Lane G. Dodson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Oct 03 2017, 11:11 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
CLERK
court except for the purpose of establishing Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
James H. Voyles Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Jennifer M. Lukemeyer Attorney General of Indiana
Voyles Vaiana Lukemeyer Baldwin &
Larry D. Allen
Webb Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Lane G. Dodson, October 3, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
50A03-1702-CR-363
v. Appeal from the Marshall Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Robert O. Bowen,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
50D01-1503-MR-1
Bailey, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Lane Dodson (“Dodson”) appeals his convictions, following a jury trial, for
count I, attempted murder, a Level 1 felony;1 count II, intimidation, as a Level
5 felony;2 count III, domestic battery, as a Class A misdemeanor; 3 and count
IV, domestic battery, as a Class A misdemeanor.4 We affirm.
Issues
[2] Dodson raises three issues on appeal which we restate as follows:
I. Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of
Dodson’s relationship with his wife, Heather Dodson
(“Heather”).
II. Whether the trial court erred by failing to sever the charges
of battery and intimidation from the charge of attempted
murder.
III. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing
Dodson.
1
Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1) and I.C. § 35-41-5-1.
2
I.C. § 35-45-2-1(a)(1) and (b)(2)(A).
3
I.C. § 35-42-2-1.3(a).
4
Id.
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Facts and Procedural History
[3] In 2011, Dodson and Heather married, and they lived in Plymouth with
Dodson’s two children from a previous marriage. Heather also had three
children of her own from a previous relationship. During the marriage, Dodson
had anger issues, and Heather became afraid of him. On December 23, 2014,
while both Dodson’s and Heather’s children were in the marital home, Dodson
confronted Heather about her extra-marital affair with Justin Pointon
(“Pointon”). Dodson became angry and punched Heather in the eye with his
fist. Heather assured Dodson that she was not going to call the police, and
Dodson left the house. After Dodson left, Heather told the children that she
had fallen.
[4] Later that night, Dodson returned to the house and again questioned Heather
about Pointon. Dodson and Heather went out to the shed behind their house
so that Heather could wrap Christmas presents for the children. Dodson again
began asking Heather about her affair, and he repeatedly hit her in her
shoulder, face, arm, chest, stomach, and side. After beating Heather, Dodson
threw her to the ground. Heather was crying, telling Dodson to stop, and trying
to shield her face from him. Dodson, who was armed with a semi-automatic
pistol, drew his gun from its holster and pointed it at Heather’s head. Dodson
stated that the world would be better off without Heather and that she was a
bad mother. He then ordered Heather to get down on her knees and beg for her
life, which she did. At that point, one of Heather’s children knocked on the
door to the shed and looked through the window, causing Dodson to stop his
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attack on Heather. Dodson and Heather resumed wrapping presents. Because
Dodson threatened to further hurt Heather if she told anyone about the beating,
Heather told others who asked about her injuries that she had fallen.
[5] On December 28, Dodson confronted Pointon at a mutual friend’s house, and
he hit Pointon in the head with a pistol, causing injury. A neighbor called the
police. Plymouth Police Officer Matt Emmenhiser (“Officer Emmenhiser”)
responded and arrested Dodson and Pointon. Dodson spent the night in jail
and was released the following day.
[6] On December 29, Heather’s sister, Samantha Harmon (“Harmon”), was at
Heather’s neighbor’s, Heather Klinedinst’s (“Klinedinst”), house to pick up
Harmon’s children. Klinedinst had previously noticed Heather’s injuries and
she told Harmon about them. Harmon then went to Heather’s house and
convinced Heather to pack up and come with the children to Harmon’s house.
On their way to Harmon’s house, Harmon and Heather briefly stopped at their
grandfather’s, Lawrence Christman’s (“Christman”), house and told him what
had happened.
