In the Matter of the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship, C.S., Minor Child, A.S., Mother v. Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Dec 31 2019, 8:22 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
T. Andrew Perkins Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Peterson Waggoner & Perkins, LLP Attorney General of Indiana
Rochester, Indiana Natalie F. Weiss
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Matter of the Termination December 31, 2019
of the Parent-Child Relationship, Court of Appeals Case No.
C.S., Minor Child, 19A-JT-1727
A.S., Mother, Appeal from the Fulton Circuit
Court
Appellant-Respondent,
The Honorable A. Christopher
v. Lee, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
Indiana Department of Child 25C01-1901-JT-1
Services,
Appellee-Petitioner.
Brown, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1727 | December 31, 2019 Page 1 of 18
[1] A.S. (“Mother”) appeals the involuntary termination of her parental rights to
her child, C.S. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] In August 2010, Mother and her eleven-month-old child, C.T., tested positive
for marijuana. C.T. was detained and, after a seven-month out-of-home child
in need of services (“CHINS”) period, C.T. and Mother were reunified. C.T.
was again detained in May 2013, when Mother tested positive for
methamphetamine. During the second ensuing out-of-home CHINS
investigation, Mother failed to comply with the services and visitation, and C.T.
was reunified with his father under a change of custody.
[3] In September 2015, Mother gave birth to S.K., who tested positive for THC and
buprenorphine at birth. Mother refused a drug test, and S.K. was detained.
After Mother tested positive for methamphetamine, an out-of-home CHINS
matter was opened. Mother failed to comply with services, and S.K. was
reunified with her father under a change of custody.
[4] In December 2016, Mother was arrested in Fulton County for possession of
methamphetamine and unlawful possession of a syringe as level 6 felonies.
[5] Mother gave birth to another child, C.S. (“the Child”), on December 14, 2017.
On December 15, 2017, the Fulton County Office of the Department of Child
Services (“DCS”) received allegations of suspicious activity and inadequate
prenatal care. That same day, family case manager Susann Field (“FCM Field”)
visited Mother’s hospital room in the obstetrics unit to investigate the allegations.
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FCM Field encountered F.W., who was believed to be the Child’s father, in the
room with Mother. In plain view in the room, FCM Field observed a plastic bag
that contained two small baggies of a green leafy substance that resembled
marijuana; four small baggies of a white powdery substance; and a bag of ten
hypodermic syringes. F.W. was arrested on drug charges.
[6] On or about December 15, 2017, Mother and F.W. tested positive for
methamphetamine; Mother also tested positive for amphetamine and
Oxycodone. The Child’s meconium screen revealed the presence of
methamphetamine, marijuana, and morphine. The Child was removed from
Mother’s care on an emergency basis on December 18, 2017. DCS placed the
Child into foster care, where the Child has remained throughout the pendency
of this action. That same day, DCS also filed a petition in which it alleged that
the Child was a CHINS. During the Child’s wardship, Mother was to
participate in supervised visits. DCS referred Mother to Lifeline Youth and
Family Services for supervised visitation, which was to occur in two-hour
increments five times each week. From December 18 to December 27, 2017,
Mother participated in only three of twelve scheduled visits and failed to follow
instructions at the visits she attended. Of Mother’s nine missed visits, she
cancelled one visit and no-showed at the other eight visits. Lifeline discharged
Mother for non-compliance.
[7] Mother also agreed to submit to random drug testing; however, with the
exception of December 19, 2017, when Mother telephoned DCS to inquire
about a drug screen, Mother did not willingly participate in drug screening
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during the pendency of this action. DCS also referred Mother to Eric Foster,
Incorporated, for a substance abuse assessment and a parenting assessment;
however, Mother failed to contact Eric Foster, Incorporated, and the referral
expired without her participation.
[8] After the Child was removed, Mother visited the Child three times and has not
visited the Child since December 27, 2017. In the meantime, the Child has
thrived in her foster placement.
[9] On January 28, 2018, Mother was arrested in Marshall County for dealing in
methamphetamine as a level 4 felony. Mother refused to submit to a drug
screen while she was in jail and indicated to the family case manager that she
had used methamphetamine, “so there was no reason for her to submit to one.”
