McMahon v. Kulig

2020 IL App (1st) 190232-UNo. 1-19-0232
Third Division
May 20, 2020
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as
precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
MARIANNA MCMAHON and KRYSTIAN ) Appeal from the
MISTERKA, ) Circuit Court of
) Cook County.
Plaintiffs-Appellants, )
)
v. )
)
MONIKA KULIG, )
)
Defendant-Appellee. ) No. 16 L 010063
_______________________________________________ ) Cons. with
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE ) No. 17 M1 13210
INSURANCE COMPANY a/s/o JULIA JOWAK, )
)
Plaintiff )
)
v. )
)
MONIKA KULIG, ) Honorable
) John P. Callahan, Jr.
Defendant. ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE COBBS delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Ellis and Justice Howse concurred in the judgment.
No. 1-19-0232
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court did not err in refusing to sever consolidated cases or in excluding a
photograph from evidence.
¶2 On February 22, 2015, defendant Monika Kulig was the driver of a vehicle that collided
with the vehicle of Martha Basurto before also striking a parked car. Plaintiffs Marianna McMahon
and Krystian Misterka, who were passengers in Kulig’s vehicle, sued Kulig for injuries allegedly
sustained in the accident. Plaintiffs’ case was later consolidated with a property damage action
brought against Kulig by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm), the
insurer of the parked car. After a trial, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of Kulig. The trial court
subsequently denied plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial and a motion to reconsider that denial.
Plaintiffs now appeal, arguing that the court abused its discretion by refusing to (1) sever their
claims from those of State Farm, and (2) allow them to introduce a post-accident photograph of
Kulig’s vehicle into evidence. For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On December 21, 2016, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint alleging negligence against
both Kulig and Basurto. 1 According to the amended complaint, “a collision occurred” between
Kulig’s and Basurto’s vehicles because Kulig “[n]egligently, carelessly, and improperly overtook
[Basurto] at an unsafe distance” while Basurto “made a left turn into [Kulig’s] vehicle.” The
amended complaint also alleged that Kulig was negligent because she “operated [her] vehicle at
an excessive rate of speed” and “failed to keep [her] vehicle under proper and sufficient control so
1
The amended complaint also alleged negligence against a Martha Bocanegra, which was
apparently an alias Basurto gave to police following the accident.
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that it could be readily stopped and slackened in speed.” Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their
claims against Basurto in June 2017 and proceeded only on their claims against Kulig.
¶5 On August 24, 2017, the trial court entered an order consolidating plaintiffs’ and State
Farm’s respective claims against Kulig. No objection to the consolidation nor any transcripts of a
hearing regarding the motion to consolidate appear in the record on appeal.
¶6 The record also does not contain any transcripts from the trial proceedings. What does
appear in the record are depositions from two doctors who treated plaintiffs (which are essentially
irrelevant to the issues presented on appeal) and a two-paragraph bystander’s report prepared by
plaintiffs’ trial counsel. According to that report, plaintiffs’ counsel made an oral motion to sever
the cases “[p]rior to the start of the trial,” 2 which was denied. Counsel also showed the trial court
a post-accident photograph of Kulig’s vehicle that plaintiffs sought to introduce “for a number of
reasons,” including as evidence that Kulig was speeding before the accident. The court excluded
the photograph, but the bystander’s report does not explain why.
¶7 The case proceeded to trial, where the jury found in favor of Kulig. Plaintiffs filed a motion
for a new trial, arguing that the trial court erred by refusing to sever the cases or admit the post-
accident photograph of Kulig’s vehicle. At the hearing on the motion, the transcript of which is
included in the record on appeal, plaintiffs argued that they were prejudiced by the consolidation
because the fact that Kulig was being sued by State Farm while not being defended by her own
insurance company caused “a very high likelihood of confusion [and] of feeling really sorry for
[Kulig], that [Kulig] actually didn’t have insurance.” The court denied the motion with respect to
2
According to Kulig, the oral motion to sever was made on the day of trial and without any notice.