[7] When they subsequently arrived at Harmon’s house, Heather was reluctant to
call the police, so Harmon did so. Marshall County Sheriff Deputy Jonathan
Bryant (“Deputy Bryant”) then met with Harmon and Heather at Harmon’s
house. Heather reported to Deputy Bryant that Dodson had caused her
injuries. While Heather was talking to Deputy Bryant in his patrol vehicle,
Harmon received a telephone call from Christman. He informed Harmon that
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Dodson had come to Christman’s house looking for Heather and that Dodson
appeared extremely angry. Christman stated that Dodson was on his way to
Harmon’s house to find Heather.
[8] Harmon immediately informed Heather and Deputy Bryant that Dodson was
on his way to Harmon’s house. Deputy Bryant was aware from police records
that Dodson had been arrested for the battery with a pistol just the previous
evening, so he took Heather to the police station for her safety. On the way to
the police station, Deputy Bryant put a call out to other officers to be on the
lookout for Dodson, who was driving a white van and was possibly armed, and
to take Dodson into custody. Later, Heather was taken to the hospital where
her injuries were photographed.
[9] After receiving the dispatch call, Indiana State Trooper William Ennis
(“Trooper Ennis”) saw Dodson’s van. Trooper Ennis initiated a traffic stop of
the van after seeing that Dodson failed to signal a turn. Trooper Ennis called
for assistance from other officers after he observed Dodson acting anxiously in
the driver’s seat. Officer Emmenhiser and his partner Officer Bridget Hite
(“Officer Hite”) then arrived at the scene. Officer Hite’s police vehicle was
equipped with a dashboard camera, which captured the subsequent interaction
between Dodson and the officers that evening.
[10] Officer Emmenhiser joined Trooper Ennis at the driver’s side door of Dodson’s
vehicle, and the officers asked Dodson to step out of his van. Dodson replied,
“F--- you.” Tr. Vol. III at 96. Dodson then drew his firearm from his shoulder
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holster, pointed it at Officer Emmenhiser, and fired. Officer Emmenhiser
retreated toward the front of Dodson’s vehicle and he and the other officers
returned Dodson’s fire. Dodson was shot, and he collapsed. Dodson’s pistol
and shell casings were retrieved from inside of the van, and Dodson was taken
to the hospital to be treated for his wounds.
[11] On March 13, 2015, the State charged Dodson with the attempted murder of
Officer Emmenhiser, intimidation of Heather, two counts of domestic battery of
Heather, and battery, with moderate bodily injury, of Pointon. Prior to
Dodson’s trial and pursuant to Indiana Rule of Evidence 404(b)(2), the
prosecutor provided notice of his intent to introduce evidence of Dodson’s and
Heather’s violent relationship during their marriage. Dodson did not object to
the admission of that evidence. At the trial, Heather provided testimony about
the two times Dodson beat her on December 23, and the trial court admitted
photographs of Heather’s injuries from December 23 without objection. At the
conclusion of Dodson’s subsequent trial, a jury found him guilty as charged on
all counts except count V, the battery charge related to Pointon, for which the
jury found Dodson not guilty.
[12] At sentencing, the trial court found that Dodson’s minimal criminal history and
his low risk of re-offense were mitigating factors. The trial court found as
aggravating factors that Dodson discharged a firearm at police officers without
provocation, and he failed to take responsibility for his actions against the
police officers by alleging a plot against him, despite clear video evidence
showing him initiating gun fire with the officers. The trial court found that the
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aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors, and it sentenced
Dodson to an aggregate term of thirty-five years in the Department of
Correction.
[13] This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
Admission of Evidence of Defendant’s and Victim’s
Relationship
[14] Dodson contends that the following evidence that he was abusive toward
Heather was improperly admitted: Heather’s testimony that Dodson was
controlling of Heather and that she was afraid of him; and Christman’s
testimony that he had suspected that Dodson had abused Heather when
Christman had seen bruises on Heather in the past. The admission of evidence
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. E.g., Speybroeck v. State, 875 N.E.2d 813,
818 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). However, as Dodson concedes, his failure to object
to the admission of the evidence waives his right to review unless the admission
was fundamental error. E.g., Treadway v. State, 924 N.E.2d 621, 633 (Ind.
