Meghan E. Price v. State of Indiana

FILED
Feb 22 2019, 9:13 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Glen E. Koch, II Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Boren Oliver & Coffey, LLP Attorney General of Indiana
Martinsville, Indiana Justin F. Roebel
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Meghan E. Price, February 22, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-1513
v. Appeal from the Morgan Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Matthew G.
Appellee-Plaintiff. Hanson, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
55C01-1706-F1-1253
Riley, Judge.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1] Appellant-Defendant, Meghan Price (Price), appeals her conviction for neglect
of a dependent resulting in death, a Level 1 felony, Ind. Code § 35-46-1-4(b)(3).
[2] We affirm.
ISSUE
[3] Price presents one issue on appeal, which we restate as: Whether the trial court
abused its discretion by admitting certain evidence.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[4] Price’s son, B.P., was on born in June 2011. As an infant, B.P. exhibited
difficulties in gaining weight and had developmental delays. Subsequent
genetic testing revealed that B.P.’s developmental delays were attributed to a
condition called Fragile X chromosome. Fragile X is an indicator of autism,
and it is associated with lack of impulse control, disruptive behavior, and
aggressiveness. Significant developmental delays followed with B.P.’s speech
being limited to single words until age four, followed by a limited vocabulary of
approximately 25 words. B.P. also had a history of self-injurious behavior.
[5] On July 14, 2014, an officer from the Morgan County Sheriff’s Department was
dispatched to Price’s residence after receiving a report of a domestic dispute.
Price informed the officer that B.P. had incurred some bruising while in the care
of her boyfriend, Steven Ingalls (Ingalls). Ingalls was not present when the
officer arrived. During the visit, the officer noted that B.P. had a scratch above
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his ear, a bruise to the right side of his forehead, and a purple bruise on his
cheek. Price indicated that the domestic dispute resulted following a verbal
altercation with Ingalls regarding B.P.’s injuries. After taking pictures of B.P.’s
injuries, the officer left but reported the incident to the Department of Child
Services (DCS). Price thereafter notified her family members and friends that
Ingalls had moved out and she did not intend on dating him again. A few
months later, Price and Ingalls resumed their relationship.
[6] On November 18, 2015, Price called St. Vincent Hospital pediatric emergency
department claiming that B.P. had ingested an unknown substance at a grocery
store, had dilated eyes, and a low heart rate. Price stated that she was on her
way to the hospital. Ingalls went with Price. While treating B.P., the attending
nurse instructed Price to change B.P. into a gown. As the nurse was inquiring
about B.P.’s medical history, she noticed that B.P. had “quite a bit of scratches
on his face and neck and bruising all over his body.” (Tr. Vol. VIII, p. 57).
Based on B.P.’s injuries, the attending nurse contacted a social worker, who in
turn interviewed Ingalls and Price. During the interview, Ingalls was
“dismissive,” and at “one point, he stormed out of the room” but later returned
to finish the child abuse assessment. (Tr. Vol. VIII, p. 43).
[7] On December 1, 2015, B.P. began preschool at Waverly Elementary School.
On B.P.’s third day of school, Price informed the teacher that B.P. had injured
his penis with his zipper. While changing B.P.’s diaper that day, the teacher
observed the head of B.P.’s penis “was extremely bruised.” (Tr. Vol. VI, p. 50).
As the school year progressed, B.P. missed school with unexcused absences on
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twenty-five days. B.P. would return from those absences with new injuries, and
Price would offer an explanation. The school nurse documented B.P.’s injuries
as follows: multiple bruises on December 15, 2015; a large knot on his head on
February 1, 2016; various bruises on his head including a “large green bruise on
left forehead with a large knot” and eyelid bruising on February 11, 2016;
bruises “all over [the] sides [of his] head” and other bruises all over his body “in
various stages of healing” on March 3, 2016. (State’s Ex. Vol. II, p.160). In
February 2016 and March 2016, the school contacted DCS about the injuries.
[8] In the fall semester of 2016, B.P. had a total of nineteen absences. The school
nurse continued to document B.P.’s injuries: Pinch marks all over his penis;
pinch like “bruise on his left ear,” and “busted lip.” (State’s Ex. Vol. II, p.160).
In September 2016, B.P. was treated for a broken arm and for a face laceration.
