People v. Aranda

NOTICE
This order was filed under Supreme 2019 IL App (4th) 170645-U FILED
Court Rule 23 and may not be cited December 18, 2019
as precedent by any party except in NO. 4-17-0645 Carla Bender
th
the limited circumstances allowed 4 District Appellate
under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) McLean County
CRISTIAN A. ARANDA, ) No. 15CF54
Defendant-Appellant. )
) Honorable
) William G. Workman,
) Judge Presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices DeArmond and Cavanagh concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court reversed, concluding the trial court erred by telling jurors they
could enter a guilty verdict without allegations being proven.
¶2 In January 2015, the State charged defendant, Cristian A. Aranda, with one count
of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child under the age of 13 (count I) (720 ILCS 5/11-
1.40(a)(1) (West 2014)) and three counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse of a victim under
the age of 13 (counts II-IV) (720 ILCS 5/11-1.60(c)(1)(i) (West 2014)). In April 2017, a jury
convicted defendant on all four counts. The trial court sentenced defendant to 25 years’
imprisonment on count I (merged with count IV), to be served consecutive to two concurrent
terms of 7 years’ imprisonment on counts II and III.
¶3 Defendant appeals, arguing the trial court (1) erred by telling jurors they could
enter a guilty verdict without allegations being proven, (2) denied defendant a fair trial by
refusing to continue the trial so his chosen counsel could appear, (3) denied defendant a fair trial
by preventing defense counsel from fully cross-examining and impeaching a witness, and
(4) abused its discretion in sentencing defendant to two concurrent terms of 7 years’
imprisonment to be served consecutive to a term of 25 years’ imprisonment. For the following
reasons, we reverse the trial court’s judgment.
¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 In January 2015, the State charged defendant with (1) predatory criminal sexual
assault of a victim under the age of 13 in that defendant knowingly committed an act of sexual
penetration involving his finger and A.W.’s vagina (count I) (720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) (West
2014)); (2) aggravated criminal sexual abuse of a victim under the age of 13 in that defendant
knowingly committed an act of sexual conduct involving his hands and K.B.’s vagina (count II)
(720 ILCS 5/11-1.60(c)(1)(i) (West 2014)); (3) aggravated criminal sexual abuse of a victim
under the age of 13 in that defendant knowingly committed an act of sexual conduct involving
his hands and K.B.’s buttocks (count III); and (4) aggravated criminal sexual abuse of a victim
under the age of 13 in that defendant knowingly committed an act of sexual conduct involving
his hands and A.W.’s vagina (count IV). Defendant was eligible for extended-term sentencing
pursuant to 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(b)(3)(i) (West 2014) if convicted of committing the offenses
against “a person under 12 years of age at the time of the offense.”
¶6 In April 2017, defendant’s jury trial commenced, and the jury heard testimony
regarding an incident at A.W.’s tenth birthday sleepover party. Defendant does not contest the
sufficiency of the evidence and our resolution of this appeal does not require an extensive
discussion of the evidence. Accordingly, we briefly summarize the relevant testimony for the
purposes of appeal. A.W. and K.B., both 12 years old at the time of the trial, testified the
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incident occurred in the basement of A.W.’s house. A.W. testified defendant rubbed her vagina
both over and under her clothes. According to A.W., defendant’s fingers touched her bare skin
and “closer to the inside” of her vagina. A.W. testified defendant pushed and bent his finger and
“it really hurt.” K.B. testified she woke up to defendant putting his hand in her pants. According
to K.B., defendant touched her vagina and buttocks under her underwear.
¶7 Following the close of evidence, the jury received the following relevant
instructions:
“A person commits the offense of predatory criminal sexual
assault of a child when he knowingly commits an act of sexual
penetration when he is 17 years of age or older and the victim is
under 13 years of age when the act is committed.
A person commits the offense of aggravated criminal
sexual abuse when he is 17 years of age or older and commits an
act of sexual conduct with a victim who is under 13 years of age
when the act is committed.
The State has also alleged that the defendant committed the
offense of aggravated criminal sexual abuse against [K.B.], as
alleged in Count 2, against a person under 12 years of age at the
time of the offense.
***
The State has also alleged that the defendant committed the
offense of aggravated criminal sexual abuse against [K.B.], as
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alleged in Count 3, against a person under 12 years of age at the
time of the offense.
***
The State has also alleged that the defendant committed the
offense of aggravated criminal sexual abuse against [A.W.], as
alleged in Count 4, against a person under 12 years of age at the
time of the offense.”
The jury received issues instructions for counts I through IV, indicating the State must prove
(1) defendant knowingly committed the acts, (2) defendant was 17 years of age or older, and
(3) A.W. and K.B. were under 13 years of age when the act was committed. The jury also
received issues in enhancement/extended-term factors instructions for counts II through IV,
indicating the State must prove the following proposition:
“That the defendant committed the offense of aggravated
criminal sexual abuse against a person under 12 years of age at the
time of the offense.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that
the above proposition has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt,
then you should sign the verdict form finding that the allegation
was proven.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that
the above proposition has not been proved beyond a reasonable
doubt, then you should sign the verdict form finding that the
allegation was not proven.”
