In re G.D.

2020 IL App (2d) 191078-UNo. 2-19-1078
Order filed March 30, 2020
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as
precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
In re G.D., a Minor ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) of Winnebago County.
)
) No. 18-JA-318
)
) Honorable
(People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner- ) Francis M. Martinez,
Appellee v. Cheryl D., Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE ZENOFF delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices McLaren and Hudson concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The judgment terminating the respondent’s parental rights was affirmed where (1)
the trial court’s findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence and
(2) the purported evidentiary errors did not compel reversal of the judgment.
¶2 Respondent, Cheryl D., appeals an order terminating her parental rights to her minor
daughter, G.D. We affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 The minor was born in March 2016 to respondent and Darryl D. Darryl has never been
involved in the minor’s life, and he is not a party to this appeal.
¶5 On September 21, 2018, the State filed a neglect petition. In count I, the State alleged that
2020 IL App (2d) 191078-Uthe minor’s environment was injurious to her welfare, in that respondent had a substance abuse
issue that prevented her from properly parenting, thereby placing the minor at risk of harm. In
count II, the State alleged that the minor’s environment was injurious to her welfare, in that
respondent “became intoxicated and minor was outside without supervision,” thereby placing the
minor at risk of harm. In count III, the State alleged that the minor’s parent or other person
responsible for her welfare left her “without supervision for an unreasonable period of time without
regard for the mental or physical health, safety, or welfare of the minor,” in that respondent
“became intoxicated and minor who is 2 years old was outside without supervision.”
¶6 Following a shelter-care hearing on September 21, 2018, the court determined that there
was probable cause to believe that the minor was neglected. The court appointed the Department
of Children and Family Services (DCFS) as the minor’s temporary guardian and custodian, with
discretion to place her with a responsible relative or in traditional foster care.
¶7 On December 18, 2018, the parties entered an agreed adjudicatory order. Respondent
stipulated that the minor was neglected pursuant to count I of the petition. The State dismissed the
other two counts in exchange for respondent’s agreement to complete services based on all counts
of the petition.
¶8 On January 23, 2019, the parties entered an agreed dispositional order. Pursuant to this
agreement, the court appointed DCFS as the minor’s guardian and custodian, with the discretion
to place her with a responsible relative or in foster care. Respondent was ordered to cooperate
with all drug, alcohol, and psychological treatment and services required by DCFS and its
contracting agencies. The goal was set as return home within 12 months. Respondent did not
appeal this order.
¶9 The court held a permanency review hearing on July 3, 2019. In a proffer submitted by
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2020 IL App (2d) 191078-Uher attorney in lieu of testimony, respondent candidly acknowledged that her “mental health has
been a detriment during this review period and that she has attempted rather unsuccessfully to
engage in a variety of services.” Respondent indicated that she intended to submit herself over the
coming weekend for inpatient psychiatric treatment to attempt to stabilize her mental health. The
court found that respondent had failed to make reasonable efforts toward the return of the minor.
The court changed the goal to substitute care pending court determination of termination of
parental rights.
¶ 10 On July 15, 2019, the State petitioned to terminate respondent’s parental rights on two
grounds: (1) failure to protect the minor from conditions within her environment that were
injurious to her welfare (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(g) (West 2018)) and (2) failure to maintain a
reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the minor’s welfare (750 ILCS
50/1(D)(b) (West 2018)).
¶ 11 A. Unfitness Hearing
¶ 12 Stephanie Sanders, a DCFS caseworker who had been assigned to the minor’s case since
September 19, 2018, testified for the State at the unfitness hearing as follows.
¶ 13 Although she was not a therapist, Sanders had concerns about respondent’s mental health,
because respondent reported being psychiatrically hospitalized numerous times and she “seemed
unstable” to Sanders. It was also clear to Sanders from the information that she received from
others that respondent “needed to see a therapist and a psychiatrist to get stable.” For example,
one contracted worker who transported respondent to visits with the minor refused to continue
doing so after respondent engaged in “ranting and raving” behavior. A replacement transporter
likewise refused to work with respondent after only a few days. DCFS asked respondent to
complete a mental health assessment, but Sanders never received documentation that respondent
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2020 IL App (2d) 191078-Ucompleted that assessment prior to the goal change.