The school bus driver also saw Price threaten “to pop [B.P.] right in the mouth”
for using foul language. (Tr. Vol. VI, p. 79). In October 2016, B.P. was
withdrawn from the school. Price conveyed to a friend that she was
homeschooling B.P. since she was “over the crap” of B.P.’s school reporting her
to DCS regarding B.P.’s injuries. (Tr. Vol. V, p. 187).
[9] On November 8, 2016, B.P. was seen at St. Vincent Hospital for a lip laceration
and underwent surgery two days later. On November 15, 2016, Price took B.P
to St. Vincent Hospital yet again since he was having trouble breathing. The
treating physician did not observe breathing difficulties in B.P., but he noticed
that B.P. had bruising underneath both eyes. During a follow up appointment
on November 22, 2016, B.P. was diagnosed with asthma and a sinus infection.
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[10] On November 23, 2016, at approximately 10:00 a.m., an unidentified male
voice called 911 and reported that there was an unconscious, unresponsive child
that was not breathing at Price’s apartment. Moments later, emergency trained
technicians (EMTs), firefighters, and police arrived at Price’s apartment
building. Ingalls was observed “walking around” like a “complete bystander”
with “no emotion” holding his infant son and B.P.’s younger brother. (Tr. Vol.
IV, pp. 134-35). EMTs then heard someone yell for help inside the building.
The EMTs found B.P. who was unconscious at the bottom of the common
stairway. When the EMTs asked Price what had happened, Price said that B.P.
went to bed at 8:30 p.m. the night before, and that shortly before 911 was
called, she checked on him and found him unresponsive.
[11] The EMTs attempted CPR but were unable to open B.P.’s jaw. After efforts to
set up an airway failed, they placed an oxygen mask over B.P.’s mouth and
nose. One of the EMTs then picked up B.P. and carried him to the ambulance.
Inside the ambulance, the EMTs inserted an IV and gave B.P. one dose of
“epinephrine,” and they arrived at the hospital shortly thereafter. (Tr. Vol. IV,
p. 138).
[12] Detective Chad Richhart (Detective Richhart) of the Mooresville Police
Department arrived as the ambulance was leaving with B.P. Because Price and
Ingalls could not ride with B.P. in the ambulance, Detective Richhart and
another officer transported them to the hospital. Price was barefoot, and she
went back to the apartment to retrieve her shoes before going to the hospital.
Price’s neighbor, Tiffany Hall, Ingalls, and Detective Richhart followed Price to
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the apartment. Detective Richhart stood by the apartment’s doorway. While
waiting for Price to get ready, Detective Richhart “saw [Price] once or twice
come up and down the hallway [and] into the living room” and ask Ingalls
“where is the camera card, where is the camera card?” (Tr. Vol. VII, p. 133).
Detective Richhart rode with Ingalls, while Price rode with the other officer to
the hospital.
[13] At the hospital, Price and Ingalls made inconsistent statements regarding B.P.’s
mouth injury and when B.P. was last seen in his normal state. For example,
Price informed a family friend at the hospital that “when the EMTs tried to
intubate [B.P] . . . they ripped his lip open.” (Tr. Vol. V, p. 236). Price later
informed that same friend that she had found B.P. “unresponsive, hanging over
the side of his bed,” and that she carried him to the living room and then “used
a flathead screwdriver to pry his mouth open so she could” administer CPR on
him. (Tr. Vol. VI, pp. 9-10).
[14] As soon as Detective Richhart dropped Ingalls off at the hospital, he went back
to the apartment. After briefly talking to another officer at the scene, Detective
Richhart determined that Price’s apartment was not secure. Also, Detective
Richhart hoped that the walkthrough could be helpful to detect any apparent
dangerous substances that B.P. might have ingested, and he intended to convey
that information to the doctors who were treating B.P. During his
walkthrough, Detective Richhart saw some blood on the bedding in B.P.’s
bedroom, and on the bedroom floor carpet. Shortly thereafter, Detective
Richhart and the other officer exited Price’s apartment. At approximately
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10:38 a.m., Detective Richhart received a call from the hospital that B.P. had
died.
[15] Detective Richhart instructed another officer to seek a search warrant for the
apartment. After the warrant was issued, the officers began processing Price’s
apartment for evidence. In B.P.’s bedroom, the officers found a blood spot on
the carpet, and inside the closet. They recovered a “green pillow that also had
some blood and a greenish fluid” which seemed like vomit. (Tr. Vol. IV, p.
187). The officers also found a flathead screwdriver on a table that had blood.
The officers also documented the medications in the apartment and counted the
pills.
