In re Marriage of Soman

2023 IL App (1st) 220548-UNo. 1-22-0548
Third Division
September 27, 2023
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
)
In re MARRIAGE OF )
) Appeal from the Circuit Court
PAMELA SOMAN, ) of Cook County.
)
Petitioner-Appellee, ) No. 11 D 006535
)
and ) The Honorable
) Robert Johnson,
ANDREW CWIK, ) Judge Presiding.
)
Respondent-Appellant. )
)
______________________________________________________________________________
PRESIDING JUSTICE REYES delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices D.B. Walker and R. Van Tine concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The circuit court’s judgment is affirmed in its entirety where (1) the circuit court
did not abuse its discretion in denying respondent’s motion for leave to file a fifth
petition to enroll foreign judgment, (2) the circuit court properly awarded petitioner
attorney fees as a sanction for respondent’s conduct, and (3) the circuit court’s
contempt finding against respondent was not against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
¶2 Petitioner Pamela Soman (Pamela) and respondent Andrew Cwik (Andrew) were married
for approximately 13 years before divorcing in 2009, while they were living in Ohio; after the
No. 1-22-0548
dissolution of their marriage, both parties moved to Chicago. 1 Over the course of the last
decade, Andrew has made several attempts to enroll the Ohio divorce judgment in Illinois, in
order to modify his child support obligation, but his attempts have all been denied. The instant
appeal arises from the denial of Andrew’s motion for leave to file a fifth petition to enroll the
foreign judgment. In addition, as a result of Andrew’s filings, the circuit court ultimately held
Andrew in indirect civil contempt and awarded Pamela attorney fees in the matter. In this pro
se appeal, Andrew appeals both the denial of his motion and the contempt finding. For the
reasons set forth below, we affirm.
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 The litigation surrounding the dissolution of the parties’ marriage involves numerous court
proceedings both in Illinois and in Ohio which span over a decade, and has been before this
court twice, in 2013 and in 2021. 2 See In re Marriage of Cwik, 2013 IL App (1st) 121123-U;
In re Marriage of Soman, 2021 IL App (1st) 200513-U. Accordingly, we relate only the facts
necessary to an understanding of the issues on appeal, taking our facts from our prior decisions
where appropriate.
¶5 Pamela and Andrew were married in 1996 and had two children, born in 2002 and 2003.
In October 2009, the court of common pleas in Hamilton County, Ohio (the Ohio court),
entered a divorce decree, naming Pamela the “residential parent and legal custodian” of the
children and permitting Andrew supervised visitation of the children. In November 2009,
Pamela filed a motion to relocate to Chicago, which the Ohio court granted in early 2010. The
1
While the litigation in Illinois was initiated by a petition filed by Andrew, we refer to the parties
in the same capacity as in the underlying Ohio divorce proceedings, namely, with Pamela as the petitioner
and Andrew as the respondent.
2
We note that the case has been before us in a more indirect fashion, as well, as Andrew filed a
legal malpractice action against one of his former attorneys. See Cwik v. Law Offices of Jonathan Merel,
P.C., 2017 IL App (1st) 153143-U.
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order permitting relocation also modified the visitation schedule, but provided that if Andrew
relocated to Chicago, the visitation schedule would return to the one provided in the divorce
decree. Pamela and the children moved to Chicago in August 2010.
¶6 In addition to the domestic relations case, Andrew was a defendant in a civil proceeding
initiated in the Ohio court by Pamela’s fiancé in July 2010. In August and December 2010,
two judges in that case entered orders finding Andrew to be a “vexatious litigator,” and Andrew
was enjoined from any further filings without leave of court. Additionally, in October 2010,
the judge in the dissolution proceeding entered an order enjoining Andrew from filing any
litigation against either Pamela or her fiancé without leave of court.