2010). The fundamental error exception to waiver is extremely narrow and
only applies when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles,
the harm or potential harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the
defendant fundamental due process and renders a fair trial impossible.
Halliburton v. State, 1 N.E.3d 670, 678 (Ind. 2013). “[A]t bottom, the
fundamental-error doctrine asks whether the error was so egregious and
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abhorrent to fundamental due process that the trial judge should or should not
have acted, irrespective of the parties’ failure to object or otherwise preserve the
error for appeal.” Whiting v. State, 969 N.E.2d 24, 34 (Ind. 2012).
[15] Dodson maintains that the challenged evidence was inadmissible under Indiana
Rule of Evidence 404(b), which provides, in relevant part:
(b) Crimes, Wrongs, or Other Acts.
(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other
act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order
to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in
accordance with the character.
(2) Permitted Uses; … This evidence may be admissible for
another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of
mistake, or lack of accident.
When assessing the admissibility of Rule 404(b) evidence, the court must
determine that the evidence of other crimes or wrongs is relevant to a matter at
issue other than the defendant’s propensity to commit the charged crime, and
the court must balance the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial
effect pursuant to Indiana Rule of Evidence 403. Hicks v. State, 690 N.E.2d 215,
221 (Ind. 1997).
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[16] Here, the evidence of Dodson’s and Heather’s tumultuous past relationship5
was probative of Dodson’s motive for beating and threatening Heather and of
the nature of their relationship in general. Our Supreme Court has repeatedly
held that a defendant’s prior bad acts of violence or threats of violence are
“usually admissible” under Rule 404(b)(2) to show the relationship between the
defendant and the victim, and to show the defendant’s motive where the charge
is battery or murder. Hicks, 690 N.E.2d at 222; see also Spencer v. State, 703
N.E.2d 1053, 1056 (Ind. 1999); Ross v. State, 676 N.E.2d 339, 346 (Ind. 1996);
Elliott v. State, 630 N.E.2d 202, 204 (Ind. 1994); Price v. State, 619 N.E.2d 582,
584 (Ind. 1993). The challenged evidence of Dodson’s and Heather’s past
relationship was probative of Dodson’s relationship with Heather and his
motive for intimidating and battering her on December 23, 2014.
[17] Moreover, Dodson has failed to articulate how the challenged evidence
prejudiced him in any way. Parties to an appeal are required to present cogent
argument. Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8). While Dodson asserts that the
evidence “had such an impact on the case that it prevented [him] from receiving
a fair trial on the relevant facts to each count,” Appellant’s Br. at 16, he
provides no explanation of how this is so. It is especially unclear how the
challenged evidence would have prejudiced his case when there was a
5
We note that Heather’s testimony that she was afraid of Dodson is not a “prior act” of Dodson’s that is
subject to the 404(b) analysis. See Hicks, 690 N.E.2d at 221, n.11. It is also questionable whether Heather’s
testimony that Dodson was controlling of her relates to a “bad act;” however, for the sake of argument, we
assume that it does.
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significant amount of unchallenged evidence describing in detail his beatings of
Heather on December 23 and depicting the injuries from those beatings.
Dodson has failed to present cogent argument as to how the challenged
evidence was prejudicial, and we will not attempt to develop such arguments
for him. Thomas v. State, 965 N.E.2d 70, 77 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans.
denied.
[18] The trial court did not commit fundamental error when it admitted Heather’s
testimony that Dodson was controlling of her and Christman’s testimony that
he had suspected Dodson had abused Heather in the past, as such testimony
was probative of Dodson’s relationship with Heather and his motive for the
crimes charged. Furthermore, Dodson failed to show any prejudicial effect
regarding the admission of that evidence.
Failure to Sever Charges
[19] Dodson asserts that the trial court erred in failing to sever the charges of battery
and intimidation from the charge of attempted murder. However, Dodson
never moved to sever the charges. Therefore, he has waived his appeal on those
grounds.
