Erin C. Unger v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing Jul 12 2017, 8:13 am
the defense of res judicata, collateral CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
estoppel, or the law of the case. Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Mark Small Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
James B. Martin
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Erin C. Unger, July 12, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
12A02-1611-CR-2555
v. Appeal from the Clinton Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Justin H. Hunter,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
12D01-1508-F6-756
Robb, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 12A02-1611-CR-2555 | July 12, 2017 Page 1 of 15
Case Summary and Issues
[1] Following a jury trial, Erin Unger was convicted of dealing in a synthetic drug
or synthetic drug lookalike, a Level 6 felony; possession of a synthetic drug or
synthetic drug lookalike, a Class A misdemeanor; and possession of
paraphernalia, a Class C misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced her to an
aggregate term of twelve months with ten of those months suspended to
probation. Unger appeals her convictions, raising two issues for our review
which we restate as: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting evidence; and (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to support her
convictions. Concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion and the
evidence was sufficient, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Unger lived in a two-story house owned by her father, Martin Unger. Unger’s
boyfriend, Jason Stephens, lived with her in August of 2015. Neighbors
reported excessive traffic in and out of the house at all hours, causing law
enforcement to begin conducting surveillance of the house. On the morning of
August 18, 2015, Detective William Hackerd of the Frankfort Police
Department observed Stephens take a paper sack from the driver of a truck and
return inside the house. Detective Hackerd also observed Ryan Lukasik, an
acquaintance of Stephens, enter and exit the house.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 12A02-1611-CR-2555 | July 12, 2017 Page 2 of 15
[3] Detective Hackerd later approached Lukasik when he left the house. Detective
Hackerd observed a bag containing what he believed to be spice hanging out of
Lukasik’s pocket. Detective Hackerd informed Lukasik of the surveillance of
the house and asked if he would cooperate with police. Detective Hackerd then
took Lukasik to the police station where Lukasik made a video-recorded
statement. After Lukasik made his statement, officers obtained a warrant to
search the house the same day.
[4] Detective Hackerd approached the house and read the search warrant to
Martin. Detective Hackerd and Martin entered the kitchen and Detective
Hackerd observed “a Ziplock sandwich bag of what looked like synthetic
marijuana or Spice” in plain view on the kitchen counter. Transcript, Volume I
at 122. Martin informed Detective Hackerd only he and Unger were in the
kitchen that morning and that the bag was not there earlier. In Unger’s
bedroom, Detective Hackerd found multi-colored pipes, which he later testified
were located either in a jewelry box or on a nightstand. He observed burnt
residue in the bowls of the pipes. Detective Hackerd also found a safe in
Unger’s bedroom. Unger provided Detective Hackerd with the combination for
the safe, which smelled strongly of marijuana when opened. Detective
Matthew Feterick of the Clinton County Sheriff’s Department helped conduct
the search and found more bags containing plant material in a concealed
section of a basement wall.
[5] Laboratory tests on the bag found in the kitchen showed it weighed 33.62 grams
and indicated the presence of Fluoro AMB. Fluoro AMB is a synthetic
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 12A02-1611-CR-2555 | July 12, 2017 Page 3 of 15
cannabinoid but is not a controlled substance. Laboratory tests performed on
one of the bags found in the basement showed it weighed 3.77 grams and also
indicated the presence of Fluoro AMB.
[6] Unger was arrested and the State charged her with dealing in a synthetic drug
or synthetic drug lookalike, a Level 6 felony; possession of a synthetic drug or
synthetic drug lookalike, a Class A misdemeanor; and possession of
paraphernalia, a Class C misdemeanor.
[7] Prior to trial, Unger filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained through
the search warrant, arguing the warrant was based solely on unreliable hearsay
from Lukasik and failed to establish probable cause to search Unger’s home.
The trial court denied Unger’s motion to suppress. At trial, Unger objected to
the admission of the evidence obtained through the search warrant for the same
reason. The trial court overruled Unger’s objection.
[8] Lukasik testified at trial that he cooperated with Detective Hackerd because he
felt intimidated, scared, and “didn’t know until the end that I wasn’t going to be
charged you know with possession or whatever I was gonna be charged with.”
Id. at 80. He testified the contents of the bags found during the search looked
like the spice he regularly purchased from Stephens and that it caused
sensations “kind of like marijuana.” Id. at 85. Stephens testified spice is
synthetic marijuana and caused effects comparable to marijuana.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 12A02-1611-CR-2555 | July 12, 2017 Page 4 of 15
[9] The jury found Unger guilty as charged and the trial court sentenced Unger to
an aggregate term of twelve months with ten of those months suspended to
probation. Unger now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
I. Admission of Evidence
A. Standard of Review
[10] Unger contends the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence
obtained from the search in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.1 Specifically, Unger alleges the search warrant lacked
probable cause and was therefore invalid.