¶7 On June 2, 2011, Pamela filed a motion to modify parenting time in the Ohio court. While
Pamela’s motion was pending before the Ohio court, on June 28, 2011, Andrew filed two
petitions in the circuit court of Cook County: (1) a petition to enroll foreign judgment for
dissolution of marriage and (2) a petition to modify the parenting schedule. Andrew’s petition
to enroll the foreign judgment alleged that both parties and the children had resided in Chicago
for more than 90 days. The petition to modify the parenting schedule alleged that Andrew had
moved to Chicago in November 2010 and since that time he had supervised parenting time
with the children pursuant to the divorce decree; the petition claimed that since May 2011,
however, Pamela had refused to allow Andrew to visit the children.
¶8 On July 14, 2011, the Ohio court granted Pamela’s motion to modify Andrew’s parenting
time. The court order provided, in relevant part, that (1) Andrew “remains a resident of
Hamilton County,” as all notices of appeal included his Cincinnati address and he did not file
an intent to relocate with the Ohio court; (2) the Ohio court was not apprised of any ongoing
litigation regarding the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities in any other court; and
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(3) the Ohio court “retains exclusive continuing jurisdiction over the issue of reallocation of
parental rights and responsibilities of the minor children of the parties pursuant to Ohio
Revised Code Section 3127.16, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act,
and this Court further fully intends to retain and exercise its continuing jurisdiction within the
confines of the law.”
¶9 On August 3, 2011, Pamela filed a motion to dismiss Andrew’s petitions to enroll the
foreign judgment of dissolution of marriage and to modify parenting time in the circuit court
of Cook County, pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS
5/2-619 (West 2010)). Pamela’s motion claimed that Andrew’s petitions were filed to forum-
shop and evade the Ohio court and argued (1) that the Ohio court had exclusive jurisdiction
pursuant to sections 203 and 206 of the Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement
Act (UCCJEA) (750 ILCS 36/203, 206 (West 2010)); (2) that Andrew incorrectly relied on
section 512(c) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Marriage Act) (750
ILCS 5/512(c) (West 2010)); and (3) that Andrew failed to attach the complete judgment and
postdecree documents as required by section 511(c) of the Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/511(c)
(West 2010)). Pamela also sought attorney fees and costs from Andrew as part of her prayer
for relief. Andrew filed a response to the motion to dismiss, arguing that Illinois had
jurisdiction pursuant to the UCCJEA.
¶ 10 On August 15, 2011, the circuit court granted Pamela’s motion to dismiss with prejudice
and denied Andrew’s petitions. The court also granted Pamela leave to file a petition for
attorney fees and costs. Pamela thereafter filed a petition for attorney fees and costs, which the
circuit court granted on November 9, 2011, finding that Andrew’s petitions were not filed in
good faith and that Pamela’s attorney fees and costs were incurred “as a result of improper
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No. 1-22-0548
purposes” and the hearing on the motion to dismiss “was precipitated and conducted for [an]
improper purpose.”
¶ 11 In December 2011, Andrew filed a motion to vacate, rehear, or reconsider the circuit
court’s November 9 order, which the circuit court denied. Andrew appealed the denial of his
petition to enroll the foreign judgment and the grant of Pamela’s petition for attorney fees. We
affirmed the judgment of the circuit court in its entirety, finding that Andrew had not provided
any evidence to contradict the Ohio court’s determination of his residency as required to
deprive Ohio of its exclusive jurisdiction under the UCCJEA and further finding that the circuit
court’s grant of Pamela’s fee petition was proper where the circuit court found that the
proceedings were precipitated for an “improper purpose.” In re Marriage of Cwik, 2013 IL
App (1st) 121123-U, ¶¶ 37, 43.
¶ 12 In 2015, Andrew filed a second petition to enroll the Ohio divorce decree in Illinois, which
copied the previous petition verbatim. 3 The second petition was dismissed, and Andrew was
again ordered to pay Pamela’s attorney fees. The court’s order also provided that, in the event
Andrew filed further pleadings in the circuit court, the court would entertain a motion filed by
Pamela to deem Andrew a vexatious litigator. Andrew did not appeal the circuit court’s order.