[16] At around 11:00 a.m., Ingalls and Price returned to the apartment, and Price
was furious that the officers were conducting a search of her apartment and
could not let her inside. While searching B.P.’s bedroom, the officers located a
camera by B.P.’s bed. Detective Richhart went outside and asked Price how
the camera worked, and Price said that it “sort of” ran “like a monitor” and
that it recorded video footage and sent it to “an app” on Price’s cellphone. (Tr.
Vol. VII, p. 140). Detective Richhart asked Price if he could have her phone,
and Price indicated that it was in the house. Detective Richhart eventually
found Price’s cellphone in Price’s bedroom, but it had no power. Detective
Richhart took the phone to Price, who was sitting outside the apartment in a
vehicle, to seek help.
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[17] After the phone had powered, Price informed Detective Richhart that she
needed to check several things on her phone. Detective Richhart informed
Price that he “didn’t want her accessing the phone at that time.” (Tr. Vol. VII,
p. 142). After about “twenty or thirty seconds” of Price “actively . . . hitting the
screen,” Detective Richhart reached into the car and grabbed the cellphone
from Price. (Tr. Vol. VII, p. 142). Detective Richhart then ordered another
officer to obtain a warrant to search Price’s cellphone.
[18] B.P.’s autopsy revealed that he was a “very frail” five-year-old weighing about
thirty-five pounds. (Tr. Vol. V, p. 133). B.P.’s cause of death was determined
to be asphyxiation and the effects of elevated levels of several medications.
The toxicology report revealed that B.P. had “very elevated levels” of two
medications—Sertraline and Clonidine. Sertraline is an antidepressant which,
in high doses, can cause “depression of the respiratory system.” (Tr. Vol. V, p.
103). Clonidine is a blood pressure medication which treats anxiety and it can
cause the lowering of “blood pressure.” (Tr. Vol. V, p. 103). Also, the
toxicology report showed that Risperidone, a prescribed drug that treats
schizophrenia, was found in B.P.’s body. When the three drugs are used
together, they can cause drowsiness, sleepiness, and low blood pressure.
[19] By another search warrant, Price’s phone was searched. There were several
texts messages between Price and Ingalls. On November 12, 2016, two weeks
before B.P. died, Price and Ingalls exchanged a long series of text messages that
discussed B.P. Ingalls wrote to Price stating
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I hate your son, he is nothing but a troublemaking worthless
excuse for a retard[] down to his DNA core malnutritioned ugly
should[’]ve been cum stain that needs to rot in a mental
institution playing with his own feces and pissing on himself
while the nursing staff beats him until he’s deaf dumb and
motionless. I want to buy a ticket to the moment he takes his last
breath, so I can be the last thing he sees as I rip his jawbone off of
his face and personally cut his brainstem in half just to make sure
not one more stupid fucking thought processes in his two-celled
fucking brain. He’ll never have a dad bc no one in their right
fucking mind will ever stay around more than 5 minutes around
that fucked up kid that [can’t] go 2 days without bashing his own
face into [] whatever he can so mommy will love on him. Lol,
kill him while he’s young and do something with your life before
he robs you of any chance of ever being happy or being anything
other than a stay at home [retard] caretaker.
(State’s Exh.140). In response, Price wrote
He’s not ruining my life, [I’ll] run for the fucking hills before [I]
stay stressed my entire life or kill him in such a violent way that
the news can’t even describe the scene without throwing up. I’m
not going to prison over that little scrawny hand-flapper.
(State’s Exh.145). Two days after Price sent the above text to Ingalls, she
conducted an internet search on her phone for information about Risperidone
overdose. DNA testing also revealed that the blood spots found on the green
pillow and carpet belonged to B.P. B.P.’s DNA was also found on the flathead
screwdriver found inside Price’s home.
[20] On June 23, 2017, the State filed an Information, charging Price with Count I,
conspiracy to commit murder, a Level 1 felony; Count II, neglect of a
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dependent resulting in death, a Level 1 felony; and Count III, neglect of a
dependent resulting in bodily injury, a Class C felony. The State later amended
the charges to Count I, conspiracy to commit murder, a Level 1 felony; Count
II, neglect of a dependent resulting in death, a Level 1 felony; and Count III,
neglect of a dependent resulting in serious bodily injury, a Level 3 felony. The
State later dismissed the Level 1 felony conspiracy to commit murder. 1
[21] On May 25, 2018, Price filed a motion to suppress evidence from the search of
her apartment and the search of her cell phone. Price argued that the search
warrant for the apartment was obtained based on information learned during an
unlawful walk-through of the apartment. With regard to the phone, Price
argued it was improperly seized and the search warrant was not supported by
probable cause. On May 26, 2018, the State filed a responsive motion, and
after an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Price’s motion.