[11] The Fourth Amendment requires that warrants only be issued “upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation.” An affidavit demonstrates probable
cause to search a place if it provides a sufficient basis of fact to permit a
reasonably prudent person to believe that a search of the particular premises
will uncover evidence of a crime. Utley v. State, 589 N.E.2d 232, 236 (Ind.
1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1058 (1993). When reviewing a probable cause
1
Unger also invokes Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution but offers no authority or independent
analysis supporting a separate standard under the state constitution and therefore waives any state
constitutional claim. Abel v. State, 773 N.E.2d 276, 278 n.1 (Ind. 2002).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 12A02-1611-CR-2555 | July 12, 2017 Page 5 of 15
determination, appellate courts consider only the evidence presented to the
issuing magistrate. Jaggers v. State, 687 N.E.2d 180, 182 (Ind. 1997).
[12] When a probable cause affidavit is based on hearsay, the affidavit must either
“(1) contain reliable information establishing the credibility of the source and of
each of the declarants of the hearsay and establishing that there is a factual basis
for the information furnished; or (2) contain information that establishes the
totality of the circumstances corroborates the hearsay.” Ind. Code § 35-33-5-
2(b). An informant’s credibility can be established through declarations against
his penal interest. Houser v. State, 678 N.E.2d 95, 100 (Ind. 1997).
[13] Finally, the admission or exclusion of evidence is within the sound discretion of
the trial court and will not be disturbed on review unless there was an abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court. Roche v. State, 690 N.E.2d 1115, 1134
(Ind. 1997). An abuse of discretion involves a decision that is clearly against
the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Stone v.
State, 536 N.E.2d 534, 538 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied. When reviewing
the trial court’s ruling on the validity of the search, we consider the evidence
most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and any uncontradicted evidence to the
contrary to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to support the ruling.
Rook v. State, 679 N.E.2d 997, 999 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
B. The Search Warrant
[14] Unger first contends the search warrant lacked probable cause because it was
based solely on unreliable hearsay from Lukasik. She alleges the police had no
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 12A02-1611-CR-2555 | July 12, 2017 Page 6 of 15
prior experience with Lukasik from which they could establish his reliability
and none of the information he gave was corroborated. Unger also argues
Lukasik’s statements were not against his penal interests because he received
leniency by avoiding charges in connection with the event.
[15] In support of her argument, Unger cites to Hirshey v. State, 852 N.E.2d 1008(Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. In Hirshey, police asked Holly Godsey, who
was arrested for dealing methamphetamine, if she wanted “to do something to
help herself with the charge.” Id. at 1011. Godsey reported purchasing drugs
from Brad Hirshey and the police obtained a search warrant for Hirshey’s
residence based solely on that statement. This court held Godsey’s statement
was not against her penal interests: she was already arrested, the statements did
not increase her criminal liability, and she offered the information to receive
leniency. Since the police provided no other evidence when obtaining the
warrant, the warrant lacked probable cause. Likewise, Unger argues the police
found Lukasik in possession of “spice” and he received leniency for his
statement. Then the police obtained a search warrant for Unger’s residence
based on Lukasik’s statement. Therefore, Unger argues that Lukasik, like
Godsey, did not act against his penal interests and the warrant lacked probable
cause. We find Unger’s argument unconvincing.
[16] In contrast to Hirshey, Detective Hackerd presented additional evidence
corroborating Lukasik’s statements. Detective Hackerd observed Lukasik
leaving Unger’s home and found what he believed to be spice in Lukasik’s
pocket. Lukasik showed Detective Hackerd a text message from Unger stating
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 12A02-1611-CR-2555 | July 12, 2017 Page 7 of 15
“[W]e are home. We’re here. Stop on over.” Tr., Vol. I at 71. Lukasik
reported regularly going to the house to purchase spice, which was supported
by neighbors’ complaints of excessive traffic. Detective Hackerd also observed
the exchange of a paper sack between Stephens and the driver of a truck in front
of the house. The neighbors’ complaints, the exchange of the paper sack, and
the spice found in Lukasik’s pocket corroborated Lukasik’s report that spice
was being sold at the house. In sum, the totality of the circumstances
demonstrated probable cause and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting at trial the evidence obtained as a result of the search warrant.
II. Sufficiency of Evidence
A. Standard of Review
[17] Our standard of review for sufficiency claims is well settled. We will not
reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. Smith v. State, 725
N.E.2d 160, 161 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). We consider only the evidence most
favorable to the verdict, together with all reasonable inferences that can be
drawn therefrom. Id. If a reasonable trier of fact could have found the
defendant guilty based on the probative evidence and reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom, then a conviction will be affirmed. Id.B. Evidence to Support the Possession Conviction
[18] Unger contends the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction for
possession of a synthetic drug or synthetic drug lookalike. To convict Unger,
the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Unger
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 12A02-1611-CR-2555 | July 12, 2017 Page 8 of 15
knowingly or intentionally possessed a synthetic drug or synthetic drug
lookalike substance. Ind. Code § 35-48-4-11.5(c). Unger argues the State
presented no evidence connecting her to the bag found in the kitchen. Further,
she argues the State failed to prove the bag contained a drug as opposed to only
fertilizer. We disagree.