¶ 13 On May 14, 2019, Andrew filed a third petition to enroll the Ohio divorce decree in Illinois,
which was identical to the two previous petitions. Andrew additionally filed a petition to
modify child support, requesting a decrease in his child support obligation based on a reduction
in his income. On May 29, 2019, Andrew filed an amended petition to enroll the foreign
3
The second petition is not included in the record on appeal for the instant appeal. It was,
however, included in the record on appeal for Andrew’s prior appeal in In re Marriage of Soman, 2021 IL
App (1st) 200513-U.
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No. 1-22-0548
judgment, claiming that in December 2015, the Ohio court had determined that it no longer
retained exclusive and continuing jurisdiction over the matter.
¶ 14 The December 2015 order referred to in Andrew’s petition addressed motions filed by
Pamela in the Ohio court for contempt and to modify parenting time, as well as a motion filed
by Andrew to vacate, dismiss, stay proceedings, and change venue. The Ohio court found that
Andrew had provided sufficient proof of his residence in Chicago and had filed a notice of
relocation with the Ohio court, but noted that the circuit court of Cook County had denied his
most recent petition to enroll a foreign judgment with prejudice. The Ohio court found that,
under Ohio law, an Ohio court must relinquish continuing exclusive jurisdiction when the
parents and children do not reside in Ohio and another court is claiming jurisdiction over the
custody issues, but that in the absence of another court’s intent to claim jurisdiction, the Ohio
court may continue to exercise jurisdiction over the matter. In this case, the Ohio court found
that the parties continued to litigate in Ohio for several years despite residing in Chicago, and
the record showed no evidence that the courts of any other state manifested intent to exercise
jurisdiction over custody matters related to the children. The Ohio court continued: “Should
that be the case, this court may be called upon to relinquish jurisdiction which it shall duly
consider. Until that time, Ohio continues to have jurisdiction over the parental rights and
responsibilities.”
¶ 15 On May 31, 2019, the circuit court denied both of Andrew’s petitions. Andrew filed a
motion to reconsider in which he, for the first time, claimed that the circuit court had
jurisdiction of the matter under the UCCJEA. After hearing argument from the parties, the
circuit court denied Andrew’s motion to reconsider and granted Pamela leave to file a petition
for attorney fees.
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No. 1-22-0548
¶ 16 Pamela filed a petition for attorney fees and costs, and also sought to have Andrew declared
a vexatious litigator. In support, Pamela pointed to the four petitions to enroll the foreign
judgment which Andrew had filed, as well as the petitions for attorney fees which followed.
Pamela further claimed that litigation in Ohio had continued, with the pending domestic
relations case having “over 900 entries, approximately 300 of which took place after October
28, 2015.” Pamela claimed that “Andrew has been involved in 22 separate actions in Hamilton
County, Ohio alone” and that the domestic relations case in Ohio “remains pending for ongoing
issues with child support enforcement, contempt, and attorneys’ fees.” Pamela requested that
the circuit court grant her motion to have Andrew declared a vexatious litigator, based on his
“long and litigious history.” In response, Andrew claimed that the circuit court had improperly
denied his prior petitions to enroll foreign judgment and, therefore, his petitions were made in
good faith and did not warrant the granting of attorney fees.
¶ 17 The circuit court granted Pamela’s motions in February 2020, finding Andrew’s “conduct
in filing the same Petition to Enroll Foreign Judgment for Dissolution of Marriage a second
and third time to be harassing and needlessly increased the cost of litigation.” The court ordered
Andrew to pay Pamela’s outstanding fees and costs and enjoined Andrew from filing any
further pleadings in the action without leave of court. Andrew appealed, and we affirmed the
circuit court’s judgment in its entirety, finding that the record was inadequate to review his
claims as to his petition to enroll foreign judgment and further finding that the court did not
abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees to Pamela. In re Marriage of Soman, 2021 IL
App (1st) 200513-U, ¶¶ 22, 30. In a special concurrence, however, Justice Gordon noted that
he was “troubled” by the fact that the Ohio divorce decree had not been registered with the
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No. 1-22-0548
circuit court, as this was generally a perfunctory matter. In re Marriage of Soman, 2021 IL
App (1st) 200513-U, ¶¶ 35-37 (Gordon, J., specially concurring).
