In re Marriage of Y.S.

NOTICE
2020 IL App (5th) 190499-U NOTICE
Decision filed 05/05/20. The This order was filed under
text of this decision may be NO. 5-19-0499 Supreme Court Rule 23 and
changed or corrected prior to may not be cited as precedent
the filing of a Peti ion for by any party except in the
Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE limited circumstances allowed
the same.
under Rule 23(e)(1).
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
________________________________________________________________________
In re MARRIAGE OF Y.S., ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Petitioner-Appellee, ) Madison County.
)
and ) No. 17-D-940
)
Q.L., ) Honorable
) A. Ryan Jumper,
Respondent-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE OVERSTREET delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Moore and Wharton concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The circuit court’s judgment granting the petitioner’s request to relocate the
parties’ minor children and initially allocating the parties’ parenting time and
decision-making responsibilities is affirmed where the respondent’s
contentions of error were without merit.
¶2 The parties, Y.S. and Q.L., were married in February 2004. In October 2017, Y.S.
filed a petition for dissolution of marriage, and in May 2018, she filed a petition to relocate
the parties’ minor children to Indiana. In August 2019, the circuit court granted the petition
to relocate and allocated the parties’ parenting time and decision-making responsibilities.
On appeal, Q.L. advances numerous arguments in support of his contention that we should
reverse the circuit court’s judgment and remand the cause for a new trial. For the reasons
that follow, we affirm.
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 The parties are naturalized American citizens from China. They were married on
February 10, 2004, in South Bend, Indiana, where they both received doctorate degrees in
engineering from the University of Notre Dame. They subsequently had two children: a
daughter, B.L., who was born February 24, 2009, and a son, J.L., who was born December
10, 2014.
¶5 On October 31, 2017, citing irreconcilable differences, Y.S. filed a petition for
dissolution of marriage in the circuit court of Madison County. The petition noted that the
parties were both 42 years old, that their children were both minors, that Q.L. was
employed as a research scientist in St. Peters, Missouri, and that Y.S. was employed as a
professor at Southern Illinois University Edwardsville (SIUE). The petition requested that
the court equitably divide the parties’ debts and assets but requested no relief with respect
to the children.
¶6 On November 16, 2017, Y.S. obtained an order of protection against Q.L., and the
circuit court entered an agreed order establishing a temporary parenting time schedule.
Pursuant to the temporary schedule, Q.L. was granted parenting time with the minors on
Mondays through Fridays from 7 p.m. to 8:30 p.m. and on Sundays from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m.
The record indicates that after November 16, 2017, the parties and the children continued
to reside together at the marital home in Glen Carbon, and the order of protection was
dismissed.
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¶7 On May 1, 2018, Y.S. filed a petition for leave to remove the minor children to
Evansville, Indiana. The petition advised that Y.S. had recently accepted a position at the
University of Evansville’s college of engineering and computer science and that the job
provided better pay and benefits than her present position at SIUE. The petition alleged
that the proposed move would be in the children’s best interests and would enhance their
general quality of life. The petition further alleged that a suitable parenting time schedule
could be fashioned to allow Q.L. a reasonable amount of parenting time with the minors.
The petition specifically requested that Y.S. be granted leave to relocate the children to
Evansville and that a “reasonable parenting time schedule” be established for Q.L.
¶8 On May 9, 2018, Q.L. filed an answer to Y.S.’s petition for leave to remove, alleging
that Y.S.’s proposed relocation would not be in the minors’ best interests and would
severely impair his relationships with the children. Q.L. also filed a petition to appoint a
guardian ad litem (GAL) to represent the children’s best interests, alleging that appointing
a GAL would be appropriate given that the issues pending before the court involved
parenting time and a request to relocate.
¶9 On May 23, 2018, the circuit court ordered the parties to engage in mediation and
appointed attorney Amy Sholar to act as the minors’ GAL (see 750 ILCS 5/506(a)(2) (West
2018); Ill. S. Ct. Rs. 905, 907 (eff. Mar. 8, 2016)). Pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule
907, the GAL was thus required to “adhere to all ethical rules governing attorneys in
professional practice, be mindful of any conflicts in the representation of children and take
appropriate action to address such conflicts.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 907(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016). The
circuit court’s appointment order specifically granted the GAL the authority to interview
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persons with special knowledge about the children’s circumstances, and the court’s
mediation order specifically directed that the parties’ mediation address “the issues of
parental responsibilities, guardianship, and/or parenting time.”
¶ 10 On August 1, 2018, Y.S. moved to Evansville to begin her new job, and the circuit
court entered an order establishing a second temporary parenting time schedule. By
agreement, Q.L. was granted custody of the children during the week, and Y.S. was
awarded parenting time at the marital home in Glen Carbon every weekend. Y.S. was also
awarded parenting time at her residence in Evansville for Labor Day weekend and several
days during the 2018 Thanksgiving and Christmas holiday breaks. The circuit court ordered
that the custody exchanges for the children’s visits to Evansville take place in Mt. Vernon,
Illinois.
¶ 11 On August 9, 2018, Q.L. served Y.S. with “Interrogatories Pertaining to Allocation
of Parental Responsibilities/Parenting Time,” which included numerous questions
specifically directed to the issue of the allocation of the parties’ parenting time. Y.S.
submitted her responses to the interrogatories on August 28, 2018.
¶ 12 On May 22, 2019, after several case management conferences, the circuit court
entered an order setting the cause for a July 19, 2019, trial on Y.S.’s proposed relocation
and the allocation of the parties’ parenting time. The court’s docket entry setting the trial
date specifically noted that the cause was being set for a “relocation hearing/parenting
time[;] other issues reserved for later hearing.” The court’s order noted that the parties had
completed their mediation as ordered but had not yet submitted their proposed parenting
plans. The order indicated that all discovery had been completed and that a continuance of
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the trial setting would only be granted in the event of “extreme circumstances.” The order
directed the parties to file their position papers by July 12, 2019.
¶ 13 On June 7, 2019, the GAL completed a 22-page report and recommendation, which
she electronically mailed to the parties and the circuit court. The report was filed under seal
on June 12, 2019.
¶ 14 In her report to the court, the GAL stated that she had met and spoken with the
parties and the minors on numerous occasions and had also spoken with Dr. Robert Clipper,
who had been “counseling with the family, on several separate occasions.” The GAL stated
that she had also reviewed the case file, the minors’ school records, and the “school
comparisons” that the parties had provided. The GAL advised that she had visited the
marital home, Y.S.’s apartment in Newburgh, Indiana, and B.L.’s prospective school in
Newburgh. The GAL further advised that she had been electronically communicating with
Q.L. and Y.S. throughout the pendency of the case. The GAL noted that the matters before
the court were Y.S.’s relocation request and “an initial determination” with respect to the
allocation of the parties’ parenting time and decision-making responsibilities.
¶ 15 The GAL’s report detailed the parties’ history and generally summarized the
information that she had gathered during the course of her investigation. The report cited
and discussed each of the relevant factors that the court would be considering when ruling
on Y.S.’s relocation request (750 ILCS 5/609.2 (West 2018)) and when allocating the
parties’ parenting time and decision-making responsibilities (id. §§ 602.5, 602.7). With
respect to parenting time, the report noted that both parties wanted to be the minors’
primary custodial parent and that Q.L. was objecting to Y.S.’s proposed relocation because
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of the impact it might have on his time with the children. With respect to the parties’
decision-making responsibilities, the report noted that the parties had both advised that they
would agree to jointly make all major decisions regarding the minors. The report further
noted that Q.L. wanted to reconcile the parties’ marriage but that Y.S. was unwilling to do
so.
¶ 16 The GAL ultimately recommended that Y.S. be awarded primary parenting time
with the right to relocate the children to the Evansville area. Noting that both parties were
high-quality parents, the GAL indicated that her recommendation had been a difficult one
to make. The GAL recommended that Q.L. be awarded parenting time every other weekend
during the school year, for “the bulk” of the children’s holiday breaks, and for the majority
of the summer. The GAL stated that she would be willing to assist in the finalization of a
“more specific” parenting time schedule following the resolution of Y.S.’s request to
relocate. The GAL noted that the parties “should be able to share in joint decision-making
regardless of where the children are located.”
¶ 17 On June 11, 2019, Q.L. filed a motion to substitute the GAL and strike her report
and recommendation. The motion advised that the GAL was a member of the board of
trustees of Southern Illinois University (SIU) and had been a member in April 2018, when
Y.S. was awarded an intradepartmental promotion with SIUE’s department of electrical
and computer engineering, effective July 2018. The motion alleged that the GAL had a
“supervisory role” over Y.S. and the authority to approve her promotion. The motion
alleged that the GAL’s professional affiliations with Y.S. and the GAL’s participation in
the parties’ case created a conflict of interest that warranted the GAL’s substitution and the
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striking of her report and recommendation. The motion further alleged that the GAL should
have recused herself in light of the conflict. The motion suggested that Q.L. had been
unaware of the conflict until after the GAL had filed her report. The motion specifically
asked the court to not consider the GAL’s assertions or conclusions when determining
whether to grant Y.S.’s request to relocate or when allocating the parties’ parenting time.
¶ 18 On June 18, 2019, Y.S. filed a response to Q.L.’s motion to substitute the GAL and
strike her report and recommendation. In her response, Y.S. asserted that Q.L. and his
attorney were fully aware of the GAL’s connections to SIUE and had specifically
questioned the GAL regarding her relationship, “if any,” with Y.S. Y.S. maintained that
the GAL had advised the parties that she did not know Y.S. and that the GAL’s position
on SIU’s board of trustees “would have no effect on her ability to render a fair and impartial
decision regarding relocation of the minor children from Illinois to Indiana.”
