In re J.S.

2020 IL App (1st) 200355-UFIRST DIVISION
August 10, 2020
No. 1-20-0355
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent
by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
In re J.S., a Minor, )
) Appeal from the
(THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Circuit Court of
) Cook County
Petitioner-Appellee, )
) No. 19 JA 515
v. )
) The Honorable
C.S., ) Demetrios G. Kottaras,
) Judge Presiding.
Respondent-Appellant). )
JUSTICE PIERCE delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Griffin and Justice Hyman concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. The circuit court did not err by finding
that respondent abused and neglected her minor son, and the circuit court’s order
terminating respondent’s parental rights was not against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
¶2 Respondent, C.S., appeals from orders of the juvenile court finding that she abused and
neglected J.S., her minor son, and declaring J.S. a ward of the court. Respondent challenges the
circuit court’s adjudication and dispositional orders. For the following reasons, we affirm.
No. 1-20-0355
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 Respondent is the mother of J.S., a minor born in May 2019. On May 20, 2019, the State
filed a petition for adjudication of wardship for J.S. alleging that J.S. was abused or neglected. The
petition contained the following allegations. Respondent had “one prior indicated report for
substantial risk of injury/environment injurious to health and welfare by neglect.” One of
respondent’s other minor children, A.S., was in DCFS custody with findings of neglect and abuse
having been entered and reunification services remained outstanding. Respondent had been
diagnosed with “adjustment disorder with depressed mood, passive and dependent personality
features and borderline intellectual functioning.” On May 20 and May 22, 2019, the circuit court
found that it was necessary to remove J.S. from respondent’s home, entered temporary orders of
custody of J.S. in favor of DCFS, and appointed a guardian ad litem for J.S.
¶5 The matter proceeded to an adjudicatory hearing. The parties stipulated to all of the
following testimony and documentary evidence, much of which relates to events prior to J.S.’s
birth. According to a 2015 psychological evaluation, respondent was born prematurely in 1993.
Her father used drugs and alcohol and he would verbally and physically abuse respondent’s mother
while intoxicated. Respondent’s mother died in 2009. After respondent’s mother’s death,
respondent’s father was verbally and physically abusive toward respondent. Respondent then went
to live with a maternal aunt. Respondent graduated from high school in 2012 and had been
involved special education services since the fifth grade due to a learning disability. Respondent
moved out of her aunt’s home but struggled to maintain stable housing. She moved in with her
boyfriend, J.T., while pregnant with J.S.’s older brother, A.S., but respondent moved out when
A.S. was born. She did not know the identity of A.S.’s father. Respondent and A.S. moved in with
one of respondent’s father’s friends, Allen C., and Allen C.’s “paramour [Cheryl S.] at the
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No. 1-20-0355
recommendation of [respondent’s] father when she had nowhere else to live.” Respondent and
Allen C. had a sexual relationship. A.S. was removed from respondent’s custody in November
2014 after respondent left A.S. in the custody of Allen C. and Cheryl S., despite being aware that
the two had a history of domestic violence, mental illness, and substance abuse. In May 2015, an
adjudication of neglect/injurious environment was entered against respondent, who was
subsequently found to be unable to parent A.S. in August 2015. Respondent was found to have an
IQ of 71 and a limited ability to apply critical thinking or abstract though to solve problems. A
March 2017 parenting capacity evaluation found that respondent believed that a normal body
temperature was between 50℉ and 60℉, and that a body temperature of 98℉ would require a
child to be taken to an emergency room. The psychologist concluded that respondent “has
significant cognitive deficits that impact her ability to independently parent,” and that her
impairments “negatively impact her ability to gain insight and use good judgment.” Despite having
completed domestic violence classes, respondent lacked insight into the concepts taught during
those classes. And despite having completed several reunification services regarding A.S., A.S.
remained at risk if returned to respondent’s care due to her cognitive deficits, poor knowledge of
child development, history of domestic violence, continued housing instability, and lack of a
support system.
