People v. Benford

Digitally signed
by Reporter of
Decisions
Reason: I attest to
Illinois Official Reports the accuracy and
integrity of this
document
Appellate Court Date: 2022.07.13
10:23:00 -05'00'
People v. Benford, 2021 IL App (1st) 181237Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
Caption REGINALD BENFORD, Defendant-Appellant.
District & No. First District, Fifth Division
No. 1-18-1237
Filed March 26, 2021
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 99-CR-2775; the
Review Hon. Diane Cannon, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Affirmed.
Counsel on James E. Chadd, Patricia Mysza, Douglas R. Hoff, and Brett C. Zeeb,
Appeal of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg
and Annette Collins, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the
People.
Panel JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Presiding Justice Delort and Justice Rochford concurred in the
judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Defendant-appellant Reginald Benford, who was convicted of first degree murder, appeals
the denial of leave to file his successive postconviction petition. On appeal, the defendant
argues that he has established cause and prejudice sufficient to require consideration of his
successive postconviction petition alleging that his 40-year sentence violated the United States
and Illinois Constitutions. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the circuit
court of Cook County.
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 In August 1998, the then 21-year-old defendant, Mr. Benford, shot and killed a fellow gang
member, Davon Cook. Prior to his trial, the defendant was examined by a licensed clinical
psychologist, who administered several psychological tests to the defendant. The verbal
portion of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale indicated that the defendant had an IQ of 63,
which was in the lowest one percentile of the population for that test. Also, the defendant
received a verbal comprehension index score of 68, which placed him in the second percentile,
and a working memory score of 55, equivalent to the lowest one-half of one percentile of the
population for that test. The psychologist determined that the defendant was “of mildly
retarded intellectual functioning.”
¶4 Following a jury trial in 2001, the defendant was convicted of first degree murder in Mr.
Cook’s death. At sentencing, the court considered the aggravating factor of the defendant’s
eight-year criminal history against the mitigating factor that the defendant had begun to study
bible scripture and was attempting to reform his behavior. The court determined that a
minimum sentence would “deprecate [sic] the seriousness of the offense” and sentenced the
defendant to 40 years’ imprisonment. The defendant appealed, alleging, in relevant part, that
his 40-year sentence was excessive, in light of his youth, mental retardation, personal history,
and potential for rehabilitation. This court rejected his claim and affirmed his conviction and
sentence. People v. Benford, 349 Ill. App. 3d 721, 737 (2004). The defendant’s initial pro se
postconviction petition, filed in 2006, was likewise unsuccessful.
¶5 On December 20, 2017, the defendant sought leave to file a successive pro se
postconviction petition alleging, inter alia, that his sentence violated the principles of Miller
v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). Specifically, he argued that his 40-year sentence was a
de facto life sentence which was imposed without taking into consideration his status as an
emerging adult with an intellectual disability and, as such, the sentence was unconstitutional.
¶6 On March 8, 2018, in an oral ruling from the bench, the trial court denied the defendant
leave to file his successive postconviction petition. The defendant appealed.
¶7 ANALYSIS
¶8 We note that we have jurisdiction to review this matter, as the defendant timely appealed.
Ill. S. Ct. R. 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994); R. 303 (eff. July 1, 2017).
¶9 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) allows a defendant who is imprisoned in a
penitentiary to challenge his conviction or sentence based on the denial of his constitutional
rights. 725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 2016). The Act ordinarily contemplates the filing of a single
postconviction petition (People v. Brown, 2017 IL App (1st) 150132, ¶ 35) and explicitly states
-2-
that “[a]ny claim of substantial denial of constitutional rights not raised in the original or an
amended petition is waived” (725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 2016)). This is because successive
postconviction petitions “ ‘plague the finality of criminal litigation.’ ” Brown, 2017 IL App
(1st) 150132, ¶ 36 (quoting People v. Tenner, 206 Ill. 2d 381, 392 (2002)).
¶ 10 Because successive postconviction petitions are so disfavored, a defendant must obtain
leave of court prior to filing such a petition. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2018). And a court
should only grant leave where a defendant can show either (1) cause and prejudice for failure
to raise the claim earlier or (2) a “ ‘fundamental miscarriage of justice,’ ” also known as a claim
of actual innocence. See People v. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶¶ 22-23. “Cause” is an objective
factor that impeded the defendant’s ability to raise the claim earlier (People v. Guerrero, 2012
IL 112020, ¶ 17), while “prejudice” occurs when the alleged constitutional error so infected
the entire trial that the resulting conviction or sentence violates due process (People v. Ortiz,
235 Ill. 2d 319, 329 (2009)). We review de novo a trial court’s denial of leave to file a
successive postconviction petition. People v. Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 13.
