People v. Petty

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as
precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2020 IL App (3d) 180011-UOrder filed January 8, 2020
____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
2020
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
ILLINOIS, ) of the 10th Judicial Circuit,
) Stark County, Illinois.
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
) Appeal No. 3-18-0011
v. ) Circuit No. 16-CF-5
)
SCOTT A. PETTY, ) The Honorable
) Thomas A. Keith,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE McDADE delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Lytton concurred in the judgment.
Justice Schmidt dissented.
____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
¶1 Held: The State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the presence of
amphetamine and benzodiazepine in Defendant’s urine results from the unlawful
consumption of methamphetamine.
¶2 The State charged Scott A. Petty with, inter alia, one count of aggravated driving a
vehicle while under the influence of methamphetamine, in violation of 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(6)
(2015). Following a stipulated bench trial, the trial court found Petty guilty of the offense
charged and sentenced him to nine years in prison. Petty now appeals, arguing: (1) the trial court
erred in failing to suppress the State’s evidence; (2) the State’s evidence was insufficient to
sustain his conviction’ and (3) section 5/11-501(a) is unconstitutional. We reverse and vacate
Petty’s conviction.
¶3 FACTS
¶4 On November 9, 2015, Stark County Sheriff's Deputy Dustin Schaill responded to a
reported car crash on Illinois Route 40 at approximately 630 feet north of 800 N. Bradford, Penn
Township. Schaill arrived on site at about 5:13 P.M. He observed a Bradford Rescue unit
removing Petty from his van in the southbound lane facing east. The front of Petty's van was
heavily damaged and seemed to have collided with another car. Petty did not appear to be
coherent. Officer Todd Marquez of the Bradford Police Department also responded to the crash
and assisted with traffic control.
¶5 The other car was in the northbound ditch and had significant damage from what
appeared to be a frontal collision. The Bradford Rescue unit removed the driver, Gina Masters,
from the crash site and air-lifted her to OSF/Saint Francis Medical Center (Saint Francis) in
Peoria. Petty was transported via ambulance to the same location. While Schaill was in transit, he
learned that Masters had died en route to Saint Francis. At the crash site, Officer Marquez
observed drug paraphernalia and a substance he believed to be cannabis inside Petty's van.
Marquez informed Schaill of his observations and collected the items.
¶6 Petty arrived at Saint Francis at about 6:43 P.M. At about 6:50 P.M., Dr. Jennifer E.
Schmidt ordered that a urine sample be drawn from Petty. After Deputy Schaill arrived at Saint
Francis, he placed Petty under arrest for driving under the influence and read him the motorist’s
implied consent warning at about 9:02 P.M., and at about 9:25 P.M. independently signed a
2
separate request for a urine draw. At the time, Petty was semi-conscious, severely injured and
incoherent. A single urine sample was collected from Petty at 4:00 A.M. the following morning.
¶7 The State filed four criminal charges against Petty on March 10, 2016. Count 1 alleged a
Class 2 felony offense in violation of 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(6) (2015). It stated that Petty, “while
under the influence of methamphetamine as listed in the Methamphetamine Control and
Community Protection Act, drove [his van], causing [it] to strike the vehicle driven by Gina M.
Masters, thereby causing the death of Gina M. Masters, and [Petty’s] driving in violation of
Section 11-501(a)(6) was a proximate cause of the death of Gina M. Masters ***.”
¶8 Petty filled two separate motions to suppress the urine draw and test results. In the first
motion, he alleged that the urine draw was performed without first obtaining his consent.
Specifically, he argued that the urine draw was not part of his medical treatment and was
conducted without probable cause. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that the Illinois
implied consent statute, 625 ILCS 5/11-501.1 (2015), creates an exception to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
¶9 In his second motion, Petty argued that the trial court should suppress all the findings of
the urine analysis obtained from his sample. He contended that, although the test was performed
for medical use only and not for legal purposes, the medical facility turned over the results
without his consent and without a warrant. The trial court denied Petty’s second motion on
September 13, 2017, ruling that the hospital records would come in under the business records
exception to the hearsay rule.
¶ 10 On October 6, 2017, Petty executed a "waiver of jury and a plea of not guilty" form. A
week later, the parties tendered following facts in stipulation: that Schaill and Marquez would
testify to their observations at the crash site and on the date of the accident; that Medical
3
Examiner J. Scott Denton would testify that he performed an examination of Masters on
November 11, 2015 and determined that she died "from multiple blunt injuries due to a motor
vehicle collision ***;" that Dr. Schmidt would testify that she ordered an analysis of Petty's urine
from which amphetamine and benzodiazepines were detected; and that Forensic Scientist Joni C.