¶ 14 Sanders explained that, throughout the life of this case, respondent missed multiple drug
drops and tested positive for opiates and benzodiazepines. Respondent told Sanders that she was
prescribed medications for physical and mental conditions, but respondent failed to provide proof
of that fact despite Sanders’s requests. On one occasion in May 2019, Sanders asked to see
respondent’s medication, and respondent gave her a white Tylenol bottle with no label on it. The
bottle contained red Skittles.
¶ 15 Sanders testified that DCFS asked respondent to participate in a drug and alcohol
assessment. In June 2019, Sanders received documentation from respondent indicating that she
had been assessed by Rosecrance. This documentation contained no recommendations for
services, however, and it was not clear to Sanders whether Rosecrance performed a mental health
assessment or a drug and alcohol assessment. Sanders sought clarification from Rosecrance but
never received a response. Respondent participated in a substance abuse assessment through
Rosecrance in August 2019, but Sanders had not received the results of that assessment at the time
of the unfitness hearing.
¶ 16 According to Sanders, DCFS also asked respondent to participate in individual counseling.
Sanders referred respondent to Hope Counseling three times, and even offered to arrange
transportation. Respondent refused to participate in counseling through that provider, insisting
that she would find a therapist on her own. Sanders told respondent that she could use any provider
that she wanted, so long as respondent presented documentation confirming that her needs were
being addressed. Sanders received no documentation that respondent participated in therapy
before the court changed the goal from reunification to termination. Around August 2019,
respondent started counseling and other services.
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2020 IL App (2d) 191078-U¶ 17 Sanders testified that DCFS asked respondent to participate in parenting classes.
Respondent presented for an intake in March or April 2019 but never completed those services.
Respondent told Sanders that the parenting class coordinator acted inappropriately by discussing
respondent’s medical information with a third party. When Sanders asked the parenting class
coordinator about that issue, the coordinator explained to Sanders that respondent had discussed
her case with one of the coordinator’s other clients. Over respondent’s hearsay objection, the court
allowed Sanders to testify that the person who performed the parenting class intake had concerns
about respondent’s mental health. Specifically, Sanders received a letter in May or June 2019
indicating that, if respondent were to continue the parenting classes, she would first have to work
with a psychiatrist and a therapist to stabilize her condition.
¶ 18 Sanders testified that respondent mentioned having numerous jobs throughout the life of
this case but never provided paystubs as requested. Respondent also had trouble maintaining stable
housing. When the minor came into care, respondent was living in her own apartment.
Respondent was later evicted from that apartment, and Sanders referred her to La Voz Latina
multiple times for assistance. Although respondent worked with La Voz Latina for a period of
time, La Voz Latina ultimately “discharged” respondent for lack of attendance. As of July 2019,
respondent was living with her aunt.
¶ 19 Sanders testified that respondent initially had three-hour visits with the minor each Friday.
During those visits, respondent would bring numerous things for the minor. On the other hand,
respondent discussed topics with the minor that Sanders deemed inappropriate, such as telling the
minor not to call her foster parents “mom” and “dad.” In June 2019, respondent met with a
psychologist because she was “exhibiting some mental health instability.” Around that time,
DCFS personnel made the determination to put respondent’s visits on hold until a therapist or
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2020 IL App (2d) 191078-Upsychiatrist confirmed that she was stable enough to resume them. Respondent subsequently told
Sanders that she missed the minor, and respondent expressed her desire to reinstate the visits. In
the week before the unfitness hearing, respondent gave Sanders a letter from somebody who
opined that respondent had stabilized. Sanders said that DCFS would consequently resume visits
once per month.
¶ 20 Sanders identified People’s Exhibits 1 through 3 as the service plans that she created.
Respondent’s counsel objected on the basis that the exhibits might contain hearsay. The court
overruled that objection. Respondent did not object to the foundation for admitting these exhibits.
¶ 21 Following Sanders’s testimony, the State asked the court to admit People’s Exhibits 4 (the
indicated packet), 5 (respondent’s medical records from Crusader Clinic), and 6 (respondent’s
medical records from SwedishAmerican Hospital). Respondent’s counsel objected only to the
hearsay contained within the indicated packet. The court overruled that objection, promising that
it would “sort the wheat from chaff.” The court also took judicial notice of the neglect petition,
the adjudicatory order, the dispositional order, and the order following the permanency review.
