In re L.P.

NOTICE FILED
This Order was filed under 2021 IL App (4th) 210025-U May 27, 2021
Supreme Court Rule 23 and Carla Bender
is not precedent except in the NO. 4-21-0025 4th District Appellate
limited circumstances Court, IL
allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
In re L.P., a Minor ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
(The People of the State of Illinois, ) McLean County
Petitioner-Appellee, ) No. 19JA35
v. )
Alexis Y., ) Honorable
Respondent-Appellant). ) J. Brian Goldrick,
) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices DeArmond and Steigmann concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, finding the trial court’s best-interest determination
was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶2 Respondent, Alexis Y., appeals from the trial court’s December 16, 2020, order
terminating her parental rights to her minor child, L.P. (born April 23, 2019), arguing the court
erred in finding termination to be in L.P.’s best interest. We affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On April 26, 2019, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship of L.P.
due to multiple police reports of domestic violence committed during respondent’s pregnancy by
L.P.’s father, Fernando P. The State alleged, in relevant part, L.P. was neglected pursuant to
section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-
3(1)(b) (West 2018)) because respondent’s unresolved issues relating to domestic violence
created an environment injurious to L.P.’s welfare. Respondent admitted the allegation, and the
trial court entered an adjudicatory order finding L.P. was neglected. On August 27, 2019, the
court entered a dispositional order finding respondent unfit to care for L.P., making L.P. a ward
of the court, and placing custody and guardianship of the minor with the Department of Children
and Family Services.
¶5 On September 30, 2020, the State filed an amended petition to terminate
respondent’s parental rights. The State alleged, in relevant part, respondent was an unfit person
within the meaning of section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West
2018)) because she failed to make reasonable progress toward L.P.’s return during any
nine-month period—specifically, December 19, 2019, through September 19, 2020—following
the adjudication of neglect. Respondent admitted the allegation, and a best-interest hearing was
scheduled.
¶6 On December 16, 2020, the trial court conducted a best-interest hearing. The
court took judicial notice of the entire case record, including two best-interest reports, and heard
the testimony of Paula Coleman, Taylor McDonald, and respondent.
¶7 The best-interest reports indicated L.P. was placed with Paula Coleman, L.P.’s
foster mother and maternal grandmother, on April 25, 2019, two days after her birth. According
to the reports, L.P. was “thriving in her foster home placement” because it “provided her with a
safe environment and unconditional love” that allowed her “to feel safe, secure[,] and happy.”
The placement also allowed L.P. to live with her three older brothers. Due to respondent’s
“ongoing domestic violence” issues—which included Fernando P. “repeatedly punching [her] in
the nose” for declining his attempts “to initiate sexual contact” on September 18, 2020—the
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reports recommended her parental rights to L.P. be terminated and the permanency goal changed
from “return home” to adoption by Coleman.
¶8 Paula Coleman testified L.P. was placed in her care two days after L.P.’s birth and
has remained in her care for the duration of the case. Coleman testified she is also the guardian
of L.P.’s three older brothers and all four siblings live with her. According to Coleman, L.P.
“really loves her three older brothers. They’re very close.” Coleman testified she and L.P. have a
strong bond and she wishes to adopt L.P. if L.P. cannot be returned to respondent’s care.
¶9 Taylor McDonald testified she is a caseworker with The Baby Fold and was
assigned to L.P.’s case. McDonald testified respondent consistently attended her visits with L.P.
and the visits were “positive.” McDonald also stated respondent’s domestic violence counselor
informed her that respondent “was going to be discharged soon[,]” although McDonald did not
know the exact date of the expected discharge. However, on cross-examination, McDonald
testified that “even though [respondent] is close to completing her domestic violence treatment, I
don’t know that we can say that she’s implemented the skills that she has learned in the course
because of her *** continued police reports for domestic violence throughout the case.”
McDonald noted it was “very hard to say” respondent and Fernando P. were not together because
“historically they have been dishonest about their contact and relationship.” She further testified
that, even if respondent’s parental rights were preserved, it could take a year or longer to return
L.P. to respondent’s care.