Plaintiffs do not dispute that characterization, nor do they explain why they did not move to sever until
more than one year after the cases were consolidated.
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No. 1-19-0232
the severance issue, stating that State Farm was a “proper party in this particular event” and that
plaintiffs received a fair trial. The court also specifically noted that plaintiffs’ trial counsel “put on
an excellent case given what he had” and that State Farm “never interjected themselves in any way
into the plaintiffs’ case during the course of this trial.”
¶8 Regarding the admissibility of the post-accident photograph, plaintiffs argued that it was
“not [an] abuse of discretion but [an] error of law to require expert testimony [to use] this
photograph for the purposes of showing that [Kulig] was speeding” because that issue was not
outside the understanding of an average juror. In response, the court asked plaintiffs’ counsel why
the photograph made it more likely that Kulig was speeding. Counsel replied, “Because she
couldn’t stop” and, “Because the car entered into a pile of heap.” The court opined that the
photograph alone would not “let a juror know whether the person driving that car had been
speeding before the accident” without such information as the type of car it was, the material of
which it was made, or the “quality of construction.” Plaintiffs’ counsel continued to argue that any
reasonable juror would have concluded that Kulig was speeding based on the photograph. The
court ultimately denied the motion for a new trial, stating that the photograph was not “really
relevant” because it was not “going to lend anything other than speculation to this jury” where
there were two separate collisions and “[t]hey heard four witnesses testify about the speed or lack
of speed during the course of this accident.”
¶9 Plaintiffs subsequently filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that Peach v. McGovern, 2019
IL 123156, which was decided by our supreme court just weeks after the trial court denied the
motion for a new trial, held that post-accident photographs “are relevant and that juries should be
permitted to consider photographs that depict the damage or lack thereof to the vehicle.” The
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record does not contain any ruling on the motion to reconsider, but it was apparently denied. This
appeal followed.
¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 11 A. Motion to Sever
¶ 12 On appeal, plaintiffs first argue that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to sever
their claims from those of State Farm. A trial court may consolidate two pending actions as an aid
to convenience whenever it can be done without prejudice to the parties’ substantial rights. 735
ILCS 5/2-1006 (West 2016). Illinois courts generally favor consolidation in the interest of judicial
economy, as such joinder conserves time and allows the courts and litigants to avoid unnecessary
duplication of effort and expense. Northwest Water Comm’n v. Carlo V. Santucci, Inc., 162 Ill.
App. 3d 877, 890 (1987). Consolidation is appropriate where two cases: “(1) are of the same
nature; (2) arise from the same act or event; (3) involve the same or like issues; and (4) depend
largely on the same evidence.” Edwards v. Addison Fire Protection Dist. Firefighter’s Pension
Fund, 2013 IL App (2d) 121262, ¶ 41. A trial court has “broad discretion” in determining whether
consolidation of two cases is proper, and its decision will not be overturned absent an abuse of that
discretion. Id. A court abuses its discretion where its decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or so
unreasonable that no reasonable person would agree with it. In re Joseph J., 2020 IL App (1st)
190305, ¶ 26.
¶ 13 As a preliminary matter, we note that plaintiffs have arguably waived the issue by failing
to object to the trial court’s consolidation order. See Klein v. Steel City National Bank, 212 Ill.
App. 3d 629, 634-35 (the plaintiff waived challenge to the trial court’s sua sponte order to sever
by failing to object). Even assuming that plaintiffs adequately preserved the issue by moving to
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sever more than one year after the cases were consolidated, we would still affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
¶ 14 Plaintiffs do not dispute that their claims involve the same events and evidence as those of
State Farm but maintain only that consolidation was improper because State Farm’s involvement
prejudiced their substantial rights. In particular, plaintiffs assert that the trial court “did not engage
in any meaningful analysis” and “did not weigh the relatively small burdens [of having two trials]
in this case against the substantial danger of prejudice.” However, as the record is devoid of any
transcripts from the court’s rulings on the motion to consolidate or on plaintiffs’ subsequent oral
motion to sever, we cannot conclude that the court failed to consider the appropriate factors.
