question of law and fact, a reviewing court must determine whether
established facts satisfy applicable legal rules. [Citation.]” Id. at 472. “An agency’s conclusion on
a mixed question of law and fact is reviewed for clear error,” which is “deferential to an agency’s
experience in construing and applying the statute that it administers.” Id. An agency’s decision
will be deemed clearly erroneous only where the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed. Id.¶ 18 The sole question in this appeal is whether, in light of Hudson’s federal court lawsuit,
dismissal of his charges was warranted under section 7-109.1 of the Act. We are not called upon
to review any factual determination. Rather, in deciding whether the charges were properly
dismissed under section 7-109.1, we determine whether established facts (the charges and federal
lawsuit) satisfy applicable legal rules. We thus agree with the respondents that this case presents a
question of mixed law and fact, and so the “clearly erroneous” standard of review applies. For the
following reasons, we determine that Commission’s orders sustaining the dismissal of Hudson’s
charges were not clearly erroneous.5
¶ 19 At the time that Hudson’s charges were dismissed by the Department and sustained by the
Commission, section 7-109.1 of the Illinois Human Rights Act provided:
“For charges filed under this Act, if the charging party has initiated litigation for
the purpose of seeking final relief in a State or federal court or before an
5
We also note that, even if we were to apply non-deferential de novo review, we would reach the
same result.
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administrative law judge or hearing officer * * * , and if a final decision on the
merits in that litigation or administrative hearing would preclude the charging party
from bringing another action based on the pending charge, the Department shall
cease its investigation and dismiss the pending charge by order of the Director, who
shall provide the charging party notice of his or her right to commence a civil action
in the appropriate circuit court or other appropriate court of competent jurisdiction.
The Director shall also provide the charging party notice of his or her right to seek
review of the dismissal order before the Commission. Any review by the
Commission of the dismissal shall be limited to the question of whether the charge
was properly dismissed pursuant to this Section. Nothing in this Section shall
preclude the Department from continuing to investigate an allegation in a charge
that is unique to this Act or otherwise could not have been included in the litigation
or administrative proceeding.” 775 ILCS 5/7-109.1 (West 2018). 6
¶ 20 Respondents argue that Hudson’s charges were properly dismissed pursuant to section 7-
109.1 of the Act, insofar as a final decision on the merits in Hudson’s federal lawsuit would
preclude him from pursuing the charges, which were premised on the same facts. Specifically,
respondents maintain that, as a matter res judicata, a final determination on the merits in the federal
case would preclude the discrimination charges. We agree.
6
Effective January 1, 2020, section 7-109.1 was amended to provide that: (1) for charges filed
under Article 7A of the Act, “if the complainant has initiated litigation in a federal or State court for the
purpose of seeking final relief on some or all of the issues that are the basis of the charge” either party
may request that the Department administratively dismiss the charge. 775 ILCS 5/7-109.1 (West 2020).
Since this appeal turns on the propriety of the Department’s August 2019 administrative dismissal of the
charges, we apply the version of the statute in effect at that time. See People v. Frederick, 2015 IL App
(2d) 140540, ¶ 23 (“Ordinarily, the law to be applied is the law that is in effect at the time of the
administrative action at issue. (citing Goral v. Illinois State Board of Education, 2013 IL App (1st)
130752, ¶ 27)).
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¶ 21 “The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment on the merits rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction bars any subsequent actions between the same parties or their
privies on the same cause of action. [Citation.] Res judicata bars not only what was actually
decided in the first action but also whatever could have been decided. [Citation.]” Hudson v. City
of Chicago, 228 Ill. 2d 462, 467 (2008). Application of the doctrine has three requirements: “(1) a
final judgment on the merits has been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) an identity
of cause of action exists; and (3) the parties or their privies are identical in both actions. [Citation.]”
Id.¶ 22 We recognize that, when this court is asked to review whether a federal court action has
res judicata effect, we apply federal law regarding the doctrine. See Peregrine Financial Group,
Inc. v. TradeMaven, L.L.C., 391 Ill. App. 3d 309, 313 (2009) (“The parties agree that * * * federal
law governs the res judicata issue because the litigation with Trading Technologies was filed and
settled in federal court. [Citation.]”). In any event, the elements of res judicata under federal law
are identical to Illinois law. See id. (“As with Illinois law, under federal law there are three
requirements for res judicata: (1) an identity of the parties or their privies; (2) an identity of the
causes of action; and (3) a final judgment on the merits.”); see also Barr v. Board of Trustees of
Western Illinois University, 796 F.3d 837, 840 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Res judicata blocks a second
lawsuit if there is (1) an identity of the parties in the two suits; (2) a final judgment on the merits
in the first; and (3) an identity of the causes of action. [Citation.]”)
