People v. Hampton

2020 IL App (1st) 171137-UNo. 1-17-1137
Order filed June 19, 2020
SIXTH DIVISION
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as
precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County.
)
v. ) No. 07 CR 4583
)
JAMES HAMPTON, ) Honorable
) Domenica A. Stephenson,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Mikva and Justice Cunningham concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirm the circuit court’s second-stage dismissal of defendant’s postconviction
petition where certain aspects of his claim could have been previously adjudicated
and those aspects that could not have been previously adjudicated did not support
a substantial showing that his guilty plea was involuntary.
¶2 Defendant James Hampton appeals from the second-stage dismissal of his petition for relief
under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2016)), arguing that
No. 1-17-1137
he made a substantial showing that his guilty plea was involuntary. For the following reasons, we
affirm.
¶3 Defendant was charged with 12 counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS
5/12-14(a)(4), (8) (West 2000)), and four counts of criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12-
13(a)(1) (West 2000)).
¶4 On September 3, 2014, the trial court held a hearing at which the State, defense counsel,
and defendant were present. At the hearing, the State and defense counsel informed the trial court
that the parties reached an “agreed disposition” for defendant to plead guilty to one count of
aggravated criminal sexual assault in exchange for a recommended sentence of 11 years’
imprisonment and dismissal of the remaining counts. The sentence would be consecutive to a
sentence defendant was already serving. Defendant acknowledged that the parties had reached an
agreement. The trial court restated the charges, the sentencing range, and the terms of the plea
bargain, and defendant stated that he understood the charges and was pleading guilty.
¶5 The trial court admonished defendant that by pleading guilty he waived his right to a jury
trial in which 12 citizens chosen by the State and the defense would decide whether the State
proved defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and that a guilty verdict must be unanimous.
Defendant stated that he read his signed jury waiver, had it explained to him, and that he
understood its meaning. The trial court next informed defendant that by pleading guilty he waived
his right to a bench trial in which a judge would decide whether the State proved him guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt. Defendant stated that he understood and that he knew he was also waiving his
rights to confronting and cross-examining witnesses against him and to presenting witnesses on
his own behalf.
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¶6 The trial court then asked defendant whether “any threats, force, or promises of any kind
aside from this plea agreement” had been directed against him in order to make him plead guilty.
Defendant responded, “Yeah.” The following colloquy occurred:
“THE COURT: Okay. Listen to the question. Ha[s] anybody threatened you or
forced you, or made you any promises of any kind aside from this plea agreement to get
you to plead guilty?
THE DEFENDANT: Not that I know of.
THE COURT: Okay. So are you pleading guilty freely and voluntarily?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.”
¶7 The State provided a factual basis. On September 5, 2000, around 12:30 a.m., S.B., who
did not know defendant, was walking alone in an alley near the 6600 block of South Union Avenue.
Defendant approached S.B., tried to engage her in conversation, and forced her into a van where
he penetrated her vagina with his penis. Later that day, S.B. went to Holy Cross Hospital and
submitted to a sexual assault kit that was given to the Chicago Police Department. Orchid Cellmark
Laboratories tested the kit and identified the DNA profile of a possible assailant. On February 7,
2007, defendant was arrested and S.B. positively identified him as the offender. Defendant
consented to a buccal swab collection, which was given to the Illinois State Police. If called, a
forensic DNA expert from the Illinois State Police would testify that defendant could not be
excluded as a contributor to the DNA profile identified from the sexual assault kit, and that the
chance of a random person having this same profile would be 1 in 93 billion black, 1 in 190 billion
white, or 1 in 10 billion Hispanic unrelated individuals. S.B. would testify that she did not consent
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to entering defendant’s van or to being sexually penetrated by him. Defense counsel stipulated to
the factual basis, and the trial court entered defendant’s guilty plea.
¶8 Defendant confirmed that he waived a presentence investigation report. During sentencing,
the following colloquy occurred:
“THEDEFENDANT:***Throughout this course of this investigation throughout
this trial process getting up to where I am right now one thing that I have, you know, pride
my whole defense was justice, you know, up in this building, and I was like I feel like put
in a situation where I know certain things that I’m pleading to are not how they should be,
but because the situation that I am put in right now, I have to do what’s best for me and my
family, so for the record, I’m only pleading for that, nothing else, and I still maintain my
innocence. That’s it, your Honor.