Transcript Volume II at 42. On February 15, 2018, Mother entered an
admission that the Child was a CHINS; the trial court adjudicated the Child as
a CHINS on February 18, 2018. Subsequently, the court entered a dispositional
order, which required Mother to: (1) participate in supervised visitation; (2)
refrain from illegal drug use or possession, call DCS daily, and submit to
random drug testing upon request; (3) complete a substance abuse assessment;
(4) undergo a parenting assessment; (5) participate in individual therapy and
follow all recommendations; (6) participate in home-based case management
services and follow all recommendations; and (7) legally establish the Child’s
paternity.
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[10] On March 2, 2018, Mother was released from the Marshall County Jail to
community corrections. Mother did not contact DCS after she was released
and did not participate in any services during that time. On April 23, 2018,
Mother was arrested in Fulton County for possession of methamphetamine as a
level 6 felony. On September 17, 2018, Mother pled guilty to the Fulton
County offenses and was sentenced.
[11] Following a periodic case review, the court found that Mother failed to: (1)
comply with the case plan; (2) meet her parental obligations; (3) demonstrate
progress regarding court-ordered services; (4) maintain contact with DCS from
March 2 to April 23, 2018, when she was no longer incarcerated; and (5)
participate in services. On January 2, 2019, DCS filed a petition to terminate
Mother’s parental rights. On March 20, 2019, DCS filed a notice of intent to
admit drug screens at the evidentiary hearing on the petition to terminate
Mother’s parental rights.
[12] The court conducted an evidentiary hearing on DCS’s petition to terminate
Mother’s parental rights on May 24, 2019. At the time of the evidentiary
hearing, Mother was incarcerated regarding the Marshall County offense. In its
presentation of evidence, DCS introduced, and the court admitted, the results of
Mother’s failed drug test on December 15, 2017, following the Child’s birth.
Without objection from Mother, DCS introduced the drug test results under the
business records exception to the rule against hearsay.
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[13] On July 1, 2019, the court entered an order in which it terminated Mother’s
parental rights to the Child; it found that: (1) DCS proved, by clear and
convincing evidence, that the Child has been removed from the home and the
custody of the Mother for more than six (6) months pursuant to the terms of the
dispositional decree; (2) “[t]he conditions that resulted in the child’s removal and
continued placement outside the home will not be remedied by the Mother”; (3)
“continuation of the parent-child relationship between the Mother and Child
poses a threat to the child’s well-being”; (4) termination of parental rights is in the
best interests of the Child; and (5) a satisfactory plan, adoption, existed for the
care and treatment of the Child. Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 73.
Discussion
[14] In order to terminate a parent-child relationship, DCS is required to allege and
prove, among other things:
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions
that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for
placement outside the home of the parents will not be
remedied.
(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation
of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-
being of the child.
(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
adjudicated a child in need of services;
(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
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(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
the child.
Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). If the court finds that the allegations in a petition
described in Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4 are true, the court shall terminate the parent-
child relationship. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a). A finding in a proceeding to
terminate parental rights must be based upon clear and convincing evidence.
Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2. We do not reweigh the evidence or determine the
credibility of witnesses, but consider only the evidence that supports the
judgment and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. In re
E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014). We confine our review to two steps:
whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings, and then
whether the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment. Id.
Reviewing whether the evidence “clearly and convincingly” supports the
findings, or the findings “clearly and convincingly” support the judgment, is not
a license to reweigh the evidence. Id. Our review must give due regard to the
trial court’s opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses firsthand and
not set aside its findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous. Id. “Because a
case that seems close on a ‘dry record’ may have been much more clear-cut in
person, we must be careful not to substitute our judgment for the trial court
when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence.” Id. at 640. The involuntary
termination statute is written in the disjunctive and requires proof of only one of
the circumstances listed in Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B).
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[15] To the extent Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it
admitted the results of Mother’s failed drug screen on December 15, 2017 as a
business record she admits that she did not object to the admission of the drug
screen results. Thus, this issue is waived. See Cavens v. Zaberdac, 849 N.E.2d 526,
533 (Ind. 2006) (“In order to properly preserve an issue on appeal, a party must,
at a minimum, ‘show that it gave the trial court a bona fide opportunity to pass
upon the merits of the claim before seeking an opinion on appeal.’”) (quoting
Endres v. Ind. State Police, 809 N.E.2d 320, 322 (Ind. 2004)).