Characterizing the motion to substitute and strike as frivolous, Y.S. contended that the
timing of Q.L.’s objection to the GAL’s participation in the case suggested that the motion
was being lodged to “cause unnecessary delay in hopes of manipulating the outcome of the
underlying relocation action.”
¶ 19 On June 19, 2019, the cause proceeded to a hearing on Q.L.’s motion to substitute
and strike. After restating the allegations set forth in the motion, Q.L. repeatedly argued
that the GAL’s “favoritism and partiality towards her former colleague” was apparent from
the GAL’s report and recommendation. Q.L. denied Y.S.’s suggestion that his motion to
substitute and strike was being brought to delay the upcoming trial, and he indicated that
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he had not begun investigating Y.S.’s “prior professional relationship” with the GAL until
after receiving the GAL’s report.
¶ 20 Y.S. advised the circuit court that the parties and their attorneys had all agreed that
Sholar would be the children’s GAL and that all were aware of the GAL’s position on
SIU’s board of trustees. Y.S. explained that there had been specific discussions as to
whether the GAL’s involvement in the present case presented a potential conflict of
interest, that it had been determined that the GAL’s position on the board would not affect
her ability to render an impartial decision, and that no one had objected to her appointment
at the time. Y.S. further noted that SIUE employs thousands of people and that before being
appointed in the present case, the GAL did not “even know who [Y.S.] was.” Y.S. again
suggested that Q.L.’s motion to substitute and strike was being filed because he did not
approve of the GAL’s recommendation and wanted to delay the proceedings and
“manipulate the evidence.”
¶ 21 The GAL confirmed that “everyone knew” she was on SIU’s board of trustees when
she was appointed in the present case. The GAL indicated that she and Y.S. had never been
colleagues and that she would not have voted on Y.S.’s promotion because the board only
voted on appointments and promotions with salary considerations greater than $150,000.
The GAL further indicated that she was insulted by Q.L.’s suggestion that she was biased,
explaining that she would have recused herself had she thought she could not be impartial.
The GAL also questioned the timing of Q.L.’s motion, suggesting that it had been filed to
prolong the case.
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¶ 22 When questioned by the court, Q.L.’s attorney acknowledged that when the GAL
was appointed, he had been aware that she was affiliated with SIU and that Y.S. worked at
SIUE. The court subsequently denied Q.L.’s motion to substitute the GAL and strike her
report and recommendation, noting that Q.L. could cross-examine her as to any potential
bias at trial.
¶ 23 On June 27, 2019, Q.L. served Dr. Clipper with a subpoena seeking all records
pertaining to B.L.’s counseling and treatment, “including, but not limited to copies of
therapy sessions, treatment records, patient participation notes, doctor’s notes, etc.” On
July 1, 2019, Y.S. moved to quash the subpoena on the grounds that it failed to comply
with section 10(d) of the Illinois Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities
Confidentiality Act (740 ILCS 110/10(d) (West 2018)).
¶ 24 On July 2, 2019, Q.L.’s co-counsel filed an entry of appearance, a motion to
reconsider the denial of Q.L.’s motion to substitute the GAL and strike her report and
recommendation, and a motion to continue the upcoming trial. In the motion to reconsider,
Q.L. maintained, inter alia, that although the GAL might not have acted under “an actual
conflict” of interest, her participation in the case created an appearance of impropriety that
warranted her disqualification.
¶ 25 On July 3, 2019, Q.L. filed a motion seeking the authorization of a subpoena
compelling the release of Clipper’s records pertaining to B.L. The motion advised that in
response to Q.L.’s request for copies of the records, Clipper had only provided “a narrative
summary regarding the minor child’s treatment.” Q.L. asserted that he needed copies of
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the records to prepare for trial, and he requested that the circuit court set the matter for a
hearing.
¶ 26 On July 5, 2019, the circuit court entered an order granting Y.S.’s motion to quash
Q.L.’s request to subpoena Clipper’s records, agreeing that Q.L. had failed to comply with
the applicable statutory requirements. See 740 ILCS 110/10(d) (West 2018). On July 9,
2019, the court entered orders denying Q.L.’s motion to continue the trial, Q.L.’s motion
to reconsider the denial of his motion to substitute and strike, and Q.L.’s motion seeking
the authorization of a subpoena compelling the release of Clipper’s records.
¶ 27 On July 11, 2019, Y.S. filed her position paper in support of her contentions that it
would be in the minors’ best interests that she be designated their primary residential parent
and that she be allowed to relocate them to Indiana. Y.S. indicated that she would be willing
to provide all transportation necessary to accommodate Q.L.’s resulting parenting time,
suggesting, inter alia, that he be given at least six weeks of parenting time every summer.
¶ 28 On July 12, 2019, Q.L. filed his position paper in support of his claim that Y.S.’s
proposed location “would have a terrible impact on the mental health, sense of belonging,
identity, and development of both children.” Noting that he had been the minors’ “primary
residential parent” since August 2018 and that his parents were actively involved in the
minors’ lives, Q.L. argued that the parties’ existing parenting time arrangement should
continue because the children had grown accustomed to it and because the court would be
unable to fashion a reasonable allocation of parenting time if Y.S.’s relocation petition
were granted.
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¶ 29 On July 18, 2019, Q.L. filed a motion in limine requesting that the circuit court
either strike the GAL’s report or compel Clipper to tender his records pertaining to B.L.’s
treatment. The motion suggested, inter alia, that because the GAL had relied on
information obtained from Clipper when preparing her report, Q.L. could not adequately
cross-examine the GAL about her report without the records. The motion alleged that
Clipper had “patently refused to allow [Q.L.] access to these records.” The motion further
intimated that Clipper might have acted as a “silent GAL,” who “performed an assessment
that the GAL [was] not trained to do” and thus acted as “an unappointed expert witness.”
¶ 30 On July 19, 2019, and August 15, 2019, the cause proceeded to a two-day trial,
during which Y.S. testified on her own behalf and called no other witnesses. Q.L. testified
on his own behalf, called the GAL and Clipper as witnesses, and called Y.S. as an adverse
witness. On the first day of the trial, Y.S. and Clipper testified. On the second day, Y.S.,
Q.L., and the GAL testified. At the time of trial, B.L. was 10 and J.L. was 4.
¶ 31 At the outset of the trial, the circuit court announced, “[W]e’re here today on
[Y.S.’s] motion—Petition to Relocate.” When Q.L.’s motion in limine was addressed, Q.L.
apologized for the late filing of the motion but explained that the preparation of his position
paper had taken precedence. After noting that he had previously attempted to obtain copies
of Clipper’s records, Q.L. emphasized that the GAL had repeatedly referenced Clipper
when reporting her observations regarding the statutory factors relevant to Y.S.’s request
to relocate and the allocation of the parties’ parenting time. Q.L. maintained that without
the requested records, he was not prepared to cross-examine Clipper. Q.L. also argued that
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Clipper should not have been permitted to speak with the GAL without Q.L.’s express
consent.
¶ 32 In response, Y.S. noted that although Q.L. had failed to properly request copies of
Clipper’s records, Q.L. had listed Clipper as a witness and could therefore question him
about the records “in open court.” Y.S. further suggested that because the GAL had “a duty
to speak with the counselor,” it was not surprising that the GAL’s report referenced her
conversations with Clipper.
¶ 33 The GAL stated that her communications with Clipper had consisted of telephone
conversations during which they had discussed matters such as their impressions of the
parties, the adjustment of the children, and the progress of the parties’ case. The GAL
advised that she and Clipper had never discussed recommendations because making
recommendations “was not really his function in this case.” The GAL further advised that
she had never seen any of the requested records.
¶ 34 When denying Q.L.’s motion in limine, the circuit court noted that Q.L. had
attempted to obtain Clipper’s records without an order from the court, that Clipper had
provided Q.L. with a summary report of B.L.’s treatment, and that whatever questions
remained about the records in question could be answered when Clipper testified.
¶ 35 Thereafter, Y.S. testified that she had a Ph.D. in electrical engineering and had been
employed as the dean of the college of engineering and computer science at the University
of Evansville since August 1, 2018. She noted that she was the first female engineering
dean in the college’s 100-year history. Y.S. explained that when she was offered the
position, she considered refusing it in light of her pending divorce but then decided that it
12
was an opportunity that she should pursue. She further explained that taking the job resulted
in a significant salary increase and better benefits. Y.S. indicated that she anticipated
working at the university for 20 years. Y.S. testified that she had previously taught at SIUE
for 11 years.
¶ 36 Y.S. testified that she was currently renting an apartment in Newburgh, Indiana, but
was building a house in Newburgh that she anticipated would be completed by October or
November 2019. Y.S. testified that Newburgh was a suburb of Evansville with schools
comparable to those of Edwardsville. Y.S. testified that it took 2½ hours to drive from
Evansville to Glen Carbon.
¶ 37 Y.S. indicated that the parties’ marital problems began after B.L.’s birth in 2009,
when Q.L. became aggressive, demanding, and controlling. Y.S. testified that in 2010,
when she confronted Q.L. about his behavior and suggested that they see a marriage
counselor, he denied that there were any issues to resolve. Y.S. testified that she stopped
wearing her wedding ring at that point and “was really on the edge of filing for divorce
then.” She explained, however, that she decided to wait until Q.L. attained permanent
residency status, which she had already obtained through SIUE. Y.S. testified that she had
also thought that it was in B.L.’s best interests that the parties remain married at the time.
Y.S. testified that she had also been reticent to dissolve the marriage because divorces were
unacceptable in traditional Chinese culture, and she knew that her parents would not
approve of her decision. Y.S. testified that “to this day,” her parents still did not approve
of her decision. When cross-examined, Y.S. acknowledged that she certainly had feelings
of “shame” and “guilt” with respect to the divorce.
