People v. Wheaton

2023 IL App (4th) 221070-UNOTICE
This Order was filed under
FILED
September 29, 2023
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NO. 4-22-1070
not precedent except in the Carla Bender
limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate
under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Henry County
CHRISTOPHER A. WHEATON, ) No. 21CF129
Defendant-Appellant. )
) Honorable
) Terence M. Patton,
) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE ZENOFF delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice DeArmond and Justice Knecht concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court remanded the cause for a preliminary inquiry into defendant’s
unaddressed pro se posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
¶2 The trial court found defendant guilty of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child
(720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) (West 2020)) and criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/11-1.20(a)(3)
(West 2020)). The court sentenced defendant to 25 years in prison. Defendant appeals, arguing
that (1) the court erroneously granted the State’s motion to extend the speedy-trial deadline, (2) the
State failed to prove the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt, (3) the court did not address
defendant’s claim that his counsel failed to submit exculpatory evidence, and (4) the court
considered improper sentencing factors, and the sentence was otherwise excessive. Pursuant to
People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984), and its progeny, we remand for a preliminary inquiry
into defendant’s unaddressed pro se posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Accordingly, we decline to address defendant’s other arguments.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 We provide only the facts necessary to understand the dipositive Krankel issue.
¶5 The State charged defendant by information with the offenses mentioned above,
both of which allegedly occurred on or about January 23, 2020. The alleged victims were
defendant’s daughters.
¶6 Over defendant’s objection, the trial court granted an extension of the speedy-trial
deadline to allow the State to procure DNA testing. See 725 ILCS 5/103-5(c) (West 2022)
(authorizing a court to extend the speedy-trial deadline for up to 120 days to facilitate DNA
testing). The matter proceeded to a bench trial within the extension granted by the court.
Defendant’s daughters testified that defendant sexually assaulted them after they returned home
from school on multiple occasions. Defendant testified on his own behalf and denied those
allegations. Defendant also testified that on January 23, 2020, his father was at the family home
from about 3 p.m. until 8 p.m. The court found defendant guilty of both charges.
¶7 The presentence investigation report (PSI) contained information that defendant
was dissatisfied with his attorney. Specifically, defendant told the interviewer that “his attorney
‘did nothing’ at trial.” Defendant “denied any wrongdoing and felt his attorney failed to call
witnesses and provide evidence on his behalf.”
¶8 At the sentencing hearing, defendant provided an oral statement. He maintained his
innocence and said he was physically incapable of committing the offenses for which he was
convicted. Defendant also said that one of his daughters made multiple reports that the Illinois
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) determined were unfounded. Defendant
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added, “DCFS found this one unfounded.” Defendant said he “wish[ed] those papers had been
brought into evidence.” Defendant further suggested there was additional evidence that could have
shown his innocence:
“And if it was redone and those papers brought in and witnesses called for me, my
friends were there, my friends were there at that house every day 3:30 to 4:00
o’clock, every single day, for several years. My dad was there the day this
supposedly happened. That 23rd, we were working on my car. My friend Aaron
showed up that night, we worked on a model together. None of this could have
happened. And that’s all I’ve got to say.”
¶9 Defendant’s sentencing range for predatory criminal sexual assault of a child was
6 to 60 years in prison. 720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(b)(1) (West 2022). The range for criminal sexual
assault was 4 to 15 years in prison. 720 ILCS 5/11-1.20(b)(1) (West 2022); 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-30(a)
(West 2022). The sentences were mandatorily consecutive. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(d)(2) (West 2022).
¶ 10 In its sentencing ruling, the trial court mentioned that it considered the “information
contained in the [PSI].” The court addressed defendant’s grievance against his counsel relating to
the DCFS reports. The court explained that such reports are inadmissible in criminal cases, which
is why defense counsel “didn’t admit them into evidence.” The court added that defense counsel
“knows what the law is, and those can’t be admitted.” The court never questioned defendant about
any other grievances against his counsel, and the court did not make any findings with respect to
those grievances. The court sentenced defendant to 15 years in prison for predatory criminal sexual
assault of a child and 10 years for criminal sexual assault.
¶ 11 The trial court denied defendant’s motion to reconsider the sentence, and defendant
filed a timely notice of appeal.
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¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 13 Defendant raises four issues on appeal, one of which is that the trial court did not
address his claim that defense counsel failed to submit exculpatory evidence. For the following
reasons, we remand the cause for a preliminary Krankel inquiry into defendant’s unaddressed
pro se posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. We decline to address the other issues
defendant raises.
¶ 14 Beginning with our supreme court’s decision in Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181, courts
developed a procedure to address pro se posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
People v. Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 95. Specifically, a court first must “examine the factual basis
of the defendant’s claim.” People v. Roddis, 2020 IL 124352, ¶ 35. “If the court determines that
the claim lacks merit or pertains only to matters of trial strategy, then the court need not appoint
new counsel and may deny the pro se motion.” Roddis, 2020 IL 124352, ¶ 35. In considering
whether a claim lacks merit, a court may consider both the factual and legal bases for the claim.
