Jason Garmon v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Feb 28 2018, 9:11 am
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
CLERK
precedent or cited before any court except for the Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, and Tax Court
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Joseph P. Hunter Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Muncie, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Caroline G. Templeton
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Jason Garmon, February 28, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A05-1707-CR-1742
v. Appeal from the Delaware Circuit
Court.
The Honorable Thomas A. Cannon,
State of Indiana, Jr., Judge.
Appellee-Plaintiff. Trial Court Cause No.
18C05-1601-F3-3
Friedlander, Senior Judge
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[1] Jason Garmon appeals his three convictions of robbery while armed with a
1
deadly weapon, all Level 3 felonies. We affirm.
[2] On November 21, 2015, a person later identified as Garmon entered a liquor
store in Delaware County. He wore a black shirt and pants, gloves, and a black
mask, and he brandished a handgun. Garmon pointed the gun at Amy
Sanders, a customer, and ordered her to get on the ground. Next, he walked
over to Rachel Penrod, the cashier, and pointed the gun at the back of her head.
Garmon ordered her to open the cash register and then took the contents, about
$500. He also took Sanders’ and Penrod’s cell phones and told them that if
they called the police, he would know and he would come back and kill them.
Garmon left the store, and security cameras showed him driving away in a
Chevrolet Malibu. The police later found Sanders’ phone by the side of a road
leading out of town.
[3] On November 23, 2015, Krista Altland and several coworkers were at work at a
bank in Delaware County. A person later identified as Garmon entered the
bank. He was wearing sunglasses and had bandages on his face and hands to
conceal his identity. Garmon approached Altland’s teller station and quietly
told her, “he wanted fifteen thousand dollars or he was going to blow [her]
f*****g head off.” Tr. Vol. I, p. 221. He also told her he had a gun. Garmon
further ordered Altland not to give him any dye packs or use other surreptitious
1
Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1 (2014).
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means to track the money. She gave him all the cash to which she had access,
except for the bait money that had trackable serial numbers. Garmon fled with
$7,859, and Altland notified her coworkers she had been robbed.
[4] The Delaware County Sheriff’s Office reached out to neighboring law
enforcement organizations seeking help in identifying the person who robbed
the liquor store and the bank. Those other agencies were investigating robberies
that happened in their own jurisdictions around the same time as the Delaware
County robberies. The sheriff’s request for help eventually reached parole agent
James Bennett, who looked at photos of the robber and recognized him as
Garmon, a parolee under his supervision. After speaking with police officers,
Bennett arranged to encounter Garmon on a street. Garmon was driving a
Chevrolet Malibu that matched the one that was used in the liquor store
robbery. Bennett instructed him to go to the local community corrections office
for an impromptu meeting.
[5] During the meeting, Garmon admitted to Bennett that he had recently used
marijuana, and Bennett handcuffed him. Bennett looked in Garmon’s car and
found marijuana and clothing that he thought the robber had worn.
[6] Police officers took Garmon into custody and obtained search warrants for the
car, for two Blackford County addresses where Garmon had recently lived, and
for Garmon’s clothing. They found items in the car that belonged to Garmon
and to his significant other, Amanda Jordan. They also found a black mask
and black pants that matched those worn by the liquor store robber.
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[7] Next, the officers went to one of the addresses identified in the search warrants.
Garmon, Jordan, and Jordan’s daughter lived there. An officer found a plastic
bag containing $1826.36 hidden in the kitchen ceiling. The officers brought
Jordan to the house from her place of employment and questioned her.
[8] The officers found a torn-up note in Garmon’s clothes. They pieced it together
and determined Garmon had written it to Jordan. It stated, “Amanda, If youre
[sic] reading this things went wrong. Im [sic] sorry, it was all for us! I Love
you forever, Jason.” Tr. Ex. Vol., State’s Ex. 35.
[9] Later in the day on December 8, 2015, two officers questioned Garmon at the
Blackford County Sheriff’s Office. We will discuss the recorded interrogation
in more detail below, but during questioning Garmon admitted to robbing the
liquor store and the bank, among other crimes. He provided details about the
robberies that had not been released to the public.
[10] The State charged Garmon with three counts of robbery while armed with a
deadly weapon, all Level 3 felonies, for his acts involving Sanders, Penrod, and
Altland. Garmon filed a motion to suppress his statements from the December
8, 2015 interrogation. The trial court denied the motion after a hearing.