13
¶ 38 Y.S. indicated that the parties’ relationship further deteriorated in 2016, when Q.L.’s
parents decided to leave China and move in next door. Y.S. explained that her relationship
with her mother-in-law had never been “great” but she understood that as an only child,
Q.L. was culturally obligated to take care of his parents as they aged. Y.S. indicated that
Q.L.’s parents were often very helpful, but over time, they began “interfering” and
pressuring her with respect to how she was raising the minors, how she cleaned her house,
and how she generally conducted herself as a wife. Y.S. explained that in the traditional
Chinese culture that she and Q.L. were accustomed to, women were expected to be
obedient, supportive housewives as opposed to career professionals. Y.S. also believed that
Q.L. and his parents preferred J.L. over B.L. because J.L. was a boy. Y.S. opined that the
presence of Q.L.’s parents in the children’s lives had been “more positive than negative”
with respect to J.L. but had been “more negative than positive” with respect to B.L. Y.S.
testified that she had not spoken to Q.L.’s parents in over two years.
¶ 39 Y.S. testified that in September 2017, she had mentioned to Q.L. that she might be
interested in obtaining a dean of engineering position. In response, he told her that she did
not have enough experience and was not ready to be a dean. Y.S. testified that she decided
to “try anyway.”
¶ 40 Y.S. testified that on October 21, 2017, Q.L.’s mother told her that they needed to
have a “family meeting.” While Q.L.’s father watched the minors, Q.L. and his mother
admonished Y.S. as to how she should be raising the minors and conducting herself as a
housewife in accordance with Chinese tradition. Y.S. testified that when she challenged
their notions and suggested that she should perhaps “quit [her] job” as a wife and daughter-
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in-law, Q.L.’s mother stated that she did not want Y.S. to divorce Q.L., she just wanted
Y.S. to “improve” herself. Y.S. indicated that she ultimately believed that living next door
to Q.L.’s parents was damaging her mental health.
¶ 41 Y.S. testified that on October 22, 2017, she told Q.L. that she wanted to dissolve
their marriage. In response, Q.L. told her that she could leave at any time so long as the
children stayed with him. When Y.S. advised Q.L. that a judge would determine what
would happen with the children, Q.L. got irritated, threatened to kill her, put his hands
around her neck, and choked her. Y.S. testified that Q.L. stopped when B.L., who had been
listening to the argument, ran into the room. The parties promptly comforted B.L., and Q.L.
assured her that he was not going to kill Y.S. Y.S. indicated that for two weeks thereafter,
B.L. had asked her if Q.L. was “really going to kill” Y.S.
¶ 42 On October 31, 2017, Y.S. filed her petition for dissolution and subsequently
obtained an order of protection against Q.L. Y.S. testified that she might not have had
“enough courage to file for divorce” had B.L. not witnessed the choking incident. Y.S.
explained that she did not want B.L. to believe that a man could “touch her without
permission that way.”
¶ 43 Y.S. testified that when she obtained her position at the University of Evansville
after the parties’ separation, Q.L. told her that she was “just lucky” and had received special
treatment because she was a woman. Y.S. indicated that Q.L. had been very supportive of
her efforts her while they were classmates at Notre Dame, but eventually, he “started to
undermine [her] ability and successes.” Y.S. further indicated that Q.L. had suggested that
she consider giving up her career for the sake of the children.
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¶ 44 Y.S. acknowledged that in addition to advancing her career, “having some distance”
between her and Q.L.’s parents played a “very big role” in her decision to accept her
position at the University of Evansville. Y.S. further explained that she viewed her move
to Indiana as a chance to reestablish herself in a new area where no one was aware of the
problems she and Q.L. had been experiencing.
¶ 45 Y.S. testified that while living in Glen Carbon, she had taken B.L. to all of B.L.’s
drum, ukulele, drawing, and ice-skating classes. Y.S. did not believe that Q.L. had been
very involved in B.L.’s extracurricular activities, but she acknowledged that he had
sometimes taken J.L. to J.L.’s karate lessons.
¶ 46 Y.S. testified that in October 2018, she made a mid-week trip to Glen Carbon to
carve pumpkins with the children and take them trick-or-treating. Y.S. stated that Q.L. had
not participated in either activity and that he commonly did not participate in such activities
with the children.
¶ 47 Y.S. indicated that Q.L.’s parenting style was “really strict” and that hers was “more
lenient.” Explaining that their parenting styles often conflicted, she acknowledged that
when Q.L. became overly strict with the children, she generally reacted by being overly
lax with them. Y.S. testified that Q.L. was “a very academically driven person” and had
very high expectations for B.L. Y.S. stated that Q.L. wanted B.L. to attend an Ivy League
university or the University of Notre Dame. Y.S. explained that if B.L. did not get the
highest possible grades on her report cards, there were consequences. Y.S. indicated that
Q.L. often yelled at B.L. while helping her with her homework. Y.S. suggested that Q.L.’s
teaching methods were potentially undermining B.L.’s confidence. Y.S. admitted that she
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was less concerned about grades and wanted to give B.L. “the freedom to be who she is
without putting too much pressure on her.” Y.S. testified that she did not expect the children
to attend Ivy League schools, and she opined that graduating from a prestigious university
was not “the only way to be successful.”
¶ 48 Y.S. opined that B.L. had been experiencing separation issues due to Y.S.’s removal
from her daughter’s day-to-day life. Y.S. indicated that when she visits the children on the
weekends, B.L. unleashes a “volcano of all the emotions” that she had to suppress during
the week. Y.S. further indicated that she wanted to be a positive role model for B.L. and
did not want either of her children to believe that a Chinese woman’s value lies in her
willingness to be a “stay-at-home mom.” Y.S. acknowledged that J.L. tended to “look up”
to Q.L. more than her. Y.S. further acknowledged that the children were well adjusted to
the Edwardsville area.
¶ 49 Y.S. testified that prior to moving to Indiana, she had been the children’s primary
caregiver. Y.S. indicated that before and after moving to Indiana, she had been primarily
responsible for taking the children to their doctor and dentist appointments. She further
indicated that her present work schedule was very flexible and that she would be able to
transport the children to and from their schools each day. Y.S. testified that the Evansville
area would provide the children numerous opportunities to participate in various activities.
Y.S. indicated that Q.L.’s daily commute and schedule would limit or preclude the children
from participating in extracurricular activities during the workweek. Y.S. explained that
neither of Q.L.’s parents drive or speak English.
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¶ 50 Y.S. testified that she had an established network of friends and contacts in
Newburgh and had recently joined the board of directors for the Girl Scouts in Evansville.
Y.S. opined that the minors would have no problems assimilating into the community and
schools. Y.S. further testified that if the children were allowed to relocate, her parents
would likely visit from China and assist in the transition. Y.S. stated that her parents had
previously traveled to Glen Carbon to visit the children, that she had previously taken the
children to China to visit her parents, and that her parents and the children had a good
relationship.
¶ 51 Y.S. opined that allowing B.L. and J.L. to relocate to Indiana to live with her would
be in the children’s best interests and would have a positive impact on their lives. She
believed that she would be a better caregiver than Q.L. because she had closer emotional
bonds with the children and had “a better temperament to educate them.” Y.S. suggested
that the children “could decide on their own which parent they want to be with when they’re
older.” Y.S. testified that she believed that the children would generally “do better” living
in Indiana with her. Y.S. acknowledged that in her discovery interrogatories, she had stated
that young children should not be separated from their mothers.
¶ 52 Y.S. testified that if the minors were not allowed to relocate to Indiana, her primary
concern would be that Q.L.’s strict parenting style might preclude B.L. from being able to
“express herself without feeling pressure.” Y.S. was also concerned that Q.L. might limit
or interfere with her parenting time. Additionally, in light of several of the comments that
Q.L. had already made to the children, Y.S. did not believe that he would facilitate the
children’s relationship with her. Y.S. disagreed with Q.L.’s apparent belief that a
18
dissolution necessarily entails “choosing between two parents and one parent.” Y.S.
suspected that Q.L. had been attempting to influence B.L.’s views about the parties’
divorce.
¶ 53 Y.S. testified that since moving to Indiana, she had been seeing the minors every
weekend at the parties’ marital home in Glen Carbon. Y.S. indicated that she and Q.L. had
basically been living together on the weekends and that he had refused her requests that he
give her and the children time alone. She further indicated that Q.L. often used the visits
as opportunities to discuss the parties’ separation in front of the children. Y.S. suggested
that a divorce is a particularly unfortunate situation when children are involved and that it
is best to “keep the divorce discussions” between the adults.
¶ 54 Y.S. testified that the children had visited her in Newburgh over their spring break,
but Q.L. had not met her in Mt. Vernon for the attendant custody exchanges. Y.S. testified
that the children liked her apartment and had a good time during the visit. Y.S. testified
that Q.L. had told the children that he would not visit them in Indiana if they moved there
with Y.S.
¶ 55 Y.S. testified that she had not told Q.L. that she was building a house in Newburgh,
but his attorney had advised him that she was doing so. Y.S. indicated that during a
visitation weekend at the marital home in April 2019, Q.L. had confronted her about her
decision to “settle down in Indiana.” When Y.S. started to leave to avoid an argument, Q.L.
took her keys and wallet. Y.S. testified that in response, she exited the house and walked
around the subdivision for several hours. When she returned, Q.L. returned her keys and
19
wallet, and she drove back to Newburgh at 2 a.m. Y.S. described Q.L.’s conduct during the
incident as “pretty typical of his behavior.”