¶ 11 In the defendant’s successive postconviction petition in this case, he contends that his 40-
year sentence imposed for a crime he committed at the age of 21 violated the United States and
Illinois Constitutions. To establish cause for failure to raise this claim earlier, the defendant
points to recent case law governing the sentencing of juveniles, beginning with Miller, 567
U.S. 460. In Miller, the United States Supreme Court held that mandatory life sentences
without the possibility of parole imposed on juveniles were unconstitutional because the
sentences prevented the trial court from considering the mitigating characteristics of youth. Id.
at 476, 489. Since the Miller decision, jurisprudence regarding juvenile sentencing has
continued to evolve. Our supreme court, over the course of several cases, has held that a life
sentence, whether natural or de facto, whether mandatory or discretionary, is unconstitutional
for juveniles where the trial court did not consider the mitigating qualities of youth which were
highlighted in Miller. People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, ¶ 9; People v. Holman, 2017 IL
120655, ¶ 40.
¶ 12 But this jurisprudence related to the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution
as discussed in Miller, and its progeny, is limited to juvenile offenders. The defendant was 21
years old when he murdered Mr. Cook, therefore he does not fit within the parameters of
Miller. Instead, the only avenue open to the defendant would be cases interpreting section 11
of article I of the Illinois Constitution, also known as the proportionate penalty clause. Ill.
Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. The proportionate penalties clause is implicated when a defendant’s
sentence is cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense so as to shock the
moral conscience of the community. People v. Villalobos, 2020 IL App (1st) 171512, ¶ 67
(citing People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 487 (2005)). The proportionate penalties clause of
the Illinois Constitution provides broader protection than the eighth amendment of the United
States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VIII). People v. Clemons, 2012 IL 107821, ¶ 40. Our
supreme court has suggested that life sentences for “emerging adults” may violate the
proportionate penalties clause, although they may not violate the eighth amendment of the
United States Constitution. See People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 40 (reversing appellate
court’s holding that 18-year-old defendant’s 76-year sentence violated proportionate penalties
clause, solely on the basis that defendant failed to raise as-applied challenge to his sentence in
trial court); see also People v. Ross, 2020 IL App (1st) 171202, ¶ 20 (recognizing that law is
trending toward increased protection for young adult offenders, in addition to juveniles).
-3-
¶ 13 While these recent cases may establish “cause” for the defendant’s failure to raise the claim
that his sentence was unconstitutional in his initial postconviction proceedings in 2006, the
defendant must still demonstrate that he suffered prejudice. His claim of prejudice turns on
whether his 40-year sentence amounts to a de facto life sentence. In People v. Buffer, 2019 IL
122327, ¶ 40, our supreme court drew a line at 40 years in order for a prison term to be
considered a de facto life sentence. 1
¶ 14 The defendant argues that Buffer is ambiguous and that his 40-year prison term amounts to
a de facto life sentence. We disagree. Buffer could not be more clear. The court stated: “We
hereby conclude that a prison sentence of 40 years or less imposed on a juvenile offender does
not constitute a de facto life sentence in violation of the eighth amendment.” (Emphasis added.)
Id. ¶ 41. At exactly 40 years, the defendant’s sentence does not constitute a de facto life
sentence. See Villalobos, 2020 IL App (1st) 171512, ¶ 63 (rejecting the juvenile defendant’s
claim that his 40-year sentence amounted to a de facto life sentence under Buffer on ground
that “[t]here is no way to interpret ‘40 years or less’ as ‘40 years or more’ ”)
¶ 15 The defendant’s argument that we should include his mandatory supervised release (MSR)
term in his prison sentence likewise fails. The defendant maintains that with the addition of his
3-year MSR term, his 40-year prison sentence is effectively a 43-year sentence amounting to
de facto life imprisonment. Not so. The MSR term, while part of the sentence, is not
imprisonment. Id. ¶ 64. Accordingly, it is not included when considering whether a defendant’s
prison sentence constitutes a life sentence. Id.; see also People v. Gunn, 2020 IL App (1st)
170542, ¶ 140 (rejecting identical argument and holding that Buffer referred to prison
sentence).
¶ 16 Because the defendant did not receive a life sentence, either natural or de facto, he cannot
establish the prejudice requirement necessary to excuse his failure to raise the claim that his
sentence was unconstitutional at an earlier proceeding. 2
¶ 17 CONCLUSION
¶ 18 For the reasons stated, we affirm the circuit court of Cook County’s denial of leave to file
a successive postconviction petition.
¶ 19 Affirmed.
1
Although Buffer considered the constitutionality of life sentences for juveniles under the eighth
amendment in articulating this bright-line rule, neither party argues that the line should be drawn
differently for emerging adults under the proportionate penalties clause.
2
To the extent the defendant argues that his 40-year sentence, even if not a de facto life sentence,
nevertheless violates the proportionate penalties clause, this claim is forfeited for failure to raise it on
direct appeal. See People v. Lenoir, 2021 IL App (1st) 180269, ¶ 27 (under the Act, issues that could
have been raised on direct appeal are forfeited).
-4-