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¶8 During deliberation, the jury asked two questions. The first question read, “One
instruction it says under 13 years of age [and] the allegation says under 12 years of age. We just
want to make sure this is correct [and] suppose[d] to be that way.” The court responded to the
question in writing, stating, “The age of 13 and the age of 12 in the instructions are both correct.
Please refer to the Instructions.”
¶9 The jury’s second question read, “Can the verdict be Guilty [and] the allegation
be not proven? What would be the consequences if that decision is made?” The State argued the
trial court should respond by telling the jurors “The answer to the first part of your question is
yes, the verdict can be guilty and the allegation of a child under 12 not proven.” The State noted
the instructions called the “child under 12 years of age” an allegation and the jury’s first note
indicated confusion over the two different ages in the various instructions. Defense counsel
argued the note could indicate the jurors did not believe the State proved its case beyond a
reasonable doubt. Defense counsel asked the court to instruct the jury to refer to the instructions
before it. Counsel stated, “I’m very concerned that just because the word ‘allegation’ is being
used, and we’re making some assumptions about what we think that means, that it isn’t—that
we’re not misunderstanding them, and we might impact indirectly their own deliberations.” The
court indicated its belief that the jury was asking about the allegations of a child under 12 years
of age and that the court had an obligation to assist the jury on its specific question. Defense
counsel declined to concede that the jury was asking about the “child under 12 years of age”
allegation and again asked the court to refer the jury to the instructions before it.
¶ 10 The State suggested the court ask the jury for clarification of its question.
However, if the court did not ask for clarification, the State argued the court should direct the
jurors “to the jury instruction that answers that question.” The court concluded the parties would
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not reach an agreement as to how to respond to the jury’s question and the court’s original
proposed response would be given to the jury. That response read, “The answer to the first part
of your question is yes. The verdict can be guilty and the allegation not proven. The second part
of your question is the jury is not to consider the consequence of the decision. That is a matter
for the Court.” The jury returned guilty verdicts on all four counts. The jury also signed the
verdict forms indicating it found the allegations that defendant committed the offenses against
K.B. and A.W. against a person under 12 years of age was proven.
¶ 11 This appeal followed.
¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 13 On appeal, defendant argues the trial court (1) erred by telling jurors they could
enter a guilty verdict without allegations being proven, (2) denied defendant a fair trial by
refusing to continue the trial so his chosen counsel could appear, (3) denied defendant a fair trial
by preventing defense counsel from fully cross-examining and impeaching a witness, and
(4) abused its discretion in sentencing defendant to two concurrent terms of 7 years’
imprisonment to be served consecutive to a term of 25 years’ imprisonment. The State concedes
the trial court erred by instructing the jury it could enter a guilty verdict without allegations being
proven. For the following reasons, we accept the State’s concession, reverse the judgment of the
trial court, and remand for a new trial.
¶ 14 The trial court has a duty to instruct the jury when clarification is requested, when
the original instructions are incomplete, and when the jury is manifestly confused. People v.
Reid, 136 Ill. 2d 27, 39, 554 N.E.2d 174, 179 (1990). However, a court may decline to answer a
jury’s question if (1) the instructions sufficiently explain the relevant law and are readily
understandable, (2) further instructions would serve no useful purpose or potentially mislead the
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jury, or (3) if the question involves a question of fact. Id. “Furthermore, if the jury’s question is
ambiguous and any response to the question may require ‘a colloquy between the court and the
jury, a further explanation of the facts, and perhaps an expression of the trial court’s opinion on
the evidence,’ the circuit court may refuse to answer the question.” Id. at 39-40 (quoting People
v. Tostado, 92 Ill. App. 3d 837, 839, 416 N.E.2d 353, 355 (1981)). We review the court’s
decision for an abuse of discretion. Id.¶ 15 Here, the second note from the jury read, “Can the verdict be Guilty [and] the
allegation be not proven? What would be the consequences if that decision is made?” The State
suggested referring the jury to the specific instruction that addressed the child “under 12 years of
age” instruction or asking the jury to clarify its question. Defense counsel asked the court to
refer the jury to the instructions before it because the State’s suggestion assumed it understood
precisely what the jury was asking. Instead, the trial court responded to the jury’s question by
stating, “The answer to the first part of your question is yes. The verdict can be guilty and the
allegation not proven. The second part of your question is the jury is not to consider the
consequence of the decision. That is a matter for the Court.”
¶ 16 Defendant argues, and the State agrees, that the jury’s question is ambiguous and
the trial court’s response was a misstatement of the law. We agree. The note does not indicate
precisely what the jury was asking. Although the record might support an assumption that the
confusion stemmed from the two different ages in the instructions, it is not clear what charges
the jury referenced. Moreover, the trial court’s response did not specifically address the “under
12 years of age” allegation. Instead, the court instructed the jury that “[t]he verdict can be guilty
and the allegation not proven.” This is a misstatement of the law because the State must prove
every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477
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(2000). The court’s response could have misled the jury to believe it could convict defendant of
an offense even if it found the State did not prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt.
Accordingly, we accept the State’s concession that the trial court abused its discretion when its
instruction misled the jury with an incorrect statement of the law. We reverse and remand for a
new trial.
¶ 17 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 18 For the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for a new
trial.
¶ 19 Reversed and remanded.
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