THE COURT: Well, all right, so you still wish to plead guilty, you’re saying that
you’re doing it?
THE DEFENDANT: Because I’m not stupid. I’m not stupid at all, and I know what
it is.
THE COURT: And you also said because that you felt that it was better for you and
your family, is that correct?
THE DEFENDANT: That’s right. Yes.
THE COURT: All right. So you still wish to plead guilty?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am.
THE COURT: All right. I’ll still accept this plea.”
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¶9 Defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which the trial court received
on October 6, 2014. 1Defendant subsequently filed an amended motion, asserting that he gave an
“untrue” response when asked if he had been threatened into pleading guilty. He explained that his
trial counsel threatened him by refusing to call a witness who could have “cast doubt on the
State[’]s DNA [e]vidence,” which caused him to accept the plea deal despite his innocence.
¶ 10 At a hearing on October 27, 2014, the court asked defendant whether he wanted to proceed
on the motion and defendant asked to speak with trial counsel. After speaking with counsel,
defendant told the trial court that he wanted to withdraw his motion because “it was just a
misunderstanding.” The trial court asked defendant if he was withdrawing his motion by his own
free will, which defendant said he was. Defendant denied being forced to withdraw the motion, or
that anyone promised him anything or threatened him.
¶ 11 On August 25, 2015, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition alleging issues with
his jury waiver, the termination of his motions to withdraw his guilty plea, ineffective assistance
of trial counsel, and the knowing and voluntary nature of his guilty plea. Defendant attached his
affidavit, in which he averred that he pleaded guilty because his attorney “manipulated” him, and
if convicted following a trial, he would “have a greater chance of serving the rest of [his] life” in
prison. On October 8, 2015, the circuit court advanced defendant’s petition to the second stage and
appointed postconviction counsel.
¶ 12 On July 26, 2016, postconviction counsel filed a supplemental petition alleging that
defendant “felt compelled” to enter the guilty plea in order to end his detention at Northern
1
The proof of service attached to the motion was notarized on September 25, 2014, but does not
specify the date the motion was mailed.
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No. 1-17-1137
Reception and Classification Center (NRC)where he suffered “intolerable” living conditions. The
petition noted that NRC is “designed for stays of less than 10 days,” but defendant was detained
there intermittently over a three-year period from November 28, 2011 to April 10, 2012; May 29,
2012 to November 20, 2013; December 11, 2013 to December 24, 2013; February 26, 2014 to
May 7, 2014;and July 16, 2014 to September 17, 2014. Counsel attached an affidavit from
defendant stating that NRC (1)deprived him of “special footwear,” pain medication, access to a
pain specialist, and physical therapy following his 2010 Achilles tendon surgery; (2) inadequately
addressed grievances about his medical condition; (3) granted him a shower and yard time once
per week; (4) did not allow him to use a walker during yard time; (5) confined him in a cell all day
and provided “insufficient” meals; (6) did not provide educational or vocational opportunities; and
(7) kept a “count light” on all night that disrupted his sleep.
¶ 13 Postconviction counsel also attached a 2014 John Howard Association report regarding
conditions at NRC, which stated the facility has cells that lack “direct natural light,” permits
inmates “five hours of yard and one shower a week,” and “struggled to meet basic needs of its
population while over capacity.” Per the report, inmates related difficulty obtaining medication,
medical treatment, and accommodations for physical disabilities, and received insufficient food
and hygiene items. Finally, counsel attached excerpts from a deposition transcript in defendant’s
federal lawsuit against Wexford Health Services, dated May 29, 2015, in which Dr. Evaristo
Aguinaldo described defendant’s medical care at NRC. According to Dr. Aguinaldo, he examined
defendant for problems with his left leg on December 29, 2012, but did not follow-up with
defendant or prescribe physical therapy because defendant’s medical chart was not provided.
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¶ 14 The State filed a motion to dismiss defendant’s petition, which the circuit court granted in
a written order on April 13, 2017. Relevant here, the circuit court stated that defendant’s allegation
that his plea was involuntary because of prison conditions was meritless because he failed to
provide a specific instance of abuse which caused him to plead guilty.