Roddis, 2020 IL 124352, ¶¶ 31, 61. “[I]f the allegations show possible neglect of the case, new
counsel should be appointed.” Roddis, 2020 IL 124352, ¶ 35. This process of screening a pro se
claim is often referred to as a “preliminary Krankel inquiry.” People v. Jolly, 2014 IL 117142,
¶ 30.
¶ 15 In conducting this inquiry, “ ‘some interchange between the trial court and trial
counsel regarding the facts and circumstances surrounding the allegedly ineffective representation
is permissible and usually necessary in assessing what further action, if any, is warranted on a
defendant’s claim.’ ” People v. Ayres, 2017 IL 120071, ¶ 12 (quoting Jolly, 2014 IL 117142, ¶ 30).
Thus, the court may “inquire of trial counsel about the defendant’s allegations” and “discuss the
allegations with defendant.” Ayres, 2017 IL 120071, ¶ 12. The court may also “make its
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determination based on its knowledge of defense counsel’s performance at trial and the
insufficiency of the defendant’s allegations.” Ayres, 2017 IL 120071, ¶ 12.
¶ 16 To trigger the duty to conduct a preliminary Krankel inquiry, “a pro se defendant
is not required to do any more than bring his or her claim to the trial court’s attention.” People v.
Moore, 207 Ill. 2d 68, 79 (2003). It must be “clear” that the defendant is claiming ineffective
assistance of counsel. Ayres, 2017 IL 120071, ¶ 18. However, such claim does not need to be
detailed. See People v. Bell, 2018 IL App (4th) 151016, ¶ 36 (holding that a bare-bones pro se
motion alleging ineffective assistance triggered the duty to conduct a preliminary Krankel inquiry).
Although a defendant need not use the specific phrase “ineffective assistance of counsel” (People
v. Clifton, 2019 IL App (1st) 151967, ¶ 90; People v. Lobdell, 2017 IL App (3d) 150074, ¶ 37),
“the defendant must at least mention his attorney” in a communication to the court (People v.
Thomas, 2017 IL App (4th) 150815, ¶ 31); see People v. Taylor, 237 Ill. 2d 68, 77 (2010)
(determining that a defendant’s “rambling” statement did not require a preliminary Krankel inquiry
where the statement was “amenable to more than one interpretation” and did not even mention the
defendant’s attorney).
¶ 17 There is no fixed procedure for a defendant to present his or her ineffective
assistance claim to the trial court. For example, the duty to conduct a preliminary Krankel inquiry
may arise from something a defendant writes in a letter or says in open court. Ayres, 2017 IL
120071, ¶ 11. Statements attributed to a defendant in a PSI likewise may trigger Krankel if the
record indicates that the trial court read the PSI. People v. Craig, 2020 IL App (2d) 170679, ¶ 18;
In re Johnathan T., 2022 IL 127222, ¶¶ 50-51 (embracing Craig’s holding and applying it to
statements made in materials prepared for a dispositional hearing in a juvenile delinquency case).
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¶ 18 Our standard of review “depends on whether the trial court did or did not determine
the merits of the defendant’s pro se posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Jackson,
2020 IL 124112, ¶ 98. To that end, we review de novo the issue of whether a defendant’s
allegations triggered a duty to conduct a preliminary Krankel inquiry. Bell, 2018 IL App (4th)
151016, ¶ 36. Likewise, “[w]hether the trial court properly conducted a Krankel preliminary
inquiry presents a legal question that we review de novo.” Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 98.
“However, if the trial court has properly conducted a Krankel inquiry and has reached a
determination on the merits of the defendant’s Krankel motion, we will reverse only if the trial
court’s action was manifestly erroneous.” Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 98. “Manifest error is error
that is clearly evident, plain, and indisputable.” Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 98.
¶ 19 Here, the PSI contained defendant’s statements that “his attorney ‘did nothing’ at
trial” and “failed to call witnesses and provide evidence on his behalf.” These statements were
neither ambiguous nor amenable to multiple interpretations. Defendant clearly was complaining
about his counsel’s performance at trial. The trial court stated that it considered the PSI, so the
record confirms the court would have seen these statements.
¶ 20 At the sentencing hearing, defendant said he wished certain DCFS reports had been
introduced as evidence, and he mentioned other witnesses who could have been called. The trial
court interpreted defendant’s remarks as criticizing his counsel’s performance, as the court
explained to defendant that the reason counsel did not seek to admit the DCFS reports was that
they were inadmissible. Under these circumstances, we conclude that defendant’s comments in the
PSI and at the sentencing hearing triggered a duty for the court to conduct a preliminary Krankel
inquiry regarding defendant’s ineffective assistance claims.
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¶ 21 The parties dispute the propriety of the trial court’s determination that the DCFS
reports defendant referenced are inadmissible. We hold that the court’s conclusion was not
manifestly erroneous. The court had enough information from defendant’s statement to understand
the factual basis for this particular claim and to determine that it lacked merit. See Moore, 207 Ill.