[19] The State presented sufficient evidence the bag found in the kitchen contained a
synthetic drug or synthetic drug lookalike substance. Laboratory tests
performed on the bag found in the kitchen indicated the bag’s contents weighed
over thirty grams and contained Fluoro AMB. Fluoro AMB is not a synthetic
drug or controlled substance. However, a synthetic drug lookalike substance is
“[a] substance, other than a synthetic drug, which any of the factors listed in
subsection (c) would lead a reasonable person to believe to be a synthetic drug.”
Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-321.5(a)(1). Subsection (c) then provides the following
factors to consider:
(1) The overall appearance of a dosage unit of the substance,
including its shape, color, size, markings or lack of markings,
taste, consistency, and any other identifying physical
characteristics.
(2) How the substance is packaged for sale or distribution,
including the shape, color, size, markings or lack of markings,
and any other identifying physical characteristics of the
packaging.
(3) Any statement made by the owner or person in control of the
substance concerning the substance’s nature, use, or effect.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 12A02-1611-CR-2555 | July 12, 2017 Page 9 of 15
(4) Any statement made to the buyer or recipient of the substance
suggesting or implying that the substance is a synthetic drug.
(5) Any statement made to the buyer or recipient of the substance
suggesting or implying that the substance may be resold for
profit.
(6) The overall circumstances under which the substance is
distributed, including whether:
(A) the distribution included an exchange of, or demand
for, money or other property as consideration; and
(B) the amount of the consideration was substantially
greater than the reasonable retail market value of the
substance the seller claims the substance to be.
[20] Here, the overall appearance, the overall packaging, and statements by Lukasik
and Stephens would lead a reasonable person to believe the bag contained a
synthetic drug. Detective Hackerd described it as “a Ziplock sandwich bag of
what looked like synthetic marijuana or Spice.” Tr., Vol. I at 122. Lukasik
testified the substance looked like spice he routinely purchased from Stephens,
which caused sensations “kind of like marijuana.” Id. at 85. Lukasik described
spice as synthetic marijuana. Likewise, Stephens referred to the substance he
sold Lukasik as spice, which he explained was synthetic marijuana. Stephens
testified the substance caused effects comparable to marijuana. As a result, the
evidence was sufficient from which the jury could conclude the bag contained a
synthetic drug lookalike substance.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 12A02-1611-CR-2555 | July 12, 2017 Page 10 of 15
[21] As for the element of possession, the State may prove the defendant either
actually or constructively possessed the substance. Washington v. State, 902
N.E.2d 280, 288 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. Constructive possession
occurs when a person has the intent and capability to maintain dominion and
control over the item. Id.[22] First, Unger had the capability to maintain dominion and control over the bag
found in the kitchen. Proof of possessory interest in the premises where the
item is found satisfies the capability prong, regardless of whether possession of
the premises is exclusive. Gee v. State, 810 N.E.2d 338, 340-41 (Ind. 2004).
Detective Hackerd observed the bag in plain view in the kitchen of Unger’s
residence. Therefore, there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could
conclude Unger had the capability to maintain dominion and control over a
synthetic drug lookalike substance.
[23] Second, the evidence shows Unger had the intent to maintain dominion and
control over the bag found in the kitchen. If a defendant’s possession of the
premises is non-exclusive, the inference of intent to maintain dominion and
control must be supported by additional circumstances pointing to the
defendant’s knowledge of the nature of the item and its presence. Id. at 341.
Recognized “additional circumstances” include: (1) incriminating statements;
(2) attempted flight or furtive gestures; (3) a setting that suggests drug
manufacturing; (4) the proximity of the item to the defendant; (5) whether the
item was found in plain view; and (6) the mingling of the item with other items
the defendant owns. Id.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 12A02-1611-CR-2555 | July 12, 2017 Page 11 of 15
[24] Here, Detective Hackerd observed the bag in plain view in the kitchen. Martin
reported Unger was the only other person in the kitchen that day and that the
bag was not there earlier. Unger was present at the house when Detective
Hackerd executed the warrant and found the bag. The testimony of both
Detective Hackerd and Martin show Unger was in close proximity to the bag.
Lukasik purchased spice at Unger’s residence after receiving a text message
from Unger telling him to come over. The text message is also indicative of her
knowledge of the substance. Taking into account Unger’s close proximity to
the bag, that the bag was found in plain view, and Unger’s text message, we
conclude the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s determination that
Unger constructively possessed a synthetic drug or synthetic drug lookalike
substance.