[11] Prior to trial, Garmon filed a motion in limine asking that the recording of the
December 8, 2015 interrogation be redacted to prevent the jury from hearing
about crimes he allegedly committed in other counties. He further requested
that the State’s witnesses be forbidden from referencing other crimes in their
trial testimony. Next, the State filed a Notice of Reliance on Other Crimes,
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Wrongs, or Acts Pursuant to Indiana Rule of Evidence 404(b), explaining that
it intended to present evidence that: (1) Garmon was on parole when he
committed the robberies at issue in this case; and (2) the officers investigating
the robberies were investigating other crimes and used evidence from those
crimes to identify Garmon as the culprit for the robberies at issue here. The
State claimed it intended to use this evidence to prove the identity of the robber,
among other purposes. The State further filed a redacted transcript of
Garmon’s December 8, 2015 interrogation, agreeing to omit details about
Garmon’s release from prison and the other crimes he committed during this
period.
[12] The trial court approved the State’s redacted version of the interrogation for
submission to the jury. Further, the court denied Garmon’s motion in limine,
determining the State’s witnesses would be allowed to testify about Garmon’s
other crimes or wrongs if offered for purposes such as motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan or identity.
[13] The case was tried to a jury, which determined Garmon was guilty as charged.
The court imposed a sentence, and this appeal followed.
[14] Garmon raises two issues, which we restate as:
1. Whether the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the
recording of Garmon’s December 8, 2015 interrogation; and
2. Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of
Garmon’s other crimes or wrongs.
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[15] Questions regarding the admission of evidence are within the sound discretion
of the trial court, and we review the court’s decision only for an abuse of that
discretion. Williams v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1154 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
1.
[16] Garmon first claims the trial court should not have admitted into evidence the
recording of his December 8, 2015 interrogation because the incriminating
statements he made during questioning were the result of coercive police
misconduct. Specifically, Garmon argues the interviewing officers threatened
to arrest his significant other, Amanda Jordan, unless he admitted to
committing the robberies.
[17] When a defendant challenges the admissibility of a confession, the State must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was given voluntarily.
Henry v. State, 738 N.E.2d 663 (Ind. 2000). We consider the totality of the
circumstances, including the length of the interrogation, its location, its
continuity, the defendant’s maturity, education, physical condition, and mental
health. Williams, 997 N.E.3d 1154. We also consider evidence of inducement
by way of violence, threats, promises, or other improper influences. Henry, 738
N.E.2nd 663. We do not reweigh the evidence. Luckhart v. State, 736 N.E.2d
227 (Ind. 2000).
[18] In this case, two officers questioned Garmon for ninety minutes in an interview
room at the Blackford County Sheriff’s Office. Other officers observed from a
neighboring room, and the interrogation was recorded. The arresting officer
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had informed Garmon of his Miranda rights while taking him into custody, and
at the beginning of the interrogation the officer read him his rights again.
Garmon read and signed a form informing him of his rights, including an
acknowledgement that no pressure could be used against him. The officers
promptly brought Garmon water when he said he was thirsty.
[19] At the time of the interrogation, Garmon was in his mid-thirties and had
completed his GED. He does not argue that he was experiencing any physical
or mental medical challenges that would have rendered him unable to assert his
constitutional rights.
[20] The crux of the dispute is whether the police unfairly overcame Garmon’s will
by threatening to arrest Jordan. In 1971, the Indiana Supreme Court
determined a confession was involuntary where the police told a defendant that
his wife was also “a prime suspect” in a series of burglaries and that they would
arrest her if the defendant did not confess. Hall v. State, 255 Ind. 606, 610, 266
N.E.2d 16, 19 (Ind. 1971). Similarly, in Storey v. State, 830 N.E.2d 1011 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2005), a panel of this Court deemed Storey’s confession to be invalid
after the arresting officer repeatedly threatened to arrest Storey’s wife, who the
officer believed had been involved in the crime at issue. This Court has stated
that to prove that a confession was involuntary due to police threats against an
accused’s family, “the defendant must present evidence of direct threats made
by the police.” Cain v. State, 594 N.E.2d 835, 840 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), clarified
on reh’g, 599 N.E.2d 625 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
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[21] In the current case, neither of the officers who questioned Garmon threatened
to arrest Jordan. To the contrary, they simply asked Garmon if Jordan had
anything to do with the robberies, explaining that they found evidence in a
location to which she had access, specifically the house. One of the officers
further told Garmon that he wanted to believe Jordan was not involved.
Garmon repeatedly and strongly denied that Jordan knew about the robberies
or was involved in them. He asked the officers about Jordan’s current
whereabouts, and the officers reassured him that she was at home and was not
in custody.
[22] In addition, during the ninety-minute interrogation the officers and Garmon
discussed many topics, not just Jordan. They spent a great deal of time
discussing the details of the two robberies and several other crimes that Garmon
allegedly committed during the same period. They also discussed Garmon’s
concerns that his family would cut off contact with him due to his criminal acts.