Rather, as it is the appellant’s burden to present an adequate record for review, we must construe
any doubts or deficiencies arising from an incomplete record against plaintiffs. Tebbens v. Levin
& Conde, 2018 IL App (1st) 170777, ¶ 31. Accordingly, we draw all reasonable inferences in favor
of the trial court’s orders and presume that they were in conformity with the law and supported by
a factual basis. Pate v. Wiseman, 2019 IL App (1st) 190449, ¶ 17. Additionally, the court’s
comments at the hearing on the motion for a new trial, which is the only transcribed hearing in the
record on appeal, belie plaintiff’s position. Those comments show that the court considered
plaintiffs’ arguments, but rejected them because it found that the cases were properly consolidated
and that plaintiffs did not suffer prejudice.
¶ 15 Moreover, the limited record before us is sufficient to establish that plaintiffs’ arguments
against consolidation are meritless. As they did in the trial court, plaintiffs contend that
consolidation was improper because the court instructed the jury, at plaintiffs’ request and in
accordance with Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 3.03, that:
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“Whether a party is insured or not insured has no bearing on any issue that you
must decide. You must refrain from any inference, speculation, or discussion about
insurance.
If you find for the plaintiff, you shall not speculate about or consider any possible
sources of benefits the plaintiff may have received or might receive. After you have
returned your verdict, the court will make whatever adjustments are necessary in this
regard.”
Plaintiffs maintain that they suffered prejudice in light of this instruction because State Farm’s
involvement “made it impossible for the jury not to discuss insurance,” “created an inference that
[plaintiffs] had the help of insurance while [Kulig] had no insurance,” and “very likely confused
the jury.”
¶ 16 These arguments are based largely on speculation, as there is absolutely no evidence to
suggest that the jury was confused or that it based its verdict on an assumption that Kulig was
uninsured. Furthermore, the fact that State Farm’s presence might have drawn the jury’s attention
to the concept of insurance in some loose sense does not entitle plaintiffs to a new trial. The general
prohibition against mentioning insurance in a personal injury case is based on the rationale that,
although irrelevant to the issue of negligence, knowledge that a defendant is insured tends to induce
the jury to award a larger verdict in the plaintiff’s favor than it otherwise would have. Imparato v.
Rooney, 95 Ill. 3d 11, 15 (1981). Even in an unconsolidated personal injury case, not every mention
of insurance is prejudicial. Diaz v. Legat Architects, Inc., 397 Ill. App. 3d 13, 41 (2009). Instead,
“[a] reference to insurance is only prejudicial if it directly indicates that the defendant is insured
[citation] or if it is the product of conduct by counsel intended to influence or prejudice the jury
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[citation].” Neyzelman v. Neyzelman, 273 Ill. App. 3d 511, 515 (1995); see also Seldin v. Babendir,
325 Ill. App. 1058, 1064 (2001); Twait v. Olson, 104 Ill. App. 3d 191, 196 (1982).
¶ 17 Here, as plaintiffs concede, there was no reference to Kulig’s insured status. Nor was there
apparently any mention that plaintiffs were insured. Despite plaintiffs’ arguments, there is nothing
in the record to suggest that the jury was unable to understand that State Farm was pursuing a
separate claim based on a similar set of operative facts. Indeed, although none of the trial
transcripts appear in the record on appeal, the trial court noted that “State Farm never interjected
themselves in any way into the plaintiffs’ case during the course of this trial.” Under these
circumstances, plaintiffs were not prejudiced by the consolidation of the cases, and the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in refusing to sever them.