[16] Mother argues that, in concluding that the conditions that led to the Child’s
removal would not be remedied, the court improperly relied on the fact that “no
one knew exactly when [Mother] would be released from the Marshall County
Jail . . . and available for services” and improperly “shift[ed] the burden of
proof” to Mother. Appellant’s Brief at 13.
[17] In determining whether the conditions that resulted in a child’s removal will not
be remedied, we engage in a two-step analysis. See E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642-643.
First, we identify the conditions that led to removal, and second, we determine
whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be
remedied. Id. at 643. In the second step, the trial court must judge a parent’s
fitness as of the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration
evidence of changed conditions, balancing a parent’s recent improvements
against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial
probability of future neglect or deprivation. Id. We entrust that delicate
balance to the trial court, which has discretion to weigh a parent’s prior history
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more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination. Id. Requiring
trial courts to give due regard to changed conditions does not preclude them
from finding that a parent’s past behavior is the best predictor of future
behavior. Id. The statute does not simply focus on the initial basis for a child’s
removal for purposes of determining whether a parent’s rights should be
terminated, but also those bases resulting in the continued placement outside
the home. In re N.Q., 996 N.E.2d 385, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). A court may
consider evidence of a parent’s history of neglect, failure to provide support,
lack of adequate housing and employment, and the services offered by DCS and
the parent’s response to those services. Id. Where there are only temporary
improvements and the pattern of conduct shows no overall progress, the court
might reasonably find that under the circumstances the problematic situation
will not improve. Id.
[18] To the extent Mother does not challenge certain findings of fact, the
unchallenged facts stand as proven. See In re B.R., 875 N.E.2d 369, 373 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2007) (failure to challenge findings by the trial court resulted in waiver
of the argument that the findings were clearly erroneous), trans. denied.
[19] In its order terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Child, the court made
the following findings:
(B) The Court recognizes Mother has been incarcerated for most
of this case and therefore has been unable to participate in court
ordered services. Case law is clear that incarceration alone cannot
serve as a basis for termination of parental rights. K.E. v. Indiana
Dep’t of Child Servs., 39 N.E.3d 641, 643 (Ind. 2015). At the same
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time, this Court cannot ignore Mother’s habitual pattern of
substance abuse and exposing her children to illegal substances.
Mother has two other children which were adjudicated CHINS.
Both cases were initiated based on Mother’s substance use. In
both cases, the child involved also tested positive for illegal
substances. In both prior CHINS cases the children were placed
with their respective fathers because Mother was unable to comply
sufficiently to support reunification.
(C) This child was also drug exposed – like [M]other’s other two
children. [M]other was given an opportunity to engage in services
just after detention in December 2017 until her arrest in January,
2018 but failed to substantially comply with services or even
visitation with her newborn child. Mother was released on
community corrections from March 2, 2018 until her arrest for
Possession of Methamphetamine on April 23, 2018. During this
time [M]other did not even attempt to contact DCS to engage in
services or see her child.
(D) The Mother is currently incarcerated and it is unknown when
she will be released and available to attempt services. Any chance
of reunification is distant and unlikely given the Mother’s criminal
difficulties coupled with her long-standing history of substance
abuse.
Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 115-116.
[20] Mother mischaracterizes the court’s reliance on her incarceration in finding that
a reasonable probability existed that the conditions that led to the Child’s
removal would not be remedied. Mother correctly states, and the court
properly found, that incarceration alone cannot serve as a basis for termination
of parental rights. It is well-settled, however, that a trial court may evaluate the
parent’s habitual patterns of conduct to assess the likelihood that the child could
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experience future neglect or deprivation; and give considerable weight to the
parent’s history of incarceration and the effects upon the child. See A.D.S. v.
Ind. Dep’t of Child Services, 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (holding
that the parent’s habitual patterns of conduct should be evaluated to determine
the probability of future neglect or deprivation of the child, that DCS is not
required to prove a parent has no possibility of changing; and that DCS need
only establish a reasonable probability that no change will occur), trans. denied.
