Heatherly v. Clarke

NOTICE
2020 IL App (5th) 190189-U NOTICE
Decision filed 05/15/20. The This order was filed under
text of this decision may be NO. 5-19-0189 Supreme Court Rule 23 and
changed or corrected prior to may not be cited as precedent
the filing of a Peti ion for by any party except in the
Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE limited circumstances allowed
the same.
under Rule 23(e)(1).
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
________________________________________________________________________
RICHARD D. HEATHERLY, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Christian County.
)
v. ) No. 19-MR-63
)
DANIEL CLARKE, Taylorville )
*
Correctional Center Warden, ) Honorable
) Amanda S. Ade-Harlow,
Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, presiding.
________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE BOIE delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Overstreet and Wharton concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Where the complaint was insufficient on its face to warrant habeas corpus
relief, the circuit court’s sua sponte dismissal of the plaintiff’s habeas corpus
complaint is affirmed.
¶2 The plaintiff, Richard D. Heatherly, appeals pro se the sua sponte dismissal of his
complaint for habeas corpus. On appeal, he argues that the circuit court erred in dismissing
his complaint because the court which rendered his judgment of conviction lost jurisdiction
*
Because the proper defendant in a habeas corpus action is the prisoner’s current custodian (see
Hennings v. Chandler, 229 Ill. 2d 18, 23 n.2 (2008)), Daniel Clarke, acting warden of Taylorville
Correctional Center, where plaintiff is incarcerated, is the sole and proper defendant in this appeal.
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when it failed to ensure that his waiver of his right to a speedy trial was knowing and
intelligent. He also argues that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to seek a
discharge based on speedy trial grounds and that section 103-5 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure of 1963 (Procedure Code) (725 ILCS 5/103-5 (West 2016)) is unconstitutional.
For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 On November 18, 2016, the plaintiff pleaded guilty to one count of predatory
criminal sexual assault of a child in violation of section 11-1.40(a)(1) of the Criminal Code
of 2012 (Criminal Code) (720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) (West 2016)) and was sentenced to 11
years in the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) with a minimum of 3 years of
mandatory supervised release. No direct appeal followed. The plaintiff is scheduled for
discharge of his sentence on November 27, 2024. See IDOC website, available at
https://www2.illinois.gov/idoc/Offender/Pages/InmateSearch.aspx (last visited Apr. 20,
2020); People v. Gipson, 2015 IL App (1st) 122451, ¶ 66 (court may take judicial notice
of information on IDOC website).
¶5 On April 19, 2019, the plaintiff filed a pro se complaint for habeas corpus and an
accompanying memorandum of law. He alleged that the circuit court lost jurisdiction when
it failed to ensure that his waiver of his constitutional and statutory rights to a speedy trial
was knowing and intelligent. Specifically, he argued that the circuit court failed to notify
him that the speedy trial term would be tolled if he requested a continuance, acquiesced to
a continuance, or failed to object to a requested continuance. He also argued that plea
counsel was ineffective for failing to seek a discharge based on the alleged speedy trial
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violation and that section 103-5 of the Procedure Code was unconstitutional because it
permits tolling of the speedy trial term without an explicit warning to the defendant in
person and on the record. The court sua sponte dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint, finding
that it failed to allege any basis for habeas relief. This timely appeal followed.
¶6 ANALYSIS
¶7 On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the circuit court erred in dismissing his complaint
for habeas corpus relief sua sponte. He contends that (1) the circuit court’s failure to
ensure that his waiver of his speedy trial rights was knowing and intelligent deprived him
of due process and divested the court of jurisdiction, (2) his absence from the courtroom
when his speedy trial rights were waived was not cured by the presence of his attorney,
(3) the test set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), for determining whether a
defendant has been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial is inappropriate in
determining whether he is entitled to habeas relief, (4) the rule that a guilty plea waives all
nonjurisdictional errors is inapplicable where the circuit court lacked jurisdiction, (5) plea
counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to seek a discharge based on speedy trial
grounds, and (6) section 103-5 of the Procedure Code is unconstitutional.
¶8 We begin by noting that the record from the plaintiff’s underlying guilty plea and
conviction has not been included in the record on appeal, and the plaintiff’s complaint for
habeas corpus relief does not set forth any of the facts upon which his speedy trial claim
is based. It is well-settled that the appellant bears the burden of presenting a sufficiently
complete record and that any doubts arising from an incomplete record will be resolved
against the appellant. Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984).
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¶9 “It is well established that an order of habeas corpus is available only to obtain the
release of a prisoner who has been incarcerated under a judgment of a court that lacked
jurisdiction of the subject matter or the person of the petitioner, or where there has been
some occurrence subsequent to the prisoner’s conviction that entitles him to release.”
Beacham v. Walker, 231 Ill. 2d 51, 58 (2008) (citing People v. Gosier, 205 Ill. 2d 198, 205
(2001), and Barney v. Prisoner Review Board, 184 Ill. 2d 428, 430 (1998)). “A petition for
writ of habeas corpus may not be used to review proceedings that do not exhibit one of the
defects set forth in the statute, even though the alleged error involves a denial of
constitutional rights. [Citations].” Schlemm v. Cowan, 323 Ill. App. 3d 318, 320 (2001).
The circuit court may sua sponte dismiss a petition for a writ of habeas corpus that is
patently nonmeritorious or insufficient on its face. Beacham, 231 Ill. 2d at 59; Hennings v.
Chandler, 229 Ill. 2d 18, 24 (2008). We apply a de novo standard of review to the dismissal
of an application for habeas corpus. Hennings, 229 Ill. 2d at 24.
¶ 10 As the plaintiff does not allege the occurrence of any postconviction event that
entitles him to release, we need only consider whether the alleged violation of his right to
speedy trial deprived the circuit court of jurisdiction.
¶ 11 It has long been held that subject matter jurisdiction is granted to the circuit courts
by the Illinois Constitution, and that they “have jurisdiction in all cases involving offenses
which fall within the ambit of section 1-5 of the Criminal Code [citation].” People v.
Gilmore, 63 Ill. 2d 23, 26 (1976). “A criminal defendant confers personal jurisdiction upon
the trial court when he appears and joins the issues with a plea.” People v. Woodall, 333
Ill. App. 3d 1146, 1156 (2002) (citing People v. Speed, 318 Ill. App. 3d 910, 932 (2001)).
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Once a court has acquired jurisdiction, no subsequent error or irregularity will oust
jurisdiction. Id. at 1157.
¶ 12 In this case, the circuit court acquired subject matter jurisdiction when the plaintiff
was charged with a violation of the Criminal Code, and it acquired personal jurisdiction
when he appeared before the court. No subsequent error involving the plaintiff’s speedy
trial rights would have divested the court of jurisdiction. Because the plaintiff’s habeas
complaint alleged no set of facts that would support a finding that the court which entered
his conviction lacked jurisdiction or the occurrence of a postconviction event entitling him
to release, the circuit court properly dismissed his complaint. Gosier, 205 Ill. 2d at 205.
¶ 13 CONCLUSION
¶ 14 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Christian County is
affirmed.
¶ 15 Affirmed.
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