[20] Indiana Code Section 35-34-1-12(a) (emphasis added) provides as follows:
A defendant’s motion for severance of crimes or motion for a
separate trial must be made before commencement of trial,
except that the motion may be made before or at the close of all
the evidence during trial if based upon a ground not previously
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known. The right to severance of offenses or separate trial is waived by
failure to make the motion at the appropriate time.
We have held that, pursuant to the express language of this statute, a defendant
waives his right to severance of offenses when he fails to renew a motion for
severance that was denied before trial. Brown v. State, 683 N.E.2d 600, 603
(Ind. Ct. App. 1997), trans. denied; see also Hobson v. State, 495 N.E.2d 741, 744
(Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (noting “the express language of the statute and the
decisions of our Supreme Court” provide for waiver upon failure to renew a
motion to sever). Here, Dodson never even made a motion to sever to begin
with. If a defendant waives severance by failing to renew a motion, he certainly
waives it by failing to make the motion at all.
[21] Moreover, it is well-established that we generally will not address an argument
that was not raised in the trial court and is raised for the first time on appeal.
[A] trial court cannot be found to have erred as to an issue or
argument that it never had an opportunity to consider.
Accordingly, as a general rule, a party may not present an
argument or issue on appeal unless the party raised that
argument or issue before the trial court. Marshall v. State, 621
N.E.2d 308, 314 (Ind. 1993). In such circumstances the
argument is waived. Id.Washington v. State, 808 N.E.2d 617, 625 (Ind. 2004). By failing to move for
severance of the charges or raise the issue of severance at all before the trial
court, Dodson has waived our consideration of that issue on appeal.
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Abuse of Discretion in Sentencing
Standard of Review
[22] Dodson maintains that the trial court erred in sentencing him. Sentencing
decisions lie within the sound discretion of the trial court. Cardwell v. State, 895
N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008). An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is
“clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the
court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn
therefrom.” Gross v. State, 22 N.E.3d 863, 869 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citation
omitted), trans. denied. A trial court abuses its discretion in sentencing if it does
any of the following:
(1) fails “to enter a sentencing statement at all;” (2) enters “a
sentencing statement that explains reasons for imposing a
sentence—including a finding of aggravating and mitigating
factors if any[6]—but the record does not support the reasons;” (3)
enters a sentencing statement that “omits reasons that are clearly
supported by the record and advanced for consideration;” or (4)
considers reasons that “are improper as a matter of law.”
[23] Id. (quoting Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490-491 (Ind. 2007), clarified on
reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007)). However, the relative weight or value
6
We note that, under the advisory sentencing scheme that replaced the presumptive sentencing scheme in
2005, the trial court “no longer has an obligation to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors against each
other when imposing a sentence.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007). However, neither is
the trial court prohibited from identifying facts in aggravation or mitigation. Id. And, if the trial court does
find the existence of such factors, “then the trial court is required to give ‘a statement of the court’s reasons
for selecting the sentence that it imposes.’” Id. (quoting Ind. Code § 35-38-1-3 (2006)).
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assignable to reasons properly found, or those which should have been found, is
not subject to review for abuse of discretion, id., and a trial court is under no
obligation to explain why a proposed mitigator does not exist or why the court
found it to be insignificant. Sandleben v. State, 22 N.E.3d 782, 796 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2014), trans. denied.
Reasonably Detailed Sentencing Statement
[24] Dodson’s first contention is that the trial court’s statement at sentencing was
not sufficiently detailed. Trial courts imposing felony sentences must make
statements which may be oral, written, or both, Gleason v. State, 965 N.E.2d
702, 711 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), and which include a reasonably detailed
recitation of the trial court’s reasons for imposing a particular sentence.
Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 490. And, while the trial court is not required to
consider aggravating and mitigating factors, if its recitation of its reasons for the
sentence includes such factors, the trial court “must identify all significant
mitigating and aggravating circumstances and explain why each circumstance
has been determined to be mitigating or aggravating.” Id.