¶ 56 Y.S. testified that three nights before the commencement of the trial, she was on a
business trip in Cape Girardeau, Missouri, and Q.L. unexpectedly showed up at her hotel
room with the children. Y.S. testified that Q.L. had tried to convince her “to stay married
for the sake of the children.” Y.S. explained that Q.L. had the children vote as to whether
they wanted to have two parents or one parent, and when they both voted “both parents,”
Q.L. advised her that she had lost the vote and should thus return home and remain married.
Y.S. indicated that she did not relent and that the following morning Q.L. angrily left
without the children, saying “I give up.” He then told her that she could have the kids and
the house and that they would never see him again. Y.S. indicated that she had to take the
children to a business meeting that morning, where J.L. stated in front of her colleagues
that his dad was “gone forever.” Y.S. testified that B.L. had since been asking if Q.L. was
really “going to leave forever.” Y.S. testified that she had assured B.L. that “daddy is just
mad, and he will come around.” Y.S. testified that B.L. had later told her that on the way
to Cape Girardeau, Q.L. had told the minors that “the mission was to convince mommy to
return home.”
¶ 57 Y.S. testified that the night before the commencement of the trial, Q.L. told the
children that the parties were going to court “to fight,” that Y.S. had been lying to them,
and that “she’s not coming back.” Y.S. further testified that on the morning of the
commencement of the trial, Q.L. told her not to “play victim” and referred to her as a
selfish, “cold-hearted person” who was not “putting the children first.”
20
¶ 58 Y.S. testified that Q.L. was “a really good person when he’s not angry” and that she
did not believe that he would ever physically harm either of the children. Y.S. testified that
Q.L. had recently advised her that he had not yelled at B.L. in several months. Y.S.
indicated that she highly respected Q.L. as a father and a scientist.
¶ 59 Y.S. testified that she did not relocate to Indiana to frustrate Q.L.’s relationships
with the minors. Y.S. testified that the children loved Q.L. and that she wanted him to be
involved in the children’s lives. Y.S. indicated that she was willing to communicate with
Q.L. so that they could effectively discuss all significant decisions regarding the children’s
education, activities, and medical needs. Y.S. indicated that religion would not be an issue.
Y.S. suggested that the parties’ parental responsibilities be jointly held.
¶ 60 Y.S. testified that she would encourage the children’s relationship with their father.
Y.S. testified that she wanted Q.L. to have a reasonable amount of parenting time so that
he could see the children on a regular basis. Y.S. testified that she was willing to drive the
children to and from Glen Carbon for parenting time with Q.L. if necessary. Y.S. stated
that if Q.L. wanted to drive to Indiana to visit the children, he could do so at any time and
could stay at her house. Y.S. testified that she was also willing to give Q.L. extended
parenting time over the children’s holiday and summer breaks. Y.S. testified that if she had
to take a business trip, she would give him the right of first refusal to care for the minors
in her absence.
¶ 61 Clipper testified that he was a licensed family and marriage counselor with a Ph.D.
in counseling and marriage therapy and had been performing clinical evaluations and
counseling services since the 1980s. Clipper acknowledged that he was not a psychiatrist
21
and that his opinions were based on his experience and training. Clipper testified that he
received client referrals from several GALs, including Sholar. Clipper indicated that he
received approximately 25 GAL referrals per year. Clipper further indicated that the type
of counseling that he provided in a particular case depended on the persons and issues
involved.
¶ 62 Clipper testified that in the present case, the GAL had asked him to counsel B.L.
because the child was seemingly experiencing difficulties dealing with the parties’
separation and Y.S.’s move to Indiana. Clipper had not been asked to evaluate B.L.’s
family with regard to any custody issues, and it was never his intent to do so. Clipper
indicated that while counseling B.L., he had met with her by herself, had met with her and
Y.S., had met with her and Q.L., had met with her and the parties together, and had met
with the parties individually.
¶ 63 Clipper acknowledged that he was aware that his impressions of B.L.’s situation
would potentially be relevant in the present case. Clipper further acknowledged that his
role in the present case had not been to evaluate the parties’ parenting abilities. Clipper
testified that he believed that Q.L. knew that B.L.’s counseling would result in
communications with the GAL.
¶ 64 When presented with the GAL’s report to the court, Clipper was confronted with
the portions that referenced his communications with the GAL and his statements and
opinions regarding the parties’ case. Clipper acknowledged that information he provided
had thus been used in her evaluation of the parties’ parental abilities. Clipper explained
that he viewed his communications with the GAL as “comparing” and “contrasting” their
22
impressions, but he acknowledged his awareness that anything he said to her had the
potential to influence her views.
¶ 65 Clipper testified that he and the GAL had briefly spoken about the parties’ case over
the telephone on three separate occasions. Clipper indicated that during each conversation,
he had generally apprised her as to how B.L. and the parties were functioning and
progressing. Clipper indicated that he believed that he was authorized to freely discuss the
case with the GAL because she had instructed the parties to consult him and neither were
existing clients. Clipper further indicated that assessing B.L.’s situation required him to
assess the parties’ situation as well.
¶ 66 Clipper testified that although he viewed B.L. as the client he was counseling, he
had also had “a therapeutic relationship with the family because they were participating.”
When asked whether Q.L. had given him permission to discuss the therapeutic relationship
with the GAL, Clipper stated that Q.L. understood that “they were there because of the
GAL.” Clipper further stated that he believed that Y.S. and Q.L. both understood that he
would be sharing information with the GAL. Clipper indicated that although he “made it
clear” that such was the case, in retrospect, he should have had them sign an appropriate
release.
¶ 67 Clipper acknowledged that when Q.L. requested and signed a release for the records
memorializing B.L.’s therapeutic sessions, he responded by providing Q.L. with a
summary of the records. Clipper explained that as a matter of policy, he does not give
records out to “individuals” and only provides summaries. Clipper further explained that
he will only provide copies of his records to the circuit court when ordered to do so. Clipper
23
indicated that he would have allowed Q.L. to review the records with him at his office,
however, had Q.L. made such a request.
¶ 68 When asked what discussions he and the GAL had with respect to Q.L., Clipper
testified that they had discussed matters such as the parties’ interactions with B.L. and the
parties’ personalities and parenting styles. Clipper testified that they had not discussed
matters such as which parent should have more time with the children or what would be in
the children’s best interests. They had, however, discussed “how the parents interacted and
how they would support each other’s role as parents.” Clipper testified that he made no
recommendations to the GAL and that they never discussed her report. Clipper also noted
that the GAL was capable of forming her own opinions.
¶ 69 Clipper acknowledged that many of his beliefs that were cited in the GAL’s report
were relevant with respect to the statutory factors that a court must consider when
determining the best interests of a child. Clipper explained, however, that he did not
perceive that by expressing his personal opinions to the GAL, he was necessarily
evaluating the factors for the court’s consideration. With respect to his cited belief
regarding Y.S.’s willingness to facilitate a relationship with Q.L., for instance, Clipper
explained, “[T]he question might have been do you think mom can support dad and the
relationship, and I said yes.”
¶ 70 At the conclusion of Clipper’s testimony, Q.L. moved to strike Clipper’s testimony
“both in court here today as well as in the [GAL’s] report.” Q.L. argued that striking
Clipper’s testimony was warranted because Clipper had not been disclosed as an expert
24
witness. Q.L. further maintained that he had called Clipper as a witness “out of necessity”
because Clipper’s opinions had been relied on to analyze the relevant statutory factors.
¶ 71 In response, the GAL observed that it was odd that Q.L. was moving to strike the
testimony of a witness who he, himself, had called. Maintaining that the court could
properly consider her entire report, the GAL noted that Q.L. could question her about its
contents when he called her to the stand.
¶ 72 The circuit court denied Q.L.’s motion to strike Clipper’s testimony, noting that
Clipper had not been tasked with evaluating the statutory factors. The court further noted
that it had previously denied Q.L.’s request that the GAL’s report be stricken.
¶ 73 The GAL subsequently cross-examined Clipper and questioned him as to the
specific discussions they had about the parties’ case. Clipper again indicated that when
they discussed the parties, the conversations generally focused on the parties’ personalities
and parenting styles. Clipper recalled advising the GAL that the parties were effectively
coparenting and that B.L. was doing well living with her father. Clipper further recalled
advising the GAL that the parties were “essentially making the best of a bad situation.”
Clipper reiterated that he was aware that their discussions could potentially be included in
her report and that he had offered her no recommendations.
¶ 74 When the trial resumed on August 15, 2019, the circuit court stated, “[W]e are back
on the record for a Petition for Relocation.” Y.S. then testified on her own behalf,
describing events that had occurred since July 19, 2019. Y.S. testified that on the morning
of August 5, 2019, as she was leaving the marital home to drive back to Indiana, Q.L. had
tried to convince her to dismiss the divorce, return to Glen Carbon, and “start over.” Y.S.
25
stated that when she declined the offer, Q.L. responded by screaming that he was going to
“take the kids and drive to the river.” He then physically blocked the front door to prevent
Y.S. from leaving. The argument woke B.L. up, and she ended up dragging Q.L. away
from the door so that Y.S. could leave the house.
¶ 75 Y.S. testified that a few hours later, Q.L. called her stating that he was going to
“give up the fight” and that she could have the kids. A few hours after that, Q.L. dropped
the minors off at Y.S.’s apartment in Newburgh and left.
¶ 76 Y.S. testified that the following night, Q.L. returned to Newburgh and advised her
that he had changed his mind and wanted to take the children back to Glen Carbon. Y.S.
indicated that the children had not wanted to go with him.
¶ 77 When cross-examined about the recent events, Y.S. acknowledged that she had not
been concerned about the children’s safety even though Q.L. had indicated that he would
drive them into a river. Y.S. explained that “he just said those things.”
