Jones v. Roth

2019 IL App (1st) 182014-UNo. 1-18-2014
Order filed December 19, 2019
Fourth Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as
precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
AMANDA JONES, ) Appeal from the Circuit
) Court of Cook County.
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
) No. 15 L 9223
v. )
)
THOMAS ROTH, ) Honorable
) Marguerite A. Quinn,
Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE LAMPKIN delivered the judgment of the court.
Justice Reyes concurred in the judgment.
Presiding Justice Gordon specially concurred.
ORDER
¶1 Held: In a suit stemming from a car accident between plaintiff and defendant, the trial
court did not err in determining, as a matter of law, that defendant’s negligence
was not a proximate cause of injuries that plaintiff suffered in a subsequent
accident because the second accident was not a reasonably foreseeable result of
defendant’s negligence. Nor did the circuit court err in barring plaintiff from
introducing evidence of injuries she sustained in the second accident because she
proffered no expert testimony causally linking those injuries to the initial accident
involving defendant. Finally, the trial court properly instructed the jury that it
could consider the violation of traffic statutes as evidence of negligence.
No. 1-18-2014
¶2 This suit arises from a car accident between plaintiff Amanda Jones and defendant
Thomas Roth. A jury determined that Roth was 51% at fault for the accident and that Jones was
49% contributorily negligent. The jury awarded Jones $20,400 in damages after accounting for
her comparative fault. On appeal, Jones argues that the trial court erred in barring evidence of a
subsequent accident that she contends was proximately caused by Roth’s negligence and resulted
in the aggravation of injuries that she initially sustained in the car accident. Jones also argues that
the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that it could consider the violation of certain traffic
laws as evidence of negligence. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the circuit court’s
judgment. 1
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 In September 2013, Jones and Roth were involved in a car accident at the intersection of
North Avenue and Sedgwick Street in Chicago. Jones was traveling eastbound on North Avenue
at 30 miles per hour as she approached Sedgwick. She testified that the traffic light turned yellow
before she entered the intersection but that she proceeded through the intersection at the same
speed because she did not think that she would be able to safely stop. Meanwhile, Roth was
traveling westbound on North Avenue and had entered the left-turn lane at Sedgwick. At trial,
Roth testified that he entered the intersection and came to a stop while the traffic light was
yellow but did not begin his left turn until the light changed to red. At a pretrial deposition,
however, Roth testified that he began his turn while the light was still yellow. As Roth turned left
onto Sedgwick, he and Jones collided in the intersection.
1
In adherence with the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 352(a) (eff. July 1,
2018), this appeal has been resolved without oral argument upon the entry of a separate written
order.
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No. 1-18-2014
¶5 The next morning, Jones saw a doctor because she was experiencing pain in her back, left
shoulder, and left knee. She was given pain medication and referred to a physical therapist. After
several months of physical therapy, her back and shoulder pain resolved, but her knee pain did
not. In March 2014, Jones saw Dr. Gregory Primus, an orthopedic surgeon, due to the continuing
pain in her left knee. Dr. Primus diagnosed Jones with chondromalacia of the patella (damaged
or worn cartilage under the kneecap) and recommended additional physical therapy. Jones’s knee
pain persisted, however, and on July 9, 2014, Dr. Primus performed arthroscopic surgery. The
surgery revealed synovitis (tissue inflammation) in the knee joint, which Dr. Primus addressed
by removing the inflamed tissue. Following surgery, Dr. Primus recommended additional
physical therapy. At a postoperative visit on August 18, 2014, Jones reported that her knee was
“doing a lot better” and that her symptoms had improved. Dr. Primus advised Jones to continue
with physical therapy and return to him in a month.
¶6 Unfortunately for Jones, on August 25, 2014, she was involved in another accident.
While in California for a work conference, she boarded a bus using an electric mobility scooter.