¶ 18 On March 17, 2021, Andrew filed a notice of registration of foreign judgment, attempting
to register the Ohio divorce decree in the circuit court. On March 19, 2021, Pamela filed a
petition for rule to show cause and request for a finding of indirect civil contempt, alleging that
Andrew had failed to pay the attorney fees awarded to her in the circuit court’s February 2020
order. Pamela also filed a petition for attorney fees and costs, seeking payment of the attorney
fees and costs expended in responding to Andrew’s appeal.
¶ 19 In April 2021, Andrew filed a motion for leave to file, inter alia, his fifth petition to enroll
the Ohio divorce decree in Illinois, in which he claimed that both parties and the children had
resided in Chicago since 2010 and the Ohio court had recognized in 2015 that it no longer had
continuing exclusive jurisdiction over the matter. In response, Pamela requested that the circuit
court deny Andrew’s motion for leave to file the petition, as it was meritless and filed for the
purpose of harassment. In the alternative, Pamela requested that, prior to accepting any filings
by Andrew, he be required to pay the attorney fees and costs which he had previously been
ordered to pay.
¶ 20 On June 4, 2021, the circuit court denied Andrew’s motion for leave to file his fifth petition
to enroll the foreign judgment and granted Pamela’s petition for attorney fees and costs and
her petition for rule to show cause and request for finding of indirect civil contempt. In granting
Pamela attorney fees and costs, the circuit court found that all of the fees and costs set forth in
her petition were “reasonable and necessary and incurred as a result of improper purposes on
Andrew’s part” and ordered Andrew to pay $53,606.90 within seven days. In finding Andrew
in contempt, the circuit court found that Andrew had failed to comply with its February 2020
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No. 1-22-0548
order directing the payment of Pamela’s attorney fees and costs, and set the purge amount at
$10,548.95. The court, however, ordered that commitment be stayed until July 19, 2021.
Finally, in denying Andrew’s motion for leave to file his fifth petition to enroll the foreign
judgment, the circuit court ordered that until he paid the amounts set forth in the other
provisions of its order, Andrew was enjoined from filing any further pleadings in the action.
¶ 21 On June 17, 2021, Pamela filed another petition for rule to show cause, alleging that
Andrew had not paid the $53,606.90 required under the June 4, 2021, order. On June 21, 2021,
Andrew filed a motion to reconsider the June 4, 2021, order, claiming that the circuit court
erred in denying him leave to file his petition to enroll the foreign judgment, as the law required
Illinois to exercise jurisdiction.
¶ 22 On September 1, 2021, the circuit court denied Andrew’s motion to reconsider and lifted
the stay of commitment, entering a body attachment order. The court found that Andrew was
attempting to “start this process all over again in Illinois,” but one child was already
emancipated and the other would shortly be emancipated, 4 and Andrew had not represented
that there were any child-related visitation issues. The court further found that “[i]t’s all about
monies you owe in Ohio,” and that it was inappropriate for the Illinois court to recalculate the
amounts that Ohio had determined that Andrew owed. The court also found unpersuasive
Andrew’s suggestion that travel to Ohio was inconvenient, noting that Andrew was engaged
in both civil and criminal litigation in Ohio.
¶ 23 On October 26, 2021, the circuit court found Andrew to be in indirect civil contempt for
failure to pay the $53,606.90 set forth in the court’s June 4, 2021, order. The court set the purge
amount at $58,441.52 to include statutory interest, and also entered a body attachment order.
4
We note that both children are since emancipated.
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On November 1, 2021, the circuit court entered another body attachment order, striking and
incorporating the prior two body attachment orders and setting the purge amount at
$68,990.47. 5
¶ 24 On November 22, 2021, Andrew filed a notice of appeal, appealing the circuit court’s June
4, 2021, September 1, 2021, and October 26, 2021, orders. This appeal follows.