Here, we find that the trial court evaluated Mother’s habitual patterns of
conduct and history of incarceration and noted the frequency, duration, and
extent of her incarcerations and the impact on the Child and ultimately
concluded that any chance of reunification is distant and unlikely.
[21] The record reveals that Mother faced pending drug charges at the outset of this
action and that, since the Child’s removal, she was arrested and incarcerated for
multiple drug crimes and pled guilty to dealing in methamphetamine and
possession of methamphetamine. At the time of the evidentiary hearing in this
case, Mother was incarcerated and had an unknown release date. The record
further reveals that Mother used methamphetamine until she discovered she was
pregnant with the Child, which was four-and-one-half months into the
pregnancy; the Child’s meconium tested positive for methamphetamine,
marijuana, and morphine; Mother failed to participate in court-ordered substance
abuse assessments and random drug screens when she was not incarcerated;
Mother refused a drug test in jail and indicated to the family case manager that
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she had used methamphetamine; and Mother’s two children, born prior to the
Child, were born drug-exposed and ultimately removed from her care.
[22] Although we observe Mother’s efforts following her April 23, 2018 arrest to
seek out substance abuse counseling, 1 we note that the trial court is given
discretion in balancing her efforts at improvement prior to termination against
the habitual patterns of her conduct and in determining that the evidence of
Mother’s prior history is the best predictor of her future behavior. See K.T.K. v.
Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., Dearborn Cty. Office, 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1234 (Ind. 2013)
(“Further, the trial court was within its discretion to ‘disregard the efforts
Mother made only shortly before termination and to weigh more heavily
Mother’s history of conduct prior to those efforts.’”). In light of the
unchallenged findings and evidence laid out above and in the record, we cannot
say that the trial court clearly erred in finding that a reasonable probability
exists that the conditions resulting in the Child’s removal or the reasons for
placement outside Mother’s care will not be remedied.
[23] We find no error and affirm the termination of Mother’s parental rights.
[24] Affirmed.
Altice, J., concurs.
1
Mother points to her testimony that she asked for individual substance abuse counseling in Marshall
County Jail and that she “obtained to the NA class weekly” and went to the Celebrate Recovery class
weekly. Transcript Volume II at 104.
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Tavitas, J., concurs with separate opinion.
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IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Matter of the Involuntary December 31, 2019
Termination of the Parent-Child Court of Appeals Case No.
Relationship of: C.S. (Minor 19A-JT-1727
Child), Appeal from the Fulton Circuit
and Court
The Honorable Christopher Lee,
A.S. (Mother), Judge
Appellant-Respondent, Trial Court Cause No.
25C01-1901-JT-1
v.
The Indiana Department of
Child Services,
Appellee-Petitioner.
Tavitas, Judge, concurring.
[25] I concur with the majority. Respectfully, I write separately regarding the merits
of Mother’s challenge to the admissibility of her drug screen results pursuant to
Indiana Evidence Rule 803, the business records exception to hearsay.
Although this issue is waived for Mother’s failure to properly preserve the issue
for appeal, I write to highlight the current split on this Court regarding whether
admission of drug test results, as occurred here, falls within the business records
exception to the rule against hearsay. See Matter of L.S., 125 N.E.3d 628, 634
(Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (“ . . . [The drug test results] were inadmissible as hearsay
and should not have been admitted . . . .”); see In re K.R., 133 N.E.3d 754, 762
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1727 | December 31, 2019 Page 14 of 18
(Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (“[W]e conclude that drug test results do indeed fit into the
business records exception to the hearsay rule.”).
[26] During DCS’s investigation, Mother submitted to an oral fluid screen. At the
fact-finding hearing on DCS’s petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights,
Mother’s drug test results were admitted as a certified business record. DCS
tendered an affidavit from Forensic Fluids Laboratories, Inc.’s (“FFL”)
laboratory director detailing FFL’s drug testing procedure; introduced the
report of the drug test; and submitted FFL’s certification of business records.