Her physical therapist advised her to use the scooter during the trip to avoid walking on hilly
terrain. According to Jones, the bus driver “negligently and improperly” harnessed the scooter,
causing it to topple over when the bus made a routine turn. Jones was thrown from the scooter
and the device landed on her. Three days later, Jones returned to Dr. Primus, complaining of
renewed pain in her back, shoulder, and left knee. Eventually, in March 2016, Dr. Primus
performed a second surgery on Jones’s left knee to reconstruct a damaged ligament. In an
evidence deposition, Dr. Primus testified that the knee pain that Jones experienced following the
accident on the bus was not related to the earlier car accident.
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No. 1-18-2014
¶7 Prior to trial, Roth filed a motion in limine to bar evidence of the bus accident and any
injuries that Jones suffered or expenses she incurred as a result of the bus accident. Roth argued
that his alleged negligence leading to the car accident was not a proximate cause of Jones’s
subsequent bus accident because the bus accident was not a reasonably foreseeable result of the
car accident. Roth also argued that Jones had not proffered any expert evidence linking the
injuries she suffered in the bus accident to the car accident. The trial court granted the motion.
The court concluded that any negligence by Roth could not be deemed to have proximately
caused the injuries Jones suffered in the bus accident because that accident was “separate” from
the car accident involving Roth and was “not [a] foreseeable *** result” of Roth’s alleged
negligence. Moreover, in light of Dr. Primus’s testimony, the court concluded that Jones lacked
evidence that could connect the knee problems she experienced following the bus accident to the
car accident. The trial court thus barred Jones from presenting evidence of the bus accident and
her resulting injuries. 2 The trial court also determined that the jury would not be instructed to
consider any damages that Jones sustained as a result of the bus accident. Later, at the jury
instruction conference, the trial court adhered to its ruling on the motion in limine and denied
Jones’s request to instruct the jury that she could recover damages for expenses and other losses
incurred following the bus accident.
¶8 When instructing the jury, the trial court delivered three instructions modeled on Illinois
Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, 60.01 (IPI Civil 60.01). That pattern instruction is designed to
“inform[ ] the jury that a statute, ordinance, or administrative regulation was in force at the time
of the occurrence and [that] the jury may consider its violation as evidence of negligence.”
2
To comply with this order, the court redacted the evidence depositions of Dr. Primus
and Jones’s other treatment providers before presenting them to the jury.
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No. 1-18-2014
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bulger v. Chicago Transit Authority, 345 Ill. App. 3d 103,
117 (2003). Defendant’s Instruction No. 14 incorporated the language of section 11-601(a) of the
Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-601(a) (West 2018)) and explained to the jury that “[t]he fact that
the speed of a vehicle does not exceed the applicable maximum speed limit does not relieve the
driver from the duty to decrease speed when approaching and crossing an intersection.”
Defendant’s Instruction No. 15 incorporated the text of section 11-306 of the Vehicle Code (625
ILCS 5/11-306 (West 2018)), which defines the legal effect of green, yellow, and red traffic
signals on vehicular traffic. Finally, Plaintiff’s Instruction No. 15, based on section 11-902 of the
Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-902 (West 2018)), informed the jury that “[t]he driver of a vehicle
intending to turn *** left within an intersection *** shall yield the right-of-way to any vehicle
approaching from the opposite direction which is so close as to constitute an immediate
hazard.” 3 After quoting the relevant statutory text, each of these instructions explained to the jury
that, if it “decide[d] that a party violated the statute on the occasion in question, then [it] may
consider that fact together with all the other facts and circumstances in evidence in determining
whether and to what extent, if any, a party was negligent before and at the time of the
occurrence.” IPI Civil 60.01.
¶9 The jury returned a verdict in favor of Jones, finding that Roth was 51% at fault for the
accident but that Jones was 49% contributorily negligent. The jury assessed Jones’s total
damages at $40,000 and, after reducing that amount in proportion to her share of fault, awarded
her $20,400. Jones moved for a new trial, arguing that the trial court erred in granting Roth’s
3
Although a copy of Plaintiff’s Instruction No. 15 does not appear in the common law
record, the report of proceedings makes clear that the trial court orally delivered the instruction
to the jury.
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No. 1-18-2014
motion in limine to bar evidence of the California bus accident and in delivering the IPI 60.01
instructions tendered by Roth. The trial court denied the motion, and Jones filed a timely notice
of appeal.
¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 11 Jones’s first argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in granting Roth’s motion in
limine to bar evidence of the California bus accident and Jones’s resulting injuries. A trial court’s
decision to grant or deny a motion in limine is generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See
Chicago Exhibitors Corp. v. Jeepers! of Illinois, Inc., 376 Ill. App. 3d 599, 606 (2007). “An
abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or
when its ruling rests on an error of law.” McClure v. Haisha, 2016 IL App (2d) 150291, ¶ 20; see
also North Spaulding Condominium Association v. Cavanaugh, 2017 IL App (1st) 160870, ¶ 46
(“If a trial court’s decision rests on an error of law, then it is clear that an abuse of discretion has
occurred, as it is always an abuse of discretion to base a decision on an incorrect view of the
law.”). “To determine whether the circuit court applied the wrong legal standard in exercising its
discretion requires us to first determine the correct legal standard, which is a question of law that
we review de novo.” Myrick v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 2017 IL App (1st) 161023, ¶ 21.
¶ 12 In a negligence action, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant owed the plaintiff a
duty of care, that the defendant breached that duty, and that the defendant’s breach was a
proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff. Monson v. City of Danville, 2018 IL 122486, ¶ 41. At
issue here is the proximate cause element, which “embodies two distinct concepts: cause in fact
and legal cause.” Turcios v. DeBruler Co., 2015 IL 117962, ¶ 23. A defendant’s conduct is the
cause in fact of a plaintiff’s injury if the injury “would not have occurred ‘but for’ the
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No. 1-18-2014
defendant’s conduct,” or if the defendant’s conduct “was a ‘substantial factor’ in bringing about
the harm.” Stanphill v. Ortberg, 2018 IL 122974, ¶ 34. Legal cause, by contrast, “involves an
assessment of foreseeability.” Turcios, 2015 IL 117962, ¶ 24. “The relevant inquiry is whether
‘the injury is of a type that a reasonable person would see as a likely result of his or her
conduct.’” (Emphasis omitted.) Abrams v. City of Chicago, 211 Ill. 2d 251, 258 (2004) (quoting
First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d 252, 260 (1999)). Where, as here, “the
plaintiff’s injury results not from the defendant’s negligence directly but from the subsequent,
independent act of a third person,” the question is “whether the first wrongdoer reasonably might
have anticipated the intervening efficient cause [that is, the third person’s subsequent,
independent act] as a natural and probable result of the first party’s own negligence.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Abrams, 211 Ill. 2d at 259. Under either formulation, legal cause is
“established only if the defendant’s conduct is so closely tied to the plaintiff’s injury that he
should be held legally responsible for it.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Young v. Bryco
Arms, 213 Ill. 2d 433, 446 (2004). “Although the issue of proximate cause is ordinarily a
question of fact determined by the trier of fact, it is well settled that it may be determined as a
matter of law by the court where the facts as alleged show that the plaintiff would never be
entitled to recover.” Abrams, 211 Ill. 2d at 257-58.
¶ 13 Jones contends that the trial court erred in determining, as a matter of law, that Roth was
not a proximate cause of the injuries she suffered in the bus accident. Roth does not dispute that
there was sufficient evidence to prove that he was a cause in fact of those injuries. After all, a
jury could have found that but for Roth’s negligence, Jones would not have been required to use
a scooter while recuperating from her initial knee surgery following the car accident and thus
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No. 1-18-2014
would not have been injured when a bus driver negligently failed to secure the scooter and
caused it to topple over on a moving bus. The issue here, however, is whether a jury also could
have found that Roth’s negligence was a legal cause of the injuries Jones suffered on the bus.
We agree with the trial court that Jones’s allegations and proffered evidence were insufficient, as
a matter of law, to establish that Roth was a legal cause of Jones’s bus accident and resulting
injuries. That Jones would be injured nearly a year after her car accident with Roth by the
intervening negligence of a bus driver failing to properly harness her scooter was not a
reasonably foreseeable result of Roth’s negligence.