¶ 25 ANALYSIS
¶ 26 On appeal, Andrew challenges (1) the denial of his motion for leave to file his fifth petition
to enroll the foreign judgment, (2) the circuit court’s award of attorney fees to Pamela, and (3)
the circuit court’s contempt finding. Prior to reaching the merits of Andrew’s arguments,
however, we must consider a motion to dismiss the appeal filed by Pamela, which we ordered
taken with the case.
¶ 27 Motion to Dismiss Appeal
¶ 28 In her motion to dismiss, Pamela contends that Andrew’s appeal should be dismissed due
to (1) violation of circuit court orders requiring him to obtain leave of court before filing any
further pleadings and (2) noncompliance with supreme court rules. In addition, Pamela
requests that we declare Andrew a vexatious litigant for filing a “frivolous and harassing”
appeal and require him to seek leave of court before filing any additional appeals, as well as
imposing monetary sanctions. We deny both requests, as well as Andrew’s request for us to
impose sanctions on Pamela for filing the motion to dismiss.
5
According to Andrew’s appellate brief, filed in March 2023, he has been held in Cook County
jail since July 2022 pursuant to the body attachment order. In her motion to dismiss the appeal, Pamela
claims that, after Andrew is released from jail in Cook County, he will be extradited to Ohio concerning
the matters pending there.
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No. 1-22-0548
¶ 29 With respect to her claims concerning violations of court orders, Pamela points to the
circuit court’s February 13, 2020, and June 4, 2021, orders, in which the circuit court enjoined
Andrew from filing any further pleadings in the action without leave of court and without
paying the outstanding judgment, respectively. Pamela provides no authority, however,
suggesting that a circuit court’s order may prevent a litigant from filing an appeal from an
otherwise appealable judgment. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994) provides
that “[e]very final judgment of a circuit court in a civil case is appealable as of right.”
(Emphasis added.) Moreover, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(b)(5) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016),
specifically provides that an order finding a person in contempt of court which imposes a
monetary or other penalty is immediately appealable. While the circuit court is certainly
entitled to impose conditions on the filing of pleadings in its own court in order to prevent
abuse of the litigation process (see J.S.A. v. M.H., 224 Ill. 2d 182, 196 (2007)), we cannot find
that the circuit court’s orders prevent Andrew from filing an otherwise appropriate appeal to
this court.
¶ 30 Pamela also argues that Andrew’s appeal should be dismissed for violating supreme court
rules. Specifically, Pamela contends that Andrew failed to timely file the record on appeal and
that his brief contains argument concerning facts occurring after the filing of the notice of
appeal, namely, his incarceration pursuant to the body attachment order. It is well settled that
“the Illinois Supreme Court rules are not suggestions; they have the force of law and must be
followed.” Ittersagen v. Advocate Health & Hospitals Corp., 2021 IL 126507, ¶ 37. A party’s
pro se status does not relieve him of his obligation to comply with the rules of appellate
practice, and he is held to the same standard as a licensed attorney. Holzrichter v. Yorath, 2013
IL App (1st) 110287, ¶ 78. Where a litigant fails to comply with the applicable rules of
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No. 1-22-0548
appellate procedure, we have the discretion to strike the brief and dismiss the appeal. McCann
v. Dart, 2015 IL App (1st) 141291, ¶ 12.
¶ 31 In this case, Pamela is correct that Andrew did not file the record on appeal within 63 days
of the filing of the notice of appeal. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 326 (eff. July 1, 2017). As a result,
however, Andrew’s appeal was initially dismissed for want of prosecution in June 2022.