¶ 18 B. Post-Accident Photograph
¶ 19 Plaintiffs next contend that the trial court erred by barring them from introducing a post-
accident photograph of Kulig’s vehicle, which they say was relevant to show that Kulig was
speeding. Specifically, plaintiffs maintain that the court “erred as a matter of law” when it stated
that the photograph was not relevant without supporting testimony and thus abused its discretion
by basing its ruling on an erroneous understanding of the law.
¶ 20 Evidentiary rulings are generally within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not
be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of the discretion. Hoffman v. Northeast Illinois Regional
Commuter Railroad Corporation, 2017 IL App (1st) 170537, ¶ 41. An exception to this general
rule is where the trial court’s exercise of discretion was “frustrated by an erroneous rule of law.”
People v. Williams, 188 Ill. 2d 365, 369 (1999). In such a case, the court’s ruling is reviewed de
novo. People v. Gonzalez, 2018 IL App (1st) 155242, ¶ 79.
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¶ 21 Here, plaintiffs, citing Peach, contend that the trial court based its decision on an erroneous
understanding that expert testimony was required to support a post-accident photograph. However,
as the court’s initial ruling on the admissibility of the photograph does not appear in the record on
appeal, we must presume that the ruling was in accordance with the law. See Foutch v. O’Bryant,
99 Ill. 2d 389, 392 (1984). To the extent that plaintiffs rely on the court’s remarks in denying their
motion for a new trial, we cannot say that those comments show that the court based its ruling on
the mistaken belief that expert testimony was required in every case. See People v. Caffey, 205 Ill.
2d 52, 89 (2001) (declining to invoke the exception to the general rule of deference to the trial
court where the ruling in question was based “on the specific circumstances of this case and not
on a broadly applicable rule”). Notably, the record shows that the court considered the photograph
in light of the specifics of this case, including that the damage to Kulig’s vehicle was the result of
two separate collisions and that the issue of Kulig’s speed was explored at trial.
¶ 22 The court’s ruling was not necessarily incongruous with Peach, which did not hold that
post-accident photographs are always admissible without expert testimony. Rather, Peach, and the
appellate court cases it cited approvingly, make clear that there is no “rigid rule that photographs
of the vehicles involved in a collision are always admissible or that expert testimony is always
necessary for such photographs to be admitted.” Peach, 2019 IL 123156, ¶ 34 (citing Ford v.
Grizzle, 398 Ill. App. 3d 639, 648 (2010); Fronabarger v. Burns, 385 Ill. App. 3d 560, 564 (2008);
Jackson v. Seib, 372 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 1071 (2007); and Ferro v. Griffiths, 361 Ill. App. 3d 738,
743 (2005)). It remains within the sound discretion of the trial court to decide the “essential
question” of whether a jury would be able to relate the damage depicted in the photographs to a
fact of consequence without the aid of an expert. Peach, 2019 IL 123156, ¶ 35; Ford, 398 Ill. App.
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3d at 648; Fronabarger, 385 Ill. App. 3d at 564-55; Jackson, 372 Ill. App. 3d at 1070-71; Ferro,
361 Ill. App. 3d at 743. As we have previously explained, the trial court here considered the
photograph and the facts of the case and determined that the photograph was not relevant without
additional testimony. Nothing in the record shows that this was an abuse of discretion.
¶ 23 Finally, even assuming, arguendo, that the photograph was erroneously excluded, the
incomplete record prevents us from finding that a new trial is required. “Reversal on appeal is not
required unless an erroneous evidentiary ruling was substantially prejudicial, and the burden of
establishing prejudice is on the party seeking reversal.” Shachter v. City of Chicago, 2011 IL App
(1st) 103582, ¶ 80. An improper evidentiary ruling is harmless if the jury would not have reached
a different verdict but for the error. Neuhengen v. Global Experience Specialists, Inc., 2018 IL
App (1st) 160322, ¶ 157. Here, as noted, there is no record of what evidence was presented at trial.
Consequently, we must resolve any doubt as to the impact of the photograph on the verdict against
plaintiffs.
¶ 24 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 25 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
¶ 26 Affirmed.
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