¶ 14 Jones relies on the principle, articulated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, that a
“negligent actor [who] is liable for an injury which impairs the physical condition of another’s
body *** is also liable for harm sustained in a subsequent accident which would not have
occurred had the other’s condition not been impaired, and which is a normal consequence of
such impairment.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 460 (1965). The Fifth District applied this
principle in Stephenson v. Air Products and Chemicals, Inc., 114 Ill. App. 2d 124 (1969). There,
the plaintiff, a painter, injured his leg when he fell while painting a flag pole on the defendant’s
premises. Id. at 129. Several years later, after returning to work as a painter, the plaintiff was
injured again when his leg gave out and caused him to fall. Id. In a negligence suit against the
defendant, the plaintiff sought to recover for the injuries he suffered in his initial fall as well as
those he sustained in the subsequent accident. Id. at 128. The trial court allowed the plaintiff to
present evidence of the second accident and his resulting injuries, and the appellate court
affirmed, concluding that the evidence was sufficient to establish that the plaintiff’s second fall
was a normal consequence of the injuries he sustained in the first fall. Id. at 132-33.
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No. 1-18-2014
¶ 15 We accept the principle articulated in section 460 of the Restatement and applied in
Stephenson, but we find it inapplicable here. In Stephenson, the plaintiff alleged that his
subsequent accident occurred “without the intervention of any intervening cause or condition.”
Id. at 129. Jones, by contrast, alleges that her bus accident resulted from the intervening
negligence of a third party. The Restatement expressly reserves the question of “whether [an]
actor whose negligence has weakened the physical condition of another’s body is *** also liable
for later harm resulting from the subsequent negligence of a third person.” Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 460 (1965). We do not rule out the possibility that a tortfeasor whose negligence
causes a person to be physically impaired may be held liable for later harm resulting from a
combination of that impairment and a third party’s negligence. But such liability is appropriate
only if the plaintiff can demonstrate, under well-settled principles of Illinois tort law, that the
defendant’s negligence was a legal cause (in addition to a but-for cause) of the plaintiff’s
subsequent injury. To do so, the plaintiff must establish that the third party’s negligence was a
reasonably foreseeable result of the defendant’s conduct. As our supreme court explained in
Abrams, in the “special subset of proximate cause cases involving injuries caused by the
intervening acts of third persons,” the legal cause inquiry asks “whether the defendant might
have reasonably anticipated the intervening efficient cause as a natural and probable result of his
own negligence.” 211 Ill. 2d at 259. Stated differently, the question in such cases is “whether the
intervening efficient cause was of a type that a reasonable person would see as a likely result of
his conduct.” Id.¶ 16 Based on Jones’s allegations and the evidence that she proffered below, we conclude, as a
matter of law, that the bus driver’s negligence in securing Jones’s scooter was not a reasonably
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No. 1-18-2014
foreseeable result of Roth’s earlier negligence. While a defendant need not have reasonably
foreseen “the precise injury” that resulted from his conduct, Williams v. University of Chicago
Hospitals, 179 Ill. 2d 80, 87 (1997), the injury must be “of a type that a reasonable person would
see as a likely result of his or her conduct,” Galman, 188 Ill. 2d at 258. An example of the type
of third-party negligence that is reasonably foreseeable was discussed in Kramer v. Szczepaniak,
2018 IL App (1st) 171411. There, an Uber driver kicked two passengers out of his car at 2:00
a.m. in a poorly lit, high traffic area that was unfamiliar to them. Id. at ¶¶ 6-10. Forced to walk
home, the passengers were struck by a hit-and-run driver in a crosswalk. Id. at ¶ 8. The
passengers sued the Uber driver (among others) to recover for their injuries. The trial court
dismissed the complaint on the ground that the passengers could not establish that the Uber
driver was a proximate cause of their injuries, but this court reversed. Id. at ¶¶ 3-4. We held that,
on the facts alleged, the possibility that the passengers would be struck by a negligent motorist
was within the scope of the risk that the Uber driver created by stranding them in an unfamiliar,
dimly lit, high traffic area. See id. at ¶ 42 (concluding that, under the circumstances as alleged,
we could not “say that the danger of being hit by a car was so remote as to be unforeseeable as a
matter of law”). Here, by contrast, the connection between Roth’s negligent driving in September
2013 and the bus driver’s negligence in securing Jones’s scooter in August 2014 is simply too
remote and attenuated to support a finding that Roth’s conduct was “so closely tied to [Jones’s]
injury that he should be held legally responsible for it.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Young, 213 Ill. 2d at 446. The trial court thus correctly determined, as a matter of law, that
Roth’s negligence could not be deemed a proximate cause of the injuries Jones suffered in the
bus accident.
