People v. Cooper

NOTICE FILED
This order was filed under Supreme
2020 IL App (4th) 170640-UCourt Rule 23 and may not be cited January 21, 2020
as precedent by any party except in NO. 4-17-0640 Carla Bender
the limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate
under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) McLean County
REGINALD DEANGELO COOPER, ) No. 17CF483
Defendant-Appellant. )
) Honorable
) John Casey Costigan,
) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Steigmann and Justice Holder White concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Defendant’s conviction for being an organizer of a continuing financial crimes
enterprise is affirmed where the evidence demonstrated an agreement between
defendant and other individuals to commit forgery.
¶2 In August 2017, a jury found defendant, Reginald Deangelo Cooper, guilty of
financial institution fraud (720 ILCS 5/17-10.6(i) (West 2016)). The trial court sentenced him to
12 years in prison. He appeals directly from his conviction, claiming the State failed to prove him
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In particular, he claims the evidence was insufficient to prove
he and any other individual agreed to commit forgery on at least three separate occasions within
an 18-month period. For the reasons that follow, we affirm defendant’s conviction.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 In May 2017, the State charged defendant with financial institution fraud, alleging
he organized a criminal enterprise by knowingly agreeing with another person to commit forgery
on at least three separate occasions within an 18-month period. The evidence presented at
defendant’s August 2017 jury trial included the following.
¶5 Mary Pat Panetti, a fraud investigator with U.S. Bank, testified she compiled the
records of all the customers’ accounts that were affected “in this fraud.” While reviewing group
exhibits A through H on the witness stand, Panetti testified that she had gathered the savings and
checking account records of four customers: Kelsey Phelps, Justin Crayton, Paris Perry, and
Thomas Gardner. Included in the group exhibits were the following documents for each account
per customer: (1) a signature card (except for Gardner); (2) the opening deposit information;
(3) copies of deposited checks; and (4) the account statements. Panetti also identified group
Exhibit I as eight photographs taken from video surveillance of various automated teller machine
(ATM) locations during the withdrawal of funds from the customers’ accounts. She identified each
transaction, the location of the ATM, and the time and date of the withdrawal. She gathered this
documentation and submitted the same to the police.
¶6 At the conclusion of Panetti’s testimony, the trial court read a stipulation to the jury
“with regard to several witnesses.” The stipulation provided that, if called to testify, Dexter Hebert,
Louise Hebert, and Janet Kull would confirm they each held an account at Commerce Bank but
none wrote a check or authorized any check to be written from their respective accounts to
defendant or any of the named account holders, whom they had never met. The copies of the checks
from their accounts did not bear their signatures. They had no knowledge as to how anyone
obtained their checks.
¶7 Kelsey Phelps, age 19, testified for the State. She said in December 2016, she
opened a bank account at U.S. Bank “to help a friend in need of another friend.” She said she was
“helping” her now ex-friend Semaj Collins, who was “helping” his friend “Flaka” (defendant).
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She positively identified defendant in court as the person she knew as Flaka. Phelps said she had
known defendant for approximately one week before she was asked to open the accounts. She
communicated directly with defendant in person and through Facebook, texting, and phone calls.
On the day she opened the account, she went to the bank with defendant, defendant’s father (Mike),
and Montel Kramer (Phelp’s boyfriend). Defendant and Collins had instructed her to “open a
checking and a savings account.” Defendant gave her $50 to open both accounts.
¶8 After Phelps left the bank, defendant instructed her to withdraw the $50 from an
ATM. The amount she withdrew was close to $50 but not the full amount. Phelps said she did not
feel “right” about opening the account; she had an “uneasy feeling in [her] stomach for a while
after it.” She said defendant asked her multiple times to open the accounts and she felt pressured
to do so.
¶9 Phelps was shown copies of two checks deposited into her savings account. Both
checks were from Rochelle Derring, written from a TCF National Bank account, in the amount of
$180 (exhibit Nos. A3 and A4), and contained the word “loan” in the subject line. She was also
shown copies of two checks deposited into her checking account. Again, both were from Derring,
written from a TCF National Bank account, in the amount of $200 (exhibit Nos. B3 and B4), and
contained the word “loan” in the subject line. Phelps said she did not endorse, deposit, or cash the
checks, nor did she borrow money from Derring. However, defendant and Collins told Phelps she
would receive $100 “out of it,” but she did not receive any money. In fact, she now owes U.S.