The State then rested.
¶ 22 Respondent’s counsel made a proffer that two counselors—who had treated respondent
since August 2019 and were unavailable to testify on the day of the unfitness hearing—would
testify that respondent was working through her issues and engaging in services. The court ruled
that evidence of respondent’s participation in services after the goal change was irrelevant to the
unfitness proceedings.
¶ 23 Respondent then testified on her own behalf. In addition to the minor, she had three other
children, ages 27, 17, and 12. None of those children resided with respondent as of the time of the
hearing, and none of them were involved in this case.
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2020 IL App (2d) 191078-U¶ 24 Respondent explained that she was hospitalized three times for mental health issues during
the life of this case. She authorized Sanders to obtain the medical records relating to those
hospitalizations. At the time of the unfitness hearing, respondent was taking Effexor, Klonopin,
and Norco. Previously, she was prescribed Cymbalta, Hydrocodone, Tylenol with codeine, and
Clonazepam. Respondent testified that she showed some of these prescriptions to Sanders and
offered to sign releases relating to other prescriptions. Respondent insisted that the “Skittles” that
Sanders mentioned in her testimony were Cymbalta pills.
¶ 25 Respondent acknowledged that she had resided in various locations recently, including
with her aunt, with her cousin, in hotels, and in her current location in Machesney Park. She had
also worked at numerous jobs. As of the time of the hearing, she worked at Cliffbreakers and
McDonald’s, where she recently received a promotion. She testified that she had contacted La
Voz Latina “[a]ll the time” for assistance with housing and employment, although she
acknowledged that she missed some appointments when she was working or did not feel well. She
stopped working with La Voz Latina when she took a new job.
¶ 26 Respondent attributed her lack of completion of some of the services to transportation
difficulties and scheduling conflicts with work. She testified that she went to Rosecrance at least
eight times, including twice for assessments. Although she was presently engaging in a service
that combined parenting classes with counseling, she acknowledged that she did not attend
counseling before the goal change.
¶ 27 Respondent testified that she requested pictures of the minor and brought food and gifts to
the minor. Respondent attended the minor’s medical appointments when she had advance notice
and was not working. She inquired regularly as to the minor’s health. Respondent’s understanding
was that there was some sort of “accident” that led to her being assigned a different transporter,
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2020 IL App (2d) 191078-Uand she denied engaging in inappropriate conversation around the minor or the transporters.
¶ 28 The court found respondent unfit pursuant to both counts of the petition. In support of its
conclusion on count I (failure to protect the minor from conditions within her environment that
were injurious to her welfare), the court relied on the indicated packet and respondent’s medical
records. The court noted that those documents showed that (1) “[t]he minor was repeatedly
exposed to lack of supervision while mother was reportedly intoxicated on multiple occasions,”
(2) respondent “ ‘had severe mental health issues’ ” and was “ ‘sometimes appearing incoherent
during encounters with medical providers,’ ” and (3) respondent “ ‘used what appeared to be
exaggerated injuries or phantom injuries to seek controlled substances.’ ” The court inferred from
the medical records that respondent had a “severe substance abuse issue.”
¶ 29 In support of its conclusion on count II (failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest,
concern, or responsibly as to the minor’s welfare), the court recalled that Sanders testified that
respondent needed to participate in services, including a mental health assessment, a drug and
alcohol assessment, individual counseling, and parenting classes. The court explained:
“[Respondent] did not initially complete an in-take procedure and I don’t believe
from the testimony did [sic]. There is no proof of a Mental Health Assessment prior to the
goal change. There is no documentation or any therapy despite significant evidence of
[respondent’s] mental health issues. She never achieved stable housing. And visitation
actually went from three hours per week supervised to eventually zero. She never
progressed to unsupervised visitation. So Count 2 has been shown by clear and convincing
evidence.”
¶ 30 B. Best Interests Hearing
¶ 31 The matter subsequently proceeded to a best interests hearing.
