In re Marriage of Merreighn

NOTICE FILED
This order was filed under Supreme
2020 IL App (4th) 190400-U May 7, 2020
Court Rule 23 and may not be cited Carla Bender
as precedent by any party except in NO. 4-19-0400 4th District Appellate
the limited circumstances allowed
under Rule 23(e)(1).
Court, IL
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
In re MARRIAGE OF ) Appeal from the
Lisa M. Merreighn, ) Circuit Court of
Petitioner-Appellant, ) Logan County
and ) No. 17D69
Joshua Merreighn, )
Respondent-Appellee. ) Honorable
) Jonathan C. Wright,
) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices DeArmond and Cavanagh concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
awarding maintenance in an amount at variance with the statutory amount.
¶2 Petitioner, Lisa M. Merreighn, appeals from the trial court’s order, which was part
of a bifurcated judgment of dissolution of marriage, requiring respondent, Joshua Merreighn, to
pay her annual maintenance in an amount less than the statutory amount of maintenance. The
trial court based its decision to deviate downward from the statutory amount on “the large
amount of marital debt,” 79% of which had been assigned to Joshua. On appeal, Lisa argues the
court erred in deviating from the statutory amount of maintenance because Joshua had not been
paying any of the marital debts for two years and he intended to discharge as much of his debt as
possible through Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings. We affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 Lisa and Joshua were married in Logan County in 1999. On July 10, 2017, Lisa
filed a petition for dissolution of marriage, which included a request for maintenance. In April
2019, the trial court conducted a hearing on all remaining financial issues related to the
dissolution, including maintenance. At that hearing, Joshua testified that he had not been paying
any of the marital debts “since April of 2017.” Joshua further testified that he “planned on
looking into [bankruptcy] to see if that’s an option.” Ultimately, the trial court found that
awarding the statutory amount of maintenance—$16,850, paid annually for 14.06 years—would
be inappropriate and chose instead to award Lisa $8400 annual maintenance for 14.06 years. The
court provided the following explanation in its written order:
“The Court’s deviation [from the statutory guidelines] is based on
the large of amount [sic] of marital debt. The total marital debt
amounts to $81,062.73. Relative to the income of [Lisa and
Joshua], this debt is almost insurmountable. Both parties testified
that they could not afford to make monthly payments on all the
debt and further testified that many debt obligations were not being
paid at all. It is worth noting that the total marital assets are valued
at $163,470.45 and most of those marital assets are retirement
accounts and not liquid. This effect of this order awards [Joshua]
53% of the marital assets but also assigns [him] 79% of the marital
debt. Given this large debt to income ratio, the Court is deviating
from the statutory guidelines ***.”
¶5 This appeal followed.
-2-
¶6 II. ANALYSIS
¶7 Lisa argues that the trial court erred by deviating downward from the statutory
amount of maintenance. She argues the court’s rationale for doing so—because it had
apportioned the majority of the marital debt to Joshua—was flawed because Joshua had not been
paying on the debt for approximately two years and he intended to discharge the debt in
bankruptcy.
¶8 We will not disturb a maintenance award on appeal unless it reflects an abuse of
discretion, which occurs “only where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the
trial court.” In re Marriage of Schneider, 214 Ill. 2d 152, 173, 824 N.E.2d 177, 189 (2005).
¶9 The procedure for awarding maintenance is governed by section 504 of the
Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/504 (West 2016)). Section 504
provides that the trial court must “first make a finding as to whether a maintenance award is
appropriate, after consideration of all relevant factors,” including 14 specific factors enumerated
in the statute. Id. § 504(a). If the court finds maintenance is appropriate, it shall award
maintenance in accordance with the statutory guidelines, “unless the court makes a finding that
the application of the guidelines would be inappropriate.” Id. § 504(b-1)(1). If the court finds that
an application of the guidelines would be inappropriate, “it shall state in its findings the amount
of maintenance (if determinable) or duration that would have been required under the guidelines
and the reasoning for any variance from the guidelines.” Id. § 504(b-2)(2).
¶ 10 Here, the trial court found that the amount of maintenance under the statutory
guidelines would have been $16,850, paid annually for 14.06 years. Lisa does not dispute the
court’s calculation of the statutory annual maintenance amount. The court then determined that
awarding maintenance in this amount would be inappropriate because of “the large amount of
-3-
marital debt” apportioned to Joshua. The court reasoned that Joshua should not be required to
pay the statutory amount of maintenance in light of the “large debt-to-income ratio” resulting
where Joshua had been awarded 53% of the marital assets but assigned 79% of the marital debt.
Thus, the court determined it would award Lisa $8400 annual maintenance for 14.06 years.
¶ 11 Relying on In re Marriage of Underwood, 314 Ill. App. 3d 325, 731 N.E.2d 1003(2000), Lisa argues that “the assignment of the majority of the debt to Josh should not have been
a justification to deviate from the statutory amount of maintenance” because Joshua had not been
paying those debts and he intended to discharge them through bankruptcy. We find Lisa’s
reliance on Underwood misplaced. Contrary to her suggestion, Underwood does not stand for the
proposition that a maintenance award must take into account the amount of debt that a party
intends to discharge through bankruptcy; instead, the Underwood court merely held that it was
not an abuse of discretion to do so. Id. at 329. Additionally, the facts of that case are
distinguishable from the instant case. There, the former husband who had been ordered to pay
maintenance “had retained an attorney and paid a $600 fee for the purpose of filing a chapter 7
bankruptcy proceeding.” Id. at 327.
¶ 12 Here, unlike in Underwood, Joshua merely testified that he “planned on looking
into [bankruptcy] to see if that’s an option.” However, until Joshua actually files for
bankruptcy—if he ever does—he remains liable to pay the marital debts even though he has not
been paying them. We find it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to base its decision
to deviate downward from the statutory guidelines in its award of maintenance based on its prior
allocation of marital debt. As the court noted, Lisa can request a modification of the maintenance
award if Joshua ever does discharge his debts through bankruptcy.
¶ 13 III. CONCLUSION
-4-
¶ 14 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 15 Affirmed.
-5-