¶ 15 On appeal, defendant argues that the circuit court erred by dismissing his postconviction
petition because he made a substantial showing that his guilty plea was involuntary due to his
desire to escape the conditions at NRC.
¶ 16 The Act provides a three-stage mechanism for defendants alleging their convictions
resulted from a substantial deprivation of their constitutional rights. People v. Cotto, 2016 IL
119006, ¶ 26. During second-stage proceedings, the circuit court may appoint counsel for an
indigent defendant, who may amend the defendant’s postconviction petition as necessary. Id. ¶ 27.
All well-pleaded facts that are not positively rebutted by the record must be accepted as true.
People v. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 35. The State may file a motion to dismiss the petition,
which the circuit court grants where the petition fails to make a substantial showing of a violation
of the defendant’s constitutional rights. People v. Dupree, 2018 IL 122307, ¶ 28. Postconviction
proceedings are “limited to constitutional matters that have not been, and could not have been,
previously adjudicated.” People v. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d 177, 183 (2005). Consequently, “any
issues which could have been raised on direct appeal, but were not, are procedurally defaulted and
any issues which have previously been decided by a reviewing court are barred by the doctrine
of res judicata.” Id. We review the second-stage dismissal of a postconviction petition de novo.
People v. Johnson, 2017 IL 120310, ¶ 14.
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¶ 17 Initially, the State contends that under Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017),
defendant waived his postconviction challenge to the voluntariness of his plea because he
withdrew the motion to withdraw his plea in the trial court.
¶ 18 Rule 604(d) provides that “[n]o appeal from a judgment entered upon a plea of guilty shall
be taken,” unless, within 30 days of sentencing, the defendant files “a motion to reconsider the
sentence, if only the sentence is being challenged, or, if the plea is being challenged, a motion to
withdraw the plea of guilty and vacate the judgment.” When the motion relies on facts outside the
record, it must be supported by the defendant’s affidavit or certification. Id. The rule further states
that “[u]pon appeal any issue not raised by the defendant in the motion to reconsider the sentence
or withdraw the plea of guilty and vacate the judgment shall be deemed waived.” Id. This provision
has been described as the Rule 604(d) “waiver rule.” People v. Stewart, 123 Ill. 2d 368, 374 (1988).
¶ 19 Our supreme considered the Rule 604(d) waiver rule in the context of postconviction
proceedings in Stewart, where the defendant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to death. Id. at 371.
The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to vacate his conviction and withdraw his plea. Id.Following an unsuccessful direct appeal, the defendant filed a postconviction petition alleging that
his plea was involuntary because he had not understood the charges or his right to plead not guilty,
and his decision reflected “psychological pressure and confusion.” Id. at 371-72. The supreme
court noted the defendant omitted this argument from his postplea motion, and pursuant to Rule
604(d), “issues not preserved in a motion to vacate a guilty plea are waived.” Id. at 373-74. Because
Rule 604(d) “specifically allows for introduction of extra-record facts by affidavit,” and “[a]ny
allegations relating to the defendant’s subjective confusion or lack of understanding could have
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been supported by affidavits at the motion-to-vacate stage,” the supreme court honored the
defendant’s waiver of the issue in the postconviction proceeding. Id. at 374.
¶ 20 Subsequently, in People v. Hampton, 165 Ill. 2d 472 (1995), another defendant who
pleaded guilty was sentenced to death, did not move to withdraw his plea, and filed a direct appeal
that did not address the voluntariness of his plea. Hampton, 165 Ill. 2d at 475-77, 478. Later, the
defendant filed a postconviction petition alleging in relevant part that his plea was not knowingly
or intelligently made because the trial court did not admonish him that, if he were not sentenced
to death, he could be eligible for a mandatory life sentence. Id. at 476. The supreme court, however,
observed that the defendant’s “basis for challenging his plea,” namely, the content of the trial
court’s admonitions, appeared in the transcript of the plea hearing. Id. at 478. Moreover, the
defendant’s claim neither “rel[ied] upon newly discovered evidence or other material outside the
record,” nor identified “any reason why he could not have raised [the issue] on direct appeal.” Id.
at 478. Accordingly, the supreme court found the defendant waived the issue of postconviction
relief for review. Id. (citing Stewart, 123 Ill. 2d at 372).