Little would testify that she analyzed 0.2 grams of the white powder found in Petty's car and
detected the presence of methamphetamine. Petty and counsel for the parties signed the written
stipulation form.
¶ 11 In the stipulations, Petty reserved the right to raise "evidentiary objections to the
admissibility of [the] test results as previously argued in [his] pretrial motions." He stated that he
would present testimony from Ronald Henson regarding "the weight to be given to the test
results."
¶ 12 The parties then proceeded to a stipulated bench trial. At the bench trial, Petty stipulated
to the facts previously tendered. Counsel for the defense explained that Petty was stipulating
only that the evidence would be as tendered. Ronald Henson never testified, and no additional
testimony was presented.
¶ 13 The trial court ruled as followed:
"I find that there is a factual basis to support a finding of
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of Count
One as charged for the aggravated driving of a vehicle under the
influence. His stipulation is accepted, and it is ordered and directed
that the defendant is found guilty of Count one of the indictment."
4
¶ 14 The court subsequently sentenced Petty to nine years in prison. On November 14, 2017,
Petty timely filed a motion for a new trial arguing, inter alia, that the evidence was insufficient
to sustain his conviction. The trial court denied his motion.
¶ 15 This appeal now follows.
¶ 16 ANALYSIS
¶ 17 On appeal, Petty contends that the State failed to show that he consumed
methamphetamine as defined in the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act.
The parties only stipulated to the presence of two substances in his urine: amphetamine and
benzodiazepine. Petty argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the charge because the
State presented no evidence that those compounds resulted from his consumption of
methamphetamine. We agree with Petty and vacate his conviction.
¶ 18 In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the relevant question is
whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v.
Holliday, 2019 IL App (3d) 160315, ¶ 10. A conviction will be reversed where the evidence is
so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory that there remains a reasonable doubt of the
defendant's guilt. Id. In reviewing the evidence presented, this Court should "allow all reasonable
inferences from that evidence to be drawn in favor of the [State].” People v. Martin, 2011 IL
109102, ¶ 15. However, this Court "should not make random speculation in favor of the [State].”
People v. Dye, 2015 IL App (4th) 130799, ¶ 12. Where review of the evidence turns on a
"statutory interpretation, our review is de novo." Martin, 2011 IL 109102, ¶ 20.
¶ 19 Petty was charged with the offense of aggravated driving of a vehicle while under the
influence of methamphetamine, in violation of subsection 5/11–501(a)(6) of the Vehicle Code.
5
Subsection (a)(6) provides: "A person shall not drive or be in actual physical control of any
vehicle within this State while *** there is any amount of a drug, substance, or compound in the
person’s breath, blood, or urine resulting from the unlawful use or consumption of ***
methamphetamine as listed in the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act
***." 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a) (6) (2015).
¶ 20 The State first contends that "methamphetamine is an amphetamine, hence the name
'methamphetamine.'" The State thus argues that a reasonable inference could be drawn that the
amphetamine and benzodiazepine found in Petty's blood were salts, optical isomers, salts of an
optical isomer, or analog thereof, from "which the methamphetamine had been metabolized." We
disagree.
¶ 21 In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court "should draw only reasonable
inferences in favor of the [State]; we should not make random speculations in favor of the
prosecution.” Dye, 2015 IL App (4th) 130799, ¶ 12. Whether the metabolization of
methamphetamine into amphetamine, benzodiazepine, or both has occurred entails a level of
chemical knowledge not ordinarily possessed by the average person. Thus, a determination by
the trier-of-fact that the presence of either chemical compound results from the consumption of
methamphetamine requires competent testimony from a person having such specialized
knowledge. To sustain Petty’s conviction absent such testimony would be tantamount to making
a random speculation regarding the metabolization of methamphetamine in favor of the State.
¶ 22 The State's contention also fails because the applicable statute specifically precludes it.
The Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act defines methamphetamine as
"the chemical methamphetamine *** or any salt, optical isomer, salt of optical isomer, or analog
thereof, with the exception of *** any other scheduled substance with a separate listing under
6
the Illinois Controlled Substances Act." 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(6) (2015) (emphasis added).