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2020 IL App (2d) 191078-U¶ 32 Sanders testified that the minor, who was three years old at the time of the hearing, had
resided with her foster parents (one of whom was respondent’s cousin) since October 1, 2018. At
some point, the minor displayed “difficult behaviors” in the foster home, so DCFS made a referral
for “intensive placement stabilization” services. The minor made progress through “play therapy,”
and those services were terminated. The minor was now “well bonded” with and affectionate
toward the foster parents. The foster parents took the minor to church and kept her engaged with
activities such as swimming and tumbling. They also took her trick-or-treating on Halloween and
brought her to see a Princesses on Ice show. The minor looked to the foster parents when she was
hurt or needed something. They provided her with food, clothing, and shelter. When the minor
was previously under treatment for a small heart murmur, the foster parents brought her to all
necessary appointments. Sanders had been to the foster parents’ home, and she deemed it safe and
appropriate.
¶ 33 Sanders testified that the foster father had a teenage daughter and a younger son, who would
both come and visit the family. The minor also had a relationship with her extended family,
including respondent’s mother. The foster parents were open to facilitating visits between the
minor and her siblings. The difficulty in that regard was that the minor’s siblings were not under
DCFS’s care, and Sanders was working with respondent’s mother to facilitate that sibling contact.
The foster parents were willing to adopt the minor and were willing to maintain respondent’s
contact with the minor. DCFS’s position was that the minor should be freed for adoption.
¶ 34 Sanders also discussed respondent’s relationship with the minor. Respondent’s visits prior
to June 2019 were “chaotic,” because respondent would talk about her mental health and what was
going on in her life. Respondent would interact with the minor only sporadically, and Sanders had
to direct respondent to stay on task and interact with the minor. In June 2019, around the time
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2020 IL App (2d) 191078-Uwhen certain contracted workers were refusing to transport respondent, DCFS suspended
respondent’s visits with the minor due to respondent’s instability. DCFS resumed those visits in
October 2019, after respondent presented a letter from a therapist at Rosecrance indicating that
supervised visitation should continue. Although Sanders did not observe the first resumed visit in
October, she was advised that respondent brought toys, gifts, and food for the minor. Sanders also
read in the visitation notes that the minor was initially standoffish at that first visit but warmed up
to respondent. Respondent, however, missed her most recent scheduled visit; the minor waited for
an hour and was upset. Sanders noticed generally that the minor was bonded with respondent and
referred to her as “mom.” The minor turned to respondent for love and affection, and, for the most
part, the minor had a very good relationship with respondent during visits.
¶ 35 Sanders further testified that respondent had recently changed medications. Additionally,
although DCFS does not refer clients for services once the goal is changed to termination of
parental rights, respondent recently began participating in services that she identified with the
assistance of her attorney. Specifically, respondent was now engaged in all services that were
originally requested of her, except for parenting classes (respondent referred herself to a parenting
class, but the instructor was on maternity leave). Nevertheless, respondent had not completed any
of those services. According to Sanders, even though it was not included in the service plan,
respondent likely would have been recommended for parenting coaching, had she completed the
parenting classes. Respondent appeared for all recent drug drops as requested.
¶ 36 Sanders testified that respondent sometimes attended the minor’s doctor’s appointments.
Respondent had a problem with her knees and was unable to make one appointment. Respondent
also left one of the minor’s other appointments early.
¶ 37 At the conclusion of Sanders’s testimony, the State sought to admit into evidence three
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2020 IL App (2d) 191078-Uletters, which were written by respondent’s mother and two aunts, respectively. Over respondent’s
objections, the court admitted those letters into evidence. At the State’s request, the court also
took judicial notice of the evidence from the unfitness hearing, as well as the reports that were
submitted to the court in conjunction with the termination proceedings.
¶ 38 Respondent testified on her own behalf. She explained that she had a close attachment to
the minor before DCFS got involved. By contrast, the foster parents were not involved in the
minor’s life during her first few years. Despite respondent’s limited interaction with the minor
after the case opened, the minor still called her “mom” and showed affection to her. Respondent
had a good relationship with the minor, and respondent provided the minor with gifts and other
items of support. When the visits resumed this past October, the minor ran up to respondent and
held her tight. Respondent acknowledged that she missed the most recent scheduled visit because
she failed to calendar the date and time. Respondent denied leaving any of the minor’s medical
appointments early. Respondent believed that it was in the minor’s best interests to have
respondent in her life, because respondent was her mother, conceived her, and loved her “to death.”
