DocketNumber: No. 02A03–1608–JT–01869
Citation Numbers: 92 N.E.3d 1083
Judges: Deny, Goff, Massa, Rush, Slaughter, Vote
Filed Date: 11/8/2017
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/24/2022
This matter has come before the Indiana Supreme Court on a petition to transfer jurisdiction, filed pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rules 56(B) and 57, following the issuance of a decision by the Court of Appeals. The Court has reviewed the decision of the Court of Appeals, and the submitted record on appeal, all briefs filed in the Court of Appeals, and all materials filed in connection with the request to transfer jurisdiction have been made available to the Court for review. Each participating member has had the opportunity to voice that Justice's views on the case in conference with the other Justices, and each participating member of the Court has voted on the petition.
Being duly advised, the Court DENIES the petition to transfer.
Rush, C.J., dissents from the denial of transfer with separate opinion in which David, J., concurs.
Today, this Court declines to resolve an important question of law: whether stale evidence and the lack of a viable permanency plan can clearly and convincingly support a conclusion that terminating a mother's parental rights is in the best interests of her child. Because I believe that they cannot, I would reverse the termination order in this case and thus respectfully dissent from the denial of transfer.
Daughter was adjudicated a Child in Need of Services (CHINS) after her stepfather intervened in a sibling quarrel and slapped her face, leaving a handprint and welts. For this regrettable-yet isolated-act, the stepfather pleaded guilty to battery and was sentenced to probation. After violating a no-contact order, he went to prison, and daughter was placed in foster care. Two years later, DCS petitioned to terminate mother's parental rights. After a hearing, the trial court issued a termination order. Mother appealed, and a majority of the Court of Appeals affirmed. In re A.K.G., No. 02A03-1608-JT-1869,
The General Assembly has commanded dismissal of a termination petition that is unsupported by clear and convincing evidence. In re Bi.B.,
Our standard of review forces us to do just that. We examine the trial court's findings and conclusions, determining "whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings, and then whether the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment." In re E.M.,
In her petition to transfer, mother challenges the conclusion that termination of her parental rights was in the best interests of her daughter. My close inspection of the record reveals that there is not clear and convincing evidence to support this conclusion because the trial court's findings were based on outdated evidence and because DCS had no viable permanency plan for the child. I address both troubling aspects briefly.
At the termination hearing, DCS called only two witnesses with up-to-date knowledge about mother and daughter. Tamra Powell, the family case manager, recognized that mother was pursuing reunification, had abided by the terms of daughter's foster placement, and had done what visitations she was allowed. Kristen Matheson, daughter's therapist, testified that therapy was helping both mother and daughter. She also wanted to see mother keep up her efforts to build her and daughter's relationship because "it's important to [daughter]" and "she loves her mom." Curiously, DCS failed to call any other then-recent providers to also testify.
Instead, DCS relied on witnesses who had not spoken to mother for over a year or two. One service provider had worked with mother and daughter for only three months in 2013-about two-and-a-half years before the termination hearing. A second provider had not worked with mother since July 2014. DCS also relied on the testimony of daughter's guardian ad litem (GAL), who admitted that he could not remember the last time he had spoken to the child, believing it was sometime prior to July 2014. And the GAL confirmed that he had not spoken to mother's then-current service providers (or at least could not recollect whether he had) and that he had not visited mother's then-current residence.
The trial court simply did not have the necessary evidence to get an accurate picture of mother's state of affairs at the time of the termination hearing . Unsurprisingly then, its findings overwhelmingly focused on mother's troubled past, such as her historical inability to maintain employment and to provide suitable housing. Perhaps, the current service providers would have given evidence that could have supported termination as in the best interests of the child. But they didn't because they were not called as witnesses.
The salient point is this: termination findings based primarily on stale (versus probative) evidence are necessarily both incomplete and misleading, and they certainly cannot clearly and convincingly support a conclusion that termination is in daughter's best interests. See In re C.M.,
Compounding that problem is DCS's lack of a viable permanency plan. It is well-established that permanency is a "central consideration" when making a best-interests determination. E.g., In re G.Y.,
This Court has not hesitated to grant transfer and reverse a termination, even when a trial court has based its best-interests determination on a parent's incarceration and failure to fully comply with referred services, In re R.S.,
At the time of the termination hearing, mother undisputedly was employed, was on the road to a pay raise and full-time hours, and had established a 401(k) account for future financial stability. She had stable housing in a studio apartment and would get a bigger place if her daughter were returned to her. And she shared a close bond with her daughter and had been actively participating in services including visitation, therapy, and parenting classes. True, there were some issues that still needed to be resolved within the family unit, including the repair of stepfather's and daughter's relationship. So, reunification may have been inappropriate at the time of the hearing. But absent additional up-to-date evidence, more time could have-and should have-been given to mother to continue on her path to improvement. That outcome would properly honor the deep value inherent in the parent-child relationship. See In re R.S.,
In sum, as Judge Bailey recognized in his dissenting opinion, terminating parental rights was clear error. I would thus grant transfer and reverse the termination order.
David, J., concurs.