[23] Considering the circumstances of the interrogation, including its relatively short
duration, the breadth of topics discussed, Garmon’s physical and mental
condition, the officers’ advisement of Garmon’s rights, and most importantly
the absence of a direct threat by police to arrest Jordan if Garmon did not
confess, we conclude Garmon’s incriminating statements were voluntary. The
trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the interrogation into
evidence at trial.
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2.
[24] For his second claim of error, Garmon argues the trial court erred in admitting
evidence of his prior crimes or other wrongs because that evidence unduly
prejudiced the jury against him.
[25] “Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s
character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in
accordance with the character.” Ind. Evidence Rule 404(b)(1). This rule
protects against the improper inference that if the defendant acted badly in the
past, the defendant’s present, charged actions merely conform with those past
bad acts. Erickson v. State, 72 N.E.3d 965 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (quotation
omitted), trans. denied.
[26] On the other hand, evidence that a person committed a past crime, wrong, or
other act “may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake,
or lack of accident.” Ind. Evidence Rule 404(b)(2). Even if such evidence is
admissible for the purposes set forth in Rule 404(b)(2), the evidence may still be
excluded if “its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger . . . of
undue prejudice.” Ind. Evid. Rule 403. The trial court has wide latitude in
weighing the probative value of the evidence against the possible prejudice.
Prairie v. State, 914 N.E.2d 294 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
[27] Here, Garmon claims the trial court should not have admitted testimony from
parole agent James Bennett or Chief Deputy James Heflin of the Blackford
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County Sheriff’s Office as to the following prior (or concurrent) crimes, wrongs
or acts: (1) Garmon had recently been released from prison and was on parole
under Bennett’s supervision; (2) officers from several different counties and the
State Police were investigating Garmon for robberies in different jurisdictions;
(3) Chief Deputy Heflin knew Garmon from a prior job as a correctional officer
in the Blackford County Jail; (4) marijuana was found in Garmon’s car on the
day of his arrest; and (5) Bennett recognized Garmon from a photograph
provided by the Blackford County Sheriff’s Department.
[28] The State argues this evidence was relevant and admissible to prove Garmon’s
identity as the robber of the liquor store and bank. We agree. During cross-
examination of the State’s first witness, Town Marshal Jonathon Snodgrass,
Garmon questioned whether the State had collected DNA or fingerprint
evidence from the crime scenes. He also questioned whether the money that
was found in Garmon’s house could be traced to the bank and whether the car
he was driving on the day of his arrest was the same car that was used in the
liquor store robbery. The identity of the robber was at issue.
[29] The State’s witnesses, in the course of describing how they identified Garmon,
were inevitably required to explain that multiple law enforcement agencies were
investigating concurrent crimes in multiple jurisdictions. It was also necessary
to discuss how Bennett knew Garmon and was authorized by law to order him
to attend a meeting, take him into custody, and search his car. We conclude
the evidence was relevant and probative to show identity. See Byers v. State, 709
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N.E.2d 1024 (Ind. 1999) (the circumstances of Byers’ prior arrest were relevant
to establish he was the person who committed the crimes at issue).
[30] Next, we agree with the trial court that the probative value of Garmon’s prior
acts was not substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice. The
evidence of the extensive police investigation was crucial to explain how
Garmon was identified. Further, the trial court limited the information the jury
heard about the other crimes and the reason Garmon had been in prison. In
addition, the court gave identical limiting instructions to the jury after Chief
Deputy Heflin and Bennett testified, explaining that those witnesses provided
evidence that Garmon may have been involved in “other crimes, wrongful
conduct, or bad acts other than those charged in the information.” Tr. Vol. I, p.
248, Tr. Vol. II, p. 29. The court told the jury that the evidence was relevant
only for the issues of “identity and/or motive” and should be considered only
for those purposes. Id. The trial court repeated the limiting instruction in its
final jury instructions. We presume that the jury follows the trial court’s
instructions. Harris v. State, 824 N.E.2d 432 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). The court
did not abuse its discretion in admitting those portions of Bennett and Chief
Deputy Heflin’s testimony.
[31] Even if the trial court had abused its discretion in admitting evidence of prior
wrongs or acts under Evidence Rule 404(b), we reverse only if the erroneous
admission of evidence affects a defendant’s substantial rights. Stettler v. State, 70
N.E.3d 874 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. The jury heard Garmon’s
detailed confession to the robberies and was provided with ample corroborating
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evidence, including that on the day of his arrest he was driving a car identical to
that used by the liquor store robber, that the car contained clothing that was
worn during one of the robberies, and that the police found a moderate sum of
money concealed in Garmon’s house. Any error in the admission of Garmon’s
prior wrongs or acts would have been harmless.
[32] For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
[33] Judgment affirmed.
May, J., and Crone, J., concur.
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