2d at 79 (recognizing that a trial court may base its evaluation of a pro se ineffective assistance
claim on “the insufficiency of the defendant’s allegations on their face”). The court properly
recognized that unfounded DCFS reports are inadmissible in criminal proceedings. 325 ILCS
5/7.14 (West 2022). Notwithstanding this statute, defendant proposes that a further preliminary
Krankel inquiry was necessary to investigate the possibilities that either (1) the DCFS reports
contained admissible exculpatory evidence or (2) defense counsel failed to use the reports to
pursue other admissible evidence. However, defendant only criticized his counsel for failing to
seek to admit into evidence the actual DCFS reports, and the court properly addressed that claim.
¶ 22 Although the trial court sufficiently addressed defendant’s claim about the
admissibility of the DCFS reports, the court failed to conduct a preliminary inquiry regarding
defendant’s allegations that his counsel “ ‘did nothing’ ” at trial and did not call witnesses or
provide evidence on defendant’s behalf. Unlike defendant’s claim about the DCFS reports, these
other claims were not inherently baseless on their face, and the court made no findings with respect
to them. The court should have elicited further information from defendant on these claims, asked
defense counsel to respond to the allegations, and then determined whether it was necessary to
appoint new counsel. The State cites Jackson for the proposition that allegations relating to trial
strategy, such as whether to present witnesses, “cannot serve as the basis of a Krankel claim.”
Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 106. In Jackson, the trial court conducted a proper preliminary Krankel
inquiry by (1) eliciting information about the factual bases of the defendant’s particular grievances,
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(2) allowing defense counsel to explain his actions, and (3) determining that the defendant’s claims
lacked merit. Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶¶ 102-03, 106. Jackson does not support the proposition
that a trial court may simply ignore pro se claims of ineffective assistance relating to the failure to
call witnesses.
¶ 23 Accordingly, we remand for the trial court to conduct a preliminary Krankel inquiry
into defendant’s unaddressed pro se posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. We
decline to address the other issues defendant raises in this appeal. See Bell, 2018 IL App (4th)
151016, ¶¶ 24, 37 (declining to address the defendant’s remaining arguments, including a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, where the cause first had to be remanded for the trial
court to conduct a preliminary Krankel inquiry). However, we retain jurisdiction over defendant’s
remaining claims. Accordingly, if defendant is dissatisfied with the outcome of the proceedings
on remand, he may appeal again and raise the claims we did not address in this appeal, along with
any claims that arise from the proceedings on remand. See People v. Wilson, 2019 IL App (4th)
180214, ¶ 26.
¶ 24 In his reply brief, defendant agrees that remanding for a preliminary Krankel
inquiry obviates the need to address his arguments regarding sentencing. However,
notwithstanding the need for a remand, defendant asks us to address both his challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence and his contention that there was a speedy-trial violation, as he would
be entitled to outright reversal of the judgment if he prevailed on either of those issues. To that
end, defendant maintains that Bell was incorrectly decided and contradicts People v. Lopez, 229
Ill. 2d 322 (2008), and People v. Taylor, 76 Ill. 2d 289 (1979).
¶ 25 Other recently published cases have declined to address substantive issues on direct
appeal until the trial court completes posttrial proceedings by conducting a proper preliminary
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Krankel inquiry. See People v. Roberson, 2021 IL App (3d) 190212, ¶ 22; People v. Lawson, 2019
IL App (4th) 180452, ¶ 57; Wilson, 2019 IL App (4th) 180214, ¶ 25; People v. Rhodes, 2019 IL
App (4th) 160917, ¶ 21. Additionally, we discern no conflict between Bell and either Lopez or
Taylor. In both Lopez and Taylor, the reviewing courts reversed convictions based on trial errors.
Lopez, 229 Ill. 2d at 366; Taylor, 76 Ill. 2d at 295, 310-11. To avoid the possibility of double
jeopardy violations, those courts reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence to ensure that retrials
would be permissible. Lopez, 229 Ill. 2d at 366-67; Taylor, 76 Ill. 2d at 309. Here, we have not
reversed the judgment or ordered a new trial, so Lopez and Taylor are inapplicable.
¶ 26 Among the goals of Krankel are to “potentially limit issues on appeal” and to create
a record for direct appeal. Ayres, 2017 IL 120071, ¶ 13. Until the trial court completes posttrial
proceedings, it is “premature” for us to address substantive issues in the case. Roberson, 2021 IL
App (3d) 190212, ¶ 22. We are unpersuaded that an exception should apply where a defendant
raises issues potentially implicating outright reversal of the judgment rather than a retrial. We note
that the defendant in Krankel challenged the sufficiency of the evidence—an issue that could have
resulted in outright reversal of the judgment—yet our supreme court remanded the matter to the
trial court for further posttrial proceedings without addressing the sufficiency of the evidence.
Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d at 183, 189. We are aware of no requirement for the appellate court to address
a defendant’s claims piecemeal over the course of multiple direct appeals.
¶ 27 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 28 For the reasons stated, we remand the cause for a preliminary Krankel inquiry into
defendant’s unaddressed pro se posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
¶ 29 Remanded with directions.
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