C. Evidence to Support the Dealing Conviction
[25] Unger next contends there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction
for dealing in a synthetic drug or synthetic drug lookalike substance. To convict
Unger of dealing, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that Unger possessed, with intent to manufacture, finance the manufacture of,
deliver, or finance the delivery of, more than five grams of a synthetic drug or
synthetic drug lookalike substance. Ind. Code § 35-48-4-10.5(c)(2), (e)(1)(B).
Unger argues the State failed to prove the intent element because no one
testified at trial she delivered such substance: Lukasik testified he purchased
spice from Stephens while Unger was not present, and Stephens testified Unger
was unaware he sold spice. Again, we disagree.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 12A02-1611-CR-2555 | July 12, 2017 Page 12 of 15
[26] In essence, Unger invites us to reweigh the evidence and assess witness
credibility, which we cannot do. Lukasik first told Detective Hackerd he
purchased the spice from Unger but testified at trial he purchased the spice from
Stephens. The jury was aware Lukasik made conflicting statements. Lukasik
also testified he texted Unger that morning “to see if anybody was home”
before going to the house to purchase spice, and Unger responded “we are
home. We’re here. Stop on over.” Tr., Vol. I at 70-71. Lukasik then went to
Unger’s residence and purchased “four or five grams” of spice. Id. at 74.
Further, Lukasik testified he purchased spice from Unger’s residence numerous
times before. As explained above, the State presented sufficient evidence Unger
possessed the bag found in the kitchen containing over thirty grams of a
synthetic drug or synthetic drug lookalike substance. The jury could have
determined Lukasik’s testimony about purchasing the spice from Stephens
instead of Unger was not credible in light of the other evidence. In sum, there
was sufficient evidence presented from which the jury could conclude Unger
was dealing in a synthetic drug or synthetic drug lookalike substance.
D. Evidence to Support the Paraphernalia Conviction
[27] Finally, Unger contends there was insufficient evidence to support her
conviction for possession of paraphernalia. To convict Unger of possession of
paraphernalia, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Unger knowingly or intentionally possessed an instrument, a device, or another
object she intended to use for introducing a controlled substance into her body.
Ind. Code § 35-48-4-8.3(b)(1). Unger argues the State presented insufficient
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 12A02-1611-CR-2555 | July 12, 2017 Page 13 of 15
evidence because the residue inside the pipes was not tested and no one testified
the pipes were found somewhere within Unger’s control. We disagree.
[28] As noted above, possession may be actual or constructive. Constructive
possession occurs when the defendant has the intent and capability to maintain
control and dominion over the illicit items. See supra ¶¶ 22-24.
[29] First we look at the capability to maintain dominion and control over the
paraphernalia. Law enforcement found the pipes in plain view in Unger’s
bedroom. Because Unger has a possessory interest in her bedroom, there was
sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude Unger was capable of
maintaining control and dominion over the pipes.
[30] Next we look at the intent to maintain dominion and control over the
paraphernalia. Detective Hackerd found the pipes in plain view in Unger’s
bedroom either in a jewelry box or on a nightstand. Since Detective Hackerd
found the pipes in plain view and mingled with other items Unger owns, the
State presented sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude Unger
intended to maintain dominion and control over the pipes.
[31] Finally, we look at Unger’s intent to use the paraphernalia to introduce a
controlled substance into her body. Intent to introduce a controlled substance
may be inferred from circumstantial evidence. Sluder v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1178,
1181 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Circumstantial evidence establishing intent
includes, but is not limited to, “possession of an identifiable amount of
narcotics, an instrument, a device, or other object that the person intends to use
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 12A02-1611-CR-2555 | July 12, 2017 Page 14 of 15
for introduction of a controlled substance in the person’s body, and/or evidence
of or admission to prior drug use.” Perkins v. State, 57 N.E.3d 861, 865 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2016).
[32] As explained above, the State presented sufficient evidence from which the jury
could conclude Unger possessed, and was dealing, a synthetic drug or synthetic
drug lookalike substance. Lukasik and Stephens referred to the substance
Unger possessed as spice, which they explained is synthetic marijuana.
Further, while the pipes were not tested for the presence of residue, Detective
Hackerd testified he observed burnt material in the bowls of the pipes. In sum,
the State presented sufficient evidence from which the jury could find Unger
knowingly or intentionally possessed pipes intended for introducing a
controlled substance into her body.
Conclusion
[33] Concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting at trial
evidence obtained as a result of the search warrant and the evidence was
sufficient to support Unger’s convictions, we affirm.
[34] Affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Bailey, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 12A02-1611-CR-2555 | July 12, 2017 Page 15 of 15