¶ 23 We note that, in this case, there is no dispute that there is a common identity of the parties
in the federal litigation and the charges filed with the Department. Hudson’s federal lawsuit named
Kimberly Foxx, Cook County, and the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office as defendants. The
same three parties were named as respondents in both charges, 2018 CR 3185 and 3186.
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¶ 24 As the parties were identical, the elements of res judicata will be satisfied if (1) there is a
final judgment on the merits and (2) an identity of the causes of action. We agree with respondents
that there is an identity of the causes of action in Hudson’s federal lawsuit and the charges filed
with the Department.
¶ 25 Under both federal and Illinois law, whether the causes of action are identical turns upon
whether there is a common factual basis. Federal precedent recognizes that “ ‘two claims are one
for purposes of res judicata if they are based on the same, or nearly the same, factual allegations’”
Barr, 796 F.3d at 840; see also Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 736 (7th Cir. 2014)
(“Whether there is an identity of the cause of action depends on ‘whether the claims comprise the
same core of operative facts that give rise to a remedy.’”). The same is true under Illinois law. See
River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 184 Ill. 2d 290, 311 (1998) (“separate claims will be
considered the same cause of action for purposes of res judicata if they arise from a single group
of operative facts, regardless of whether they assert different theories of relief. [Citation.]”).
¶ 26 Here, it is apparent from Hudson’s filings that his federal lawsuit and his administrative
charges stem from the same alleged acts of gender and racial discrimination during his
employment with the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office. On appeal, Hudson does not dispute
that they are based on the same core of operative facts.
¶ 27 Nonetheless, Hudson suggests that resolution of claim in his federal lawsuit could not
preclude his administrative charges because in federal court he asserted claims under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act, whereas his administrative charges were brought under the Human Rights
Act. He asserts that regardless of the outcome of his federal lawsuit, “he still could have filed a
State court lawsuit alleging discrimination under State law (the Illinois Human Rights Act) even
though both cases arose out of the exact same set of underlying facts.” In essence, he suggests that
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his federal lawsuit could not have a preclusive effect as res judicata, because he sought relief under
different statutes before the federal court and the Department. However, that argument is flawed,
because whether there is an identity of the causes of action depends on whether there is a common
underlying factual basis, regardless of the theory of recovery. See Alvear-Velez v. Mukasey, 540
F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2008) (explaining that identity of the cause of action “is determined by
using the operative facts or same transaction test” and that res judicata prevents a party from using
“several theories of recovery as the basis for separate suits.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.));
see also Arlin-Golf, LLC v. Village of Arlington Heights, 631 F.3d 818, 822 (7th Cir. 2011) (“The
federal-court complaint seeks recovery based on additional theories not mentioned in the state-
court complaint, but res judicata is nonetheless appropriate because * * * both complaints rely on
the same operative facts.”); River Park, Inc., 184 Ill. 2d at 310 (“separate claims will be considered
the same cause of action * * * if they arise from a single group of operative facts regardless of
whether they assert different theories of relief. [Citation.]”).
¶ 28 It is apparent from Hudson’s filings, and he does not dispute, that the same core of operative
facts forms the basis for his Title VII claims in his federal lawsuit and the charges filed with the
Department under the Act. Indeed, Hudson’s reply brief concedes that his state law charges “are
based upon the very same set of facts alleged in support of his Title VII claims.” Nonetheless, he
maintains that his federal lawsuit cannot have a preclusive res judicata effect to bar his state law
claims.
¶ 29 In support of this argument, Hudson directs our attention to case law to suggest that Title
VII claims are not subject to res judicata, but we find that precedent is inapposite. None of those
cases convinces us that a judgment in Hudson’s federal Title VII action would not have a res
judicata effect on his state law claims, based on the same facts.
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¶ 30 First, Hudson relies heavily on this court’s decision in City of Chicago v. Illinois Fair
Employment Practices Commission, 87 Ill. App. 3d 597 (1980). However, as explained below, that
case relies on precedent that was undermined by a subsequent United States Supreme Court
decision.
¶ 31 City of Chicago concerned an appeal by the City of Chicago (City) from a state court
judgment affirming a decision of the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC),
which found that the City had discriminated against the complainant and other female custodial
employees, in violation of state law. Id. at 597. The complainant was also a member of a federal
class action lawsuit alleging violations of Title VII and other federal statutes, on the same factual
basis. While the FEPC administrative proceedings were pending, a decision was entered in the
federal district court in favor of the class members, which was affirmed by the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals. Id. at 600, 603.
