Jarrez Hughley v. State of Indiana

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not
be regarded as precedent or cited
before any court except for the purpose
of establishing the defense of res
Jan 15 2015, 9:56 am
judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law
of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
BARBARA J. SIMMONS GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Oldenburg, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
KATHERINE MODESITT COOPER
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
JARREZ HUGHLEY, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A02-1406-CR-395
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Linda Brown, Judge
The Honorable Todd Sallee, Judge Pro-Tem
Cause No. 49F10-1401-CM-4274
January 15, 2015
MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BARNES, Judge
Case Summary
Jarrez Hughley appeals his conviction for Class A misdemeanor trespass. We
affirm.
Issues
Hughley raises one issue, which we restate as whether there is sufficient evidence
to support his conviction.
Facts
On January 28, 2014, Ralph Bridgeforth, a reserve police officer for the City of
Lawrence, was working “off-duty security for the Greyhound Bus station.” Tr. p. 5.
Bridgeforth was employed by Greyhound and, as part of his work for Greyhound, he
patrolled the premises and enforced the laws and policies for Greyhound. His work
included “trespassing people from the Greyhound property[.]” Id. at 7. That day,
Bridgeforth encountered Hughley in the bus station without a ticket to ride the bus.
Bridgeforth recalled that Hughley had previously been “trespassed” by him, and Hughley
was arrested. Id. at 17.
The State charged Hughley with Class A misdemeanor trespass, and he was found
guilty after a bench trial. Hughley now appeals.
Analysis
Hughley argues that there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction. When
reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we neither reweigh the evidence
nor assess the credibility of witnesses. Bailey v. State, 979 N.E.2d 133, 135 (Ind. 2012).
We view the evidence—even if conflicting—and all reasonable inferences drawn from it
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in a light most favorable to the conviction and affirm if there is substantial evidence of
probative value supporting each element of the crime from which a reasonable trier of
fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
A person who, not having a contractual interest in the property, knowingly or
intentionally enters the real property of another person after having been denied entry by
the other person or that person’s agent commits Class A misdemeanor trespass. Ind.
Code 35-43-2-2(b)(1). “Agency is a relationship resulting from the manifestation of
consent by one party to another that the latter will act as an agent for the former.” Glispie
v. State, 955 N.E.2d 819, 822 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (quotation omitted). “To establish an
actual agency relationship, three elements must be shown: (1) manifestation of consent
by the principal, (2) acceptance of authority by the agent, and (3) control exerted by the
principal over the agent.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Relying on Glispie, Hughley argues that there was insufficient evidence of
Bridgeforth’s agency relationship with Greyhound. In Glispie, a police officer, acting in
his capacity as a police officer, was dispatched to a building to investigate a report of
trespassing. When he arrived, the officer recognized Glispie as someone he had
previously given oral and written warnings for trespassing and arrested Glispie. Glispie
was then charged with and convicted of Class A misdemeanor trespass. On appeal, we
reversed the conviction because there was no evidence in the record of the building
owner’s manifestation of consent to the agency relationship with the officer or its control
over the officer as its agent and, therefore, no evidence of an agency relationship between
the officer and the building owner. Id. We concluded that an officer, “if neither an
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owner nor an agent of the owner, cannot create a trespass violation by denying a person
entry to private property and later discovering that person again on the property.” Id. at
823.
The facts before us are distinguishable from Glispie because Officer Bridgeforth
was not acting in his capacity as a police officer when he encountered Hughley. Instead,
he was employed by Greyhound to patrol the premises and enforce laws and
Greyhound’s polices. The evidence of the employment relationship between Bridgeforth
and Greyhound is sufficient to establish the elements of an agency relationship. See
Berry v. State, 4 N.E.3d 204, 206-207 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (distinguishing Glispie and
affirming trespass conviction where evidence that off-duty police officers were working
as paid security guards at an apartment complex allowed a reasonable fact-finder to
determine that they had authority to act on behalf of the apartment complex), trans.
denied. There is sufficient evidence to support Hughley’s conviction.
Conclusion
The evidence is sufficient to support Hughley’s trespass conviction. We affirm.
Affirmed.
MAY, J., and PYLE, J., concur.
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