¶6 The stipulated evidence showed that J.S. was born in May 2019. Hospital records reflect
that Allen C. was listed as respondent’s next of kin and respondent’s father was identified as her
“support person.” Hospital staff were told that respondent’s father would be caring for respondent
and J.S. upon discharge. Respondent had not received sufficient prenatal care, and hospital staff
found her to be an unreliable historian of her living circumstances. A consultation with child
protective services was ordered.
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¶7 The parties stipulated that DCFS investigator Yvette Booze would testify that she had an
in-person conversation with respondent in May 2019. Respondent had a prior indicated report for
substantial risk of physical injury, environment injurious to health and welfare by neglect for A.S.,
who was in DCFS custody with a permanency goal of substitute care pending termination of
respondent’s parental rights. Booze would also testify that respondent disclosed that she had a
psychological evaluation in October 2015 and had a diagnosis of adjustment disorder with
depressed mood but was not taking any medications.
¶8 The parties stipulated that Sara Jacobs, a caseworker for Lydia Home Association assigned
to respondent’s cases, would testify that respondent’s other minor child, A.S., was in DCFS care
at the time of J.S.’s birth, and that respondent was still in need of individual therapy and domestic
violence services at the time of J.S.’s birth.
¶9 The parties further stipulated that Malva Waters, a supervisor at Lydia Home Association
assigned to respondent’s cases since 2017, would testify that respondent had five hours of
unsupervised day visits with A.S. until May 2017 when A.S.’s goals were changed from
reunification to the termination of respondent’s parental rights. Numerous documents were
admitted into evidence by stipulation.
¶ 10 On January 22, 2020, after considering the stipulated evidence and hearing argument from
counsel, the circuit court entered a finding of neglect/injurious environment against respondent.
The circuit court’s written order reflects that J.S. was abused or neglected under section 2-3 of the
Juvenile Court Act (Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-3 (West 2018)) due to an injurious environment (id.
§ 2-3(1)(b)) because respondent was still in need of individual therapy and domestic violence
services at the time of J.S.’s birth, and because of DCFS’s “concerns regarding [respondent’s]
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No. 1-20-0355
judgment,” which were echoed by the Cook County Juvenile Court Clinic and in respondent’s
psychological exams.
¶ 11 The matter proceeded to a dispositional hearing the same day. The parties stipulated to a
June 2019 integrated assessment (IA), which was entered into evidence. The IA reflects the
following. Respondent was living with a female roommate in Berwyn and had been living there
for a year. Respondent had recently obtained a job at a restaurant. Respondent’s cognitive abilities
affected her decision making and judgment and there was a moderate risk of errors in her decision
making. Respondent did not receive sufficient prenatal care during her pregnancy with J.S. J.S.’s
putative father, Jesse S., ended his relationship with respondent during the pregnancy because he
did not want to be involved with DCFS or to complete a background check. Respondent appeared
to be unable to effectively engage with providers to improve her parenting skills and needed time
to focus on her own individual therapy and recovery from domestic abuse. The IA cited a previous
parenting capacity assessment reflecting that, while respondent had completed services in 2017,
her cognitive limitations prevented her from fully internalizing the information and guidance she
had been provided. The IA recommended that respondent obtain trauma-based therapy and a
psychiatric evaluation. The prognosis for J.S.’s return home with respondent was poor.
¶ 12 The State called Malva Waters, the caseworker assigned to respondent’s case, as a witness
and she gave the following testimony. Respondent was in need of individual therapy, a psychiatric
evaluation, parenting classes, and domestic violence classes. Respondent had not yet been referred
for individual therapy because respondent had obtained her own therapist, whom Waters had not
been able to reach to determine any treatment goals or whether the therapist was appropriate in
regard to DCFS’s requirements. Waters, therefore, had not been able to provide the therapist with
supporting documentation for respondent. Respondent had not yet been referred for a psychiatric
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No. 1-20-0355
evaluation, to parenting classes, or for domestic violence services, but those referrals were
expected to happen within 30 days of the hearing. The domestic violence services were
recommended because respondent was arrested in August 2018 for “another domestic violence
issue.” There were concerns about the people with whom respondent associated, particularly Allen
C., due to his history of domestic violence issues. Respondent had weekly supervised visits with
J.S. that lasted two hours each and there were no concerns about those visits. J.S. was doing “very
well” in his placement home, there were no concerns about his current placement, and he was not
in need of any services. The agency had not had any contact with J.S.’s putative father, Jessie R.,
despite a diligent search. It was the agency’s belief that it was in J.S.’s best interests to be made a
ward of the court in order to give respondent time to engage with and make substantial progress in
the recommended services. Respondent was living with a roommate and there were no concerns
about J.S. visiting respondent’s home. There were agency plans to increase respondent’s visitation
with J.S. It was a “big step” for respondent to maintain stable housing and consistent, stable
employment.