¶ 78 When subsequently questioned as an adverse witness, Y.S. was asked why her
petition to relocate the minors did not reference the October 22, 2017, domestic violence
incident. In response, Y.S. explained that the incident had been the basis for her dissolution
petition but that her new job in Evansville had been the basis for her petition to relocate.
¶ 79 When asked what her proposed parenting time schedule would be in the event that
her request to relocate the minors were granted, Y.S. indicated that she would be willing
to drive the children to and from Glen Carbon two weekends per month and that Q.L. could
visit them in Newburgh whenever he wanted. Y.S. further indicated that she would be
willing to drive the children to and from Glen Carbon every weekend if necessary.
26
¶ 80 Q.L. testified that he was employed as a research and development scientist, that he
resided at the marital home with the parties’ children, and that his parents lived next door.
Q.L. indicated that having his parents nearby was convenient and beneficial to him and the
children.
¶ 81 Q.L. stated that B.L. took the school bus to and from school and that his parents fed
her dinner when she returned home. Q.L. testified that he took J.L. to and from preschool
on his way to and from work and that they ate dinner together when they returned home.
Q.L. indicated that the children had an established routine that worked well.
¶ 82 Q.L. acknowledged that he was strict with B.L. with respect to her homework and
that as a matter of Chinese tradition, perfect grades were expected. Q.L. explained that he
wanted B.L. to excel academically so that she could someday attend an elite college if she
wanted to do so. Q.L. testified that he had enrolled B.L. in a karate class to boost her
confidence, but she decided to “give up on that.”
¶ 83 Q.L. testified that the parties’ financial situation was solid and that Y.S. did not need
to change jobs for monetary reasons. Q.L. testified that he was not an aggressive person
and that Y.S. knew that he would never hurt her. Q.L. testified that he had completed a 26-
week partner abuse intervention program following the October 22, 2017, incident at the
marital home.
¶ 84 Q.L. suggested that Y.S. did not have an established support group in the Evansville
area and that her new job would require her to frequently travel. Q.L. noted that
Edwardsville’s Chinese-American community was larger than Evansville’s, that B.L. and
27
J.L. both spoke fluent Chinese, and that B.L. had many Chinese friends. Q.L. further noted
that the Indiana branch of the KKK had been founded in Evansville.
¶ 85 Over Y.S.’s relevancy objections, Q.L. testified that in October 2016, he and his
family had been discriminated against on the basis of their race while visiting an
amusement park in southern Indiana. Q.L. indicated that he and his family did not like
drinking tap water and that based on Chinese tradition, they only drank warm water. When
they attempted to bring their own warm water into the amusement park, they were told that
there were no outside beverages allowed. When the circuit court suggested that the park’s
outside-beverage restriction likely applied to everyone who entered the park, Q.L.
indicated that he believed that he had been discriminated against because “[w]ater is not a
beverage.”
¶ 86 Q.L. testified that he objected to Y.S.’s relocation petition because the children were
well adjusted to their present environment and would be slow to adjust to a new one. He
further objected because both minors, especially B.L., wanted to see both parties
frequently.
¶ 87 Q.L. testified that J.L. had recently been acting aggressively towards him. Q.L.
suggested that J.L.’s behavior was attributable to Y.S.’s tendency to spoil the child with
candy and toys. Q.L. testified that during B.L.’s counseling sessions, he never considered
himself to be Clipper’s patient and that the sessions were solely intended to help B.L. with
her separation issues.
¶ 88 Q.L. testified that he wanted the children to remain in Glen Carbon and wanted the
parties’ present parenting time schedule to continue. Q.L. estimated that if Y.S. continued
28
visiting the children at the marital home every weekend, with spring break and additional
time in the summer, she would be able to see the children “probably half of the year.” Q.L.
testified that his relationship with the children would degrade under Y.S.’s proposed
allocation. Q.L. testified that Y.S. could visit the children and stay at the marital home
whenever she wanted. Q.L. testified that he was willing to facilitate a relationship between
the children and Y.S. Q.L. testified that he would drive to Indiana to visit the children if he
had to, but he “definitely” did not want to. Q.L. acknowledged that other than the times
that he had driven to Newburgh on August 5 and 6, Y.S. had “done all the driving” back
and forth from Indiana. Q.L. indicated that he would be willing to meet in Mt. Vernon for
weekend custody exchanges if ordered to do so.
¶ 89 When Q.L. subsequently called the GAL as a witness, the circuit court, having
previously advised the parties that it had another trial scheduled in the afternoon,
admonished him to “restrict the questions” to matters that were relevant.
¶ 90 The GAL subsequently testified that she had been present during both days of the
trial and that the parties’ testimony had reinforced her reported recommendation. When
counsel commenced questioning the GAL with respect to her position on SIU’s board of
trustees, Y.S. objected, and the circuit court reminded counsel that the issue had already
been explored. The court indicated it would allow Q.L. some leeway to explore the GAL’s
possible bias, but it was not going to allow his attorney to relitigate the motion to substitute
the GAL and strike her report.
¶ 91 Again, acknowledging that she had been on the board of trustees when she was
appointed in the present case, the GAL testified that she did not know who Y.S. was before
29
being appointed. The GAL explained that she first learned that Y.S. worked for SIUE
during their initial interview, when Y.S. stated that she was leaving her job at SIUE and
taking a new job in Evansville.
¶ 92 When asked if she was involved in any other civic organizations, the GAL indicated
that she did charity work and served on a local community development board. When the
GAL was asked what kind of charity work she did, the circuit court interjected and
explained that it was not going to allow counsel to “fish for bias” as if the hearing were a
deposition. The court noted that Q.L. could have deposed the GAL prior to trial but
apparently chose not to do so. As an offer of proof, counsel subsequently represented that
counsel had reason to believe that the GAL had recently been involved “in a civic
organization devoted to the enhancement of women in the law and women professionals in
general.” Suggesting that making an offer of proof on the matter was “ridiculous,” the court
directed counsel to ask the GAL a direct question. Counsel subsequently asked the GAL if
she was a member of the “Madison County Women’s Bar Association.” In response, the
GAL indicated that she was on the “e-mail chain” of a group of women from the Madison
County Bar Association that periodically met for lunch. The GAL further indicated that
she might have gone to one of the luncheons six or seven years ago.
¶ 93 Thereafter, the GAL testified as to how she generally interacted with the parties in
a custody dispute and how she specifically interacted with the parties in the present case.
The GAL was asked numerous questions about her interactions and impressions of B.L.
and J.L. The GAL testified that Y.S. and B.L. had both been suffering from apparent
anxiety. The GAL recommended that B.L. see Clipper and that Y.S. “reach out for her own
30
individual counseling.” The GAL stated that she had referred B.L. to Clipper because he
was “well accustomed with the courts and divorce” and was actively involved in numerous
Madison County cases. The GAL acknowledged that she had worked with Clipper on prior
occasions and trusted his judgment. The GAL indicated that she worked with several
counselors and did not recall insisting that the parties use Clipper.
¶ 94 The GAL indicated that she had been serving as a GAL for 16 years and was
generally appointed in cases that had become difficult and challenging for the family
members involved. She explained that as a result, she referred many children to therapy.
The GAL further explained that a referral for the counseling of a couple’s children will
often result in counseling for the couple. The GAL indicated that when she works with
families, she asks that they sign releases with any counselors she refers them to so that she
can communicate with the counselors. The GAL indicated that the manner in which the
releases were obtained was “entirely up to the counselor.” The GAL acknowledged that
she and Clipper had discussed the present case and that she received a copy of the
counseling summary that Q.L. had obtained.
¶ 95 The GAL explained that she made her own recommendations in the cases that she
worked and that she generally viewed Clipper as “just another set of eyes.” The GAL
further explained that Clipper only gave recommendations when he was appointed to act
as a custody evaluator. When asked whether Clipper’s opinions had affected any of hers,
the GAL indicated that she “would have likely” arrived at the same conclusions without
his opinions but that she was always interested in hearing from “third-party, independent
sources.” The GAL extensively testified regarding many of the matters upon which she
31
and Clipper had agreed. The GAL recalled that Clipper had referred to the parties’ as “two
great parents” and had referred to their situation as a “sad case.”
¶ 96 While discussing other information that she had obtained during her investigation,
the GAL testified that she had visited Y.S.’s apartment in Newburgh in May 2019. The
GAL explained that housing was not a concern, and she was extensively questioned about
her visit to Newburgh. In response, the GAL testified, inter alia, that the visit had been
preapproved by the parties and that she had toured the schools the minors would attend if
they moved. The GAL acknowledged that when she went to Indiana the month before she
filed her report, she was “already leaning towards recommending” that Y.S.’s request to
relocate be granted.
¶ 97 The GAL explained that while she believed that J.L. could readily adapt to any set
of circumstances, B.L. and Y.S. were very close, and B.L. would ultimately suffer if she
and Y.S. were separated. The GAL acknowledged that Clipper had indicated that B.L. “was
adjusting fairly well to mom being away.” The GAL further acknowledged that B.L. had
become more independent since Y.S. had moved to Indiana. The GAL was aware that Q.L.
did not want to dissolve the parties’ marriage.
¶ 98 The GAL testified as to various facts and factors that she considered when forming
her opinions, and she acknowledged that cultural issues played a part in the present case.
The GAL indicated that she was not qualified to state whether “the traditional Chinese
culture is a little closed and prefers to be among other Chinese.” The GAL acknowledged
that Q.L.’s broken English was sometimes hard to understand, but she denied the
suggestion that it may have affected her judgment. The GAL acknowledged that although
32
she had visited the marital home in Glen Carbon, she had not spoken with any of the
children’s friends and had not obtained the services of a translator so that she could speak
with Q.L.’s parents. She noted, however, that it was undisputed that while Q.L.’s parents
were actively involved in the children’s lives, his parents’ relationship with Y.S. was “very
strained.” The GAL further noted that Q.L.’s parents were an asset to the children and
helped him attend to the children’s needs during the week.