Andrew then filed a timely motion to vacate the dismissal and reinstate the appeal, which we
granted. In that order, we also ordered the record on appeal to be filed on or before July 14,
2022, and Andrew complied with that order by filing the record on July 14, 2022. We therefore
will not use Andrew’s earlier failure to file the record as a basis to dismiss his appeal. Similarly,
while Andrew’s brief improperly contains argument as to events occurring after the filing of
the notice of appeal, we decline to dismiss the appeal on that basis and will simply disregard
the inappropriate portions of the brief. See In re Marriage of Buonincontro, 2022 IL App (2d)
210380, ¶ 34 (declining to strike brief and disregarding any noncompliant statements).
¶ 32 Finally, we decline to find Andrew a vexatious litigant or to impose sanctions for the filing
of the instant appeal. Again, while the circuit court is free to impose sanctions if it deems them
appropriate, our focus is on Andrew’s actions before this court, which we cannot find warrant
the imposition of the sanctions sought by Pamela. Accordingly, we deny Pamela’s motion to
dismiss the appeal and her request for sanctions, and proceed to consider the merits of
Andrew’s appeal. We note that Pamela declined to file a brief on appeal and has chosen to rest
on her motion to dismiss. To the extent that Pamela’s motion does not address certain issues
raised by Andrew on appeal, we consider such issues on the record and Andrew’s pro se brief
alone. See First Capitol Mortgage Co. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133
(1976).
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¶ 33 Denial of Motion for Leave to File Fifth Petition to Enroll a Foreign Judgment
¶ 34 Andrew’s first arguments on appeal concern what he terms the denial of his fifth petition
to enroll the Ohio judgment. The record on appeal, however, demonstrates that the circuit court
actually denied Andrew leave to file his petition and did not rule on the petition itself. We
therefore consider whether the circuit court’s denial of Andrew’s motion for leave to file his
fifth petition to enroll the Ohio judgment was proper.
¶ 35 A circuit court’s ruling on a motion to amend pleadings is within the discretion of the
circuit court, and we will not reverse absent an abuse of that discretion. Griffin v. Cook County,
2023 IL App (1st) 221376, ¶ 50. In determining whether the circuit court has abused its
discretion, we consider (1) whether the proposed amendment would cure the defective
pleading, (2) whether other parties would sustain prejudice or surprise by virtue of the proposed
amendment, (3) whether the proposed amendment is timely, and (4) whether previous
opportunities to amend the pleading could be identified. Loyola Academy v. S&S Roof
Maintenance, Inc., 146 Ill. 2d 263, 273 (1992).
¶ 36 In this case, the proposed amendment constituted Andrew’s fifth attempt to enroll the Ohio
judgment in Illinois. The circuit court found that Andrew’s repeated filings were done for
improper purposes, granting Pamela’s requests for attorney fees as sanctions multiple times.
Thus, it is clear that at least some of the factors support the circuit court’s denial of Andrew’s
motion for leave to file his latest petition. See id. (factors include whether other parties would
sustain prejudice and whether there were previous opportunities to amend).
¶ 37 Moreover, we cannot find that the fifth petition to enroll the foreign judgment would have
cured the defects present in the prior petitions, which in itself serves as an appropriate basis
for denial of the motion. See Malacina v. Cook County Sheriff’s Merit Board, 2021 IL App
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(1st) 191893, ¶ 40 (“[W]e may begin and end our analysis with the observation that it is never
an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend when the proposed amendment would be
futile.”). Andrew spends much of his brief arguing that Illinois has jurisdiction under the
UCCJEA. Even if the circuit court has jurisdiction under the UCCJEA, however, the court may
decline to exercise such jurisdiction if it determines that it is an inconvenient forum under the
circumstances and a court of another state is a more appropriate forum. See 750 ILCS 36/207(a)
(West 2020). A decision to decline jurisdiction in favor of a foreign court is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Rickett, 2020 IL App (3d) 180657, ¶ 18. “An abuse of
discretion occurs only where no reasonable person could agree with the trial court.” Id. (citing
In re Marriage of Hall, 278 Ill. App. 3d 782, 785 (1996)).