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No. 1-18-2014
¶ 17 Jones also argues that, even if Roth was not a proximate cause of the bus accident, the
trial court nevertheless erred in barring her from presenting evidence of the expenses and other
losses she incurred following the bus accident because that accident merely aggravated the
injuries that she sustained in the earlier car accident. Jones contends that the jury should have
been allowed to apportion responsibility for the damages she incurred following the bus accident
between Roth and the bus driver “on the basis of the relative degree to which [each tortfeasor’s]
conduct proximately caused [her] injuries.” The problem with this argument, however, is that
Jones proffered no expert evidence linking the injuries she suffered following the bus accident to
the earlier car accident with Roth. Indeed, as the trial court observed, Jones’s own expert, Dr.
Primus, testified that the knee problems that Jones experienced after the bus accident were not
related to her earlier car accident.
¶ 18 In Voykin v. Estate of DeBoer, 192 Ill. 2d 49 (2000), our supreme court held that a
defendant who seeks to avoid liability for a plaintiff’s current injuries by presenting evidence
that those injuries resulted from a prior accident “must introduce expert evidence demonstrating
why the prior injury is relevant to causation, damages, or some other issue of consequence.” Id.
at 59. This rule recognizes that “the connection between *** past and current injuries is a subject
that is beyond the ken of the average layperson” and that jurors normally cannot “effectively or
accurately assess the relationship between a prior injury and a current injury without expert
assistance.” Id. Jones does not dispute that the Voykin rule likewise applies where, as here, the
plaintiff seeks to introduce evidence that her current injuries were causally related to a prior
accident.
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No. 1-18-2014
¶ 19 Instead, Jones contends that the trial court misconstrued Dr. Primus’s testimony. But
when asked whether he was “able to say that any knee issue that [Jones] was having [when he
examined her shortly after the bus accident] was related or unrelated to the previous [car]
accident,” Dr. Primus stated that “[i]t was not.” Jones argues that Dr. Primus did not definitively
state that her knee issues following the bus accident were not related to the earlier car accident
(as the trial court concluded), but that he was simply unable to say whether such a relationship
existed. But we fail to see how this interpretation of Dr. Primus’s testimony is helpful to Jones,
as it still fails to satisfy Voykin’s requirement of expert evidence causally linking her injuries to
the car accident. Regardless, the trial court’s interpretation of Dr. Primus’s testimony was neither
arbitrary nor unreasonable and so we must defer to it. See Department of Transportation v.
Dalzell, 2018 IL App (2d) 160911, ¶ 66 (trial court’s factual findings in support of ruling on
motion in limine “are reviewed under the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard”). Jones also
suggests that Dr. Primus offered additional testimony that was more favorable to her, but she has
forfeited this contention by failing to quote or cite any portion of the record in support of it. See
Castillo v. Stevens, 2019 IL App (1st) 172958, ¶ 58 (citing Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Nov. 1,
2017)). For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err in barring Jones from
presenting evidence of the bus accident and her resulting injuries, and that the court likewise did
not err in refusing to allow the jury to assess damages against Roth for injuries and expenses
Jones sustained following the bus accident.