[22] A jury trial was held on June 1 through June 12, 2018. At trial, Price renewed
her motion to suppress but it was denied. At the close of the evidence, Price
was found guilty of Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in death and
Level 3 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in serious bodily injury. On
June 26, 2016, the trial court conducted a sentencing hearing, merged the Level
3 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in serious bodily injury into the Level
1
Initially, the State had alleged that the Class C felony offense was committed between January 1, 2014 and
June 30, 2014. However, in the amended Information, the State changed the dates, alleging that the neglect
of a dependent resulting in bodily injury occurred between July 1, 2014 and November 23, 2016.
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1 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in death. The trial court then
sentenced Price to a term of thirty-six years in the Department of Correction.
[23] Price now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. Standard of Review
[24] Price argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying her motion to
suppress evidence obtained from the search of her apartment and her cellphone,
arguing that both searches violated her Fourth Amendment rights under the
United State Constitution. 2 Although Price originally challenged the admission
of the evidence through a motion to suppress, she appeals following a
completed trial and challenges the admission of such evidence at trial. Thus,
the issue is appropriately framed as whether the trial court abused its discretion
by admitting the evidence at trial. Lanham v. State, 937 N.E.2d 419, 421-22
(Ind. Ct. App. 2010). The admission or exclusion of evidence is a
determination entrusted to the discretion of the trial court. Farris v. State, 818
N.E.2d 63, 67 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. We will reverse a trial court’s
decision only for an abuse of discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs
2
Price also asserts that search of her apartment and seizure and search of her phone violated her rights under
Article 1, Section 11, of the Indiana Constitution. However, Price fails develop her argument, and it is
therefore waived. Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a), see also, Francis v. State, 764 N.E.2d 641, 646-47 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2002) (notes that Indiana courts interpret and apply Article I, Section 11 independently from federal
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and failure by a defendant to provide separate analysis waives any claim
of error).
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when the trial court’s action is clearly erroneous and against the logic and effect
of the facts and circumstances before it. Id.
II. Initial Entry to Price’s Apartment
[25] The Fourth Amendment states,
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
“The fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment ‘is to protect the
legitimate expectations of privacy that citizens possess in their persons, their
homes, and their belongings.’” Hines v. State, 981 N.E.2d 150, 153 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2013).
[26] Here, Price argues that Detective Richhart violated her Fourth Amendment
rights by conducting a warrantless entry of her apartment. The State responds
by stating that the “brief walk-through of the residence was permitted pursuant
to the exception for exigent circumstances” and the warrant requirement was
therefore “inapplicable.” (Appellees’ Br. pp. 26-27). We agree.
[S]earches or seizures inside a home without a warrant are
presumptively unreasonable. “However, ‘on occasion the public
interest demands greater flexibility than is offered by the
constitutional mandate’ of the warrant requirement.”
Accordingly, there are some carefully delineated exceptions to
the warrant requirement. “A search without a warrant requires
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the State to prove an exception to the warrant requirement
applicable at the time of the search.”
One exception allows police to dispense with the warrant
requirement in the presence of exigent circumstances. “The
warrant requirement becomes inapplicable where the ‘exigencies
of the situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so
compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.” Among the well-known exigent
circumstances that have justified a warrantless search or seizure
are entries (1) to prevent bodily harm or death; (2) to aid a person
in need of assistance; (3) to protect private property; and (4) to
prevent actual or imminent destruction or removal of
incriminating evidence before a search warrant may be obtained.
Exigent circumstances have also been found where a suspect is
fleeing or likely to take flight in order to avoid arrest; or the case
involves hot pursuit or movable vehicles. In addition, we have
found exigent circumstances where police entered to aid or
prevent further injury to victims of violent crime.
McDermott v. State, 877 N.E.2d 467, 473-74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citations
omitted).
