Maeson Lee Coffin v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Aug 20 2018, 10:42 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Alexander L. Hoover Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Law Office of Christopher G. Walter, Attorney General
P.C.
Nappanee, Indiana Chandra K. Hein
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Maeson Lee Coffin, August 20, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-506
v. Appeal from the Marshall Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Robert O. Bowen,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
50D01-1611-MR-1
Crone, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Maeson Lee Coffin pled guilty via open plea agreement to level 4 felony
burglary, level 6 felony auto theft, and level 6 felony theft. The trial court
sentenced him to a fifteen-year aggregate term. Coffin now appeals his
sentence, claiming that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing
consecutive sentences. He also asserts that his sentence is inappropriate in light
of the nature of his offenses and his character. Finding that Coffin has failed to
establish an abuse of discretion and has failed to meet his burden of
demonstrating that his sentence is inappropriate, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] In 2016, Coffin was renting a small residence from seventy-nine-year-old
Richard “Paul” Costello. The residence was situated on a large parcel of land,
where Costello maintained his own residence and some outbuildings. In
October 2016, Coffin allowed Gauvin Monaghan to reside with him at his
rental house. One evening in late October, Monaghan drove Coffin to
Costello’s residence, where Costello’s brutally beaten and lifeless body lay on
the ground. Monaghan and Coffin stole Costello’s cell phone and other items
from his person. Monaghan stated that they needed to move Costello’s body,
so they chained and dragged the body to a remote outbuilding on the property,
put a plastic barrel over part of the body, and attempted to cover the remainder
with sheet metal. The two entered Costello’s home and garage and stole several
items, including power tools and a large TV. They put the contraband in
Costello’s vehicle and drove to South Bend, where Monaghan’s father lived.
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They pawned the items they had stolen and drove Costello’s vehicle to New
York, where Monaghan’s mother lived.
[3] Costello’s relatives became concerned because they had not heard from him for
a couple weeks. On November 5, 2016, his brother and sister-in-law went to his
property, searched the buildings, and discovered Costello’s decayed and
concealed body outside one of the outbuildings. They notified the county
sheriff’s department concerning the suspicious circumstances surrounding their
discovery. The state police were brought in to assist with processing the crime
scene, and the death was ruled a homicide due to blunt force trauma to the
head. Among the missing items were Costello’s vehicle and cell phone.
Through provider records, the cell phone was traced to a location in New York.
[4] Late that night, after seeing a news report regarding Costello’s death,
Monaghan’s girlfriend M.P. and her mother went to the police station to
provide information concerning Monaghan’s whereabouts and possession of
the stolen vehicle. M.P. reported that she had been present during an incident
at Coffin’s rental house on October 27, 2016, where Costello had come to
collect unpaid rent from Coffin and Monaghan, an argument had ensued, and
Monaghan had commented that he should kill Costello and steal his vehicle.
M.P.’s mother told police that she had contacted Monaghan’s mother, who
confirmed that Monaghan and Coffin were currently at her New York
residence and verified the color, make, and model of the vehicle they had
driven there (an exact match with Costello’s vehicle).
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[5] On November 10, 2016, the State charged Coffin with murder and level 6
felony auto theft. On December 16, 2016, the State amended the information
charging Coffin with conspiracy to commit murder, murder, level 4 felony
burglary, level 6 felony auto theft, and level 6 felony theft. Coffin pled not
guilty, and a jury trial was scheduled. On December 21, 2017, Coffin entered
into an open plea agreement in which he pled guilty to burglary, auto theft, and
theft, and the State dismissed the murder and conspiracy counts.
[6] During sentencing, the trial court heard victim impact testimony from several of
Costello’s relatives as well as character testimony from Coffin’s relatives. The
court identified as aggravating factors Coffin’s juvenile record, which includes
true findings for theft and burglary, his violation of a relationship of trust with
the victim, his conduct in fleeing the jurisdiction after he committed his
offenses, and his assistance in covering up a murder crime scene. Appellant’s
App. Vol. 2 at 142. The court identified Coffin’s guilty plea as the sole
mitigating factor and sentenced Coffin to consecutive terms of twelve years for
burglary, one and a half years for auto theft, and one and a half years for theft.
Coffin appeals his sentence. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
Discussion and Decision
Section 1 – The trial court acted within its discretion in
imposing consecutive sentences.
[7] Coffin asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing consecutive
sentences because it “never made any specific finding that the aggravators
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outweighed the mitigators.” Appellant’s Br. at 13. The trial court’s written
sentencing order does make such a finding. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 143.
Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion.1
Section 2 – Coffin has failed to meet his burden of
demonstrating that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the
nature of his offenses and his character.
[8] Coffin asks that we review and revise his sentence pursuant to Indiana
Appellate Rule 7(B), which states that we “may revise a sentence authorized by
statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, [this] Court finds
that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the
character of the offender.” When a defendant requests appellate review and
revision of his sentence, we have the power to affirm or reduce the sentence.
Akard v. State, 937 N.E.2d 811, 813 (Ind. 2010). In conducting our review, our
principal role is to leaven the outliers, focusing on the length of the aggregate
sentence and how it is to be served. Bess v. State, 58 N.E.3d 174, 175 (Ind.
2016); Foutch v. State, 53 N.E.3d 577, 580 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). This allows for
consideration of all aspects of the penal consequences imposed by the trial court
in sentencing, i.e., whether it consists of executed time, probation, suspension,
home detention, or placement in community corrections, and whether the
sentences run concurrently or consecutively. Davidson v. State, 926 N.E.2d
1In arguing that the trial court was required to make such a finding, Coffin’s reliance on authority predating
our supreme court’s opinion in Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d
218, is questionable at best.
