State of Indiana v. Matthew Stidham (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any
Jun 14 2017, 9:10 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
estoppel, or the law of the case. Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Curtis T. Hill, Jr. David W. Stone IV
Attorney General of Indiana STONE Law Office & Legal
Research
Jodi Kathryn Stein
Anderson, Indiana
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
State of Indiana, June 14, 2017
Appellant-Respondent, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A02-1701-PC-68
v. Appeal from the Delaware Circuit
Court
Matthew Stidham, The Honorable Kimberly S.
Appellee-Petitioner. Dowling, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
18C02-1602-PC-3
Brown, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A02-1701-PC-68 | June 14, 2017 Page 1 of 8
[1] The State of Indiana appeals the post-conviction court’s grant of a petition for
post-conviction relief filed by Matthew Stidham. We find one issue dispositive,
which is whether the post-conviction court entered an appropriate order with
respect to Stidham’s sentence. We remand.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] The relevant facts as discussed in Stidham’s direct appeal follow:
On the night of February 23, 1991, [Stidham] and several of his
friends, including the decedent in this case, drove to the
decedent’s apartment where they drank whiskey and played
guitars. They eventually started “trading punches.” This
evidentially started as horseplay but grew into an angry
encounter between [Stidham] and the decedent.
As the fight escalated, the others joined with [Stidham] in beating
the decedent. Not only did they beat and kick the decedent, but
they also struck him with a wooden club. They then loaded
much of the decedent’s electronic equipment into his van, gagged
him, placed him in the back of the van and drove off. They
eventually arrived at a secluded area near the Mississinewa River
where the decedent was removed from the van and again beaten
and stabbed some forty-seven times before his body was thrown
into the river. After visiting with friends, who they told of the
killing, [Stidham] and his associates drove into the State of
Illinois where they were arrested.
Stidham v. State, 637 N.E.2d 140, 142 (Ind. 1994).
[3] A jury trial resulted in the conviction of Stidham for murder, robbery as a class
A felony, criminal confinement as a class B felony, battery as a class C felony,
and auto theft as a class D felony. Id. In February 1993, the Indiana Supreme
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Court reversed Stidham’s original conviction and remanded the case to the trial
court for a new trial. Id. (citing Stidham v. State, 608 N.E.2d 699 (Ind. 1993)).
[4] After retrial, Stidham appealed. Id. In that appeal, Stidham argued in part that
his 141-year sentence was unreasonable and disproportionate to the crime
committed. Id. at 144. He argued that “in sharp contrast to his behavior prior
to his original sentencing, his behavior in prison had been exemplary, that he
had obtained a GED, and that he actively participated in a substance abuse
program as certified by a letter to Judge Dailey from Linda Poe the substance
abuse supervisor at the institution.” Id. He also argued that the record
disclosed that he was an abused child. Id. The Court concluded: “Given the
extreme brutality of the crimes committed in this case, the trial judge was well
within his discretion in refusing to mitigate the sentences either on [Stidham’s]
subsequent conduct in the prison or the abuse he had received as a child.” Id.The Court observed: “As pointed out by the trial judge, two of [Stidham’s]
brothers had received the same treatment but had become upstanding citizens
in their community.” Id. The Court concluded that the sentence was defective
in one regard, remanded to the trial court for the purpose of vacating the auto
theft conviction as it should have been merged with the robbery conviction, and
affirmed the trial court in all other respects. Id.1
1
Justice Sullivan, with Justice DeBruler concurring, dissented with respect to the sentence and stated:
I concur in affirming the convictions in this case in all respects but dissent as to the
reasonableness of the 141-year sentence. Given the age of the appellant at the time of the
crime (17years) and the extent of other mitigation, particularly the physical, sexual, and
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[5] On February 8, 2016, Stidham filed a verified petition for post-conviction relief
contending that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and Article 1, Section 16 of the Indiana Constitution. On
February 12, 2016, the State filed an answer to Stidham’s petition. On October
27, 2016, the court held a hearing. On November 29, 2016, Stidham filed
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, which concluded with the
proposed judgment that his sentence be ordered reduced to time served and he
be released.
[6] On January 3, 2017, the post-conviction court entered an order granting
Stidham’s petition and stating in part:
The Court has reviewed the evidence and the proposed findings
and conclusions of both counsel, and now finds as follows:
*****
2. [Stidham] was seventeen (17) years old at the time of the
offense.