[27] In this case, following a 911 call, officers were dispatched to Price’s apartment
after a report that B.P. had been found unconscious. The officers’ arrival was
contemporaneous with the EMTs. Because Ingalls and Price could not ride
with B.P. in the ambulance, Detective Richhart and another officer transported
them to the hospital. Detective Richhart thereafter returned to Price’s
apartment. At Price’s jury trial, Detective Richhart testified that when he
returned, he briefly spoke to another officer at the scene and determined that
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Price’s apartment was not secure since he “didn’t know if there was anybody
else in the apartment.” (Tr. Vol. VII, p. 135). Detective Richhart added
I just wanted to make sure . . . that there were [] no animals, no
other people, no apparent dangers. At this time, we had [] no
idea what had happened to [B.P.]. So we didn’t know if [B.P.]
had gotten into anything. And if he had been, would there have
been something apparent that may have helped the doctors make
a medical diagnosis. Like I said, we just didn’t know if there was
anything that [] could disrupt even evidence from the scene.
(Tr. Vol. VII, p. 135). Based on that reasoning, at approximately 10:38 a.m.,
and in the company of another officer, Detective Richhart entered Price’s
apartment. During a brief walkthrough that lasted for a about a minute,
Detective Richhart observed blood spots on the bedding in B.P.’s room and a
blood spot on the bedroom carpet. No apparent dangers, such as chemical
substances, were lying around. Moments after exiting Price’s apartment,
Detective Richhart received a call from the hospital that B.P. had died. At that
point, Detective Richhart called another officer and instructed him to obtain a
warrant.
[28] In Middleton v. State, 714 N.E.2d 1099, 1103 (Ind. 1999), our supreme court
noted that “[s]ecuring the house eliminates any risk of destruction of evidence.”
Here, we find Detective Richhart’s cursory walkthrough was permissible in
ensuring Price’s apartment was secure.
[29] Secondly, we note that “[t]he very point of exigent circumstances is that officers
are confronted with a situation where time is of the essence and immediate
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action required.” Montgomery, 904 N.E.2d at 381. As stated by the Supreme
Court, “[w]e do not question the right of the police to respond to emergency
situations . . . The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is
justification for what would be otherwise illegal.” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S.
385, 392-93, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 57 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1978). We cannot find many
situations more urgent than a child who has been found unconscious, was on
his way to the hospital, and an officer’s need to save that child’s life by looking
for apparent dangerous substances in the apartment that the child might
possibly have consumed, and in turn offering that information to doctors to aid
in the child’s treatment. Additionally, we note that unlike the majority of cases
discussing exigent circumstances, Detective Richhart’s entry was not motivated
by an intent to apprehend a suspect or to seize incriminating evidence. See, e.g.,
McDermott, 877 N.E.2d at 474. One of the concerns Detective Richhart had
prior to entering Price’s apartment was to assist the doctors with any
information that would aid in B.P.’s treatment. Detective Richhart was
unaware that B.P. had died when he performed his cursory sweep, and the
record is silent as to whether the walkthrough was geared at gathering
incriminating evidence.
[30] Moreover, we find that Detective Richhart’s warrantless entry into Price’s
home constituted a legitimate exercise of the community caretaking function of
the police. The community caretaking function is:
a catchall term for the wide range of responsibilities that police
officers must discharge aside from their criminal enforcement
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activities. Indeed, besides enforcing criminal laws, police aid
those in distress, combat actual hazards, prevent potential
hazards . . . and provide an infinite variety of services to preserve
and protect community safety.
Wilford v. State, 50 N.E.3d 371, 375 (Ind. 2016). When Detective Richhart
returned to Price’s apartment, he objectively believed that his cursory inspection
of Price’s apartment would have been helpful to detect any apparent hazardous
substances that B.P. might have consumed, and in turn, relay that information
to the doctors who were treating B.P. In our view, we find that Detective
Richhart was acting out of his concern for B.P. who was in need of medical
assistance, and based upon the circumstance, we conclude that Detective
Richhart was engaged in a community caretaking function and the entry did
not violate Price’s Fourth Amendment rights.
[31] In her brief, Price argues that no exigency existed because Detective Richhart
did not return to the apartment until 10:40 a.m. and that Detective Richhart
“returned from the hospital approximately forty-five minutes after leaving”
Price’s apartment. (Appellant’s Br. p. 16). The record does not support Price’s
claim. Detective Richhart testified he returned to Price’s apartment “before
10:30 a.m.,” and that he was gone for “a couple of minutes” after transporting
Ingalls to a hospital which was “maybe 300 yards away.” (Suppression Tr. p.