¶ 32 Before this court, the City argued that, in light of the award in the federal lawsuit, res
judicata applied to bar the state court litigation. Id. at 602-03. This court concluded that the FEPC
award was not barred by res judicata. In so doing, this court relied upon the Seventh Circuit’s
decision in Batiste v. Furnco Construction Corp., 503 F.2d 447 (7th Cir. 1974), which held that
res judicata did not bar plaintiffs’ federal court lawsuit alleging violation of Title VII,
notwithstanding that plaintiffs had already prevailed before the Illinois FEPC on a similar
discrimination claim. We noted that the Seventh Circuit in Batiste recognized a “ ‘strong
Congressional policy that plaintiffs not be deprived of their right to resort to the federal courts for
adjudication of their federal claims under Title VII.’ ” City of Chicago, 87 Ill. App. 3d at 603(quoting Batiste, 503 F.2d at 450).
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¶ 33 Our court’s decision in City of Chicago also relied upon the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Company, 415 U.S. 36 (1974). Alexander held that an
employee was not precluded from suing his employer in federal court under Title VII,
notwithstanding that the employee had been unsuccessful in pursuing a discrimination claim in
arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. In holding that the employee’s federal
lawsuit was not precluded by the adverse arbitral decision, the Alexander court explained:
“Title VII provides for consideration of employment-discrimination claims in
several forums. [Citations.] And, in general, submission of a claim to one forum
does not preclude a later submission to another. Moreover, the legislative history
of Title VII manifests a congressional intent to allow an individual to pursue
independently his rights under both Title VII and other applicable state and federal
statutes. The clear inference is that Title VII was designed to supplement rather
than supplant, existing laws and institutions relating to employment
discrimination.” Alexander, 415 U.S. at 48-49.
Our court in City of Chicago quoted the above language from Alexander and concluded that the
state law FEPC proceeding was not barred by the federal class action award: “It is clear the defense
of res judicata is inapplicable in this state proceeding as it was in the federal proceeding in Batiste
and in Alexander.” 87 Ill. App. 3d at 604.
¶ 34 In his briefs before this court, Hudson suggests that City of Chicago (as well as Batiste and
Alexander), establish that res judicata cannot apply where one of the two proceedings involves
Title VII claims, even if both proceedings are based on the same facts. That is, he suggests that a
final decision in his federal court Title VII lawsuit could not “preclude” his state law charges
within the meaning of section 7-109.1 of the Act.
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¶ 35 We agree with respondents that the City of Chicago decision is not controlling. City of
Chicago relied on Batiste and Alexander, which were superseded by the U.S. Supreme Court’s
subsequent decision in Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp, 456 U.S. 461 (1982), which applied res
judicata from a state court judgment to bar a federal Title VII action.
¶ 36 In Kremer, the petitioner (Kremer) filed an employment discrimination charge with the
EEOC, which was referred to the New York State Division of Human Rights. Id. at 464-65. That
agency found no probable cause to support Kremer’s claim, and that determination was upheld by
the agency’s Appeal Board. Id. at 464. The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court
affirmed the Appeal Board’s order. Id. Kremer then brought a Title VII action against his former
employer in federal district court, which was dismissed on the ground of res judicata; that
dismissal was affirmed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Id. at 466.
¶ 37 The U.S. Supreme Court viewed the res judicata question in light of section 1738 of the
United States Code (28 U.S.C. § 1738,) which requires federal courts to “afford the same full faith
and credit to state court judgments that would apply in the State’s own courts. [Citation.]” Kremer,
456 U.S. at 462-63. The Supreme Court framed the question as:
“whether Congress intended Title VII to supersede the principles of comity and
repose embodied in § 1738. Specifically, we decide whether a federal court in a
Title VII case should give preclusive effect to a decision of a state court upholding
a state administrative agency’s rejection of an employment discrimination claim as
meritless when the state court’s decision would be res judicata in the State’s own
courts.” Id. at 463.
¶ 38 The Supreme Court in Kremer determined that Title VII lawsuits are subject to section
1738’s directive that prior state court judgments are entitled to a preclusive effect. Significantly,
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Kremer expressly distinguished Alexander in the course of holding that the adverse New York
state court decision precluded the federal Title VII action:
“The petitioner and the Courts of Appeal which have denied res judicata effect to
such [prior state court judgments] rely heavily on our statement in Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver, that ‘final responsibility for enforcement of Title VII is vested
with federal courts.’ 415 U.S. at 44. We did not say, and our language should not
be read to imply, that by vesting ‘final responsibility’ in one forum, Congress
intended to deny finality to decisions in another.” Kremer, 456 U.S. at 477.