¶ 99 The GAL testified that Y.S. had reported that she would not have to extensively
travel for her job but would have to occasionally attend events at the university. Y.S.
explained that the university had a nanny service available if she needed it. The GAL
testified that she hoped that Y.S. would have Q.L. watch the children when she traveled.
When asked if Q.L. had watched the kids during Y.S.’s recent business trips, the GAL
testified that since the minors were living with Q.L., she assumed that such was the case.
When counsel asked whether the GAL’s custody recommendation would change were she
to ever learn that Y.S. “had somebody other than the dad watch the kids because of a work
commitment,” Y.S. objected, noting that the question called for speculation. The circuit
court sustained the objection and denied counsel’s request to make an offer of proof on the
matter. When the GAL was subsequently asked whether there was any evidence that could
have been offered that would have changed her recommendation, Y.S. objected, noting that
that question likewise called for speculation. The court again sustained Y.S.’s objection
and denied counsel’s request to make an offer of proof on the matter.
¶ 100 The GAL testified that both parties could adequately parent the children alone. The
GAL testified that both parties were actively involved in the minors’ lives and that both
33
children were well bonded with both parents. The GAL indicated that when the parties’
efforts and parenting styles were combined and considered together, the parties did “a great
job covering all the needs” of the children. The GAL noted that both parties were highly
educated and that the minors were extremely intelligent. The GAL explained that since the
parties’ separation, however, acting as “a complete unit” had become more difficult. The
GAL noted that Y.S. had been driving to and from Glen Carbon every weekend to visit the
minors since she moved to Indiana.
¶ 101 The GAL testified that one of her primary concerns in the present case was the
potential impact the proposed relocation might have on Q.L.’s parenting time. The GAL
explained that she wanted Q.L. to be involved in the minors’ lives as much as possible.
The GAL testified that Y.S. was willing to facilitate a reasonable visitation arrangement
but that Q.L. had repeatedly advised that he did not want to drive to see the children. The
GAL opined that Q.L.’s recent behavior had further indicated that he could not “facilitate
a relationship in the way that mom can.” The GAL noted that Y.S. was willing to drive the
children to and from Glen Carbon two weekends a month and that she was willing to allow
Q.L. to visit the children in Indiana whenever he wanted. The GAL suggested that a three-
weekend per month visitation schedule at the marital home could likely be negotiated. The
GAL recommended that Q.L. also be given the majority of the summertime so that he and
his parents would have extended periods of visitation with the minors.
¶ 102 The GAL testified that relocation cases are never easy and that her
recommendations in such cases are never made “lightly.” The GAL acknowledged that
contentious situations can lead to “irrational behavior at times.” The GAL explained that
34
although her recommendation that Y.S. be allowed to relocate the children had been very
difficult to make when she prepared her report, it was “less difficult” for her to make the
same recommendation after hearing the parties’ testimony. The GAL testified that she had
tried not to consider the parties’ marital disagreements when preparing her report but that
Q.L.’s recent behavior suggested that he viewed their custody dispute as “a control issue.”
Emphasizing that her role was to represent the minors’ best interests, the GAL further noted
that Q.L.’s recent behavior had likely confused the children. The GAL opined that the
children would “be better suited residing with mom.” The GAL reiterated her
recommendation that the children be allowed to relocate to Indiana with Y.S. and that Q.L.
be allocated as much parenting time as possible.
¶ 103 At the conclusion of the hearing, recognizing that the school year was commencing,
the circuit court announced that it was granting Y.S.’s petition to relocate the minors to
Indiana. The court stated that it was a “very tough decision” to make but that it was in the
minors’ best interests that Y.S.’s home be their “primary residence.” The court awarded
Q.L. parenting time at the marital residence every weekend pending the entry of an order
establishing a permanent parenting time schedule and directed that the parties’ custody
exchanges occur in Mt. Vernon.
¶ 104 A few hours later, Q.L. filed a 16-page motion asking the circuit court to either
reconsider its ruling or vacate its judgment. The motion argued, inter alia, that the court
erred in not compelling Clipper to produce his records and that Clipper’s testimony “tainted
the entire trial process.” Q.L. maintained, inter alia, that Clipper had testified as an expert
witness without being disclosed as such, that Clipper’s communications with the GAL were
35
unauthorized, and that although it was “unclear” what information Clipper had relayed to
the GAL, Clipper had violated Q.L.’s “confidentiality rights.”
¶ 105 On September 12, 2019, Q.L. filed a motion for an extension of time to file an
amended motion to reconsider or vacate, asserting various reasons why an extension was
necessary. On September 16, 2019, and September 26, 2019, noting that the circuit court
had not yet ruled on his previous motion, Q.L. filed renewed motions for an extension of
time. On September 27, 2019, the circuit court set the matter for an October 9, 2019,
hearing. On October 9, 2019, over Y.S.’s objection, Q.L. was granted until October 24,
2019, to file his amended posttrial motion.
¶ 106 On October 16, 2019, the circuit court entered a written order on its August 15,
2019, bench ruling. When memorializing its decision to grant Y.S.’s relocation petition,
the court indicated that its consideration of the relevant statutory factors had been
significantly influenced by Q.L.’s recent conduct. The court noted, inter alia, that Q.L. had
been placing “as much cultural pressure on [Y.S.] as possible in the hope that she would
capitulate to his desires.” The court found that Q.L. had “enlisted his attorneys, his
traditional Chinese parents, and at times[,] his innocent children, in his efforts to place the
full cultural dishonor and shame on [Y.S.] for having ambition beyond her traditional
Chinese mother/wife caste.” The court stated that while it was sympathetic to Q.L.’s views
regarding discipline and hard work, it was not sympathetic to Q.L.’s bias against women
or “his attempts to manipulate the children.” The court indicated, however, that it had
“intentionally considered its own bias” so that the best interests of the minors “would be
the only considerations.”
36
¶ 107 The court also referenced Q.L.’s abusive behavior towards Y.S., noting that
although Y.S.’s culture had groomed her to accept Q.L.’s mistreatment, the court was not
required to ignore it. The court specifically noted that on two separate occasions, B.L. had
been “put into the middle of physical altercations between her parents,” which was “an
overwhelming fact that weighed heavily in favor of granting the petition for relocation.”
¶ 108 The court indicated that the obvious “switch” in Q.L.’s legal tactics following the
filing of the GAL’s report and recommendation was also revealing. Noting that the parties
had wanted to conclude the trial prior to the start of the upcoming school year, that all
discovery had been required to be completed before the trial date was set, and that Q.L.’s
request that a Chinese translator be present at trial had previously been granted, the court
observed that “after being certain the matter was ready for trial a month earlier,” Q.L. had
engaged in a series of delay tactics after receiving the GAL’s report recommending that
Y.S.’s petition to relocate be granted. Rejecting Q.L.’s suggestions that he had not been
aware of the GAL’s position on SIU’s board of trustees until after receiving her report, the
court concluded that his motion to substitute the GAL and strike her report had been filed
to cause delay and to otherwise give Q.L. “another bite at the apple on the GAL
recommendation.” The court suggested that Q.L.’s attempts to obtain Clipper’s records had
been halfhearted and likewise made to cause unnecessary delay. The court noted that Q.L.’s
co-counsel entered her appearance 12 days before the set date of the trial and had
immediately requested, inter alia, that the trial be continued. The court further noted that
delaying the trial would have ensured that the minors’ upcoming school year would not
37
have commenced in Indiana, which would have furthered his position that the children
should remain with him.
¶ 109 When discussing the factors relevant to Y.S.’s petition to relocate, the court noted,
inter alia, that both parties were admirably committed to their children, that both parties
had done a remarkable job coparenting and maximizing their roles as parents, and that both
children were undoubtedly bonded with Q.L.’s parents. The court also noted that the
present case was a “very difficult case” and that the relocation would likely cause the
children considerable “short[-]term pain.” The court concluded, however, that in the long
run, it was in the children’s best interests that Y.S.’s petition be granted.
¶ 110 With respect to the allocation of the parties’ decision-making responsibilities, the
court noted that both parties had conceded that the responsibilities would be shared and
that nothing suggested that they would be unable to jointly make decisions with the
children’s best interests in mind. The court accordingly ordered that the parties’ decision-
making responsibilities be shared with respect to both minors.
¶ 111 With respect to the allocation of parenting time, the circuit court noted that although
“primary parenting time” had been decided by the granting of Y.S.’s petition to relocate,
the court was nevertheless required to allocate Q.L.’s parenting time according to the
children’s best interests. After considering the relevant statutory factors, the court “made
permanent” the temporary visitation schedule that had been ordered on August 15, 2019,
but did not address the minors’ spring, holiday, or summer breaks. The court directed the
parties to submit a final parenting time order within 30 days and set the cause for a
November 2019 case management conference.
38
¶ 112 On October 24, 2019, Q.L. filed a 36-page amended motion to reconsider or vacate
judgment. In addition to realleging Q.L.’s previous claims pertaining to Clipper’s
testimony and records, the amended motion argued, inter alia, that the circuit court acted
outside the scope of its jurisdiction when entering its order awarding Y.S. the “primary
allocation” of parenting time because the “issue of allocation” was not before the court and
that the court erred in prohibiting Q.L.’s counsel from making offers of proof when
questioning the GAL. With respect to the offers of proof, Q.L. suggested that had he been
allowed to ask the GAL the questions that he had wanted to ask, she would have changed
her opinions and recommendation, and the result of the trial would have been different.