8). At the suppression hearing, and at trial, Detective Richhart consistently
testified that he performed the walkthrough at 10:38 a.m. before learning of
B.P.’s death and he hoped to find any apparent evidence that might assist the
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doctors in B.P.’s treatment, and his walkthrough was intended to secure and
preserve any evidence located in Price’s apartment.
[32] Under the facts and circumstances of this case, the State proved exigency and
we conclude that Detective Richhart’s warrantless entry into Price’s apartment
did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting any evidence derived from that walkthrough.
II. Cellphone
[33] Next, Price argues that the seizure and search of her cellphone violated her
rights under the Fourth Amendment. 3 Specifically, she contends that Detective
Richhart improperly seized her cellphone before obtaining a search warrant.
Additionally, Price argues that the search warrant was overly broad.
A. Seizure
[34] Absent probable cause, exigent circumstances alone are insufficient to justify a
warrantless seizure. Harless v. State, 577 N.E.2d 245, 248 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
(“[E]xigent circumstances justify dispensing with the search warrant, but do not
eliminate the need for probable cause.”); Jones v. State, 409 N.E.2d 1254, 1258
(Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (“A search without probable cause is never justified by the
need to prevent the disappearance or destruction of evidence of a crime.”).
3
Price likewise makes no separate analysis under the Indiana Constitution regarding the seizure and search
of the cellphone. Thus, Price waives her claim since she fails to present a separate independent analysis
supporting her state constitutional claim. See Lockett v. State, 747 N.E.2d 539, 541 (Ind. 2001).
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Whether a particular warrantless seizure violates the guarantees of the Fourth
Amendment depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. State v.
Joe, 693 N.E.2d 573, 575 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied. “The State bears
the burden of proving that the warrantless seizure fell within an exception to the
warrant requirement.” Id.
[35] The State asserts that exigent circumstance supported the seizure. Again, we
note that “[e]xigent circumstances compelling quick action before a warrant can
be obtained are recognized as . . . [an] exception” to the warrant requirement.
Bryant v. State, 660 N.E.2d 290, 300-01 (Ind. 1995). This exception allows
officers to act without a warrant when they “believe evidence may be destroyed
or removed before a search warrant is obtained.” Hawkins v. State, 626 N.E.2d
436, 439 (Ind. 1993).
[36] Turning to the present facts, during the search of Price’s apartment, Price and
Ingalls relayed to other officers at the scene that there was a “monitor or a
camera” in B.P.’s room, and that it “recorded” and sent footage to on an “app”
on Price’s phone. (Tr. Vol. VII, p.140). Detective Richhart hoped that
“whatever footage” that was in Price’s cellphone “could answer a lot of
questions” regarding B.P.’s cause of death. (Tr. Vol. VII, p.140). After finding
Price’s phone in Price’s bedroom, Detective Richhart asked Price for assistance
to retrieve the video footage but started punching the cellphone screen. Because
Detective Richhart reasonably believed that Price was deleting evidence from
her phone, he correctly seized the phone. Here, the State proved both exigency
and an objective reasonable belief from Detective Richhart that Price was
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destroying evidence from her phone and the seizure of Price’s cellphone did not
violate the Fourth Amendment.
[37] Price argues that we should reject the State’s exigency argument, and she
contends that Detective Richhart improperly created the exigency prior to
seizing her phone. In particular, she argues, that Detective Richhart unlawfully
removed her “dead” phone from her apartment, brought it to her for assistance,
instead of first “obtaining a warrant.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 20). As a general
matter, officers may not circumvent the warrant requirement by purposefully
creating exigent circumstances. State v. Williams, 615 N.E.2d 487, 488–89 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1993). In Williams, a police officer already had probable cause to
believe there were drugs in a residence before he knocked on the door and it
thus was clearly foreseeable that the occupant would attempt to destroy
contraband when the officer knocked and identified himself. Id. at 488-89. We
held the officer’s subsequent entry into the residence after observing the
occupant run through the house was unconstitutional and noted that there was
no explanation as to why a search warrant had not been obtained before
approaching the residence. Id. Here, by contrast, Price indicated a willingness
to help by charging and unlocking her phone, and that she would assist
Detective Richhart in obtaining helpful video footage in her phone. However,
after the phone was powered, Price began “actively punching stuff on the
screen” and refused to return the phone when requested. (Tr. Vol. VIII, p.