¶ 39 Respondent explained that she recently began engaging in services as best she could, which
she coordinated with the help of her lawyer. This included taking appropriate medication.
Although she saw many doctors in the past, for the last three months, she had been seeing a new
primary care physician. She just started a new full-time job at CVS Care, in addition to her work
at Cliffbreakers and McDonald’s. Addressing the unfavorable letters from her relatives that the
State introduced into evidence, respondent explained that her aunts had minimal interaction with
her and the minor. Respondent also stated that she was estranged from her mother.
¶ 40 At the conclusion of respondent’s testimony, respondent submitted letters from three
acquaintances. The State and the guardian ad litem objected that this evidence was irrelevant and
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2020 IL App (2d) 191078-Uwas not timely tendered in discovery. The court admitted the letters over those objections,
indicating that it would give them the appropriate weight. The guardian ad litem introduced into
evidence a photo album depicting the foster parents’ life with the minor. That photo album is not
included in the record on appeal.
¶ 41 The court found that it was in the minor’s best interests to terminate respondent’s parental
rights. The court commended respondent for continuing services on her own after the court
changed the goal to termination of parental rights. The court noted, however, the lack of evidence
that those services cured, or in the foreseeable future would cure, the conditions that led to the
removal of the minor. Nor was there any evidence presented as to whether respondent made
progress in those services. In the court’s view, to deny the State’s petition would require the court
to speculate as to how long it would take to reunite the minor with respondent, if that were even
possible. The court determined that, even though respondent had a bond with the minor, the minor
was integrated into her foster family. For example, the foster parents provided the minor with
shelter and attended to her medical needs. Referring to the foster parents, the court noted that “this
is [the minor’s] family.”
¶ 42 The court continued:
“In looking and applying the best interest factors, it’s clear by a preponderance of
the evidence that it is in the best interest to terminate parental rights because that overriding
need for permanency in the court’s view is best served by allowing the adoption of [the
minor] by this foster family.”
The court indicated that it reviewed the letters submitted by the parties but did not “find them to
be particularly determinative on either side,” as they were hearsay. The court found that the photo
album, however, was relevant and corroborated that the minor was part of her foster family.
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2020 IL App (2d) 191078-U¶ 43 Respondent timely appealed.
¶ 44 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 45 Respondent disputes the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the court’s judgment as to
both unfitness and the minor’s bests interests. In challenging the unfitness findings, respondent
presents numerous ancillary arguments that she did not raise below. The State, however, does not
argue that respondent forfeited those arguments. See People v. Lucas, 231 Ill. 2d 169, 175 (2008)
(the State may forfeit an argument that its opponent failed to preserve an issue for review).
¶ 46 Involuntary termination of parental rights under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS
405/1-1 et seq. (West 2018)) is a two-step process. In re C.W., 199 Ill. 2d 198, 210 (2002). The
State must first prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is unfit under any single
ground listed in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2018)). C.W., 199 Ill.
2d at 210. If the parent is unfit, the matter proceeds to a second hearing, at which the State must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it is in the best interests of the minor to terminate
parental rights. In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 352, 366 (2004). We will not disturb a finding of
unfitness unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Jacorey S., 2012 IL App
(1st) 113427, ¶ 19. “A decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence where the opposite
result is clearly evident from the record.” In re Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d 1052, 1064 (2006).