The Kremer court also emphasized that Alexander concerned whether to give preclusive effect to
an arbitration decision, rather than a state court judgment:
“The holding in [Alexander] was that a private arbitration decision concerning an
employment discrimination claim did not bind the federal courts. Arbitration
decisions, of course, are not subject to the mandate of §1738. Furthermore, unlike
arbitration hearings * * * state fair employment practice laws are explicitly made
part of the Title VII enforcement scheme. * * * Here we are dealing with a state
statutory right, subject to state enforcement in a manner expressly provided for by
the federal Act.
[Alexander] also rested on the inappropriateness of arbitration as a forum
for the resolution of Title VII issues. The arbitrator’s task, we recognized, is to
‘effectuate the intent of the parties rather than the requirements of enacted
legislation.’ Id. at 56-57. * * * These characteristics cannot be attributed to state
administrative boards and state courts.” Kremer, 456 U.S. at 477-78.
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¶ 39 The United States Supreme Court in Kremer affirmed the dismissal of petitioner’s federal
Title VII lawsuit, upon concluding there was no showing of a “legislative purpose in Title VII to
deny res judicata or collateral estoppel effect to a state court judgment affirming that a claim of
employment discrimination is unproved.” Id. at 485.
¶ 40 Kremer makes clear that a Title VII lawsuit is not immune from res judicata effect of a
prior state court judgment. We agree with the respondents that, in light of Kremer, Hudson cannot
rely on our prior decision in City of Chicago, which in turn relied on Batiste and Alexander. The
Seventh Circuit’s 1974 Batiste decision—declining to apply a res judicata effect to a prior state
court adjudication to preclude a federal Title VII lawsuit—is clearly at odds with the U.S. Supreme
Court’s subsequent decision in Kremer. Further, as discussed, Alexander was explicitly
distinguished in Kremer.
¶ 41 We similarly reject Hudson’s reliance in his reply brief on Batiste and Alexander for the
proposition that “Title VII provides for consideration of employment-discrimination claims in
several forums and submission of a claim to one forum does not preclude a later submission to
another.” That suggestion is clearly rejected by Kremer. In short, Kremer squarely undermines
Hudson’s reliance on City of Chicago, Batiste, and Alexander.
¶ 42 In disputing the res judicata effect of a federal Title VII lawsuit on his state law claims,
Hudson also cites the principle that “state and federal courts generally possess concurrent
jurisdiction over federal civil rights claims.” Zoepfel-Thuline v. Black Hawk College, 2019 IL App
(3d) 180524, ¶ 26 (citing Blount v. Stroud, 232 Ill. 2d 302, 328-30 (2009)). However, that principle
has no bearing on our res judicata analysis. It merely recognizes that a plaintiff may elect to pursue
federal discrimination claims in either state court or federal court. See Yellow Freight System, Inc.
v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820 (1990) (holding that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over Title
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VII actions); Zoepfel-Thuline, 2019 IL App (3d) 180524, ¶ 26 (recognizing that Illinois courts
deciding federal statutory claims will follow Seventh Circuit precedent because the “failure to do
so would detract from uniform application of a federal statute, depending on whether the case was
filed in federal or state court.”). That is entirely different from suggesting that a plaintiff may
simultaneously bring discrimination claims, based on the same operative facts, in different forums.
¶ 43 We thus reject Hudson’s arguments that resolution of his federal Title VII lawsuit could
not have a preclusive res judicata effect with respect to his state law charges. Rather, all three
elements of res judicata will be satisfied if there is a final judgment on his federal lawsuit: (1) an
identity of the parties or their privies; (2) an identity of the causes of action; and (3) a final
judgment on the merits. Peregrine Financial Group, 391 Ill. App. 3d at 313.
¶ 44 In turn, by operation of res judicata, a “final decision on the merits” in the federal lawsuit
“would preclude the charging party [Hudson] from bringing another action based on the pending
charge[s]” within the meaning of section 7-109.1 of the Act. 775 ILCS 5/7-109.1 (2018).
¶ 45 Accordingly, we do not find that the Commission erred, let alone committed clear error, in
sustaining the Department’s dismissal of Hudson’s charges.
¶ 46 CONCLUSION
¶ 47 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the Commission.
¶ 48 Affirmed.
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No. 1-20-0508
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