*****
emotional abuse he suffered at the hands of his mother only a few years prior to
committing the crimes, I would hold that the sentences should be served concurrently, not
consecutively, resulting in a total sentence of 60 years.
637 N.E.2d at 144.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A02-1701-PC-68 | June 14, 2017 Page 4 of 8
4. On June 24, 1993, the Court (Judge Richard Dailey)
sentenced [Stidham] to an aggregate sentence of one
hundred forty-one (141) years.
*****
7. On February 6, 2016, [Stidham] filed his Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief.
8. The Petition raises a single issue for consideration by this
Court: Whether [Stidham’s] sentence violates the 8th
Amendment of the US Constitution and Article 1 Sec 16
of the Indiana Constitution prohibiting cruel and unusual
punishment.
9. Based upon the sentence imposed by this Court, if
[Stidham] is still alive, he will be eighty two (82) years of
age when his sentence is complete.
10. Since [Stidham] was sentenced much research has been
done on the brains of juveniles and their ability to change.
11. Neither the trial court nor the Supreme Court had access
to this information and research since it did not exist at
that time.
12. Furthermore, [Stidham’s] actions and progress in prison is
a testament to this research.
13. There is no question that the crimes committed were
heinous.
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14. The question for the Court, however, is whether the
sentence imposed was excessive in light of the research
done and cases decided in the meantime.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
15. The United States Supreme Court in Miller v. Alabama, 132
S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012) held that the
imposition of mandatory life sentences without parole on
juveniles is forbidden.
16. Miller requires the sentencing judge to “take into account
how children are different, and how those differences
counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime
in prison” [132] S. Ct. at 2469.
17. While Stidham was not sentenced to life without parole, it
is the functional equivalent.
18. Other courts in other jurisdictions have held similarly in
cases involving juveniles. Hayden v. Keller, 134 F.Supp.3d
1000 (E.D.N.C. 2015) cites several cases where de facto
life sentences for juveniles were held to be cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the 8th Amendment of
the Constitution.
19. The Indiana Supreme Court relied on Miller in two
separate 2014 cases.
20. In Brown v. State 10 N.E.3d 1 (Ind. 2014) and Fuller v. State,
the Court held that imposition of juveniles of two
consecutive 75 year sentences for two (2) murders was
improper.
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21. The Court in those cases discussed the U.S. Supreme
Court’s observations that first, a juvenile lacks maturity
and has an underdeveloped sense of responsibility; second
that they are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative
influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure,
and they have limited control over their own environment
and lack the ability to extricate themselves from horrific,
crime-producing settings; and third a child’s character is
not as well formed as an adult’s and his actions are less
likely to be evidence of irretrievable depravity.
22. The Court in Fuller found that the maximum consecutive
sentence means denial of hope; it means that good
behavior and character improvement are immaterial; it
means that whatever the future might hold in store for the
mind and spirit of the juvenile convict, he will remain in
prison for the rest of his days.
23. As a result, this Court finds that [Stidham’s] sentence was
excessive in light of his age at the time of the offense and
his Petition should be GRANTED.
Appellant’s Appendix Volume 2 at 51-52 (underlining omitted).
Discussion
[7] Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(6) is titled “Judgment” and provides:
The court shall make specific findings of fact, and conclusions of
law on all issues presented, whether or not a hearing is held. If
the court finds in favor of the petitioner, it shall enter an appropriate
order with respect to the conviction or sentence in the former
proceedings, and any supplementary orders as to arraignment,
retrial, custody, bail, discharge, correction of sentence, or other
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matters that may be necessary and proper. This order is a final
judgment.
(Emphasis added).
[8] While Stidham’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law included a
proposed judgment that his sentence be ordered reduced to time served and he
be released, his petition merely argued that his sentence was unconstitutional
and it did not request release or a specific sentence. Given that the post-
conviction court’s order merely found that Stidham’s sentence was excessive
and granted his petition without entering a specific sentence or Stidham’s
release, we cannot say that it entered “an appropriate order with respect to the
conviction or sentence” or complied with Section 6 of Ind. Post-Conviction
Rule 1. Accordingly, we remand.
Conclusion
[9] For the foregoing reasons, we remand for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
[10] Remanded.
May, J., concurs in result without opinion.
Pyle, J., concurs.
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