¶ 113 On November 12, 2019, Q.L. filed a motion to clarify the circuit court’s directive
that the parties submit a final parenting time order for the court’s approval. In the motion
to clarify, Q.L. again argued that the circuit court lacked the jurisdiction to allocate the
parties’ parenting time, stating that “the issue that was tried in July and August 2019 was
that of relocation, not allocation.”
¶ 114 On November 20, 2019, the cause proceeded to the previously scheduled case
management conference. The record on appeal does not include a transcript of the
proceeding, but in its docket entry, the circuit court stated, “If the parties are unable to
jointly decide the 2019 holidays[,] they need to contact [the GAL] to get a
recommendation. Until further order, the previous parenting time [schedule] shall be
adhered to unless the parties agree otherwise.” On November 20, 2019, the court also
denied Q.L.’s amended motion to reconsider or vacate judgment, entered judgment on its
39
order granting Y.S.’s petition to relocate, and set the cause for a January 2020 case
management conference.
¶ 115 On November 22, 2019, Y.S. filed a petition for temporary relief, indicating that
there had been a substantial change of circumstances in that it was no longer feasible for
the parties to meet in Mt. Vernon every weekend for their custody exchanges. The petition
further advised that there was presently no schedule in place for the minors’ spring,
holiday, or summer breaks. The petition requested that the circuit court enter an order
modifying Q.L.’s parenting time and establishing a visitation schedule for the minors’
breaks. On November 26, 2019, Q.L. filed a timely notice of appeal from the circuit court’s
judgment denying his amended motion to reconsider or vacate judgment.
¶ 116 DISCUSSION
¶ 117 On appeal, Q.L. does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
circuit court’s determination that it was in the minors’ best interests that they be allowed
to relocate to Indiana with Y.S. He rather argues that we should vacate the circuit court’s
judgment and remand the cause for a new trial because the GAL had a conflict of interest,
the circuit court was admittedly biased, and the circuit court’s rulings with respect to his
offers of proof and his attempts to obtain Clipper’s records denied him a fair hearing. Q.L.
maintains that on remand, a new GAL should be appointed, and the cause should be
assigned to a new judge. Q.L. further argues that the circuit court was not authorized to
enter an order allocating the parties’ parenting time in conjunction with its order granting
Y.S.’s relocation petition. Having thoroughly reviewed the record, we conclude that none
of these claims are meritorious.
40
¶ 118 At the outset, we will address Q.L.’s argument that the circuit court was biased.
“Judges, of course, are presumed impartial, and the burden of overcoming the presumption
by showing prejudicial trial conduct or personal bias rests on the party making the charge.”
In re Marriage of O’Brien, 2011 IL 109039, ¶ 31. Because a judge’s allegedly erroneous
findings and rulings are insufficient reasons to believe that the judge had a personal bias
for or against a party, “the party making the charge of prejudice must present evidence of
prejudicial trial conduct and evidence of the judge’s personal bias.” Eychaner v. Gross,
202 Ill. 2d 228, 280 (2002). Furthermore, judicial remarks indicating disapproval or
hostility to a party will not support a claim of judicial bias unless the remarks “ ‘reveal
such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible.’ ” Id.
at 281 (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)).
¶ 119 Here, emphasizing that in the circuit court’s written judgment order, the court stated
that it had “considered its own bias,” Q.L. suggests that the circuit court’s “self-admitted
bias” permeated the proceedings below and improperly influenced the court’s judgment.
Q.L. maintains, inter alia, that on the second day of trial, the circuit court displayed its bias
by forcing him to hurriedly present his evidence and by improperly limiting his cross-
examination of the GAL with respect to her bias. We reject these contentions as belied by
the record.
¶ 120 We initially note that in context, the circuit court’s reference to its “own bias” was
a reference to its self-admitted bias against Q.L.’s bias against women and Q.L.’s “attempts
to manipulate the children.” More importantly, however, is that the court specifically stated
that it had “intentionally considered its own bias” so that the best interests of the minors
41
“would be the only considerations.” The circuit court was in the best position to determine
whether it was prejudiced against Q.L. (see Kamelgard v. American College of Surgeons,
385 Ill. App. 3d 675, 681 (2008)), and considered in context, the court’s comments fail to
demonstrate an inability to render a fair judgment or “control [its] personal biases,” as Q.L.
asserts on appeal. The comments rather reveal that the circuit court was aware of its
personal biases and consciously set them aside.
¶ 121 We find Q.L.’s contentions that the circuit court forced him to present his case in
“short and scant” fashion and improperly limited his cross-examination of the GAL are
also unsupported by the record. We initially note that on the first day of trial, the circuit
court admonished Q.L. that while he was entitled to make “a good clean record,” many of
his inquiries tended to delve into irrelevant matters, “minutia,” and material that had
already been covered. The court also observed that Q.L. tended to divide general questions
into “itty bitty parts.” On several occasions, the court prompted Q.L. to “move on” or
“please keep moving.” As previously noted, on the second day of trial, the circuit court
admonished the parties that it had another trial scheduled that afternoon, and when Q.L.
called the GAL to testify, the court specifically admonished him to “restrict the questions”
to matters that were relevant. The court further advised him that while it would allow him
some leeway to explore the GAL’s possible bias, it was not going to allow him to relitigate
his motion to substitute the GAL and strike her report.
¶ 122 Despite the circuit court’s admonishments, when questioning Y.S. and the GAL on
the second day of trial, Q.L. repeatedly questioned them as to matters that had previously
been addressed and repeatedly attempted to explore matters that had little or no relevance.
42
In response, the circuit court repeatedly explained that the trial was not a “deposition” and
again advised Q.L. to avoid delving into “minutia.” Similarly, when Q.L. testified, he was
questioned about irrelevant matters, such as a private school that B.L. was not going to
attend. At times, Q.L. also gave lengthy narrative answers, which prompted the circuit
court to advise Q.L.’s attorney to “move on” or “get to the point.” At one point, when
Q.L.’s counsel insisted that he had “been trying to be cognizant of the time,” the circuit
court observed that it did not “appear that way.”
¶ 123 “A trial court’s decisions on the admissibility of evidence and the scope of cross-
examination on an appropriate subject of inquiry are reviewed for abuse of discretion.”
People v. Reese, 2017 IL 120011, ¶ 75. “An abuse of discretion occurs where no reasonable
person would agree with the position adopted by the trial court.” Schwartz v. Cortelloni,
177 Ill. 2d 166, 176 (1997). The circuit court also has the inherent authority to manage and
control the presentation of evidence to avoid the needless consumption of time. Ill. R. Evid.
611(a)(2) (eff. Oct. 15, 2015).
¶ 124 Here, despite Q.L.’s repeated claims to the contrary, the record indicates that he was
not forced to hurriedly present his case. The record rather indicates that the circuit court
was quite patient under the circumstances and did not abuse its discretion to preclude the
admission of repetitive or irrelevant evidence. Moreover, Q.L. was fully afforded his right
to cross-examine the GAL about her report and recommendation (see 750 ILCS 5/506(a)(2)
(West 2018)), and in its discretion, the court granted him considerable latitude to explore
her potential bias. We also note that while Q.L. complains that his testimony was “cut
short,” he does not indicate what further evidence he would have presented.
43
¶ 125 We relatedly find no error with respect to the circuit court’s rulings denying Q.L.’s
purported offers of proof as to what evidence might have possibly changed the GAL’s
opinions and recommendation. The so-called offers of proof were essentially requests to
ask the GAL hypothetical questions, to which Y.S.’s objections the court was within its
sound discretion to sustain. See Modelski v. Navistar International Transportation Corp.,
302 Ill. App. 3d 879, 886 (1999) (stating “testimony grounded in guess, surmise, or
conjecture, not being regarded as proof of a fact, is irrelevant as it has no tendency to make
the existence of a fact more or less probable”); see also Schiff v. Friberg, 331 Ill. App. 3d
643, 656 (2002) (noting that the trial court has the discretion to allow or deny the admission
of evidence for attempted impeachment purposes, and the court’s decision will not be
disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion). Moreover, summary speculation is an
insufficient offer of proof (People v. Andrews, 146 Ill. 2d 413, 421 (1992)), and the alleged
evidence that Q.L. later claimed had been improperly excluded consisted of unsupported
conclusions that had he been permitted to ask the GAL the questions he had wanted to ask,
she would have changed her opinions and recommendation. In any event, “[t]he two
primary functions of an offer of proof are to disclose to the trial judge and opposing counsel
the nature of the offered evidence, enabling them to take appropriate action, and to provide
the reviewing court with a record to determine whether exclusion of the evidence was
erroneous and harmful.” People v. Thompkins, 181 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (1998). Here, these functions
were ultimately served, and we cannot conclude that the circuit court’s rulings on Q.L.’s
purported offers of proof were erroneous or harmful.
44
¶ 126 With respect to Q.L.’s argument that the cause should be remanded for a new trial
because the GAL had a conflict of interest, whether to disqualify the GAL on the basis of
the alleged conflict required the circuit court to resolve factual disputes regarding
conversations that occurred when the GAL was appointed in May 2018. As a result, the
denial of Q.L.’s motion to substitute the GAL and strike her report and recommendation
was directed to the sound discretion of the circuit court and will not be disturbed on appeal
absent an abuse of discretion. Schwartz, 177 Ill. 2d at 176. We note that the abuse-of-
discretion standard recognizes that the circuit court is in a superior position to evaluate
evidence and determine credibility. In re Marriage of Wade, 158 Ill. App. 3d 255, 265-66
(1987).