142). Detective Richhart had not foreseen that Price would destroy evidence
from her phone, and based on Price’s alarming acts, Detective Richhart reached
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-1513 | February 22, 2019 Page 19 of 26
into the car and grabbed the phone from Price’s hand. Under the circumstance,
Detective Richhart seizure of Price’s phone was justified.
B. Overly-Broad Search Warrant
[38] As an additional argument, Price argues that the warrant to search her phone
was invalid because it was overly broad. The Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution forbids general search warrants. “‘[A] warrant must describe
the place to be searched and the items to be searched for.’” Overstreet v. State,
783 N.E.2d 1140, 1158 (Ind. 2003) (quoting Phillips v. State, 514 N.E.2d 1073,
1075 (Ind. 1987)), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1150, 124 S. Ct. 1145, 157 L. Ed. 2d 1044
(2004). Athough the warrant must describe “with some specificity” where
officers are to search and what they are to seize, “there is no requirement that
there be an exact description.” Overstreet, 783 N.E.2d at 1158. Nonetheless, the
warrant must be specific enough so that officers can, “with reasonable effort,”
ascertain the place to be searched and the items to be seized. Steele v. United
States, 267 U.S. 498, 503, 45 S. Ct. 414, 69 L. Ed. 757 (1925). This requirement
“prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another. As to
what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the
warrant.” Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 198, 48 S. Ct. 74, 72 L. Ed. 231
(1927); see also Griffith v. State, 59 N.E.3d 947, 958 (Ind. 2016) (observing that a
sufficient description avoids giving the police unbridled discretion). Ultimately,
the description in a search warrant should “‘be as particular as circumstances
permit.’” State v. Foy, 862 N.E.2d 1219, 1227 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting
United States v. Lievertz, 247 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1062 (S.D. Ind. 2002)). Moreover,
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to satisfy the particularity requirement, it is permissible if a warrant
incorporates by reference certain supporting documents—such as the probable
cause affidavit—that collectively “serv[e] to identify the scope of . . . items that
could properly be seized.” Membres v. State, 889 N.E.2d 265, 276 (Ind. 2008).
[39] After re-seizing Price’s cellphone, Detective Richhart instructed another officer,
Detective Larry Sanders (Detective Sanders) to obtain a warrant. A probable
cause determination hearing was conducted pursuant to that request. Detective
Sanders explained to the magistrate that the Mooresville Police Department
was investigating the “suspicious death” of B.P. who had been found by Price
unconscious that morning. (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 141). Detective
Sanders continued, “when [the officers] arrived, [Price] had blood on her, [B.P.]
had blood on [his] face and mouth areas, and it appeared that [Price had] been
giving CPR” to B.P. (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 141). Detective Sanders
mentioned that they had already obtained a warrant to search Price’s
apartment, but the department was seeking an additional warrant to “do a
forensic search” of Price’s phone. (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 142). When
asked what specific things the department hoped to find on Price’s cellphone,
Detective Sanders stated, “[W]e have a phone, we’re trying to cross all of our
T’s and dot all of our I’s []. Basically, Your Honor, we’re trying to verify her
story, [i.e.] that at such time she called law enforcement or medical personnel to
arrive, to where we received the phone call about 10:30 [a.m.].” (Appellant’s
App. Vol. II, p. 144). Detective Sanders testified that the search was limited to
“pertinent information” relating to B.P.’s suspicious death, and he testified that
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if the data on the cellphone is “erased” or reset to factory settings, the
department would “lose” any possible leads. (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 145).
At the close of the probable cause determination hearing, the magistrate granted
the warrant stating, it is “limited” in its “scope.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p.
146).
[40] The ensuing search warrant that permitted the search of Price’s cellphone
provided:
The right to physically and forensically examine White Samsung
Galaxy Express 3 phone in a black case belonging to Megan
Price with [] serial number P86730V59F3, and the electronic
data and intellectual content contained on said-device[],
including but not limited to, phone settings and information,
pictures, videos, audio files, ringtones, voicemails, contact lists,
calendars, text messages, multi-media messages, other electronic
communications, records of calls received, sent, or missed,
details of internet activity, installed applications, memos, route
data, location data, settings, databases, favorites, historical data,
documents, and any user-related data, as well as any associated
accessories, including, but not limited to, chargers, cables, media
cards and SIM cards. These items will be seized and later
examined. There may also be the need for decrypting and/or
breaking of passwords.
(All of which is evidence of the crimes of neglect, homicide)
(Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 136) (emphasis in the original).