¶ 13 After hearing argument from counsel and considering facts in the documentary record, the
circuit court found that respondent was unable to parent J.S., ordered that J.S. be made a ward of
the court, and appointed a guardian. There was no involvement from J.S.’s father or any
appearance filed on his behalf, and therefore Jessie R. was unable, unwilling, and unfit to be J.S.’s
parent. Respondent filed a timely notice of appeal from the circuit court’s January 22, 2020,
adjudication and disposition orders.
¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 15 On appeal, respondent argues that the circuit court’s adjudication and disposition orders
are against the manifest weight of the evidence. The State and J.S. address the merits of
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No. 1-20-0355
respondent’s arguments and argue that the circuit court’s adjudication order is subject to de novo
review because the parties stipulated to all of the evidence presented at the adjudication hearing.
Respondent has not filed a reply brief and thus has not responded to the argument regarding our
standard of review of the circuit court’s adjudication order.
¶ 16 “[C]ases involving allegations of neglect and adjudication of wardship are sui generis, and
must be decided on the basis of their unique circumstances.” In re Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d 441, 463
(2004). The State bears the burden of proving allegations of neglect by a preponderance of the
evidence, meaning that the allegations of neglect are more probably true than not. In re A.P., 2012
IL 113875, ¶ 17. Ordinarily, we review a circuit court’s adjudication order under the manifest
weight of the evidence standard. Id. However, here we agree with the State and J.S. that our review
of the circuit court’s adjudication order is de novo because the adjudicatory finding was based on
a stipulated record, the circuit court did not make any discretionary decisions regarding the
admissibility of any of the evidence, and the circuit court did not assess the credibility of any of
the witnesses’ testimony. See In re Zion M., 2015 IL App (1st) 151119, ¶ 28 (finding that de novo
review is the proper standard of review of a judgment based on a stipulated record because “the
trial court was not in a better position than the reviewing court to assess credibility or weigh the
evidence.”).
¶ 17 Section 2-3(1)(b) of the Act provides that neglected persons include “any minor under 18
years of age *** whose environment is injurious to his or her welfare.” 705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b)
(West 2018). In In re A.P., our supreme court stated
“Generally, neglect is defined as the failure to exercise the care that circumstances
justly demand. [Citations.] This does not mean, however, that the term neglect is
limited to a narrow definition. [Citation.] As this court has long held, neglect
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No. 1-20-0355
encompasses [willful] as well as unintentional disregard of duty. It is not a term of
fixed and measured meaning. It takes its content always from specific
circumstances, and its meaning varies as the context of surrounding circumstances
changes. [Citations.] Similarly, the term injurious environment has been recognized
by our courts as an amorphous concept that cannot be defined with particularity.
[Citation.] Generally, however, the term injurious environment has been interpreted
to include the breach of a parent’s duty to ensure a safe and nurturing shelter for his
or her children. [Citations.]” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re A.P., 2012
IL 113875, ¶ 22.
¶ 18 We find that the circuit court did not err in finding that the State proved by a preponderance
of the evidence that J.S. was abused or neglected by exposure to an injurious environment under a
theory of anticipatory neglect. “The theory of anticipatory neglect flows from the concept of an
‘injurious environment’ which is set forth in the Act.” In re Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d at 468. The
theory of anticipatory neglect protects children who have a probability of being neglected or
abused due to living with someone who has already been found to have neglected or abused another
child. In re Chelsea H., 2016 IL App (1st) 150560, ¶ 84; In re Kamesha J., 364 Ill. App. 3d 785,
793 (2006). A previous finding of neglect or abuse against one child is not conclusive of neglect
or abuse against another child, but such a finding is admissible and relevant (In re Chelsea H.,
2016 IL App (1st) 150560, ¶ 84; In re Kamesha J., 364 Ill. App. 3d at 793), and should be
considered along with the care and condition of the child in question (In re Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d
at 468).