¶ 127 It is well established that a party waives the right to object to an alleged conflict of
interest by failing to promptly raise the issue. See In re Possession & Control of the
Commissioner of Banks & Real Estate of Independent Trust Corp., 327 Ill. App. 3d 441,
479 (2001). “In addition, the party seeking disqualification carries a heavy burden to prove
that his motion for disqualification is not being brought as a tactical weapon to gain undue
advantage in the litigation.” In re Marriage of Stephenson, 2011 IL App (2d) 101214, ¶ 19;
see also Miller v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 183 Ill. App. 3d 261, 267-68 (1989) (noting
that a motion to disqualify is generally viewed with caution and should not be granted
where the alleged conflict is merely hypothetical).
¶ 128 Here, the circuit court rejected Q.L.’s claims that he had been unaware of the GAL’s
position on SIU’s board of trustees until after he received her report in June 2019. The
court obviously credited the opposing representations made by the GAL and Y.S., which
45
indicated that Q.L. had knowingly waived any alleged conflict arising from the GAL’s
representation after her position on the board had been fully disclosed and discussed when
she was appointed in May 2018. The court thus concluded that Q.L.’s motion to substitute
and strike had been filed to delay the pending trial and otherwise give Q.L. “another bite
at the apple on the GAL recommendation.” The record on appeal supports the circuit
court’s findings on the matter and further supports a finding that an actual conflict never
existed. As noted, the GAL advised the court that she had no idea who Y.S. was prior to
May 2018, that she would have withdrawn from the parties’ case had she felt that she could
not have been impartial, and that Y.S.’s status as an SIUE employee had no bearing on her
opinions or recommendation. Under the circumstances, we conclude that, at most, the
GAL’s participation in the present case gave rise to a tenuous appearance of impropriety
that was fully explored, explained, and waived. We accordingly find no error with respect
to the circuit court’s rulings on the issue.
¶ 129 We likewise find no error with respect to the circuit court’s rulings regarding
Clipper’s testimony and records. On appeal, Q.L. argues, as he maintained below, that
Clipper’s testimony should have been stricken and that all of the information that Clipper
provided to the GAL should have been stricken from her report. Q.L. bases these claims
on his suggestions that Clipper’s records were “inappropriately withheld” and that Clipper
“testified as an expert” and provided expert opinions. Again, however, we find that these
claims are without merit.
¶ 130 Clipper was neither disclosed nor called as an expert witness, and he did not testify
as an expert witness. He offered no expert opinions or recommendations to the circuit court
46
or the GAL, and as the circuit court noted, he had not been tasked with evaluating any of
the relevant statutory factors. Clipper testified as a fact witness (see Burke v. 12
Rothschild’s Liquor Mart, Inc., 209 Ill. App. 3d 192, 197 (1991)) and was called by Q.L.
so that he could be cross-examined as to whether he had influenced or participated in the
preparation of the GAL’s report. To that end, Clipper’s testimony revealed that to the extent
he offered the GAL any opinions regarding the parties, they were his personal opinions on
matters such as the parties’ personalities, parenting styles, and interpersonal interactions.
He further explained that he viewed his communications with the GAL as “comparing”
and “contrasting” their impressions of the parties’ situation. Referencing Clipper’s
testimony that he had a therapeutic relationship with the entire family, Q.L. intimates that
Clipper’s discussions with the GAL were improper because the communications violated
his “patient-therapist confidentiality” rights. Clipper explained, however, that it was
undisputed that B.L. was his only “client” in the situation, and Q.L. testified that he never
considered himself to be Clipper’s patient. Clipper further indicated that Q.L. was fully
aware that any information gleaned from B.L.’s counseling sessions would be shared with
the GAL. Thus, even assuming that a therapist-patient privilege existed, Q.L. waived it
under the circumstances. See In re Marriage of Slomka, 397 Ill. App. 3d 137, 142 (2009)
(noting that “the patient-therapist privilege must be asserted by either the patient or the
therapist or it is considered waived”).
¶ 131 With respect to Q.L.’s contention that Clipper’s records were inappropriately
withheld, the record on appeal supports the circuit court’s findings that Q.L.’s efforts to
obtain the documents were halfhearted and among the numerous delay tactics that Q.L.
47
pursued after receiving the GAL’s report and recommendation. As noted, after Q.L. was
provided with a summary of Clipper’s records approximately two weeks before the trial
was scheduled to commence, Q.L. requested that the cause be set for a hearing on his
motion to obtain a court-authorized subpoena for the records. When that request was
denied, Q.L. filed a last-minute motion in limine to compel the production of the records.
When denying the motion in limine at the commencement of the trial, the circuit court
noted that Clipper had provided Q.L. with a summary of B.L.’s treatment and that whatever
questions remained about the records could be addressed when Clipper testified.
¶ 132 The circuit court has wide discretion in controlling the scope and process of
discovery, and an abuse of that discretion will only be found if the court’s rulings either
prevented the ascertainment of the truth or substantially affected a critical issue in the case.
United Nuclear Corp. v. Energy Conversion Devices, Inc., 110 Ill. App. 3d 88, 104-05
(1982). Here, the circuit court’s rulings on Clipper’s records did neither, and we find no
abuse of discretion in the manner in which the circuit court proceeded. At trial, Clipper was
questioned about the records and his refusal to provide them, and he and the GAL were
both extensively questioned as to their discussions about the parties’ situation, Clipper’s
involvement in the case, and the GAL’s report and recommendation. Although Q.L.
maintains that he needed Clipper’s records so that he could effectively cross-examine
Clipper and the GAL, that argument is belied by the record of the proceedings. We further
emphasize that Clipper testified that he would have allowed Q.L. to examine, but not copy,
the records, had Q.L. requested to do so.
48
¶ 133 As an aside, we note that while Q.L. contends that by allowing the GAL to use
information gained from Clipper, the circuit court “transmuted her into the fact finder,” the
record indicates that the court was fully aware that the GAL had not been appointed to act
in “the role of a surrogate judge” (750 ILCS 5/506(a-5) (West 2018)) and that it was
ultimately free to accept or reject her offered opinions and recommendations “in whole or
in part” (In re Marriage of Felson, 171 Ill. App. 3d 923, 928 (1988)). Moreover, as the
“eyes and ears of the court” (internal quotation marks omitted) (Nichols v. Fahrenkamp,
2019 IL 123990, ¶ 46), the GAL was required to interview Clipper because he had special
knowledge of the minors’ circumstances (Ill. S. Ct. R. 907(c) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016)). In any
event, it is readily apparent that the circuit court thoroughly and independently considered
both parties’ positions before arriving at a reasoned judgment and that its judgment was
significantly influenced by conduct that Q.L. exhibited after the filing of the GAL’s report.
¶ 134 Lastly, we find that Q.L.’s claim that the trial “was set only on the question of
relocation” is clearly belied by the record and that he has waived his contention that the
circuit court was not authorized to enter an order allocating the parties’ parenting time in
conjunction with its order granting Y.S.’s relocation petition.
¶ 135 In November 2017, the circuit court entered its temporary order granting Q.L.
limited parenting time with the minors. In May 2018, Y.S. filed her petition to relocate the
children to Indiana. Three months later, when Y.S. moved to Indiana, the circuit court
entered its order granting Q.L. custody of the children during the week and Y.S. parenting
time on the weekends. Y.S.’s relocation petition requested that she be granted leave to
relocate the children to Indiana and that a “reasonable parenting time schedule” be
49
established for Q.L. The petition necessarily involved a modification of the parties’
parenting time (see 750 ILCS 5/609.2(a), 610.5(a) (West 2018)) and could fairly be
interpreted as asking that their then-existing custody arrangement be switched. It is
otherwise undisputed that at all times thereafter, both parties were aware that a reallocation
of their parenting time was an issue that would require resolution should Y.S.’s relocation
petition be granted. The allocation of the parties’ parenting time was specifically referenced
in Q.L.’s petition to appoint a GAL, Q.L.’s “Interrogatories Pertaining to Allocation of
Parental Responsibilities/Parenting Time,” the GAL’s report, the circuit court’s mediation
order, and the circuit court’s order setting the cause for trial. The focus of the case has
always been on who would be the minors’ primary custodial parent. To the parties’ credit,
that they would jointly share their decision-making responsibilities as to their children has
never been an issue. In any event, to the extent that Q.L. argues that Y.S.’s relocation
petition failed to strictly comply with the pleading requirements set forth in Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 902(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016), any defect was undoubtedly waived and
harmless under the circumstances. See Ragan v. Columbia Mutual Insurance Co., 183 Ill.
2d 342, 354-55 (1998).
¶ 136 Waiver aside, Q.L. seemingly argues that because Y.S.’s relocation petition did not
include the word “allocation” and because the circuit court referred to the trial as a hearing
on Y.S.’s “Petition to Relocate” and “Petition for Relocation,” the court lacked the
authority to enter an allocation order. This contention is clearly without merit, the cases
Q.L. cites in support of his argument are readily distinguishable (see, e.g., In re Marriage
of Fox, 191 Ill. App. 3d 514, 521 (1989) (concluding that the respondent “could not have
50
known custody of her children was at issue in the contempt proceedings until the trial judge
made his decision”)), and Q.L. again takes the circuit court’s words out of context.
¶ 137 As a final aside, we note that as evidenced by the circuit court’s recognition that the
parties were experiencing problems agreeing on the division of their parenting time over
the minors’ breaks and the fact that Y.S. has already filed a motion to modify the parties’
existing parenting time schedule, it unfortunately appears that the services of the GAL or
the mediator might be required to resolve their pending issues. During the proceedings
below, the circuit court instructed the parties to “work together to the extent possible to
maximize each parent’s relationship with the children.” We instruct them to do the same
and further urge them to amicably resolve their differences keeping the best interests of the
children in mind.
¶ 138 CONCLUSION
¶ 139 For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court’s judgment granting Y.S.’s petition to
relocate and allocating the parties’ parenting time and decision-making responsibilities is
hereby affirmed.
¶ 140 Affirmed.
51