Anthony Ervin v. State of Indiana

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before
any court except for the purpose of Jan 14 2015, 9:41 am
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the
case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
TIMOTHY J. BURNS GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
JUSTIN F. ROEBEL
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
ANTHONY ERVIN, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A02-1406-CR-390
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Vernon Lorenz, Judge Pro Tem
Cause No. 49F10-1311-CM-71738
January 14, 2015
MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BARNES, Judge
Case Summary
Anthony Ervin appeals his conviction for Class A misdemeanor trespass. We
affirm.
Issue
The sole issue before us is whether there is sufficient evidence to support Ervin’s
conviction.
Facts
On November 5, 2013, Ralph Bridgeforth, who is a reserve officer for the Lawrence
Police Department, was working “off-duty as a security officer for the Greyhound
Terminal” in Indianapolis. Tr. p. 5. In his position as a paid security guard for Greyhound,
Bridgeforth would “look for any type of violations such as trespassers, or any violation of
the law.” Id. at 5-6. Bridgeforth also had the authority to kick people off of the property
as he saw fit. On that day, Bridgeforth encountered Ervin in the terminal yelling at a female
customer. Bridgeforth took Ervin to a security station and checked Ervin’s name against a
“Trespass List,” which showed that in October 2012, Bridgeforth had asked Ervin to leave
the terminal and was told he could not return.
Ervin was arrested and charged with Class A misdemeanor trespass. After a bench
trial Ervin was convicted as charged. He now appeals.
Analysis
Ervin argues that there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction. When
reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we neither reweigh the evidence
nor assess the credibility of witnesses. Bailey v. State, 979 N.E.2d 133, 135 (Ind. 2012).
2
We view the evidence—even if conflicting—and all reasonable inferences drawn from it
in a light most favorable to the conviction and affirm if there is substantial evidence of
probative value supporting each element of the crime from which a reasonable trier of fact
could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
A person who, not having a contractual interest in the property, knowingly or
intentionally enters the real property of another person after having been denied entry by
the other person or that person’s agent commits Class A misdemeanor trespass. Ind. Code
35-43-2-2(b)(1). “Agency is a relationship resulting from the manifestation of consent by
one party to another that the latter will act as an agent for the former.” Glispie v. State,
955 N.E.2d 819, 822 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (quotation omitted). “To establish an actual
agency relationship, three elements must be shown: (1) manifestation of consent by the
principal, (2) acceptance of authority by the agent, and (3) control exerted by the principal
over the agent.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Relying on Glispie, Ervin argues that there was insufficient evidence of
Bridgeforth’s agency relationship with Greyhound. In Glispie, a police officer, acting in
his capacity as a police officer, was dispatched to a building to investigate a report of
trespassing. When he arrived, the officer recognized Glispie as someone he had previously
given oral and written warnings for trespassing and arrested Glispie. Glispie was then
charged with and convicted of Class A misdemeanor trespass. On appeal, we reversed the
conviction because there was no evidence in the record of the building owner’s
manifestation of consent to the agency relationship with the officer or its control over the
officer as its agent and, therefore, no evidence of an agency relationship between the officer
3
and the building owner. Id. We concluded that an officer, “if neither an owner nor an
agent of the owner, cannot create a trespass violation by denying a person entry to private
property and later discovering that person again on the property.” Id. at 823.
The facts before us are distinguishable from Glispie because Bridgeforth was not
acting in his capacity as a police officer when he encountered Ervin. Instead, he was
employed by Greyhound to patrol the premises and enforce laws and Greyhound’s polices.
The evidence of the employment relationship between Bridgeforth and Greyhound is
sufficient to establish the elements of an agency relationship. See Berry v. State, 4 N.E.3d
204, 206-207 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (distinguishing Glispie and affirming trespass
conviction where evidence that off-duty police officers were working as paid security
guards at an apartment complex allowed a reasonable fact-finder to determine that they had
authority to act on behalf of the apartment complex), trans. denied. There is sufficient
evidence to support Ervin’s conviction.
Conclusion
There is sufficient evidence Bridgeforth was acting as Greyhound’s agent as
required to support Ervin’s conviction for trespass. We affirm.
Affirmed.
MAY, J., and PYLE, J., concur.
4