Amphetamine is listed as a controlled substance under subsection 570/206 (d)(1) of the
Controlled Substances Act, whereas methamphetamine and "its salts, isomers, and salts of its
isomers" are separately listed under subsection 570/206(d)(2) of that act. See 720 ILCS
570/206(d)(1) (2015); 720 ILCS 570/206(d)(2) (2015). So even if one could appropriately infer
without competent testimony that amphetamine is a "salt" or "isomer" of methamphetamine
simply because of its name, the plain language of both the Illinois Controlled Substances Act and
the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act excludes amphetamine as a
predicate for a subsection 11–501(a)(6) violation based on consuming methamphetamine. 625
ILCS 5/11-501(a)(6).
¶ 23 Finally, the State contends that Petty failed to argue in the trial court, that the presence of
amphetamine and benzodiazepine is insufficient to establish consumption of methamphetamine
and has, therefore, "forfeited the argument on appeal.” The State also contends that this Court
can sustain the decision of the trial court on any grounds supported in the record regardless of
whether the trial court relied on the grounds and regardless of whether the trial court's reasoning
was correct. The State seems to conclude from these contentions that the presence of
methamphetamine in a white powder collected from Petty’s van supports an inference that he
unlawfully consumed methamphetamine. We again disagree.
¶ 24 First, this Court has previously found that a "challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
is not subject to the waiver rule and can be raised by a defendant for the first time on direct
appeal, even if not properly preserved ***." People v. Muhammad, 398 Ill. App. 3d 1013, 1018
(2010). Thus, Petty’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal is not limited to his
theory before the trial court. And second, as previously noted, our duty is to draw reasonable
7
inferences from the evidence, not to “make random speculations in favor of the [State].” Dye,
2015 IL App (4th) 130799, ¶ 12. There is nothing in the stipulated facts showing that Petty
consumed methamphetamine, regardless of whether the evidence showed that Officer Marquez
collected methamphetamine from his car.
¶ 25 CONCLUSION
¶ 26 The judgment of the circuit court of Stark County is vacated and the conviction of Scott
A. Petty’s conviction for aggravated driving while under the influence of methamphetamine is
vacated.
¶ 27 As a result of our ruling, we need not address Petty’s arguments regarding (1) the
constitutionality of section 5/11-501(a), and (2) the suppression of the evidence.
¶ 28 Conviction vacated.
¶ 29 JUSTICE SCHMIDT, dissenting:
¶ 29 I respectfully dissent. In my opinion, the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable
to the State, supports the trial court’s finding that defendant violated subsection 11-501(a)(6) of
the Vehicle Code.
¶ 30 The majority acknowledges that when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must
ask whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt. Holliday, 2019 IL App (3d) 160315, ¶ 10. The majority continues that the
reviewing court will not reverse unless the evidence is so improbable so as to create a reasonable
doubt of defendant’s guilt. Id. But then the majority does just that.
¶ 31 The trier of fact need not be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to each link in the chain
of circumstances but rather be satisfied that all evidence, taken together, establishes defendant’s
guilt. People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d 187, 242 (2006). Defendant struck a car and killed the
8
driver. When the paramedics removed defendant from his vehicle, he was incoherent. Officers
found drug paraphernalia and a white powdery substance in his car. A forensic scientist identified
this substance as methamphetamine. Defendant’s urinalysis returned a positive result for
benzodiazepines and amphetamine. The subsection under which the State charged defendant
criminalizes operating a motor vehicle when a defendant has any amount of a “drug, substance, or
compound” in his “breath, blood, or urine resulting from the unlawful use or consumption of ***
a controlled substance listed in the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, *** or methamphetamine.”
625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(6) (2014). The State put forth a common sense argument:
methamphetamine is an amphetamine. See Methamphetamine, THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON
DRUG ABUSE (May 2019), https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/methamphetamine.
The consumption of methamphetamine metabolizes down into amphetamine. See Robert West et
al., Differentiating Medicinal from Illicit Use in Positive Methamphetamine Results in a Pain
Population, 37(2) J. OF ANALYTICAL TOXICOLOGY 83, 85 (2013) (“[Methamphetamine] is
metabolized by hepatic microsomal enzymes to amphetamine.”). Defendant had
methamphetamine in his vehicle and paraphernalia to consume it. He tested positive for
amphetamines. Therefore, one can make a reasonable inference that defendant was under the
influence of methamphetamine at the time of the collision.
¶ 32 The majority also contends the State failed to satisfy the statutory requirements to sustain
a conviction under subsection 11-501(a)(6) of the Vehicle Code. Subsection 501(a)(6) describes
not only consumption of methamphetamine but also any drug listed in the Illinois Controlled
Substances Act. Referring to the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, one can see that both
amphetamine and methamphetamine are included. 720 ILCS 570/206(d)(1), (2) (West 2014).
Therefore, the State proved defendant was in violation of the charging statute.
9