People v. Reyes

NOTICE 2020 IL App (4th) 180190-U FILED
This order was filed under Supreme May 5, 2020
Court Rule 23 and may not be cited NO. 4-18-0190 Carla Bender
as precedent by any party except in
the limited circumstances allowed
4th District Appellate
under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Morgan County
VICTOR REYES, ) No. 97CF73
Defendant-Appellant. )
) Honorable
) Christopher E. Reif,
) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Harris and Holder White concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We grant the Office of the State Appellate Defender’s motion to withdraw as
counsel and affirm the trial court’s order dismissing defendant’s postconviction
petition.
¶2 This case comes to us on the motion of the Office of the State Appellate Defender
(OSAD) to withdraw as counsel on the ground no meritorious issues can be raised in this case.
We grant OSAD’s motion and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On direct appeal, this court set forth all the relevant facts in this case. People v.
Reyes, No. 4-98-0787 (2000) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23).
Accordingly, we recite below only those facts relevant to resolve the issues involved in this
appeal.
¶5 On May 28, 1997, the State charged defendant, Victor Reyes, by information with
first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 1996)) (count I), reckless homicide (id. § 9-
3(a)) (count II), attempted first degree murder (id. § 8-4(a)) (count III), aggravated battery of a
senior citizen (id. § 12-4.6(a)) (count IV), residential burglary (id. § 19-3) (count V), and theft
(id. § 16-1(a)(1)) (count VI). (The State later moved to dismiss the reckless homicide charge.)
¶6 Following an August 1998 trial, a jury found defendant guilty of all counts. In
October 1998, the trial court sentenced defendant to a 50-year prison term for first degree murder
and a mandatory consecutive 20-year term for attempted first degree murder. The court also
imposed three concurrent 5-year sentences for each of the three remaining counts.
¶7 Defendant appealed, arguing (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to
suppress; (2) the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of first degree
murder; (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to his counsel’s failure to sever
charges and call witnesses; (4) the prosecutor’s comments during closing argument about a
“reasonable person standard” for first degree murder denied him a fair trial; (5) the trial court’s
refusal to define reasonable doubt to the jury resulted in a denial of due process; (6) the trial
court erred by finding consecutive sentences mandatory; and (7) the trial court failed to properly
award sentencing credit. Reyes, slip order at 1-2. This court affirmed defendant’s convictions and
sentence and remanded with directions for the sentencing credit issue. Id. at 2.
¶8 On December 28, 2017, defendant pro se filed a petition for postconviction relief
under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 to 122-7 (West 2016)), alleging
(1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel and (2) the first degree murder statute was facially
unconstitutional. Specifically, defendant alleged he was denied the effective assistance of trial
counsel when his attorney failed to object to the State’s attorney’s “erroneous misstatement of
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the law regarding what constitute[s] the offense of reckless homicide” during closing argument.
On February 23, 2018, the trial court entered a written order dismissing the petition as patently
without merit.
¶9 Defendant appealed the trial court’s summary dismissal of his postconviction
petition, and OSAD was appointed to represent him on appeal. In November 2019, OSAD
moved to withdraw as counsel on appeal. The record shows defendant filed a response on
December 13, 2019.
¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 11 OSAD contends no meritorious argument can be made the trial court erred in
summarily dismissing defendant’s postconviction petition. We agree.
¶ 12 A. The Act
¶ 13 The Act provides a mechanism for a criminal defendant to challenge his
conviction or sentence based on a substantial violation of federal or state constitutional rights.
People v. Morris, 236 Ill. 2d 345, 354, 925 N.E.2d 1069, 1075 (2010). Proceedings under the Act
are collateral in nature and not an appeal from the defendant’s conviction or sentence. People v.
English, 2013 IL 112890, ¶ 21, 987 N.E.2d 371. Once a defendant files a petition for
postconviction relief, the trial court may, during this first stage of the proceedings, enter a
dismissal order within 90 days if it finds the petition is “frivolous or is patently without merit.”
725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2016). “A post-conviction petition is considered frivolous or
patently without merit only if the allegations in the petition, taken as true and liberally construed,
fail to present the gist of a constitutional claim.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v.
Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239, 244, 757 N.E.2d 442, 445 (2001).
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¶ 14 “Issues that were raised and decided on direct appeal are barred by res judicata,
and issues that could have been raised on direct appeal, but were not, are forfeited.” English,
2013 IL 112890, ¶ 22. The doctrines of res judicata and forfeiture may be relaxed “where the
forfeiture stems from the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, or where the facts relating to
the issue do not appear on the face of the original appellate record.” Id.¶ 15 We review the trial court’s summary dismissal of a postconviction petition
de novo. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 247.
¶ 16 B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
¶ 17 OSAD asserts it can make no colorable argument in support of defendant’s claim
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
¶ 18 To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show
counsel’s (1) performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) deficient
performance resulted in prejudice to the defendant such that, but for counsel’s errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694
(1984). If a defendant fails to prove either prong of the Strickland test, his claim for ineffective
assistance of counsel must fail. People v. Sanchez, 169 Ill. 2d 472, 487, 662 N.E.2d 1199, 1208
(1996). In the context of postconviction proceedings, “a petition alleging ineffective assistance
may not be summarily dismissed if (i) it is arguable that counsel’s performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness and (ii) it is arguable that the defendant was prejudiced.”