Bank for the amounts withdrawn. Phelps said her personal identification number (PIN) was written
on the documents she had given defendant. Phelps acknowledged the State granted her immunity
for her testimony against defendant.
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¶ 10 Justin Crayton, age 21, testified that in early January 2017, he was approached by
his friend “Mo” about getting “some money in [his] pocket.” The next day, Crayton met with
“Flaka” (Crayton made an in-court identification of defendant as the person he knew as Flaka),
who told Crayton he “could help [him] get some money. All he needed was [Crayton’s] help.”
Defendant told Crayton the only thing he needed to do was open a bank account at U.S. Bank.
Defendant gave him money to open a checking and a savings account; he walked to the bank alone.
Defendant told him he would give him $400 to $500 for opening the accounts.
¶ 11 Crayton was shown copies of four checks deposited into his accounts. Two checks
from Janet Kull, written from a Commerce Bank account, in the amount of $200 (exhibit Nos. C3
and C4), were deposited into his checking account. Each check contained the word “loan” in the
subject line. He was also shown copies of two checks deposited into his savings account. Again,
both were from Kull, written from a Commerce Bank account, in the amount of $180 (exhibit Nos.
D3 and D4), and contained the word “loan” in the subject line. Crayton said he did not endorse,
deposit, or cash the checks, nor did he borrow money from Kull. Crayton acknowledged he
received immunity for his testimony.
¶ 12 Paris Perry testified she opened a checking and a savings account at U.S. Bank in
January 2017 after her boyfriend, Crayton, asked her if she would like to “make a little extra
money.” She identified defendant in court as the person she had met at Crayton’s suggestion. She
agreed to open a checking account and a savings account at U.S. Bank. Defendant gave her $50 to
split evenly between the two accounts. After she opened the accounts, she was to give him the
temporary debit card and the corresponding PIN. She was told she would get between $800 and
$1,000 for opening the accounts. Defendant was in the car that picked Perry up to take her to the
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bank. Perry said the vehicle depicted in exhibit No. 5 was the vehicle in which she rode to the
bank. She did not receive any payment for her participation, and she now owed U.S. Bank $1,300.
¶ 13 Perry was shown copies of two checks deposited into her checking account. Both
checks were from Kull, written from a Commerce Bank account, in the amount of $200 (exhibit
Nos. E3 and E4), and contained the word “loan” in the subject line. She was also shown copies of
two checks deposited into her savings account. Again, both were from Kull, written from a
Commerce Bank account, in the amount of $180 (exhibit Nos. F3 and F4), and contained the word
“loan” in the subject line. Perry said she did not endorse, deposit, or cash the checks, nor did she
borrow money from Kull. Perry acknowledged she received immunity for her testimony.
¶ 14 Thomas Gardner, age 59, testified that on February 1, 2017, a man approached him
outside of the Salvation Army shelter at which he was staying in Bloomington. He got in a vehicle
(he said he remembered seeing the word Lexus on the steering wheel) with this man and three
other individuals. He said it was “hard to tell” if he would recognize the man again. The man told
him to open a savings account and a checking account with the $50 he was given. They drove to
Springfield, where Gardner opened the accounts as instructed at U.S. Bank. In exchange for his
participation, the man was going to pay him $100. He was given $50 after he opened the accounts.
¶ 15 Gardner was shown a copy of a check deposited into his checking account. The
check was from Dexter or Louise Hebert, written from a Commerce Bank account, in the amount
of $200 (exhibit No. G2), and contained the word “loan” in the subject line. He was also shown a
copy of a check deposited into his savings account. Again, it was from Dexter or Louise Hebert,
written from a Commerce Bank account, in the amount of $180 (exhibit No. H2), and contained
the word “loan” in the subject line. Gardner said he did not endorse, deposit, or cash the checks,
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nor did he borrow money from Kull. Gardner acknowledged he received immunity for his
testimony.