¶ 10 Respondent testified her final domestic violence class was scheduled for later that
day. She indicated she planned to continue meeting with her domestic violence counselor once
she completed the class to “continue to learn and just stay on the right track.” Respondent further
testified she no longer had a relationship with Fernando P. and had no intentions of continuing a
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relationship with him in the future. On cross-examination, respondent acknowledged L.P. was
removed from her care due to domestic violence during her pregnancy, and she acknowledged
that Fernando P. hit her on September 18, 2020, while she was twenty weeks pregnant with her
fifth child. Respondent also admitted she previously lied on multiple occasions about her
relationship with Fernando P.
¶ 11 Following presentation of the evidence, the trial court determined it was in L.P.’s
best interest to terminate respondent’s parental rights and entered an order terminating parental
rights.
¶ 12 This appeal followed.
¶ 13 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 14 Respondent argues the trial court erred in determining termination of her parental
rights was in L.P.’s best interest. We will not reverse a best-interest determination absent a
finding it was against the manifest weight of the evidence, which occurs “only if the facts clearly
demonstrate that the court should have reached the opposite result.” In re Jay H., 395 Ill. App. 3d
1063, 1071, 918 N.E.2d 284, 291 (2009).
¶ 15 Section 2-29 of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-29 (West 2018))
“delineates a two-step process in seeking termination of parental rights involuntarily.” In re J.L.,
236 Ill. 2d 329, 337, 924 N.E.2d 961, 966 (2010). Relevant to the instant appeal is the second
step—i.e., the best-interest stage—at which the trial court must determine whether the State has
proven by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of the respondent’s parental rights is
in the minor’s best interest. 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2018). At the best-interest stage, the
focus shifts from the parent to the child, and the issue is “whether, in light of the child’s needs,
parental rights should be terminated.” (Emphasis omitted.) In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 364, 818
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N.E.2d 1214, 1227 (2004). Thus, “the parent’s interest in maintaining the parent-child
relationship must yield to the child’s interest in a stable, loving home life.” Id.¶ 16 Section 1-3 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West
2018)) lists the best-interest factors for the court to consider, in the context of the minor’s age
and developmental needs, when making its best-interest determination: (1) the child’s physical
safety and welfare; (2) the development of the child’s identity; (3) the child’s background and
ties; (4) the child’s sense of attachments; (5) the child’s wishes and long-term goals; (6) the
child’s community ties; (7) the child’s need for permanence; (8) the uniqueness of every family
and child; (9) the risks associated with substitute care; and (10) the preferences of the persons
available to care for the child.
¶ 17 Here, the facts do not demonstrate termination of respondent’s parental rights was
not in L.P.’s best interest. Paula Coleman, L.P.’s foster mother and maternal grandmother,
testified L.P. was placed in her care on April 25, 2019, two days after her birth, and has remained
in her care for the duration of the case. Coleman is also the guardian of L.P.’s three older
brothers, and all four siblings live in the same home. According to Coleman, L.P. “really loves
her three older brothers. They’re very close.” The best-interest reports indicated L.P. was
“thriving in her foster home placement” because the placement “provided her with a safe
environment and unconditional love”; further, “a very strong attachment” between L.P. and
Coleman was “very evident throughout their interactions.” Coleman also testified she would be
willing to adopt L.P. and would allow her to maintain a relationship with respondent.
¶ 18 On the other hand, while respondent’s visits with L.P. reportedly went well and
she had recently been making progress in her domestic violence classes, there remained concerns
about her relationship with Fernando P. and the potential threat it posed to L.P.’s safety. As
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recently as September 18, 2020, respondent—who was twenty weeks pregnant with her fifth
child at the time—was “repeatedly punch[ed] *** in the nose” by Fernando P. for declining his
attempts “to initiate sexual contact.” Although respondent testified she no longer had contact
with Fernando P., she also admitted she had lied about her relationship with him in the past.
Moreover, McDonald, the caseworker assigned to L.P.’s case, indicated that even if respondent’s
parental rights were preserved, it could still take a year or longer to return L.P. to her care.
¶ 19 Based on these facts, and considering L.P.’s need for permanence and a safe and
loving environment, we cannot say the trial court’s best-interest determination was against the
manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 20 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 21 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 22 Affirmed.
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