¶ 19 Here, the record reflects that respondent failed to make reasonable progress toward
reunification with J.S.’s sibling, A.S., in the years that respondent was receiving services, and she
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No. 1-20-0355
failed to achieve reunification with A.S. There were concerns—both during her reunification
efforts with A.S. and prior to the adjudicatory hearing at issue here—that respondent had not
internalized the information she was provided in her parenting classes. When the circuit court
previously terminated respondent’s parental rights for A.S., the circuit court expressly found that
respondent had not been able to effectively apply the skills she learned from her services and that
she exercised poor decision making. The stipulated evidence in the record shows that she might
struggle to recognize situations in which her decisions might put a child at risk. Here, at the time
of J.S.’s birth, respondent listed Allen C. as her next of kin, despite the fact that A.S. was removed
from respondent’s care after respondent left A.S. with Allen C., who had a history of domestic
violence and substance abuse. Respondent also listed her father as the person who would be caring
for respondent and J.S. upon discharge from the hospital, despite her father’s history of domestic
violence and substance abuse. In other words, at the time of J.S.’s birth, respondent demonstrated
that she was relying on the same support system that had caused her to lose custody of A.S.
Respondent’s cognitive deficiencies, poor decision-making skills, and a current lack of a personal
support system were documented in the record. These facts, combined with respondent’s current
need for individual therapy and domestic violence services, support a finding that J.S. was born
into an injurious environment under a theory of anticipatory neglect. Simply put, respondent was
in virtually the same position she was in when her parental rights for A.S. were terminated and
evidence in the record established that respondent had not adequately internalized the lessons of
the services she received in connection with A.S.
¶ 20 Respondent relies on the following evidence in the record to support her argument that the
circuit court’s adjudication order is erroneous. She was able to have five-hour unsupervised visits
with A.S. until 2017 when A.S.’s goals were changed, and that during those visits she was
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No. 1-20-0355
attentive, showed affection, and tended to A.S.’s needs. A Cook County Juvenile Court Clinic
report from March 2017 reflected that respondent’s mental health was stable, she had organized
thought processes, and she could maintain attention throughout a long interview. While she was
found to have below average intelligence, respondent was able to provide detailed personal and
family history, had graduated from high school, and had secured a variety of jobs. A 2015
psychiatric evaluation found that she did not meet the criteria for mental illness, and respondent
argues that there was no evidence that she had any psychiatric disorder that would prevent her
from parenting J.S. There were favorable reports from 32 parenting coaching sessions she
completed in 2016 reflecting that respondent took appropriate corrective actions with J.S.’s sibling,
A.S., and that she kept her composure while helping him learn from mistakes. She displayed
affection and verbal praise, maintained focus and patience, and was able to “handle the complete
spectrum of behavior and emotion” displayed by A.S. She also relies on evidence showing that her
adaptive functioning was stronger than her cognitive functioning, and her conceptual and practical
skills were average. She contends that the State failed to establish anticipatory neglect because
there was no showing that she had not learned from her previous mistake of leaving her child with
an inappropriate caretaker, and there was no showing that the same or similar conduct might occur.
¶ 21 We find that, on balance, the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence that J.S. was
subjected to an injurious environment at the time of his birth under a theory of anticipatory neglect
because the allegations of neglect are more probably true than not. Respondent previously failed
to make reasonable progress toward reunification with A.S. and continued to represent that her
support system consisted of the people who directly contributed to A.S. being removed from
respondent’s care. While respondent’s living and employment situations had improved, she was
still in need of the same services she was required to receive when A.S. was removed from her
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No. 1-20-0355
care. In our view, the progress that she may have made in the years between the termination of her
parental rights of A.S. and the birth of J.S. do not overcome the continued risks that J.S. might, if
left in respondent’s care, be neglected or abused in the same manner that A.S. was. Therefore, we
affirm the circuit court’s judgment finding that respondent abused or neglected J.S. through an
injurious environment.