¶ 21 Relying on Stewart and Hampton, the Second District in People v. Vilces, 321 Ill. App. 3d
937 (2001), held that pursuant to Rule 604(d), the defendant waived a postconviction claim that
his guilty plea was involuntary. The defendant in Vilces, unlike in Stewart, predicated his
involuntary plea allegation on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel: specifically, that
counsel provided erroneous advice about the applicable sentencing range were the defendant to be
convicted at trial. Vilces, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 939. Notwithstanding, the Second District found that
“as in Stewart, the facts that defendant needed to state his claim were entirely within his knowledge
at the time a motion to withdraw the plea should have been filed,” as the record of the plea hearing
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established that the trial court properly admonished the defendant regarding the sentencing range
and the defendant stated that he understood. Id. at 941-42. Thus, the defendant “could have raised
this claim in a motion to withdraw the plea and, if necessary, in a direct appeal,” and therefore, he
“waived consideration of it at the postconviction stage.” Id. at 942. The Second District noted,
however, that waiver would not bar a postconviction claim of involuntariness under other
circumstances, including when the claim is based on facts not available to a defendant at the time
for filing a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. Id.¶ 22 Several years later, the supreme court applied a similar analysis in Whitfield. There, the
defendant pleaded guilty, was convicted, and did not file a motion to withdraw his plea or a direct
appeal; instead, he filed a motion ultimately recharacterized as a postconviction petition. Whitfield,
217 Ill. 2d at 179-81. Therein, the defendant alleged that he was denied due process because he
pleaded guilty without knowing that his sentence would include three years’ mandatory supervised
release (MSR). Id. at 180-81. The State contended the defendant waived this claim because he “
‘was aware from the date of his guilty plea that the judge had not included an admonition regarding
the period of MSR’ and never sought to withdraw his guilty plea or directly appeal his conviction.”
Id. at 187. The supreme disagreed, finding it “incongruous” to conclude the defendant defaulted
his postconviction claim because he did not object to the trial court’s failure to admonish him,
particularly where he alleged that he did not learn of the MSR term until prison, and therefore,
“could not have raised the error in a motion to withdraw his plea or a direct appeal.” Id. at 188.
¶ 23 Our review of Stewart, Hampton, and Whitfield, as discussed above, shows that in those
cases the supreme court did not reject out-of-hand the defendants’ postconviction allegations that
their guilty pleas were involuntary when they had not complied with Rule 604(d) in the trial court.
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Nor did the court find the Rule 604(d) waiver rule per se inapplicable solely because the defendants
challenged the voluntariness of their pleas in postconviction proceedings. Instead, in each case,
the court considered whether the bases for the defendants’ allegations were known to them at the
time for filing postplea motions in the trial court. In Stewart and Hampton, the Rule 604(d) waiver
rule applied because the grounds were known to the defendants when they pleaded guilty and could
have been raised in motions to withdraw their pleas. See Stewart, 123 Ill. 2d at 374 (“[a]ny
allegations relating to the defendant’s subjective confusion or lack of understanding could have
been supported by affidavits at the motion-to-vacate stage”); Hampton, 165 Ill. 2d at 478 (the
defendant’s claim did not rely on “material outside the record”). In Whitfield, in contrast, the
grounds were not known to the defendant, could not have been raised in a motion to withdraw his
plea, and therefore, were not waived. See Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d at 188.
¶ 24 With this framework in mind, we turn to the present case. The record shows that defendant
pleaded guilty on September 3, 2014, and answered affirmatively when the court asked whether
his plea was free and voluntary. During sentencing, however, defendant stated that due to the
“situation that I am put in right now, I have to do what’s best for me and my family.” Defendant
then filed a motion to withdraw his plea, which he withdrew. Later, defendant filed a
postconviction petition and supplemental petition alleging, inter alia, that he “felt compelled” to
plead guilty in order to escape “intolerable” living conditions at NRC. According to the
supplemental petition, defendant was intermittently detained at NRC while his case was pending
in the trial court, including on the date he pleaded guilty. The supplemental petition included
defendant’s affidavit alleging various hardships, a report describing conditions at NRC, and the
deposition transcript of a doctor who examined defendant at that facility.
