Sammons v. Conrad and Leach

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Karen M. Freeman-Wilson
Attorney General of Indiana
Jon Laramore
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
Nana Quay-Smith
Candace L. Sage
Indianapolis, Indiana
R. Steven Ryan
Kentland, Indiana
__________________________________________________________________
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA
__________________________________________________________________
WILLIAM F. SAMMONS, Judge of )
the Newton Circuit Court )
)
Appellant (Defendant Below), ) Indiana Supreme Court
) Cause No. 56S00-0011-CV-635
v. )
)
KYLE D. CONRAD, Clerk of the ) Indiana Court of Appeals
Newton Circuit Court, JERYL F. ) Cause No. 56A05-0010-CV-451
LEACH, )
)
Appellees (Plaintiffs Below). )
__________________________________________________________________
APPEAL FROM THE NEWTON SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Robert M. Hall, Special Judge
Cause No. 56D01-0009-MI-76
__________________________________________________________________
ON PETITION TO TRANSFER
__________________________________________________________________
December 22, 2000
BOEHM, Justice.
Factual and Procedural Background
Newton Circuit Court Judge Robert Smart died on February 25, 2000.
Judge Smart was last re-elected in 1998 and his current term would have
expired December 31, 2004. Within ten days of Judge Smart’s death, the
Clerk of the Newton Circuit Court certified the vacancy to Governor Frank
O’Bannon. On May 17, Jeryl Leach filed with the Secretary of State to have
his name placed on the ballot for Judge of the Newton Circuit Court.[1]
Indiana Code section 3-8-1-16 sets out the requirements for a candidate for
Judge of the Circuit Court, and Mr. Leach met all of them.
On August 21, the Indiana Election Division issued a certification of
candidates to appear on the November 7, 2000 general election ballot. The
office of Newton Circuit Court Judge was not on this certification. In a
separate action that same day, Candy Marendt, Republican Co-Director of the
Indiana Election Division, unilaterally and without agreement by her
Democratic co-director, issued a certification containing Mr. Leach’s name
as the Republican candidate for Newton Circuit Court Judge. No registered
voter from Newton County filed a challenge to Mr. Leach as a candidate with
either the State Election Commission or the Newton County Election Board.
On September 1, Governor O’Bannon appointed William Sammons to fill
the vacancy created by Judge Smart’s death. Judge Sammons also met all the
statutory requirements for Circuit Court Judge. Judge Sammons did not
attempt to have his name placed on the ballot for the November 7, 2000
general election because he believed that Indiana Code section 3-13-6-1
provided that his appointed term would end in 2002, not 2000, and he
accepted the appointment with that understanding. He has since closed his
law practice and assumed the judicial office.
At the November 7 general election, Mr. Leach received some 3500
votes for the office of Newton Circuit Court Judge. Mr. Leach’s name was
the only name on the ballot for Newton Circuit Court Judge.
This appeal arose out of an action filed on September 27, by Mr.
Leach and Newton Circuit Court Clerk Kyle Conrad to seek a declaratory
judgment that Mr. Leach was properly certified as a candidate on the
November 7, 2000 ballot. Judge Sammons filed a motion on October 23, for a
preliminary injunction enjoining Conrad from placing Mr. Leach’s name on
the ballot, but that motion was denied. An effort to appeal the denial of
preliminary injunction was rendered moot by the intervening election.
After conducting a hearing on November 15, a special judge entered final
judgment in favor of Mr. Leach and Conrad, finding that: 1) Mr. Leach’s
name was properly on the November 7 ballot; 2) Mr. Leach’s election as
Judge for a six-year term beginning January 1, 2001, was valid; and 3)
Judge Sammons’ appointed term expires December 31, 2000. Judge Sammons
appealed the judgment of the trial court and we granted transfer pursuant
to Appellate Rule 4(A)(9).
I. Indiana Code section 3-13-6-1
The principal issue presented by this case is whether the office of
judge of the Newton Circuit Court was an office eligible for election in
the November 2000 general election. Mr. Leach presented a candidate’s
filing under the appropriate statute, and was certified by the Indiana
Election Division. That certification, though defective for reasons
explained in Part II, was not challenged until the unsuccessful preliminary
injunction motion of October 23. Judge Sammons concedes that this
procedural error in certification cannot be raised after the election if
the substantive ruling to place the office on the ballot was correct. Mr.
Leach received the majority of the votes in the election. As a result, if
the office was eligible for election by the voters of Newton County in the
fall of 2000, Mr. Leach was the winning candidate and should take office on
January 1, 2001.