¶ 38 Here, the record does not indicate whether the circuit court provided any reasoning in
denying Andrew’s motion for leave to file his petition. To the extent that the record is silent,
we presume that the circuit court’s order was in conformity with the law and had a sufficient
factual basis. Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 392 (1984). We note, however, that the circuit
court set forth its reasoning when it denied Andrew’s motion to reconsider the denial of his
motion for leave, and we presume that this reasoning is similar to the reasoning behind the
original denial of the motion for leave.
¶ 39 In denying the motion to reconsider, the circuit court noted that there were no child-related
visitation issues, since one child was already emancipated and the other was nearly so. Instead,
the court found that “[i]t’s all about monies you owe in Ohio.” The circuit court found that
asking the Illinois court to recalculate the monies that Ohio had determined Andrew owed was
“no reason to bring that litigation” into the Illinois court, especially when Andrew was already
engaged in both civil and criminal proceedings in Ohio. While other factors would certainly
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No. 1-22-0548
weigh in favor of litigating in Illinois, we cannot find that the circuit court abused its discretion
in determining that Ohio, not Illinois, provided the appropriate forum under the facts of this
case. See Horgan v. Romans, 366 Ill. App. 3d 180, 186 (2006) (the circuit court has the
discretion to attach varying importance to the factors it considers in determining whether
Illinois is an inconvenient forum). Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in denying Andrew
leave to file his fifth petition to enroll the foreign judgment when such a filing would have
been futile. See Malacina, 2021 IL App (1st) 191893, ¶ 40.
¶ 40 Attorney Fees
¶ 41 Andrew next contends that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to award Pamela attorney
fees after it denied his motion for leave to file his fifth amended petition to enroll the foreign
judgment. Andrew raised the identical argument in both his prior appeals, and we rejected the
argument both times. See In re Marriage of Cwik, 2013 IL App (1st) 121123-U, ¶¶ 38-44; In
re Marriage of Soman, 2021 IL App (1st) 200513-U, ¶¶ 24-30. We do so here, as well.
¶ 42 As explained in our prior decision, Andrew’s reliance on In re Marriage of Rogers, 141
Ill. App. 3d 561 (1986), is unwarranted, as that case involved the circuit court awarding
attorney fees as a sanction for violating an order over which the court had no jurisdiction. By
contrast, in this case, Andrew was sanctioned for his conduct in pursuing an appeal from an
order entered by the circuit court. As we have previously observed: “The circuit court always
has jurisdiction to consider the court’s jurisdiction, even sua sponte. [Citation.] Accordingly,
the circuit court also would have jurisdiction to determine whether the hearings in this case
were ‘precipitated or conducted for any improper purpose,’ including ‘harassment,
unnecessary delay, or other acts needlessly increasing the cost of litigation.’ ” In re Marriage
of Cwik, 2013 IL App (1st) 121123-U, ¶ 40 (quoting 750 ILCS 5/508(b) (West 2010)). We
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No. 1-22-0548
therefore reject Andrew’s contention that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to sanction him
by awarding Pamela attorney fees.
¶ 43 We similarly find unpersuasive Andrew’s claim that the circuit court erred in finding his
conduct to be harassing and his appeal filed for an improper purpose. The circuit court awarded
Pamela attorney fees based on section 508(b) of the Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/508(b) (West
2020)) and Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137 (eff. Jan. 1, 2018), both of which permit the award
of reasonable attorney fees for actions which are conducted for an improper purpose, such as
harassment, causing unnecessary delay, or needlessly increasing the cost of litigation. We
review a circuit court’s decision to award attorney fees for an abuse of discretion. In re
Marriage of Schneider, 214 Ill. 2d 152, 174 (2005). In this case, we cannot find that the circuit
court abused its discretion in finding that the attorney fees Pamela incurred as a result of
Andrew’s prior appeal were “incurred as a result of improper purposes on Andrew’s part.”