¶ 16 Bloomington police officer Paul Jones testified that on January 25, 2017, he was
dispatched to U.S. Bank in Bloomington on a report of fraudulent activity. When he arrived, he
saw a blue Nissan Sentra in the bank’s parking lot with four people inside. Defendant was exiting
the rear passenger seat. Photographs taken from Jones’s body camera (exhibit Nos. 5, 6, 7, 7a, and
8) showing the vehicle and a person who Jones identified in court as defendant were admitted into
evidence.
¶ 17 Normal police officer Jason Wood testified that his duties included computer and
cellular telephone forensics. He testified as the State’s expert witness in the field of historical cell-
site analysis, which he described as the analysis of data derived from detailed call records. He
analyzed the activity on defendant’s phone for the month of January 2017. During that time,
defendant’s phone connected to towers in Bloomington, Normal, Lincoln, and Springfield.
Because defendant’s phone was used to make these calls in these areas, the phone could not have
been in Chicago as defendant had suggested.
¶ 18 Normal police detective Nicole Bruno, who specializes in the investigation of
financial crimes, testified she was assigned to this case and worked in conjunction with
Bloomington police detective Todd McClusky. On May 2, 2017, she and McClusky interviewed
defendant. The videotaped interview and a typewritten transcript of the interview were admitted
into evidence. Defendant denied knowing anyone in Bloomington-Normal besides his father and
denied knowing anything about opening accounts or withdrawals from those accounts.
¶ 19 Both parties rested. During his closing argument, the prosecutor proposed to the
jury that defendant “got three other—got these four other people, over a course of about a month,
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to open these accounts and help him commit the forgeries so he could profit from them, because
he was their boss, because he was in charge.” Defendant argued the State failed to prove defendant
organized or supervised anything. Nevertheless, the jury found defendant guilty.
¶ 20 On August 25, 2017, the trial court conducted a sentencing hearing. First, the court
denied defendant’s motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the grounds of
insufficient evidence. Next, with regard to sentencing, the court considered evidence in
aggravation, factors in mitigation, defendant’s presentence investigation report, and defendant’s
statement in allocution. The court sentenced defendant to 12 years in prison on this Class X offense
plus restitution and fines, fees, and costs.
¶ 21 This appeal followed.
¶ 22 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 23 Defendant claims the State failed to prove the elements of the charged offense
beyond a reasonable doubt. The dispute does not center around the facts as much as it does the
definitions of the terms used in the statute and the charging instrument. Specifically, defendant
contends the State failed to prove the existence of an agreement between him and anyone else to
commit forgery. We disagree.
¶ 24 Due process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt to convict a criminal
defendant. People v. Ross, 229 Ill. 2d 255, 272 (2008). In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency
of the evidence, it is not a reviewing court’s role to retry the defendant; rather, we must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether any rational trier of
fact could have found each of the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
People v. Ward, 215 Ill. 2d 317, 322 (2005). The trier of fact is responsible for evaluating the
credibility of the witnesses, drawing reasonable inferences from the evidence, and resolving any
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inconsistencies in the evidence, and a reviewing court should not substitute its judgment for that
of the trier of fact. People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d 187, 242 (2006). Ultimately, a reviewing court
will not reverse a defendant’s conviction unless the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory
that it creates a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. People v. Cox, 195 Ill. 2d 378, 387 (2001).
¶ 25 The State charged defendant with one count of being an organizer of a financial
crimes enterprise, alleging he, “with the intent to commit the offense of forgery involving a
financial institution, agreed with another person to the commission of that offense on at least three
separate occasions [sic] within an [18-]month period, and with respect to the other individuals, the
defendant occupied a position of organizer or supervisor of the conspiracy[.]” (Emphasis added.)
See 720 ILCS 5/17-10.6(i) (West 2016).
¶ 26 Section 17-10.6(i) of the Criminal Code of 2012 sets forth the offense of being an
organizer of a continuing financial crimes enterprise. 720 ILCS 5/17-10.6(i) (West 2016). In order
to sustain a conviction for that offense, the State must establish that the defendant agreed with one
or more persons to commit three or more felony offenses involving a financial institution within
an 18-month period and that the defendant “occupie[d] a position of organizer, supervisor, or
financier or other position of management” with respect to the other participants in the conspiracy.