¶ 47 The trial court found respondent unfit pursuant to both counts of the State’s petition. We
focus on count II. See In re B’yata I., 2014 IL App (2d) 130558-B, ¶ 30 (“As the grounds for
finding unfitness are independent, we may affirm the trial court’s judgment if the evidence
supports it on any one of the grounds alleged.”). Section 1(D)(b) of the Adoption Act provides
that a parent is unfit if she fails to “maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or
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2020 IL App (2d) 191078-Uresponsibility as to the child’s welfare.” 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2018). In B’yata I., we
explained:
“Since the language of the statute is in the disjunctive, any one of the three individual
elements, i.e., interest or concern or responsibility, may be considered by itself as a basis
for unfitness. [Citations.] In determining whether a parent has shown a reasonable degree
of interest, concern, or responsibility for a minor’s welfare, a court considers the parent’s
efforts to visit and maintain contact with the child as well as other indicia, such as inquiries
into the child’s welfare. [Citation.] Completion of service plans may also be considered
evidence of a parent’s interest, concern, or responsibility. [Citations.] The court must
focus on the parent’s efforts, not his or her success. [Citation.] In this regard, the court
examines the parent’s conduct concerning the child in the context of the circumstances in
which that conduct occurred. [Citation.] Accordingly, circumstances such as difficulty in
obtaining transportation, poverty, actions and statements of others that hinder visitation,
and the need to resolve other life issues are relevant. [Citations.] Furthermore, if personal
visits with the child are somehow impractical, other methods of communication, such as
letters, telephone calls, and gifts, may demonstrate a reasonable degree of interest, concern,
or responsibility, depending upon the content, tone, and frequency of those contacts under
the circumstances. [Citation.] We are mindful, however, that a parent is not fit merely
because he or she has demonstrated some interest or affection toward the child. [Citation.]
Rather, the interest, concern, or responsibility must be objectively reasonable.” (Emphasis
in original, and internal quotation marks omitted.) B’yata I., 2014 IL App (2d) 130558-B,
¶ 31.
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2020 IL App (2d) 191078-U¶ 48 The trial court’s finding of unfitness was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Respondent unquestionably loved the minor. Nevertheless, the court was entitled to find that
respondent’s level of responsibility was not objectively reasonable, especially in the period
between when the minor was taken into protective custody and when the goal changed to
termination of parental rights. Respondent missed multiple drug drops. When she did complete
drug drops, she tested positive for opiates and benzodiazepines. The caseworker requested
documentation from respondent to confirm that the positive tests were due to valid prescriptions,
as respondent claimed, but respondent failed to provide that documentation. Respondent likewise
failed to provide documentation that she completed the required mental health assessment.
Furthermore, respondent declined to participate in individual counseling, even after the caseworker
offered to arrange transportation. Respondent also failed to complete parenting classes, failed to
provide paystubs to confirm that she was employed, and failed to maintain contact with resources
who were willing to help her obtain employment and housing. Under these circumstances, we
cannot say that it was clearly evident that the trial court’s conclusion as to unfitness was erroneous.
¶ 49 In arguing to the contrary, respondent contends that: (1) that State failed to show that the
services demanded by DCFS were necessary, (2) the State’s evidence, including Sanders’s
testimony, consisted entirely of hearsay, which was insufficient to meet the State’s burden, (3) the
State failed to lay a proper foundation to admit the service plans and the indicated packet as
business records, (4) those same exhibits contained multiple levels of hearsay, so the State was
required to “provide hearsay exceptions for each level of hearsay,” and (5) the State “should have
made a proffer of what in each of the voluminous DCFS reports it intended to rely to prove
unfitness.” For the following reasons, none of these arguments provides a basis for disturbing the
trial court’s judgment as to respondent’s unfitness.
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2020 IL App (2d) 191078-U¶ 50 With respect to respondent’s first point, we have recognized that a trial court should not
base its finding of unfitness on a respondent’s “failure to comply with administrative directives
that ha[ve] nothing to do with his ability as a parent.” In re A.J., 296 Ill. App. 3d 903, 916 (1998).
That is not a concern here, however. Respondent stipulated to the adjudicatory and dispositional
orders, agreeing to engage in services relating to all counts of the neglect petition. That explicitly
included all drug, alcohol, and psychological treatment and services required by DCFS and its
contracting agencies. Respondent did not appeal the dispositional order. Furthermore, the
evidence at the unfitness hearing showed that the services that DCFS recommended for respondent
were reasonable and necessary, and respondent did not argue to the contrary below. Thus, this is
not a case where the trial court terminated parental rights based on the failure to comply with
questionable or merely technical administrative directives.
¶ 51 Respondent’s contention that all the State’s evidence was hearsay is likewise without merit.
Sanders served as the minor’s caseworker for the duration of this case, and she testified primarily
to matters within her personal knowledge. Respondent’s assertion that Sanders’s “entire testimony
should have been excluded as rank hearsay” is misguided.
