James Meredith v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), Nov 14 2017, 10:43 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be CLERK
regarded as precedent or cited before any Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Brooke Smith Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Scott L. Barnhart Attorney General of Indiana
Keffer Barnhart LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana Katherine Cooper
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
James Meredith, November 14, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
82A05-1705-CR-1117
v. Appeal from the Vanderburgh
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Richard G.
Appellee-Plaintiff. D’Amour, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
82D02-1406-FA-801
Najam, Judge.
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Statement of the Case
[1] James Meredith appeals his thirty-year sentence following his convictions for
four counts of child molesting, as Class A felonies, and four counts of child
molesting, as Class C felonies. Meredith presents a single issue for our review,
namely, whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the
offenses and his character. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Between February 16, 2011, and 2013, Meredith, who was then at least twenty-
one years old,1 molested H.D., who was born in February 2001, multiple times.
On June 12, 2014, the State charged Meredith with thirty counts of child
molesting, twenty-two as Class A felonies, and eight as Class C felonies. On
March 23, 2017, the State amended the charging information. In particular, the
State dismissed twenty-two of the charges and charged Meredith with four
counts of child molesting, as Class A felonies, and four counts of child
molesting, as Class C felonies. On March 27, 2017, a jury trial commenced,
and voir dire was completed. When the trial resumed the following day, before
opening arguments, Meredith pleaded guilty as charged.
[3] Meredith’s guilty plea left sentencing open to the trial court’s discretion. At the
ensuing sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed sentence as follows:
1
Meredith was born in October 1975.
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Before I can sentence you I have to find aggravating factors and
mitigating factors . . . . And I do find that there are aggravators
and there are mitigators in this case. Let’s talk about the
aggravators first. The first one that I found was the harm to the
victim was very significant. Obviously “H” was a young child
when you decided to begin this course of conduct with her. And
the harm to her is incalculable. Apparently there were times
where other minors were present when some of this activity was
going on. I also find that to be an aggravator. You apparently
were in a position of trust. I guess there was some relationship
here[2] where there were times where you were left alone with
“H” as some sort of authority figure. And I also find that was an
aggravator. And then, of course, the heinousness of this crime.
Child molesting is one of the more heinous crimes that we have
on the books. The harm that it does to the mind and the spirit
and the soul of “H” that she will have to carry for the rest of her
life. So I listed there four aggravating circumstances. I do find
two mitigating circumstances in this case. I was aware of the
evaluations that were done. I understand you do have some
cognitive deficiencies, through no fault of your own. Those are
as a result of nature and nothing you did wrong there. But you
do have those problems. It’s not an excuse, as was pointed out
by your Counsel, for this behavior, but it is something that
you’ve had to deal with in your life and has made your life more
difficult. The second mitigating factor, notwithstanding the fact
that you attempted to withdraw the plea today, was I think you
did the right thing by, you know, on the day of the trial when we
knew there was gonna be time for “H” to come up here and
relive all of these circumstances and all of these incidents, that
you did the right thing and you said, you know, “I’m gonna
plead guilty. I’m gonna accept my responsibility for what I did
and I’m not going to make her go through that.” Now whether
2
In a report, Dr. David Cerling noted that H.D. is “the granddaughter of a family friend of his ex-wife[.]”
Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 59.
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that actually went through your head and that was the reason
you pled guilty, I can’t be sure. But I’m gonna say in my mind
that maybe in the back of your head you were thinking, you
know, “I don’t want her to have to go through this and so I’m
gonna step up. I’m gonna man up and I’m gonna say I did
wrong and I’m not gonna have to make her go through that.” So
I’m gonna count that as a mitigating factor in this matter.
Notwithstanding, the aggravators I think do exceed the
mitigators in this case. And accordingly, the Court’s now going
to enter a judgment of conviction on Counts 1 through 4, Class A
child molesting and enter a judgment of conviction on Counts 5
through 8, Class C child molesting. On Counts 1 through 4, sir,
I’m going to sentence you to thirty years at the Indiana
Department of Corrections. Counts 1 through 4 will run
concurrent with each other. So they’ll run at the same time. On
Counts 5 through 8, sir, I’m sentencing you to four years at the
Indiana Department of Corrections. Those Counts will run
concurrent [with] each other at the same time and they also will
run concurrent with Counts 1 through 4. But all eight Counts
will run consecutive to the [thirty-year] sentence that you
received, you’re now serving, in 82C01-1306-FA-639 [for child
molesting]. Meaning, sir, the time for this sentence will not run
until such time as you have completed your sentence in 639.
Tr. at 28-30. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[4] Meredith’s sole contention on appeal is that his sentence is inappropriate in
light of the nature of the offenses and his character. As we have explained:
Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) permits an Indiana appellate court
to “revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due
consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the
sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and
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the character of the offender.” We assess the trial court’s
recognition or nonrecognition of aggravators and mitigators as an
initial guide to determining whether the sentence imposed was
inappropriate. Gibson v. State, 856 N.E.2d 142, 147 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2006). The principal role of appellate review is to “leaven
the outliers.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind.
2008). A defendant must persuade the appellate court that his or
her sentence has met the inappropriateness standard of review.
Roush v. State, 875 N.E.2d 801, 812 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
Robinson v. State, 61 N.E.3d 1226, 1228 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
[5] Meredith asserts that his “diminished mental capacity significantly impacted
the nature of the offences [sic].” Appellant’s Br. at 9. In particular, prior to
trial, the court ordered three psychiatric examinations of Meredith to determine
whether he was competent to stand trial. The results of those examinations
revealed that Meredith, while competent to stand trial, “was in the fifth
percentile for I.Q., which is right at the borderline of impairment,” and he had a
history of “learning disabilities” and “substantially below[-]average verbal
functioning.” Id. Meredith maintains that, “[a]s a result of his diminished
mental capacity and cognitive ability, Meredith’s actions demonstrate a
lessened amount of culpability.” Id. at 10. Meredith also contends that the
nature of the offenses “are [sic] lessened as a result of his decision to accept an
open plea.” Id. Finally, Meredith asserts that the trial court “inappropriately
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considered the heinousness of the crime[s] as an aggravating factor,”3 which, he
maintains, warrants a “less than . . . advisory sentence” here. Id. at 11.
[6] Initially, we note that Meredith’s argument regarding the nature of the offenses
reads more like an argument regarding his character. Regardless, Meredith’s
argument on appeal ignores that, at sentencing, H.D.’s grandmother read a
statement H.D. had written. H.D. described having attempted suicide
“multiple times” as a result of the molestations. Tr. at 20. And H.D. stated
that Meredith had made her life “a living hell.” Id. We cannot say that
Meredith’s aggregate thirty-year sentence for four Class A felony convictions
and four Class C felony convictions is inappropriate in light of the nature of the
offenses.
[7] Meredith also maintains that his sentence is inappropriate in light of his
character. In support, Meredith alleges that he “received no benefit to his open
plea, as there was no bargained-for sentence associated with his plea.”
Appellant’s Br. at 11 (emphasis added). But Meredith ignores the mitigating
weight the trial court gave to his guilty plea. And, notably, the trial court
imposed concurrent and advisory sentences on each conviction. Further,
Meredith contends that his limited criminal history warrants a revised sentence.
But Meredith’s prior convictions, which also were for four counts of child
molesting, as Class A felonies, are significant, especially given that those
3
Meredith makes no contention or cogent argument that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing.
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offenses occurred in the summer of 2013 and involved a young family member.
We cannot say that Meredith’s sentence is inappropriate in light of his
character.
[8] Affirmed.
Kirsch, J., and Brown, J., concur.
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