720 ILCS 5/17-10.6(i) (West 2016). In this case, the predicate felony offense that formed the basis
for defendant’s conviction for being an organizer of a continuing financial crimes enterprise was
forgery.
¶ 27 A person commits forgery when, with intent to defraud, he or she knowingly makes
a false document or alters any document to make it false and that document is apparently capable
of defrauding another. 720 ILCS 5/17-3(a)(1) (West 2016). A person may be guilty of a “false
making” of an instrument within the meaning of “forgery” where the instrument is false in any
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material part and calculated to induce another to give credit to it as genuine and authentic,
notwithstanding fact that person signs and executes the instrument in his own name. People v.
Mau, 377 Ill. 199, 202-203 (1941). Forgery does not always involve a false signature, but also
includes the false making of a writing when that writing is done with the intent to damage or
defraud any person. People v. Kubanek, 370 Ill. 646, 650 (1939).
¶ 28 The statute, as did the indictment against defendant, used the word “conspiracy.”
A conspiracy is defined as an agreement to commit a criminal act or acts. People v. Caraga, 2018
IL App (1st) 170123, ¶ 37. “To make a prima facie showing of a conspiracy, the State must
establish that (i) two or more people intended to commit a crime, (ii) they engaged in a common
plan to accomplish this goal, and (iii) an act or acts were done by one or more of them in
furtherance of the conspiracy.” Id. The question then is whether the State sufficiently proved the
existence of an agreement or a conspiracy to commit forgery.
¶ 29 The evidence presented at trial demonstrated that Phelps, Crayton, Perry, and
Gardner agreed to open bank accounts (accounts they never intended to use as their own) in
furtherance of defendant’s objective and at defendant’s direction. Although they did not know
exactly what defendant was intending to do with the accounts, nor were they involved in cashing
or depositing fraudulent checks into their accounts, they nevertheless agreed to open shell accounts
with the intent to defraud the bank in exchange for compensation from defendant. They each
knowingly opened a deceptive account, intending to “induce another to give credit to it as genuine
and authentic,” while having no intent of holding the accounts as their own. It is of no consequence
that each person opened the account in his or her own name. See Mau, 377 Ill. at 203 (a defendant
may be guilty of forgery when he falsely makes an instrument, even in his own name, which is
calculated to induce another to believe it to be genuine and authentic when it is actually false and
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deceptive). The bank, relying on the good faith of these individuals, opened the accounts and
distributed debit cards to each.
¶ 30 Every person who is guilty either of making and forging or uttering and passing, or
attempting to utter and pass, under the conditions named in the statute, is guilty of forgery. People
v. Katz, 356 Ill. 440, 444 (1934). The words “utter” and “uttering” in this context mean,
“substantially, ‘to offer’.” Id. at 445. In order to open the bank accounts, each individual signed a
signature card, knowing he or she would never personally utilize the account but, rather, offering
his or her signature seemingly in good faith as if he or she would. Each individual testified he or
she opened the account only because he or she was instructed to do so with the promise of
compensation.
¶ 31 Given the evidence presented at trial, we find the State presented sufficient
evidence to show that defendant organized, recruited, and directed the others to open checking and
savings accounts at U.S. Bank. He gave them the funds to open each account and directed them to
release the account numbers and bank-issued debit cards to him. In exchange for the promise of
compensation, each individual agreed, even while suspecting that something “wasn’t right.”
Regardless of the uneasiness, each person agreed to open the account having no intention of using
the account for their own individual use. Instead, they knowingly opened these false accounts at
defendant’s request knowing defendant had ulterior motives and that the accounts would not be
used as intended by the bank.
¶ 32 Viewing the totality of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
including the testimony provided by Phelps, Crayton, Perry, and Gardner, and within the context
of the applicable statutes, we conclude a reasonable trier of fact could have found defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of being the organizer of a financial crimes enterprise.
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¶ 33 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 34 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 35 Affirmed.
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