Additionally, DCS presented witness testimony that described the manner in
which DCS obtained and secured Mother’s fluid sample; detailed the process
that DCS typically employs for obtaining all drug screen samples; and attested
that DCS’s typical process was used to obtain Mother’s drug screen sample.
[27] Mother maintains that the drug screen results constituted inadmissible hearsay;
I disagree. In K.R., a panel of this Court considered whether a trial court
abused its discretion when it admitted the appellant-parents’ drug test results, as
reported by Forensic Fluids Laboratories, Inc. (“FFL”), pursuant to the
business records exception to the rule against hearsay. The panel considered
the following in analyzing the issue:
Evid. R. 803(6) provides that such records are admissible if:
(A) the record was made at or near the time by – or from
information transmitted by – someone with knowledge;
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(B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly
conducted activity of a business, organization, occupation,
or calling, whether or not for profit;
(C) making the record was a regular practice of that
activity;
(D) all these conditions are shown by the testimony of the
custodian or another qualified witness, or by a certification
that complies with Rule 902(11) or (12) [the rule on self-
authentication] or with a statute permitting certification;
and
(E) neither the source of the information nor the method
or circumstances of preparation indicated a lack of
trustworthiness.
This hearsay exception is grounded on the theory that records of
regularly conducted activity are reliable because they can be
checked systematically.
The Indiana Supreme Court has explained as follows regarding
this rule:
The business records exception to the hearsay rule is based
on the fact that the circumstances of preparation assure the
accuracy and reliability of the entries. As we have
observed more recently, the reliability of business records
stems in part from the fact that the organization depends
on them to operate, from the sense that they are subject to
review, audit, or internal checks, [and] from the precision
engendered by the repetition[.]
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In essence, the basis for the business records exception is
that reliability is assured because the maker of the record
relies on the record in the ordinary course of business
activities. The ‘regular course’ of business ‘must find its
meaning in the inherent nature of the business in question
and in the methods systematically employed for the
conduct of the business as a business.’ Thus where a
company does not rely upon certain records for the
performance of its function those records are not business
records within the meaning of the exception to the hearsay
rule[.] It is not enough to qualify under the business
records exception to show that the records are made
regularly, rather, the court must also look to ‘the character
of the records and their earmarks of reliability acquired
from their source and origin and the nature of the
compilation.’
K.R., 133 N.E.3d at 760-61 (citations omitted). In rejecting the parents’
argument that the drug test results did not fit within the business records
exception to the hearsay rule, the K.R. panel distinguished the circumstances
surrounding the admission of the parents’ drug test results from the
circumstances surrounding the admission of a social services agency’s reports in
Termination of Parent-Child Relationship of E.T., 808 N.E.2d 639, 642-43 (Ind.
2004).
[28] In E.T., our Supreme Court found that reports generated by nonprofit SCAN,
Inc., a social services agency, did not qualify as business records within the
meaning of the business records exception. The reports, which described the
agency’s impressions following home visits and supervised visits, “included
third-party statements concerning events not observed by [SCAN’s] staff
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members” and “conclusory lay opinions”; “appeared to have been compiled for
the sole benefit of DCS,” which was also SCAN’s sole source of referrals; and
did not appear to “ha[ve] been prepared for the systematic conduct of [SCAN].”
K.R., 133 N.E.3d at 761 (citing E.T., 808 N.E.2d at 642-43).
[29] The K.R. panel contrasted the SCAN reports in E.T., which lacked certain
inherent indicia of reliability, with FFL’s protocols as follows:
Specifically, [FFL] functions independently from any law
enforcement body or state agency. Rather, its services are
presumably available to any person, public or private, corporate
or individual, who wishes to pay the lab fees. In addition, the
chemical analyses performed at [FFL] appear to be routine
procedures, done for whomever requests them. These facts
distinguish the SCAN reports [i]n E.T. from the drug test results
in [K.R.] . . . . Accordingly, we conclude that drug test results do
indeed fit into the business records exception to the hearsay rule.
Id. at 762.
[30] I agree fully with the K.R. panel’s reasoning. Waiver notwithstanding, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted Mother’s drug test results,
pursuant to the business records exception to hearsay, because the drug test
results meet the requirements of Indiana Evidence Rule 803.
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