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¶ 25 Following Stewart, Hampton, and Whitfield, we find that defendant waived his
postconviction challenge to the voluntariness of his guilty plea to the extent he could have raised
the above bases in a motion to withdraw the plea in the trial court. Defendant knew of the
conditions at NRC outlined in his affidavit when he pleaded guilty, as he was incarcerated there
when he entered his plea and had been for some time. Further, because Rule 604(d) permits
defendants to introduce by affidavit facts outside the record, defendant could have supported a
motion to withdraw his plea with those same allegations. See Stewart, 123 Ill. 2d at 374; Hampton,
165 Ill. 2d at 478.
¶ 26 However, to the extent that defendant predicates his claim on material attached to his
postconviction petition that was not available when he pleaded guilty, we find it proper to address
his allegations on the merits. As the supreme court has explained, it would be incongruous to find
that defendant defaulted that part of his postconviction challenge to the voluntariness of his guilty
plea that is based on previously unavailable evidence, which he could not have presented in a
motion to withdraw his plea or on direct appeal. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d at 188. Specifically,
defendant has not waived his claims to the extent they are predicated on the 2014 John Howard
Association report and the deposition transcript from defendant’s federal lawsuit.
¶ 27 In so holding, we recognize that a panel of this district applied a different analysis in People
v. Miranda, 329 Ill. App. 3d 837 (2002), where, in considering whether the defendant waived her
postconviction challenge to the voluntariness of her guilty plea, the court did not distinguish
between grounds that were known to her at the time for filing a Rule 604(d) motion and grounds
that were not known.
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¶ 28 In Miranda, the defendant was found guilty and sentenced in absentia for possession of a
controlled substance with intent to deliver. Miranda, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 839. Later, she was
arrested, charged with violation of bail bond, pleaded guilty to that offense, and was sentenced
thereon. Id. She did not move to withdraw her guilty plea, and only filed a direct appeal from her
drug conviction. Id. at 839-40, 841. She then filed a postconviction petition alleging there was no
factual basis for her guilty plea for violating bail bond and that trial counsel was ineffective for
advising her to plead guilty where no factual basis existed. Id. at 840.The circuit court denied the
petition, and the defendant appealed. Id. at 840-41.
¶ 29 On review, we stated that “Rule 604(d) does not apply in post-conviction proceedings,”
and therefore, the defendant “has not waived her claims solely because she failed to file a motion
to withdraw her guilty plea.” Id. at 841. Moreover, although the defendant did not file a direct
appeal from her bail violation conviction, she could still assert a violation of her constitutional
rights as contemplated by the Act. Id. at 841-42. In reaching this conclusion, we stated that “the
doctrines of waiver and res judicata apply to appeals from the denial of post-conviction petitions
only in cases ‘where a petitioner has previously taken a direct appeal from a judgment of
conviction.’ ” Id. at 842 (quoting People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264, 274 (1992)).Further, while the
defendant “could have waived—by failure to appeal—issues of mere trial error, she is ‘still entitled
to assert those constitutional rights which the *** Act is designed to protect and preserve.’ ” Id.(quoting People v. Rose, 43 Ill. 2d 273, 279 (1969)). 2
2
As a further basis for our holding in Miranda, we found that “fundamental fairness” required
excusing any waiver that may have occurred because the record established the defendant was improperly
convicted. Miranda, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 843.
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¶ 30 In stating that a defendant who did not file a direct appeal did not waive any claims
regarding rights amenable to vindication under the Act, Miranda—unlike Whitfield, Hampton, and
Stewart—did not consider whether the underlying facts were known to the defendant when she
could have raised them in a motion to withdraw her guilty plea. Indeed, Miranda predated
Whitfield and addressed neither Stewart nor Hampton. The cases on which Miranda relied also did
not recognize this distinction. See id. at 841 (citing People v. Stein, 255 Ill. App. 3d 847, 848
(1993), People v. Brumas, 142 Ill. App. 3d 178, 180 (1986), and People v. Parker, 57 Ill. App. 3d
697, 700-01 (1978)).