[25] Here, the trial court found that Dodson’s minimal criminal history and his low
risk of re-offense were mitigating factors. But the trial court also found that
Dodson shooting, unprovoked, at police officers and failing to show remorse
for his actions were aggravators that outweighed the mitigating factors. In its
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oral sentencing statement,7 the trial court explained that the discharge of the
firearm without provocation was an aggravating factor because “[t]he offense
was against a law enforcement officer and the officers did not pose any threat to
[Dodson] nor provoke[] any reaction on [Dodson’s] part.” Tr. Vol. IV at 242.
The trial court further explained that Dodson’s lack of remorse for his crime
was demonstrated by his continued allegations that the police officers plotted
against him, despite clear video evidence showing him initiating gun fire with
the officers. Id. at 242-43. That is a “reasonably detailed sentencing statement
that explained the trial court’s reasons for imposing the sentence” and the
record supported those reasons. Kimbrough v. State, 979 N.E.2d 625, 629 (Ind.
2012) (citing Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 490).
Consideration of Improper Reasons
[26] Dodson also asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by considering
improper reasons for his sentence. Specifically, Dodson maintains that the trial
court erred in finding his use of a firearm and his plea of innocence as
aggravating factors. However, Dodson misstates what the trial court found to
be aggravating factors.
[27] As Dodson points out, a trial court may not use a material element of the crime
as an aggravating factor. Spears v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1161, 1167 (Ind. 2000).
7
A trial court’s consideration of the mitigating and aggravating factors “may be evidenced in either the
written order or in an oral sentencing statement.” Anderson v. State, 989 N.E.2d 823, 826 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013)
(citing Gleason, 965 N.E.2d at 711), trans. denied.
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However, the trial court may find the nature and circumstances of the offense to
be an aggravating circumstance. Lemos v. State, 746 N.E.2d 972, 975 (Ind.
2001). Here, as in Lemos, the fact that a specific weapon was used “is in itself
not an aggravating circumstance, because some means is used in every
murder.” Id. However, as in Lemos, it does not appear that the trial court
concluded that discharging the firearm was a separate aggravating
circumstance. Rather, the trial court emphasized in both its oral and written
sentencing statements that Dodson shooting at a police officer without any
provocation was an aggravating circumstance. That is part of the nature and
circumstance of the crime, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
finding it to be an aggravating factor. Id.[28] Further, while a defendant’s denial of guilt is not a permissible aggravating
factor, his lack of remorse is. Deane v. State, 759 N.E.2d 201, 205 (Ind. 2001).
Here, the trial court did not find that Dodson’s plea of innocence was the
evidence of his lack of remorse. Rather, the court specifically stated that
Dodson’s continued allegations that the police officers plotted against him,
despite clear video evidence showing him initiating gun fire with the officers,
showed his lack of remorse. We cannot say that the trial court abused its
discretion in reaching that conclusion. Cf. Dockery v. State, 504 N.E.2d 291, 297
(Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (holding trial court’s use of lack of remorse as an
aggravating factor was impermissible where it was based solely upon defendant’s
continued assertion of his innocence).
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Failure to Properly Weigh Factors
[29] Finally, Dodson maintains that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to
give sufficient weight to his poor physical health and his lack of a criminal
history. As our Supreme Court stated in Anglemyer, “[b]ecause the trial court
no longer has any obligation to ‘weigh’ aggravating and mitigating factors
against each other when imposing a sentence, … a trial court cannot now be
said to have abused its discretion in failing to ‘properly weigh’ such factors.”
Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491 (citations omitted). Therefore, we must decline
Dodson’s request that we review the relative weight of the proposed mitigating
factors. Gross, 22 N.E.3d at 869.
Conclusion
[30] The trial court did not commit fundamental error when it admitted evidence of
Dodson’s and Heather’s relationship, as that evidence was admissible under
Indiana Rule of Evidence 404(b)(2). Furthermore, Dodson has waived our
review of the severance of charges by failing to raise that issue before the trial
court. And the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its sentencing of
Dodson.
[31] Affirmed.
Baker, J., and Altice, J., concur.
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