¶ 52 Respondent additionally challenges the admissibility of four of the State’s exhibits. The
trial court, however, properly admitted the indicated packet pursuant to section 2-18(4)(b) of the
Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/2-18(4)(b) (West 2018)), which provides that “[a]ny
indicated report filed pursuant to the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act shall be
admissible in evidence.” The service plans too were admissible as business records, so long as the
State demonstrated that the documents were “(1) made as a memorandum or record of the event,
(2) made in the ordinary course of business, and (3) made at the time of the event or within a
reasonable time thereafter.” In re A.B., 308 Ill. App. 3d 227, 235 (1999); see also 705 ILCS 405/2-
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2020 IL App (2d) 191078-U18(4)(a) (West 2018)). Respondent notes that DCFS’s employees did not witness all the acts and
occurrences that were referenced in the State’s exhibits. That, however, is not a barrier to
admissibility. See A.B., 308 Ill. App. 3d at 235 (“The author of the writing need not testify or be
shown to be unavailable; anyone familiar with the business and its procedures may testify about
how the writing was prepared.”); 705 ILCS 405/2-18(4)(a) (West 2018) (lack of personal
knowledge affects the weight of the documentary evidence, not its admissibility).
¶ 53 Respondent correctly notes that Sanders was not asked whether the service plans were
made at the time of the events referenced or within a reasonable time thereafter. Had respondent
raised this objection during the unfitness hearing, the prosecutor likely could have asked Sanders
a follow-up question or two to complete the foundation. Nevertheless, assuming that it was error
for the court to admit the four disputed exhibits into evidence, we hold that any error was harmless.
As explained above, Sanders’s testimony—which was based primarily on her personal
observations and her interactions with respondent and others—provided a sufficient basis for the
trial court to conclude that respondent failed to maintain a reasonable degree of responsibility as
to the minor’s welfare. We note that, in explaining its findings on count II of the petition, the trial
court relied on Sanders’s testimony without mentioning the exhibits that respondent claims were
improperly admitted.
¶ 54 Apart from her arguments pertaining to the foundation for the State’s exhibits, respondent
maintains that these exhibits contained multiple levels of hearsay. According to respondent, the
State was required to provide hearsay exceptions for each level of hearsay. The State insists that
respondent’s arguments go toward the weight to be attributed to the documentary evidence, not
admissibility. In so arguing, the State criticizes some of the cases that respondent cites and reminds
us that we are not bound by the decisions of other districts of the appellate court. We need not
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2020 IL App (2d) 191078-Uaddress whether the State must identify hearsay exceptions for each level of hearsay that is
contained within documents that are otherwise admissible as business records. As explained
above, the trial court did not mention the disputed documentary evidence when explaining its
ruling on count II of the petition, and Sanders offered competent testimony that supported the
court’s decision. Any error in admitting the State’s exhibits was thus harmless.
¶ 55 Respondent’s final argument with respect to the unfitness finding appears to be rooted in
due process concerns. Respondent complains that the State made her “sift[ ] through hundreds of
pages of reports to determine which of the thousands of hearsay statements upon which the state
and court wish to rely, and whether the record of the hearsay event was made at or near the time
of the occurrence.” According to respondent, the State “should have made a proffer of what in
each of the voluminous DCFS reports it intended to rely to prove unfitness.” In respondent’s view,
“[m]erely pointing at a stack of records does not constitute ‘notice’ adequate to allow a parent to
prepare a proper defense to the state’s case.”
¶ 56 We find no error. Respondent does not claim that the State failed to timely tender its
documentary evidence in discovery. Nor did respondent ever request on the record for the State
to make a proffer of the type that she now claims would have been appropriate. Furthermore, the
two cases that respondent cites—In re J.P., 316 Ill. App. 3d 652 (2000), and In re K.S., 365 Ill.
App. 3d 566 (2006)—are inapposite, as they involved evidentiary irregularities that are not present
here. Specifically, in J.P., in support of its best interests finding, the trial court cited facts that
were outside of the evidentiary record. J.P., 316 Ill. App. 3d at 662-63. The trial court did not
make that error here. In K.S., we reversed a dispositional order, along with an order requiring the
respondent to engage in a sex offender evaluation, where the State introduced no evidence showing
that the respondent engaged in sexual misconduct. K.S., 365 Ill. App. 3d at 575, 578. Unlike the
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2020 IL App (2d) 191078-Uparent in K.S., respondent stipulated that the minor was neglected, agreed to the dispositional order,
and never challenged in the trial court the propriety of the services that DCFS recommended for
her.