¶ 31 In the present case, we find it more appropriate to apply the approach utilized in Whitfield,
Hampton, and Stewart. That is, generally “it is not necessary for a defendant to have moved to
withdraw his guilty plea if he wishes to raise voluntariness issues in a postconviction proceeding,”
but only “in cases where the facts forming the basis for the claim were not available at the time
defendant should have moved to withdraw the plea.” Vilces, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 943. “[T]he
opposite rule” applies, however, “with respect to those cases in which defendant could have raised
the claim in a motion to withdraw the plea.” Id. at 943 (citing Hampton, 165 Ill. 2d at 478 and
Stewart, 123 Ill. 2d at 373-74).
¶ 32 Here, as we have explained, certain bases for defendant’s assertion that his guilty plea was
involuntary were known to him when he could have filed a motion to withdraw his plea and others
were not. The former grounds, but not the latter, are waived. Therefore, we turn to the merits of
those grounds that are properly before us on appeal.
¶ 33 In particular, defendant’s supplemental postconviction petition included a 2014 John
Howard Association report that described conditions at NRC, including cells that lack natural light,
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limited yard and shower time, and overcrowding. According to the report, inmates received
insufficient food and reported difficulty obtaining medication, medical treatment, and
accommodations for physical disabilities. The petition also included excerpts from the May 29,
2015 deposition of Dr. Aguinaldo, who examined defendant at NRC on December 29, 2012.
According to Dr. Aguinaldo, he did not prescribe physical therapy because defendant’s medical
chart was not provided.
¶ 34 Based on these materials, we find that defendant has failed to make a substantial showing
of a violation of a constitutional right. “When a defendant claims that he only pleaded guilty due
to prison conditions, it does not necessarily follow that his plea was involuntary.” People v. Urr,
321 Ill.App.3d 544, 547 (2001) (citing People v. St. Pierre, 146 Ill.2d 494, 507 (1992)). Rather, a
“[d]efendant must allege a specific instance of abuse, which caused him to plead guilty, and he
must sufficiently establish a nexus between the alleged violence and his guilty plea.” Id.¶ 35 In St. Pierre, the trial court entered the defendant’s guilty plea after defense counsel said
that defendant was pleading guilty due to the gangs, homosexuality, drugs, and weapons prevalent
in the jail in which he was housed. St. Pierre, 146 Ill.2d at 502. The defendant filed a direct appeal,
arguing in relevant part that his plea was involuntary based on the dangerous conditions at the jail.
Id. at 499. The supreme court disagreed, noting that the defendant stated in the trial court that “the
main reason” he pleaded guilty was that he committed the crime, and his “personal discomfort” at
the time of his plea did not invalidate it without him alleging any specific physical, mental, or
coercive abuse which caused him to plead guilty. Id. at 508.
¶ 36 In contrast, specific instances of abuse were found in Urr, where the defendant claimed
prison violence as the basis for his involuntary plea throughout the proceedings, including plea
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admonishment. Urr, 321 Ill.App.3d at 548. On direct appeal from the trial court’s denial of the
defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, we reasoned that because the defendant “alleged
specific acts of violence in claiming he was sexually assaulted, urine was thrown at him, and his
life was threatened,” and “he specifically told the court that these incidences were the reason he
was pleading guilty,” he “established the nexus required” between the poor conditions and his
plea. Id.¶ 37 In this case, the report and doctor’s affidavit attached to defendant’s supplemental
postconviction petition neither identified specific instances of abuse that caused defendant to plead
guilty nor established the requisite nexus between such instances and his plea. The report echoes
certain allegations about the conditions at NRC that defendant made in his own affidavit, but as
we have explained, those conditions were known to defendant when he had the opportunity to file
a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and at that juncture, he did not bring to the trial court’s
attention that any of those circumstances were the reason he pleaded guilty. Dr. Aguinaldo averred
that he examined defendant’s left leg and did not prescribe physical therapy because he did not
have defendant’s medical chart. These circumstances do not establish a nexus with the guilty plea
that defendant entered nearly two years after Dr. Aguinaldo examined him, and therefore, do not
support a substantial showing that defendant pleaded guilty involuntarily.
¶ 38 Because the materials from defendant’s supplemental postconviction petition that are
properly before us do not support a substantial showing of a constitutional violation, we find the
circuit court properly dismissed the petition. Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the
judgment of the circuit court.
¶ 39 Affirmed.
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