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[41] Price argues that “[e]ven if there was probable cause to search [her] phone for
texts and calls a few hours prior to the call to 911, that probable cause did not
extend to searching everything on the phone.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 26).
[42] Recently, we addressed the type of evidence which would support a search of a
suspect’s cellphone in Carter v. State, 105 N.E.3d 1121, 1127 (Ind. Ct. App.
2018), trans. denied. One of Carter’s claims was that the search warrant
authorized a broad search of his device and was therefore an impermissible
general warrant. Id. The warrant in Carter’s case authorized the searching of
his phone for:
fruits, instrumentalities and evidence pertaining to the crime(s)
of DEALING, POSSESSION and/or CONSPIRACY TO
COMMIT DEALING OR POSSESSION OF
METHAMPHETAMINE, as more particularly described as
follows: [ ] Permission to search the above described phone for
any information relating to calls, messages, including Facebook
messages and accounts, and all information including but not
limited to photographs, images, emails, letters, applications, and
folders as well as any messages that may be stored on the phone
that would indicate the identity of the phone’s owner/user and
permission to view and copy said information if deemed
necessary for preservation.
Id. at 1129 (emphasis in the original). Notwithstanding Carter’s claims that the
warrant was a general warrant, we determined that the
the warrant specifically described the place law enforcement
could search—the phone recovered from Carter—and specifically
described what law enforcement could search for—(1) “any
information relating to calls, messages, including Facebook
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messages and accounts,” and (2) “all information . . . that would
indicate the identity of the phone’s owner/user.” [] Moreover,
the first clause permitting the search for calls and messages
enjoys a close nexus to the probable cause that justified issuing
the search warrant—which is that Carter was a suspected drug
dealer, and drug dealers use cell phones to communicate with
others involved in illicit drug activity. [] Thus, this aspect of the
search warrant was “tailored to its justifications.”
Id. at 1130. (internal citations omitted).
[43] Similar to Carter, the warrant in Price’s case described the place law
enforcement could search—i.e., Price’s white Samsung Galaxy, and the warrant
authorized Mooresville Police Department to search for “electronic data and
intellectual content contained on said-device[], including but not limited to, . . .
text messages, . . . records of calls received, sent, or missed.” (Appellant’s App. Vol.
II, p. 136) (emphasis added). The clause of the warrant that related to searching
of Price’s texts enjoyed a close nexus to the testimony offered by Detective
Sanders at the probable cause determination hearing—that his department was
investigating the suspicious death of B.P., and they hoped a search of Price’s
phone would yield “pertinent information.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 145).
[44] Price argues that the “warrant itself contains no limitation on dates or material
to search for or a requirement that the search be related to confirming her story
about finding [B.P.] shortly before calling 911[]; instead, it grants the broad
right to physically examine the electronic data and intellectual content
contained on [her] phone.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 27). We disagree. Like looking
through drawers in a home or office file cabinet for specific files or letters that
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are relevant to the investigation, a great deal of other information had to have
been sifted through Price’s phone to find the relevant information. See Carter,
105 N.E.3d at 1130 (citing United States v. Grimmett, 439 F.3d 1263, 1270 (10th
Cir. 2006) (holding that “‘[A] computer search may be as extensive as
reasonably required to locate the items described in the warrant’ based on
probable cause.”) see also, Wheeler v. State, 135 A.3d 282, 301 (Del. 2016)
(“Some irrelevant files may have to be at least cursorily perused to determine
whether they are within the authorized search ambit.”). Although Detective
Sanders’ testimony established that the scope of the search would be to verify
Price’s version of events the morning B.P. died, Detective Sanders also testified
that his department was investigating the suspicious death of B.P., and they
were looking for any pertinent information relating to B.P.’s death. Indeed,
two weeks prior, Ingalls and Price discussed killing B.P. through text messages,
and these text messages were relevant pursuant to the specific portion of the
warrant that authorized searching Price’s phone for messages relating to the
death of B.P.
[45] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the evidence seized from Price’s
phone was not pursuant to an impermissibly general warrant. Therefore, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the evidence over Price’s
objection.
CONCLUSION
[46] Here, we hold that exigent circumstances existed to allow Detective Richhart’s
warrantless entry into Price’s apartment and the trial court did not abuse its
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discretion by admitting evidence procured by that entry. Also, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence obtained from Price’s
cellphone, and the search was pursuant to a valid search warrant.
[47] Affirmed.
[48] Kirsch, J. and Robb, J. concur
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