The relevant constitutional provision is Article V, section 18. It
states that if a “vacancy shall have occurred . . . in the office of
Judge of any Court, the Governor shall fill such vacancy, by appointment,
which shall expire when a successor shall have been elected and qualified.”
Thus, the Governor’s power of appointment is limited to the period until a
successor is elected, but there is no other constitutional limitation on
the time for filling the vacancy after it occurs. In this case, the
appointment took place on September 1, 2000. At that time, the period for
filling vacancies on the ballot for offices that were up for election on
November 7, 2000 had expired, but the election had not yet been held.
In State ex rel. Custer v. Schortemeier, 197 Ind. 507, 516, 151 N.E.
407, 409 (1926), this Court held, at a time when there was no relevant
statute, that a circuit court vacancy is limited to the period until the
next general election. Accord. Stanek v. Marion County Election Board, 262
Ind. 397, 399, 316 N.E.2d 830, 832 (1974); Harrison v. Alexander, 224 Ind.
450, 454, 68 N.E.2d 784, 785 (1946); State ex rel. Middleton v. Scott
Circuit Court, 214 Ind. 643, 645-6, 17 N.E.2d 464, 465 (1938). The General
Assembly has since provided that a person appointed by the Governor to fill
a vacancy in a circuit court judgeship is to serve “until (1) the end of
the unexpired term; or (2) a successor is elected at the next general
election and qualified; whichever occurs first.” Ind. Code § 3-13-6-1
(1998). The statute, by its terms, thus provides for the term of the
appointee to run from the appointment until “the next general election.”
The next general election following the September 1 appointment was
conducted on November 7, 2000. Judge Sammons argues that because the
filing deadlines had expired before the appointment was made, the “next”
general election after the appointment will be held in 2002. He notes that
it may be difficult to locate suitable candidates who must disrupt a law
practice or other career path if the guaranteed judicial career is measured
in months. He points to other practical difficulties in short-term or eve-
of-election vacancies. We agree that the statute may create significant
practical problems in filling vacancies because of the statutory limitation
that the appointment expire at the “next general election,” but find the
statute to prohibit an appointment that survives the “next general
election.” Biddle v. Willard, 10 Ind. 62 (1857), the only authority Judge
Sammons cites for the contrary view, held that a resignation submitted
before an election but to take effect after the election did not create a
vacancy subject to the intervening election. The effective date of the
resignation, not the date of submission of the resignation, created the
vacancy and was the trigger by which the “next” election is measured. Here
the death of Judge Smart was the event that created the need for a
successor to be elected. Otherwise stated, the appointment defined the
term of the appointee, but did not affect the outer limits of the
appointee’s term, which was and remained only until a successor is elected
and qualified. If a successor is elected at the next general election, the
beginning of the term of that person is the point at which “a successor”
shall have been elected and qualified, as that phrase appears in Article V,
section 18.
Judge Sammons points out that this statutory scheme creates an
incentive for the Governor to delay filling a vacancy, and at the same time
raises significant deterrents to acceptance of the position by qualified
candidates. We agree that these are persuasive considerations.
Nevertheless, it is the scheme the General Assembly has provided for
circuit court vacancies. Although it presents difficulties for a governor
and an interim appointee, it is not irrational. The Constitution itself
contemplates the filling of this office only as an interim measure. And,
unlike most other offices where vacancies are filled “for the unexpired
term,”[2] the six-year term of a Circuit Judge will necessarily be in a
different election from other offices every other election. In contrast,
the statewide offices of Governor, Lieutenant Governor, and Attorney
General are forever joined at the hip by the four-year election cycle and
the provision that vacancies are filled until the end of the unexpired
term, even if there is an intervening election. Similar provisions apply
to the other statewide offices that are elected in the non-presidential
election years, and to groups of county offices.
Mr. Leach, by filing and seeking an office that had not been filled,
correctly identified that a vacancy had been created that could be filled
at “the next general election” whether or not an interim appointment was
made. If there were no appointment by that time, the power to fill the
vacancy would be terminated as of January 1 of the following year if the
November election produced a winner who would be “elected and qualified.”
Similarly, if no circuit court judge had been elected in November, then a
vacancy would again arise, and the position could again be filled by
appointment until the 2002 election produced a successor. Whether this
arrangement for circuit court judges is preferable to the more prevalent
scheme that permits an appointee to serve for the remainder of the
unexpired term is debatable. Both Judge Sammons and Mr. Leach have
effectively presented persuasive arguments for their respective
constructions of this statute. In the end, however, we conclude that the
General Assembly has provided for an election to fill the vacancy at the
earliest date and accordingly affirm the trial court on this issue.