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1023, 1025 (Ind. 2010). We do “not look to see whether the defendant’s
sentence is appropriate or if another sentence might be more appropriate; rather,
the test is whether the sentence is ‘inappropriate.’” Foutch, 53 N.E.3d at 581
(quoting Barker v. State, 994 N.E.2d 306, 315 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied
(2014)). The defendant bears the burden of persuading this Court that his
sentence meets the inappropriateness standard. Bowman v. State, 51 N.E.3d
1174, 1181 (Ind. 2016).
[9] In considering the nature of Coffin’s offenses, “the advisory sentence is the
starting point the Legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence.” Green v.
State, 65 N.E.3d 620, 637-38 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied (2017). When
determining the appropriateness of a sentence that deviates from an advisory
sentence, we consider whether there is anything more or less egregious about
the offense as committed by the defendant that “makes it different from the
typical offense accounted for by the legislature when it set the advisory
sentence.” Holloway v. State, 950 N.E.2d 803, 807 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
[10] Coffin pled guilty to one level 4 felony and two level 6 felonies. A level 4 felony
carries a sentencing range of two to twelve years with an advisory term of six
years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5.5. The statutory range for a level 6 felony is six
months to two and one-half years, with an advisory term of one year. Ind.
Code § 35-50-2-7(b). Coffin’s aggregate fifteen-year term comprises twelve
years for the level 4 felony, with consecutive one and a half-year terms on each
of the two level 6 felonies.
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[11] The circumstances surrounding Coffin’s offenses are far more egregious than
those typically involved when a person commits burglary, auto theft, and theft,
offenses often involving no physical harm to or contact with a victim. Here,
Coffin assisted Monaghan in chaining and dragging Costello’s newly murdered
body to a remote location on Costello’s property and hiding it in a barrel and
under some sheet metal to avoid detection. The two young men then broke and
entered Costello’s residence to procure items for their getaway. They took
several items from the house, stole Costello’s vehicle, and fled for New York,
pawning whatever they could in exchange for money to facilitate their flight.
Coffin did not merely steal an automobile and personal property from a
person’s residence; rather, he aided in covering up a brutal murder and then
facilitated the perpetrator’s escape. The nature of Coffin’s offenses does not
merit a reduction in his fifteen-year sentence.
[12] Likewise, Coffin’s character does not militate toward a shorter sentence. We
conduct our review of his character by engaging in a broad consideration of his
qualities. Aslinger v. State, 2 N.E.3d 84, 95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), clarified on other
grounds on reh’g, 11 N.E.3d 571. Coffin began illegally consuming alcohol and
marijuana at age fifteen. That same year, he had a juvenile delinquency true
finding for acts amounting to class D felony theft if committed by an adult. His
probation was revoked when, at age sixteen, he committed acts resulting in six
true findings – two for acts amounting to class C felony burglary, two for acts
amounting to class D felony theft, and two for acts amounting to class A
misdemeanor criminal mischief if committed by an adult. He has no prior
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record as an adult, as he was only eighteen at the time he committed his current
offenses.
[13] With respect to Coffin’s relationship with the victim, we note that Costello was
Coffin’s landlord and friend who encouraged him and demonstrated patience
with him concerning rent payments. During sentencing, Coffin acknowledged
Costello’s positive influence on him, stating, “Paul wanted me to better myself
by following my dreams.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 19. In contrast, he described
Monaghan as someone he did not know well and had known only for a few
weeks. Yet, he showed callous disregard for his friend and mentor to help a
purportedly casual acquaintance cover up a heinous crime and then fled the
state with the acquaintance while his friend’s body lay decaying and
undetected. He attributed his actions to fear of Monaghan but admitted that at
the time of the offenses and in the days before his arrest, “I had plenty of
opportunities to flee and call the police, but I didn’t.” Id. at 19.
[14] Coffin asks that we consider his remorse as indicative of his upstanding
character. Trial courts are uniquely situated to observe a defendant and can
best determine whether his remorse is genuine. Phelps v. State, 969 N.E.2d
1009, 1020 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. During sentencing Coffin
testified, in reflecting on his actions, “I mentally beat myself up every
morning.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 19. Testimonials from his relatives and friends urged
forgiveness and a second chance. Several of Costello’s relatives submitted
victim impact letters and testimony during sentencing, many questioning the
authenticity of Coffin’s remorse and each requesting that Coffin be given the
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maximum sentence. For example, Costello’s youngest brother testified
concerning Coffin’s “callous and uncaring” conduct in choosing not to alert
authorities so that Costello’s body could be found. Id. at 12. Instead, Coffin
“ransack[ed] and pillag[ed]” Costello’s property, left his body to “rot,” drove to
New York, and “partied for days until [he was] caught.” Id. at 12-13.
[15] Coffin also asserts that his decision to plead guilty reflects his willingness to
take responsibility for his actions. The trial court designated his guilty plea as
the sole mitigating factor in making its sentencing decision. However, we note
that Coffin initially pled not guilty, sought and was granted a continuance, and
had his case set for jury trial. Over one year elapsed between the time Coffin
was charged and the date he decided to plead guilty. Even then, he received a
substantial benefit in the form of the dismissal of the murder and conspiracy
charges. The notion that sparing Costello’s family the trauma of a trial
demonstrates Coffin’s good character rings hollow in the face of Coffin’s abject
disregard for Costello’s frantic family members after he actively concealed and
left Costello’s body to decompose for over a week after the murder.
[16] In sum, Coffin has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that his sentence
is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character.
Accordingly, we affirm.
[17] Affirmed.
Najam, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
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