¶ 57 For all these reasons, we reject respondent’s arguments that the court improperly
determined that she was an unfit parent.
¶ 58 After the court makes a finding of parental unfitness, “the focus shifts to the child.” D.T.,
212 Ill. 2d at 364. Specifically, the court must consider whether it is in the best interests of the
child to terminate parental rights. B’yata I., 2014 IL App (2d) 130558-B, ¶ 41. At the best interests
hearing, the trial court considers:
“(a) the physical safety and welfare of the child, including food, shelter, health, and
clothing;
(b) the development of the child’s identity;
(c) the child’s background and ties, including familial, cultural, and religious;
(d) the child’s sense of attachments, including:
(i) where the child actually feels love, attachment, and a sense of being valued (as
opposed to where adults believe the child should feel such love, attachment, and a sense of
being valued);
(ii) the child’s sense of security;
(iii) the child’s sense of familiarity;
(iv) continuity of affection for the child;
(v) the least disruptive placement alternative for the child;
(e) the child’s wishes and long-term goals;
(f) the child’s community ties, including church, school, and friends;
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2020 IL App (2d) 191078-U(g) the child’s need for permanence which includes the child’s need for stability and
continuity of relationships with parent figures and with siblings and other relatives;
(h) the uniqueness of every family and child;
(i) the risks attendant to entering and being in substitute care; and
(j) the preferences of the persons available to care for the child.” 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05)
(West 2018).
We will not overturn the trial court’s finding that termination of parental rights is in the child’s
best interests unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Shru. R., 2014 IL App
(4th) 140275, ¶ 24.
¶ 59 We hold that the trial court’s finding that it was in the best interests of the minor to
terminate respondent’s parental rights was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. At the
time of the best interests hearing, the minor was three years old and had lived with her foster
parents, who were her relatives, for more than a year. The foster parents offered the minor stability
and a safe home. They enrolled her in activities within the community. They were willing to
adopt her, facilitate her contact with her siblings, and maintain her relationship with respondent.
Although respondent undoubtedly loved the minor, she plainly had not progressed to the point
where the court could feel confident that it could return the minor to her care in the near future.
Like the trial court, we commend respondent for working toward improving her life after the court
changed the goal from reunification to termination. We encourage respondent to continue those
efforts. Nevertheless, the evidence showed that the minor’s interests would be best served by
freeing the minor for adoption by her foster parents.
¶ 60 In arguing that the court’s best interests finding was against the manifest weight of the
evidence, respondent mentions that (1) she and the minor had a bond, (2) she was “actively
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2020 IL App (2d) 191078-Uengaged in services” at the time of the hearing, (3) she provided food, clothing, and toys for the
minor during visits, (4) there was no explanation given for why the case proceeded so quickly to
termination of parental rights, and (5) there was no evidence as to what the impact would be on
the minor if the respondent were to lose her parental rights. Respondent also reiterates her
argument that the State failed to prove that the services demanded of her were necessary.
¶ 61 Respondent is correct that the evidence showed that the minor was bonded with her. The
evidence also showed that the minor was bonded with the foster parents. With respect to
respondent’s claim that she actively engaged in services, the trial court was entitled to conclude
that respondent’s participation in services was too late, as she did not make meaningful efforts
toward reunification until the goal had changed; nor was there evidence of respondent’s progress
in those services. Moreover, although respondent provided the minor with food, clothing, and toys
during visits, the foster parents attended to the minor’s needs daily. Furthermore, contrary to what
respondent argues, the record confirms that the reason why the case proceeded to termination of
parental rights in a relatively expedited fashion is that respondent was not engaging in services and
was not stable enough to continue visits with the minor. As to the fifth item that respondent
mentions, respondent’s counsel was free to question Sanders about the potential effects on the
minor of terminating respondent’s parental rights. Although that might be a relevant issue, we are
aware of no authority holding that the attorneys’ failure to explore such matters requires reversal
of an order terminating parental rights. Finally, for the reasons explained above, we again reject
respondent’s argument that the State failed to prove the necessity of her recommended services.
¶ 62 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 63 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County.
¶ 64 Affirmed.
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