Dallarius T. Jackson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Feb 13 2015, 7:52 am
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Jacob Wahl Gregory F. Zoeller
Ripstra Law Office Attorney General of Indiana
Jasper, Indiana
Karl M. Scharnberg
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Dallarius T. Jackson, February 13, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Cause No.
82A04-1406-CR-281
v. Appeal from the Vanderburgh
Circuit Court, The Honorable Kelli
E. Fink, Judge
State of Indiana, Cause No. 82C01-1301-FC-110
Appellee-Plaintiff
Najam, Judge.
Statement of the Case
[1] Dallarius T. Jackson appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation.
Jackson raises a single issue for our review, namely, whether the trial court
abused its discretion when it admitted statements made by Jackson to police
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officers before Jackson had been read his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966). We affirm the trial court’s revocation of Jackson’s probation.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On January 23, 2014, Jackson pleaded guilty to criminal recklessness, as a Class
D felony. The court sentenced Jackson to eighteen months probation, the terms
of which required Jackson, among other things, to follow the law and not to
possess a firearm.
[3] The day after he was sentenced to probation, Jackson rode in the front
passenger seat of a vehicle that was subjected to a traffic stop. Smelling
marijuana inside the vehicle, the officer who had initiated the traffic stop asked
Jackson and the driver to stand with other officers by the officers’ vehicles while
he searched the car. During the search, the officer discovered a loaded firearm
under the front passenger seat and a bag of marijuana between the front
passenger seat and the front passenger door. Without prompting, Jackson
stated that the firearm and marijuana were his.
[4] The State filed a petition to revoke Jackson’s probation. At an ensuing
evidentiary hearing, Jackson moved to have his statements made during (and
after) the traffic stop suppressed. The trial court admitted all statements made
by Jackson that were not in response to an actual question by an officer. The
court then revoked Jackson’s probation. This appeal ensued.
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Discussion and Decision
[5] Jackson asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted any
statements he made following the traffic stop because Jackson never received
his Miranda warnings. Jackson further argues that he was in police custody
during the search of the vehicle and that the officers at that scene induced him
into making his incriminating statements.
[6] As our supreme court has explained:
Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a
right to which a criminal defendant is entitled. The trial court
determines the conditions of probation and may revoke
probation if the conditions are violated. Once a trial court has
exercised its grace by ordering probation rather than
incarceration, the judge should have considerable leeway in
deciding how to proceed. If this discretion were not afforded to
trial courts and sentences were scrutinized too severely on
appeal, trial judges might be less inclined to order probation to
future defendants. Accordingly, a trial court’s sentencing
decisions for probation violations are reviewable using the abuse
of discretion standard. An abuse of discretion occurs where the
decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
circumstances.
Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007) (citations omitted).
[7] Underlying Jackson’s argument on appeal is his assumption that Miranda
applies to civil probation revocation proceedings. While Jackson fails to offer
any authority on this issue in his brief to this court, nonetheless our courts have
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made clear that Miranda does not apply to probation revocation proceedings.
As we have explained:
The protection against self-incrimination found in the Fifth
Amendment, by its very terms, applies only to “criminal case[s].”
U.S. Const. amend. V. As our courts have consistently held, a
probation revocation hearing is in the nature of a civil action and
is not to be equated with an adversarial criminal proceeding.
Cox[ v. State], 706 N.E.2d [547,] 550 [(Ind. 1999)]; Isaac v. State,
605 N.E.2d 144, 147 (Ind. 1992), cert. denied 508 U.S. 922, 113 S.
Ct. 2373, 124 L. Ed. 2d 278 (1993). As such, a probationer who
is faced with a petition to revoke his probation, although he must
be given “written notice of the claimed violations, disclosure of
the evidence against him, an opportunity to be heard and present
evidence, the right to confront and cross-examine adverse
witnesses, and a neutral and detached hearing body,” is not
entitled to the full panoply of rights that he enjoyed prior to his
conviction. Isaac, 605 N.E.2d at 148 (Ind.1992); see also Ind.
Code § 35-38-2-3. The reason behind this is simple: a
probationer, who has already been convicted and had his
sentence imposed, differs substantially from those individuals
who have not yet been tried and convicted of those crimes that
they are suspected of having committed. Unlike the latter, a
probationer’s liberty is not enjoyed as a matter of right, but is
dependent upon the trial court’s discretion in granting probation.
See Isaac, 605 N.E.2d at 146 (noting that there is no right to
probation and that the decision whether to grant probation is a
matter within the discretion of the trial court). Once granted, a
probationer is entitled to retain his liberty only so long as he
substantially abides by the conditions of his probation. Rivera v.
State, 667 N.E.2d 764, 766 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied.
Such restrictions are designed to ensure that the probation serves
as a period of genuine rehabilitation and that the community is
not harmed by a probationer being at large. Id.
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***
Therefore, we hold that [the probationer’s] statements obtained
in violation of Miranda were properly admitted at his probation
revocation proceeding.
Grubb v. State, 734 N.E.2d 589, 591-93 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (alterations
original), trans. denied. Accordingly, Jackson cannot demonstrate that the trial
court abused its discretion when it did not apply Miranda to exclude any
statements that might have been excluded under Miranda in a criminal
proceeding.
[8] Moreover, even if Miranda did apply in civil probation revocation proceedings,
it would not apply here. In Miranda, the Supreme Court held that “the
prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory,
stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates
the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-
incrimination.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. These procedural safeguards include
an advisement to the accused the he has the right to remain silent, that anything
said can be used against him, that he has the right to an attorney, and that one
will be appointed if he cannot afford one. Id. at 479. The Miranda warnings are
required only where a suspect in custody is subjected to interrogation. Rhode
Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 (1980); White v. State, 772 N.E.2d 408, 412
(Ind. 2002).
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[9] Assuming for the sake of argument that Jackson was in custody at the time he
made his incriminating statements, the question then becomes whether his
statements were in response to an official interrogation. E.g., McClure v. State,
803 N.E.2d 210, 213 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Under Miranda, “interrogation”
includes express questioning and words or actions on the part of the police that
the police know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from
the suspect. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301. Volunteered statements do not amount to
an interrogation. White, 772 N.E.2d at 412; Hopkins v. State, 582 N.E.2d 345,
348 (Ind. 1991).
[10] Here, Jackson voluntarily blurted out that the firearm and marijuana belonged
to him. Jackson argues that the officers asked an “implied question” when they
placed the discovered firearm on top of the vehicle. Appellant’s Br. at 9. But
placing a discovered firearm on the roof of the vehicle in which it was
discovered is not “reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
suspect.” Innis, 446 U.S. at 301. Jackson’s arguments on appeal are without
merit, and, thus, we affirm the trial court’s revocation of his probation.
[11] Affirmed.
[12] Mathias, J., and Bradford, J., concur.
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