¶ 44 Andrew contends that his appeal was made in good faith and for a proper purpose, as he
believed that the circuit court had jurisdiction over child-support and visitation issues. Andrew
overlooks, however, that he had made identical claims several times by this point in the
proceedings, and the circuit court expressly found that his conduct in filing third and fourth
petitions to enroll foreign judgment—the petitions serving as the basis for the appeal—was
“harassing and needlessly increased the cost of litigation.” This finding, and the resulting
award of attorney fees, was affirmed on appeal. In re Marriage of Soman, 2021 IL App (1st)
200513-U, ¶¶ 29-30. Given the history of the litigation, we cannot find that the circuit court
abused its discretion in finding that the appeal itself was also filed as a result of improper
purposes.
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¶ 45 Finally, we find no merit to Andrew’s contention that the circuit court failed to provide a
factual basis for its finding. The record on appeal does not contain a transcript or bystander’s
report for the hearing on the fee petition. Accordingly, we presume that the circuit court’s order
finding the attorney fees Pamela incurred as a result of Andrew’s prior appeal were “incurred
as a result of improper purposes on Andrew’s part” was in conformity with the law and had a
sufficient factual basis. See Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 392. We therefore cannot find that the circuit
court’s decision was an abuse of discretion and affirm the circuit court’s award of attorney
fees.
¶ 46 Contempt Finding
¶ 47 Finally, Andrew claims that the circuit court erred in holding him in contempt without
considering his ability to pay. “The circuit court has the power to enforce an order to pay
money through a contempt proceeding where there has been a willful refusal to obey the court’s
order.” In re Marriage of Harnack, 2022 IL App (1st) 210143, ¶ 52 (citing In re Marriage of
Logston, 103 Ill. 2d 266, 286-87 (1984)). While the sanctions imposed by the circuit court do
not depend on a party’s ability to pay (see 750 ILCS 5/508(b) (West 2020); Ill. S. Ct. R. 137(a)
(eff. Jan. 1, 2018)), a contemnor’s inability to pay may be a defense to contempt (see In re
Marriage of Harnack, 2022 IL App (1st) 210143, ¶ 52). To prove this defense, “ ‘a defendant
must show that he neither has money now with which he can pay, nor has disposed wrongfully
of money or assets with which he might have paid.’ ” Id. (quoting In re Marriage of Logston,
103 Ill. 2d at 285). The question of whether a party is guilty of contempt is a question of fact
for the circuit court, which we will not reverse unless it is against the manifest weight of the
evidence or the record reflects an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Logston, 103 Ill. 2d at
286-87. “For a finding of fact to be contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, an opposite
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No. 1-22-0548
conclusion must be clearly apparent.” In re Marriage of Harnack, 2022 IL App (1st) 210143,
¶ 47.
¶ 48 In this case, Andrew claims that he established an inability to pay, showing a Social
Security disability decision and a letter from a doctor indicating that he was suffering from
long Covid. We cannot find, however, that the circuit court’s contempt finding is against the
manifest weight of the evidence, despite the evidence submitted by Andrew. In addition to the
evidence provided by Andrew, the circuit court had the opportunity to observe the parties
directly and was aware of the long history of the dissolution proceedings, both in Illinois and
in Ohio. The circuit court would also have been aware of the fact that Andrew had been held
in contempt or otherwise punished for failure to pay several times throughout the
proceedings—including criminal charges for felony nonsupport in Ohio—at which time he
was able to pay what was owed, suggesting that Andrew had some resources at his disposal.
We also note that the circuit court expressly found Andrew’s version of events to be “without
credibility” at least once. Given the circuit court’s superior position in the matter, we therefore
cannot find its ultimate contempt finding to be against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 49 CONCLUSION
¶ 50 For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment in its entirety, as (1)
the circuit court did not err in denying Andrew’s motion for leave to file a fifth petition to
enroll the foreign judgment, (2) the circuit court properly awarded attorney fees to Pamela as
a sanction for Andrew’s conduct, and (3) the circuit court’s contempt finding was not against
the manifest weight of the evidence. Additionally, we deny Pamela’s motion to dismiss the
appeal and for sanctions, which we ordered taken with the case.
¶ 51 Affirmed.
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