¶ 20 Finally, Jones contends that the trial court erred in giving the two IPI Civil 60.01
instructions tendered by Roth that informed the jury that it could consider a party’s violation of
certain traffic statutes as evidence of negligence. We find no error. “A litigant has the right to
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No. 1-18-2014
have the jury clearly and fairly instructed upon each theory which was supported by the
evidence.” Leonardi v. Loyola University of Chicago, 168 Ill. 2d 83, 100 (1995). “All that is
required to justify the giving of an instruction is that there be some evidence in the record to
justify the theory of the instruction.” Heastie v. Roberts, 226 Ill. 2d 515, 543 (2007). “The test in
determining the propriety of tendered instructions is whether the jury was fairly, fully, and
comprehensively informed as to the relevant principles, considering the instructions in their
entirety.” Leonardi, 168 Ill. 2d at 100. A trial court’s decision to give an instruction is reviewed
for an abuse of discretion. Studt v. Sherman Health Systems, 2011 IL 108182, ¶ 13. Under this
standard, we ask “whether, taken as a whole, the instructions [were] sufficiently clear so as not to
mislead and whether they fairly and correctly state[d] the law.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id. Whether an instruction accurately stated the applicable law, however, is a question
that we review de novo. Id.¶ 21 Jones first challenges Defendant’s Instruction No. 14. Tracking the language of section
11-601(a) of the Vehicle Code, that instruction informed the jury that a statute in effect at the
time of the accident provided that “[t]he fact that the speed of a vehicle does not exceed the
applicable maximum speed limit does not relieve the driver from the duty to decrease speed
when approaching and crossing an intersection.” 625 ILCS 5/11-601(a) (West 2018). In
accordance with the language of IPI Civil 60.01, the instruction further advised the jury that, if it
“decide[d] that a party violated the statute on the occasion in question, then [it] may consider that
fact together with all the other facts and circumstances in evidence in determining whether and to
what extent, if any, a party was negligent before and at the time of the occurrence.” There is no
question that this instruction, which simply quoted the text of a statute, accurately conveyed the
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No. 1-18-2014
applicable law. Indeed, Jones does not (and cannot) contend that the instruction misstated the
traffic rules contained in section 11-601(a) of the Vehicle Code. Nor does she dispute that a jury
may properly consider a party’s violation of that statute, along with all other relevant facts and
circumstances, as evidence of negligence. See Leaks v. City of Chicago, 238 Ill. App. 3d 12, 18
(1992) (“Violation of a statute or ordinance designed for the protection of human life or property
is prima facie evidence of negligence, but does not constitute negligence per se because the
evidence of negligence may be rebutted by proof that the party acted reasonably under the
circumstances, despite the violation.”).
¶ 22 Jones argues instead that the instruction was misleading because it was not balanced by a
“clarifying instruction” that a driver turning left must yield the right of way to oncoming traffic.
But Jones overlooks the fact that the trial court did give such an instruction. Plaintiff’s
Instruction No. 15, tracking the language of section 11-902 of the Vehicle Code, informed the
jury that “[t]he driver of a vehicle intending to turn to the left within an intersection *** shall
yield the right-of-way to any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction which is so close
as to constitute an immediate hazard.” 625 ILCS 5/11-902 (West 2018). Considered together,
these instructions “fairly, fully, and comprehensively informed [the jury] as to the relevant
[legal] principles.” Leonardi, 168 Ill. 2d at 100.
¶ 23 Jones further contends that the trial court abused its discretion in giving Defendant’s
Instruction No. 14 because it “misapplied the direct testimony of the witnesses and did not take
into account” contradictions in Roth’s trial and deposition testimony. But when assessing the
propriety of a jury instruction, the question is whether “there [is] some evidence in the record to
justify the theory of the instruction.” Heastie, 226 Ill. 2d at 543. Jones herself testified that she
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entered the intersection at the speed limit of 30 miles per hour. That testimony alone constituted
sufficient evidence on which to instruct the jury that “[t]he fact that the speed of a vehicle does
not exceed the applicable maximum speed limit does not relieve the driver from the duty to
decrease speed when approaching and crossing an intersection.” 625 ILCS 5/11-601(a) (West
2018). Defendant’s Instruction No. 14 correctly stated the law, was supported by sufficient
evidence, and fairly informed the jury of Roth’s theory that Jones was at least contributorily
negligent for the accident by failing to reduce her speed when entering the intersection. The trial
court did not abuse its discretion in giving the instruction.