II. Certification by One Co-Director of the Election Division
The trial court concluded that Mr. Leach’s certification, signed by
only one of the two co-directors of the Indiana Election Division, was
valid. The court interpreted the language of Indiana Code section 3-6-4.2-
3 and concluded that even though the co-directors were intended to be
“equal,” each of the co-directors may act independently. We do not believe
that this conclusion is correct in light of the language of the statute and
the limited legislative history available to us.
The original bill to establish the Indiana Election Commission and the
Indiana Election Division was passed by the Indiana House without amendment
and slightly modified in the Senate. Pub. L. No. 8-1995, §§ 1-34, 1995
Ind. Acts 1289-1310. It replaced the partisan Election Board, controlled
by the party of the governor, that was responsible for some noteworthy
decisions in the past. See State Election Board v. Bayh, 521 N.E.2d 1313(Ind. 1988). Because the House rejected the Senate’s changes, the bill was
brought to the conference committee. There, the language providing for the
leadership of the Election Division underwent significant changes. Indiana
House Journal at 1161 (1995). In the original bill, the Election Division
was to have a single executive director, appointed by the bi-partisan
Election Commission. Id. Because the Election Commission was designed to
have four members, two from each party, the director would have to
represent a compromise agreeable to both Republicans and Democrats. The
version of the bill that emerged from the conference committee, and that
was eventually enacted into law, created co-directors from two different
political parties, to be appointed by the governor. Ind. Code § 3-6-4.2-3
(1998). To ensure that both co-directors truly represented their parties
and were not merely nominal representatives, the governor was required to
select co-directors from persons nominated by the respective state party
chairs. Ind. Code § 3-6-4.2-8 (1998).
The attempt to create a truly bi-partisan Election Division extended
past the co-directors and into the administrative staff. Indiana Code
section 3-6-4.2-5 provides that “[t]he employees of the election division
must be divided equally between the major political parties of the state.”
The Code also provides that the “co-directors may each employ an equal
number of employees” and “[t]he commission shall provide equal funding to
each co-director with which to employ employees.” Ind. Code §§ 3-6-4.2-6
to -7 (1998). The Election Division even has oxymoronic “co-general
counsels.” It seems quite clear that the legislature intended the Election
Division, like the Commission, to be a perfectly balanced agency that could
act only when its co-directors agreed. To allow either to act unilaterally
renders the deliberate steps taken to maintain an equal budget and staff
meaningless.
If a single co-director may not act independently, then Mr. Leach’s
certification, signed only by Marendt without authority of her counterpart,
was invalid. Nevertheless, the Newton County Clerk treated it as valid and
placed Mr. Leach’s name and the office of Circuit Court Judge on the ballot
of the November 2000 election.
Because there is no explicit statutory procedure for challenging an
invalid certification from the Election Division, the question is what
remedy is appropriate. Mr. Leach argues, and we agree, that the proper way
to challenge an allegedly invalid certification is provided in Indiana Code
section 3-8-1-2. This is the general statute allowing any registered voter
to file a complaint with a county election board or the Election Division
questioning the “eligibility” of a candidate to seek a particular office.
A candidate may be ineligible because he or she does not meet residency or
other requirements for the office. This case presents the far less typical
scenario where the claim is that the candidate is ineligible because the
office itself is not properly on the ballot. Although Marendt’s
certification was made on August 21, no effort to review or challenge that
action was made until the preliminary injunction motion of October 23,
which was unsuccessful. Because the resolution of that issue ultimately
turned on the merits of the issue discussed in Part I, and because we
conclude the office was properly on the ballot, this is a moot point.
Conclusion
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, SULLIVAN, and RUCKER, JJ., concur.
-----------------------
[1] The record does not reveal the procedure by which Mr. Leach was
selected, presumably pursuant to Indiana Code section 3-13-1-6, when no
Republican filed in the primary. The filing was made was within the time
required by Indiana Code section 3-13-1-7. Judge Sammons does not allege
that there was an error, other than the certification by Marendt, in the
paperwork filed by Mr. Leach to have his name placed on the ballot.
[2] See Ind. Code § 3-13-4-3 (1998) (appointees to state office other than
governor, lieutenant governor, or a judicial office hold office for the
remainder of the unexpired term); Id. § 3-13-6-2 (appointed prosecuting
attorneys hold office for the remainder of the unexpired term). Persons
appointed to most other courts of record also serve the balance of an
unexpired term. Ind. Code § 3-13-6-1(c) (1998). Many of these, unlike
circuit courts, are not elected offices in the first place.