(Emphasis added.) People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 17, 912 N.E.2d 1204, 1212 (2009).
¶ 19 Here, defendant alleged his trial counsel was ineffective when he failed to object
to the State’s “erroneous misstatement of the law regarding what constitute[s] the offense of
reckless homicide” during closing argument. Defendant does not allege ineffective assistance of
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his appellate counsel, and the factual basis for defendant’s claim appears in the trial court record.
Defendant could have raised this issue on direct appeal but did not. We therefore agree with
OSAD defendant’s claim is procedurally barred.
¶ 20 Even if defendant’s claim were not barred, it is meritless. Defendant argues his
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object when the Morgan County State’s Attorney made
the following remarks during closing argument:
“Driving blind, unable to control this vehicle, driving down the road.
Now, if during this time period as you’re realizing this and trying to—and trying
to stop, if at that point you hit a bicyclist, then I could see at that point saying,
‘Yes, guilty of reckless homicide’ because you’ve breached that standard of care
just by getting in the car in the first place but you’re trying to stop.
I can see reckless homicide at that point but, folks, what did [defendant]
do? What did he do even according to his own best evidence after he found that
he couldn’t drive, couldn’t see and couldn’t control the car?
Did he stop? No, he kept driving and driving and drove over two miles, up
these roads, turning left, turning right. Up this road, continued to drive.
Continued to drive even after he realized, according to his best evidence,
that he was driving an out of control two thousand pound metal bullet straight
down a two-lane road. This goes beyond being merely reckless.
A reasonable person would know that there is a strong probability of death
or great bodily harm to someone else on that road under those circumstances.
***
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This is not recklessness, this goes beyond recklessness. This is murder and
that’s the result, if you believe strictly the defendant’s version in the light most
favorable to him ***.”
¶ 21 Improper remarks during closing argument warrant reversal only when they result
in substantial prejudice to the defendant, considering the content of the language, its relationship
to the evidence, and its effect on the defendant’s right to a fair and impartial trial. People v.
Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 151-52, 705 N.E.2d 850, 886 (1998). Substantial prejudice occurs when
the verdict would have been different absent the improper remark. People v. Quiroz, 257 Ill.
App. 3d 576, 585, 628 N.E.2d 542, 549 (1993). When reviewing allegations of improper closing
arguments, the argument must be examined in its entirety and the complained-of comments must
be placed in the proper context. People v. Buckley, 282 Ill. App. 3d 81, 89, 668 N.E.2d 1082,
1088 (1996). “A misstatement of the law during closing argument does not normally constitute
reversible error if the circuit court properly instructs the jury on the law, as counsel’s arguments
are construed to carry less weight with the jury than do instructions from the circuit court.” Id. at
89-90.
¶ 22 Here, the state’s attorney’s statements did not constitute a misstatement on the
law of reckless homicide; rather, the State was arguing defendant’s actions showed a knowing,
rather than reckless, mental state.
¶ 23 Even assuming arguendo the state’s attorney misstated the law, defendant
suffered no prejudice. Following defense counsel’s request for a reckless homicide jury
instruction as a lesser-included offense of first degree murder, the court gave the reckless
homicide instructions and properly advised the jury of the law. The trial court further instructed
the jury that closing arguments do not constitute evidence. Finally, defense counsel also correctly
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stated the law of reckless homicide during closing argument. Considering the State’s comments
in this context, it is not arguable the jury was misled on the law of reckless homicide and, but for
defense counsel’s failure to object to the State’s alleged misstatements, the outcome of
defendant’s case would have been different. Accordingly, we agree with OSAD it is not arguable
defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel.
¶ 24 C. Constitutionality of Intentional Murder Statute
¶ 25 OSAD further asserts it can make no colorable argument in support of defendant’s
claim the knowing first degree murder statute under which he was convicted (720 ILCS 5/9-
1(a)(2) (1996)) is indistinguishable from the reckless homicide and involuntary manslaughter
statute (id. § 9-3(a)), and therefore, the more severe penalty associated with section 9-1(a)(2)
violates the due process, equal protection, and proportionate penalties clauses of the Illinois
Constitution. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §§ 2, 11.
¶ 26 Contrary to defendant’s assertions, 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) and 720 ILCS 5/9-3(a)
are separate and distinct statutes covering different offenses; 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) defines first
degree murder and 720 ILCS 5/9-3(a) defines involuntary manslaughter and reckless homicide.
The statutes are distinguishable because they provide different penalties and require different
mental states. Moreover, neither of these statutes have been found to be facially unconstitutional.
Here, the jury was instructed as to both first degree murder and reckless homicide and found
defendant’s actions constituted knowing first degree murder. Accordingly, we agree with OSAD
defendant did not raise an arguably meritorious claim the first degree murder statute is
unconstitutional.
¶ 27 III. CONCLUSION
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¶ 28 For the reasons stated, we agree no meritorious issue can be raised on appeal. We
grant counsel’s motion to withdraw as appellate counsel and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 29 Affirmed.
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