¶ 24 Jones also challenges Defendant’s Instruction No. 15, which informed the jury of the
legal effect of green, yellow, and red traffic signals. This challenge is both forfeited and
meritless. Jones forfeited her challenge to Defendant’s Instruction No. 15 by failing to object to
it in the trial court. See Studt, 2011 IL 108182, ¶ 19 (“A party forfeits the right to challenge a
jury instruction that was given at trial unless it makes a timely and specific objection to the
instruction and tenders an alternative, remedial instruction to the trial court.”) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Indeed, at the jury instruction conference, Jones’s counsel stated that
Defendant’s Instruction No. 15 was “fine” and that she did not “have a problem” with it. In light
of those representations, she may not now challenge the instruction on appeal. Even if she had
not forfeited her challenge, however, it would fail on the merits. Jones appears to concede (and
we agree) that Defendant’s Instruction No. 15 accurately stated the “general rule *** as to what a
driver is expected to do at each color of *** traffic light.” Indeed, the instruction simply quoted
the relevant language from section 11-306 of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-306 (West
2018)). Nevertheless, Jones argues that the instruction was confusing and prejudicial because
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Roth gave conflicting testimony at trial and in his pretrial deposition about whether he began his
left turn when the traffic light was yellow or red. But she does not explain how that fact renders
the instruction itself improper. It was within “the province of the jury to resolve conflicts in the
evidence, to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses, and to decide what weight should be
given to the witnesses’ testimony.” Maple v. Gustafson, 151 Ill. 2d 445, 452 (1992). Defendant’s
Instruction No. 15 correctly stated relevant legal principles and allowed the jury to apply those
principles to the facts as it found them. See People v. Parker, 223 Ill.2d 494, 501 (2006) (“Jury
instructions are intended to guide the jury in its deliberations and to assist the jury in reaching a
proper verdict through application of legal principles to the evidence and law.”). The trial court
thus did not abuse its discretion in delivering the instruction.
¶ 25 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 26 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.
¶ 27 Affirmed.
¶ 28 PRESIDING JUSTICE GORDON, specially concurring:
¶ 29 I agree with the ultimate decision of the majority in this case, but I must write separately
on the statement by the majority in ¶ 5 where the majority states that Dr. Primus performed
arthroscopic surgery on Jones and removed inflamed tissue. The report of proceedings illustrates
that Dr. Primus performed a partial meniscectomy chondroplasty on Jones. The MRI
demonstrated a tear in the meniscus. The doctor testified that:
“[W]e can either debride it, or—or smooth it out, or repair it, fix it. In terms of the
articular cartilage, so that’s the special lining that covers the bone, if there is a—if—if we
would find any type of defect, then there’s ways that we can treat that defect in a way to
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reduce the irritation and pain. So if there’s a loose flap, for instance, we can cut that flap,
or trim it, or smooth it off, and—and then if there’s inflamed tissue just throughout the
knee joint in general, there’s ways that we can reduce that tissue and also reduce pain.
Q. Okay. And I see this word ‘synovectomy,’ what does that mean?
A. So that’s the inflamed tissue I was—I was referring to, so that’s the synovial
tissue which lines all of our joints, and if it gets inflamed, it’s called synovitis *** and so
part of the surgery, if someone has a lot of inflamed tissue, is to remove that tissue.”
¶ 30 Dr. Primus never actually stated that he removed inflamed tissue in this case. What he did
state was:
“Q. Well with respect to any different things that might—you might have seen,
other than what you would have expected, or anything that took place during the surgery,
or anything of that nature?
A. No, her MRI—or her—or her surgical findings were actually negative
compared to the MRI findings, which was very positive for her, in that we did not have to
do any meniscus work, we did not have to do any significant cartilage work. She did have
the synovitis, and we debrided some of the extra synovial tissue that I talked about.
Q. Okay. Did you do anything else during that procedure?
A. No.”
¶ 31 In other words, he debrided the tissue, meaning he scraped off the dead tissue to decrease
the inflammation.
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