¶ 22 Next, respondent argues that the circuit court’s termination of her parental rights was
against the manifest weight of the evidence. We review a circuit court’s judgment following a
dispositional hearing under the manifest weight of the evidence standard. In re Brandon L., 2015
IL App (1st) 150779, ¶ 89. “A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the
opposite conclusion is clearly evident.” In re A.P., 2012 IL 113875, ¶ 17.
¶ 23 Respondent argues that while further services might have been beneficial, the State did not
establish that any services were necessary in order for her to be an able parent. She relies on
Waters’s testimony that respondent had obtained her own therapist to argue that the State failed to
prove “that [respondent] was not was successfully engaging in individual therapy, whether she had
progressed with respect to the goals, and whether it was even still needed for [respondent] to be
able to parent.” She further contends that Waters had not timely referred respondent for a
psychiatric evaluation and offered no explanation as to why respondent had not been referred
earlier, which “ensured that there would be a non-completed service task at the time of the
dispositional hearing ***.” Furthermore, respondent had not been able to participate in parenting
classes because the next available class with the chosen provider would not begin until February
2020—after the dispositional hearing—and respondent had indicated a willingness to take the
classes with a different provider. She also argues that visitations with J.S. were going well, there
were plans to increase the visits in her home, and she was steadily employed. J.S.’s response to
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No. 1-20-0355
respondent’s arguments in part acknowledges that it appears that referrals were not made as
quickly as they could have been, but he relies on In re Marianna F.-M., 2015 IL App (1st) 142897to argue that “the fact that [respondent] was not engaged in necessary services meant that she was
unable to parent,” as services had been recommended but not started.
¶ 24 In In re Marianna F.-M., 2015 IL App (1st) 142897, ¶¶ 36-37, we reversed a circuit court’s
dispositional finding that a father was fit and able to parent his minor child. The circuit court had
found that the minor’s father had abused and neglected the minor due to a lack of care, substantial
risk of injury or physical injury, and excessive corporal punishment (id. ¶ 9), but concluded that it
was in the minor’s best interest to be returned to her father’s care because the father “underst[ood]
the inappropriateness of what happened in the home and that he will be able to provide at this point
a safe and stable home with the assistance and help of the services that have been ordered” (id.
¶ 29). We found in part that the circuit court’s judgment was against the manifest weight of the
evidence because the father had not actually completed the services that were recommended in the
integrated assessment considered at the dispositional hearing. Id. ¶ 36. It was of no moment that
his failure to complete those services were through no fault of his own because that “[did] not
negate that these services were recommended in order to ensure that [the father] could safely
reunify with [the minor].” Id.; see also In re M.W., 386 Ill. App. 3d 186, 199 (2008) (finding that
a failure to make sufficient progress on recommended services prior to reunification is a basis for
finding a parent unfit and unable to parent a minor).
¶ 25 Here, we find that the circuit court’s decision to make J.S. a ward of the court is not against
the manifest weight of the evidence. Waters testified that she had the opportunity to assess
respondent for services and found that she needed individual therapy, a psychiatric evaluation,
parenting classes, and domestic violence classes. Waters had not been able to verify that the
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No. 1-20-0355
therapist respondent obtained on her own was sufficient. A referral for a psychiatric evaluation at
a hospital chosen by respondent was going to made within 30 days of the dispositional hearing.
The circuit court concluded that respondent abused or neglected J.S. due to an injurious
environment and respondent was still in need of individual therapy and domestic violence services
at the time of J.S.’s birth. Regardless of whether respondent was referred to services as quickly as
possible, it is undisputed that individual therapy, a psychiatric evaluation, parenting classes, and
domestic violence classes were all recommended, and there was no showing that respondent had
made substantial progress—or any progress at all—toward completing those services at the time
of the dispositional hearing. These facts support the circuit court’s conclusion that, at the time of
the dispositional hearing, respondent was not able to parent J.S. The circuit court’s judgment was
not against the manifest weight of the evidence, and we therefore affirm the circuit court’s
dispositional order.
¶ 26 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 27 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed
¶ 28 Affirmed.
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